A Social History of Modern Tehran

Space, Power, and the City

ASHKAN REZVANI NARAGHI
University of Tehran

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A Social History of Modern Tehran

Tehran, the capital of Iran since the late eighteenth century, is now one of the largest cities in the Middle East. Exploring Tehran's development from the nineteenth to the mid-twentieth century, Ashkan Rezvani Naraghi paints a vibrant picture of a city undergoing rapid and dynamic social transformation. Rezvani Naraghi demonstrates that this shift was the product of a developing discourse around spatial knowledge, in which the West became the model for the social practices of the state and sections of Iranian society. As traditional social spaces, such as coffeehouses, bathhouses, and mosques, were replaced by European-style cafés, theaters, and sports clubs, Tehran and its people were irreversibly altered. Using an array of archival sources, Rezvani Naraghi stresses the agency of everyday inhabitants in shaping urban change. This enlightening history not only allows us to better understand the contours of contemporary Tehran, but to develop a new way of imagining, talking about, and building "the city."

ASHKAN REZVANI NARAGHI (1983–2020) was Assistant Professor in the School of Urban Planning and Design at the University of Tehran. He received his PhD in Urban Studies from the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee in 2016 and his article on middle-class urbanism appeared in *Iranian Studies* in 2017.

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To Yazdan and Aftab

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Foreword

If Isfahan is half of the world, as a famous Persian proverb stipulates, Tehran surely has been the epicenter of modern Iran. A megalopolis with one of the largest populations in the region, Tehran represents the monstrosity of modern city development for some, and the aesthetic beauty of urban life for others. The present study captures these sentiments and dilemmas beautifully and with a rather unique authorial voice that is at the same time empathetic and analytical. It is only in this way that Ashkan Rezvani Naraghi could position Tehran as a microcosm for his wider analysis of Iranian society, and the joy and travails of everyday life of ordinary Iranians in particular.

In this ambition, the author connects rather neatly to the avant-garde of Middle Eastern and Iranian Studies that is showcased by the Global Middle East book series, in order to move the discourse about this area of the world into uncharted territories. The present study makes a unique and indelible contribution to these movements beyond. I am employing these trans-spatial analogies on purpose here, as they represent the methodological backbone of Ashkan's study, thereby heaving the reader into new realms of understanding, not only of the dynamics in Tehran, but comparably cosmopolitan urban centers all over the world. This is not a confined book – like Tehran itself, it speaks to a global audience.

In this effort to dissect and traverse Tehran as a spatial concept, the book tells the tales that turn living in this megacity at once into a challenge and woeful excitement. For instance, one of the author's interlocutors beautifully connects such sentiments to women's bathhouses by comparing them to entering a joyful picnic. The analysis frames the anecdote: In the olden days during the Qajar dynasty in the nineteenth century, bathing was an excuse for socializing. As a result, these gender-exclusive spaces became particularly important as centers of feminist organization and therefore always also had a political significance beyond the joy and happiness of social interaction that they enabled.

Ashkan shows in great detail, with the help of wonderfully curated primary materials that he gathered though his fieldwork, how between the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, traditional social spaces such as coffeehouses, bathhouses, *zūrkhānih*s, and *takīyyih*s were slowly transformed into European ideal-types such as cafés, theaters, cinemas, hotels, restaurants, and sports clubs. In a central conceptual narrative permeating the present study, Ashkan shows how this transformation of spaces yielded radical changes of urban society in Iran that merged into repeated upheaval and ultimately revolution. *Space, Power, and the City* – the subtitle of the book – captures those dynamics perfectly.

Undoubtedly, the interdisciplinary approach taken speaks to various central themes in the current social sciences that break away from a narrow understanding of Iranian and Middle Eastern Studies which the Global Middle East book series underlines. The present book positions itself beyond and in-between emerging disciplines as it charters new territory in its emphatic connection between everyday life, material spaces, and politics. As such, this dive into the vast urban landscapes that delineate contemporary Tehran turns this city into a perfect case study to understand everything that is human about us. In this manner, the present book breaks away from any disciplinary confines, exactly because it traverses its subject matter with such elegant and inviting rhythm.

Arshin Adib-Moghaddam

Preface

The brilliant, thoughtful young man who wrote this book died before he could see its publication. Dr. Ashkan Rezvani Naraghi perished in an avalanche in the mountains above Tehran soon after completing this manuscript, and shortly before the birth of his second child. He was a gifted mountaineer, and the tragedy that took him from us took another eleven lives as well. But we have the privilege of hearing his voice again with the publication of this manuscript. Ashkan's children are still too young to read this book, but my hope is that in a few years these pages will be one way for them to feel his presence in their lives. I hope they will be inspired by his deep curiosity about the world, his meticulous search for the vital details of urban life, and his abiding belief in doing good in and for the world.

Ashkan created vital friendships and communities wherever he went. His students and colleagues at the University of Tehran are particularly in my thoughts as I write this – for them this loss was especially stark. His death leaves a profound absence at the heart of so many communities. A young professor with a bright future, a devoted mentor, teacher, researcher, and writer, gone from one day to the next.

One of the greatest honors of my nearly three decades in academia is to have been chosen by Ashkan as the chair of his dissertation committee. The relationship between advisee and advisor can, at its best, be a connection of great mutual trust and warmth – this was the case for us, and I miss him terribly. When I first met him, I knew I was in the presence of a unique mind, and a remarkable person – a feeling shared by so many of us at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, particularly those of us affiliated with the Urban Studies programs. He was beloved by faculty and fellow students alike – an inquisitive, supportive contributor to every class discussion, and an inspiring model of academic curiosity and collegiality. We have planted a beautiful Turkish filbert tree in the heart of campus in his honor – this type of tree thrives in Iran and Wisconsin alike, just as Ashkan did. I am

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certain that, were he writing these acknowledgments, Ashkan would offer heartfelt thanks to the other members of his dissertation committee: Afshin Marashi, Amanda Seligman, Arijit H. Sen, and Kristin Sziarto. Nancy Mathiowetz also worked closely with Ashkan, and has been so supportive of my work in bringing this manuscript out into the world.

Bringing this book into the world would have been impossible without the gracious assistance of so many people. Above all, I send love and gratitude to Ashkan's widow, Setareh, for her assistance in tracking down computer files, for her blessing of this project, and for her friendship from afar. Second, on Ashkan's behalf I extend immense gratitude to Cambridge University Press. In the hours after I heard the news of his death, adrift in the face of this unbearable loss, I took the only action I could think of – I went digging through my email in the hopes of uncovering the name of his editor at Cambridge. I was in luck and was able to reach out to Maria Marsh and begin to make arrangements to continue with the publication of the book. Atifa Jiwa kindly stepped in when Maria went on parental leave. Cambridge's Emily Sharp, Rachel Imrie, and especially Lisa Carter played central roles in bringing the book to publication. In addition, I want to thank (on Ashkan's behalf), Lisa DeBoer (indexing), Gary Smith (copy editing), and Balaji Devadoss (typesetting) for their careful, thoughtful work on this manuscript. Setareh and I are both immensely grateful for their support and assistance. I am also grateful to Arshin Adib-Moghaddam for writing the foreword and, with his co-editor Ali Mirsepassi, supporting so many aspects of the publication process. So many thanks are also due to the Sharmin and Bijan Mossavar-Rahmani Center for Iran and Persian Gulf Studies at Princeton University, for their generous support of the work of indexing the book. Mehdi Heris and Georgia Brown provided important assistance along the way. There are many other people that Ashkan would thank if he were here with us – to those unnamed in this preface, please know that your friendship and collegiality are woven into the pages of this manuscript. The publication of this book reflects the work not only of Ashkan, but also of the communities he cared for and that cared for him.

Jennifer A. Jordan

Introduction

This book is about an ontological shift in the conceptualization and representation of the spatiality of Tehran, the capital of Iran, as the outcome of the formation and establishment of a novel spatial discourse. Between the mid-nineteenth and the mid-twentieth centuries, this novel discourse sidelined the indigenous knowledge of Iranian urban society and the state and became the legitimate sources of imagining and producing the spatiality of Iranian cities. It transformed the spaces of the social, political, and economic processes in Tehran and elsewhere in the country.

This shift was ontological and spatial, meaning that it brought about novel frameworks for urban society and the state to produce the spaces of their daily practices and strategies. This shift was discursive, leading to the abandonment of the traditional and indigenous spatial understanding in a long process of knowledge production; society and the state internalized a novel form of knowledge as the authentic source of producing the spatiality of social, economic, and political relations. This shift targeted both the state and society; it was top-down and bottom-up simultaneously. As the book suggests, since the mid-nineteenth century, this new spatial discourse has reproduced Tehran; the contours of the current city should be read through the analysis of this discursive transformation. An example helps to clarify these opening arguments.

Between April 21 and 26, 1962, a large group of university professors, researchers, state representatives, urban activists, architects, planners, and investors gathered in Tehran, the capital of Iran, for a six-day seminar on the social problems of the city. The participants presented more than seventy talks covering a wide range of topics including infrastructure, pollution, poverty, crime, living conditions, history, and so forth.[1] The seminar proceedings provide a valuable

[1] Two years later, the University of Tehran published the seminar proceedings as a book. Muʾassissih-ye Mutaliʿat va Tahqiqat-i Ijtimaʿi, *Sukhanrani-ha va*

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window into people's living conditions and the various social problems of mid-century Tehran.

A handful of talks focus on the southern and old neighborhoods of the city. The picture that they depict resembles Friedrich Engels's description of the working class's living conditions in the UK in the mid-nineteenth century.[2] These neighborhoods are illustrated as dilapidated areas with high crime rates, lacking sanitary facilities, and with lots of social and hygienic problems. At the time, the old and southern sections of Tehran had the highest population densities compared to the rest of the city,[3] as well as the lowest quality of life in Tehran.

Banu Faqiyyih, an activist and social worker in southern Tehran, provided a detailed description of the living conditions in the neighborhoods north and south of Shush Street in southern Tehran. Based on people's housing conditions, she divided the population of these neighborhoods into three groups: those who lived in houses on the streets and alleyways; those who lived in abandoned brick burners and their adjacent pits; and those who lived in the old caravanserais.[4] The pits, as she described them, were the remnants of the lands used for excavating clay for the brick burners. They were as small as 2,000 m^2 and as large as 40,000 m^2. These pits were 20–30 steps lower than their adjacent street level. Inside, there were many small houses built from mud and clay. These dwellings were mostly around 40–50 m^2,

Guzarish-ha dar Nakhustin Siminar-i Barrasi-yi Masaʾil-i Ijtimaʿi-yi Shahr-i Tehran [Talks and Reports of the First Seminar for Discussing the Social Problems of the City of Tehran] (Tehran: University of Tehran, 1343 [1964]).

2 Friedrich Engels, *The Condition of the Working Class in England* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1987).

3 For example, the section between Shush Street on the south and Muwlavi Street on the north accommodated 59,920 people in an area of sixty-five hectares (160 acres): M. H. Amani, "Masaʾil-i Dimugrafic-i (Jamʿiyati-yi) Shahr-i Tehran [The Demographic Problems of the City of Tehran]," in *Sukhanrani-ha va Guzarish-ha dar Nakhustin Siminar-i Barrasi-yi Masaʾil-i Ijtimaʿi-yi Shahr-i Tehran [Talks and Reports of the First Seminar for Discussing the Social Problems of the City of Tehran]* (Tehran: University of Tehran, 1343 [1964]), 47.

4 In Iranian cities and on land routes, caravanserais were fortified rest houses providing accommodation for travelers. Banu Faqiyih, "Kuy-ha-yi Faqirnishin-i Junub-i Shahr [The Poor Neighborhoods of the Southern City]," in *Sukhanrani-ha va Guzarish-ha dar Nakhustin Siminar-i Barrasi-yi Masaʾil-i Ijtimaʿi-yi Shahr-i Tehran [Talks and Reports of the First Seminar for Discussing the Social Problems of the City of Tehran]* (Tehran: University of Tehran, 1343 [1964]), 337.

and each accommodated 6–12 families. After these general descriptions, Banu Faqiyyih continued:

Each family has a bucket at the corner of the courtyard in which they collect their wastewater. Whenever it is full, they have to carry it outside the pit and dump it in the creeks alongside the streets […] there is no fresh fruit or vegetable available in the pits […] during the day, only women and small kids or old and sick men remain there and others leave to work […] Only eight percent of the kids go to primary school […] most of the kids, as small as seven years old, have to work in glass and crystal factories, dealing with the hot and burning furnaces receiving wages as low as fifteen to thirty rīāls.[5]

The living conditions of other groups were pretty much the same. Even those with houses on the streets and alleyways did not have much access to sanitary water:

In the creeks of these alleyways, there is a dark and thick liquid that goes into water reservoirs [*āanbār*] and small pools [*ḥuwẓ*] in the courtyards, and this water, which in fact is the wastewater of the northern city, is used by residents for cooking and washing their dishes.[6]

Similar descriptions are available for all of the old neighborhoods of Tehran and the southern sections of the city.[7] Mehdi Muʾtamini, a social scientist from the University of Tehran, went as far as suggesting a correlation between the degeneration of these neighborhoods and an

[5] Banu Faqiyih, "Kuy-ha-yi Faqirnishin-i Junub-i Shahr," 340–2.

[6] Banu Faqiyih, "Kuy-ha-yi Faqirnishin-i Junub-i Shahr," 338.

[7] Mehdi Muʾtamini, "Inhitat-i Bakhsh-i Qadimi-yi Shahr-i Tehran va Rabitih-yi An ba Bimari-ha-yi Ravani [The Degeneration of the Old Section of Tehran and Its Relationship with Mental Illnesses]," in *Sukhanrani-ha va Guzarish-ha dar Nakhustin Siminar-i Barrasi-yi Masaʾil-i Ijtimaʿi-yi Shahr-i Tehran [Talks and Reports of the First Seminar for Discussing the Social Problems of the City of Tehran]* (Tehran: University of Tehran, 1343 [1964]), 331–6; Azhdari, "Puruzhih-yi Shahrsazi-yi Yek Bakhsh-i Qadimi-yi Udlajan [Urban Planning Project in an Old Section of Udlajan]," in *Sukhanrani-ha va Guzarish-ha dar Nakhustin Siminar-i Barrasi-yi Masaʾil-i Ijtimaʿi-yi Shahr-i Tehran [Talks and Reports of the First Seminar for Discussing the Social Problems of the City of Tehran]* (Tehran: University of Tehran, 1343 [1964]), 198–201; Minuchihr, "Bakhsh-i Javaddiyyih-yi Tehran [The Javaddiyyih District of Tehran]," in *Sukhanrani-ha va Guzarish-ha dar Nakhustin Siminar-i Barrasi-yi Masaʾil-i Ijtimaʿi-yi Shahr-i Tehran [Talks and Reports of the First Seminar for Discussing the Social Problems of the City of Tehran]* (Tehran: University of Tehran, 1343 [1964]), 452–64; Banu Faqiyih, "Kuy-ha-yi Faqirnishin-i Junub-i Shahr," 337–47.

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increase in mental illnesses in the city. Blaming the high density of the population in southern Tehran, he talked about various houses where hundreds of people lived together in a shared space. As an example, he described a single house that accommodated as many as 207 residents constituting forty-two families. He concluded that this high density was the main reason for the increase in mental illnesses, moral corruption, and crime rates. He suggested that the government was responsible for providing better accommodation and living conditions for the residents of these neighborhoods.[8]

The state-sponsored responses to these social problems and the decline of the living standards in the southern neighborhoods were part of a bigger problem. Rather than providing a long-term strategy for the improvement of these neighborhoods, the state representatives, architects, and planners mostly suggested the complete destruction of the old city and the construction of new high-rises, green spaces, shopping malls, and offices. In his talk, the head of the Housing Bank of Iran, *Bānk-i Rahnī*, proposed a project designed for the *Ūdlājān* neighborhood. By tearing down the entire *Ūdlājān* neighborhood, the bank envisioned a modern district with a huge public market, 4,700 apartment units, a central mosque, a cinema, a theater, some recreational centers and clubs, a central park with cafés and restaurants, eight schools and kindergartens, a technical school, three public and private bathhouses, a hotel with 300 rooms, a motel with the capacity for 100 cars, and finally a block for government offices.[9] Despite these detailed and extensive plans for the destruction of the old neighborhoods and the construction of new ones from scratch, there was no comprehensive plan for the revitalization of Tehran's southern section. Instead of focusing on the social problems of these neighborhoods and improving people's living conditions, the state's proposal for the complete destruction of these neighborhoods was just a rudimentary solution for displacing those who demanded the most support.

The dilapidated neighborhoods of southern Tehran aligned, for the most part, with the historic section of the city formed in the sixteenth century, which flourished in the nineteenth century during the rule of the Qajar dynasty (1796–1925). In contrast to the impoverished

[8] Muʾtamini, "Inhitat-i Bakhsh-i Qadimi-yi Shahr-i Tehran," 331–6.
[9] Azhdari, "Puruzhih-yi Shahrsazi-yi Yek Bakhsh-i Qadimi-yi Udlajan," 199–200.

southern district, mid-twentieth-century Tehran enjoyed upper- and middle-class neighborhoods in the north. The northern neighborhoods, with their wide streets and squares and European-style buildings, accommodated many boutiques, cinemas, theaters, cafés, restaurants, hotels, and sport clubs. These spaces structured the social lives of the middle- and upper-class residents of the city. In his memoir, Parviz Davaʾi describes the first time his parents took him to a cinema in northern Tehran:

> The cinema was on the other side of the universe in the bright and charming neighborhoods [of Tehran]. The buildings, shops, streets, and people of these neighborhoods were totally different from ours [...] People called their shops *maghāzih*.[10] Rows after rows, there were many bright and beautiful *maghāzih*s, which sold colorful and shiny stuff and new clothes [...] Similar to festival nights, everywhere was bright and full of light. Our neighborhood had long, narrow, and dark alleyways, creeks full of sludge, and mud walls. Most of its houses and stores did not have electricity and the night was totally black. But here, in these neighborhoods of cinemas, everywhere was bright. People were cheerful wearing new clothes, as if they were celebrating New Year's Eve. They were strolling and window shopping alongside the streets.[11]

These descriptions demonstrate the contrast between the two poles of Tehran around the mid-twentieth century. Northern Tehran was European, modern, alive, rich, and enchanting, while the southern district was poor, dilapidated, filthy, dark, and unsafe.

The contrast between the south and north of the city has reproduced itself continuously up to the present time. Northern Tehran, with its high-end residential apartments, skyscrapers, shopping centers, boutiques, restaurants, and cafés, stands in stark contrast to the southern city, with its labyrinthine network of dark, unsafe, and sometimes dirty alleyways. This geographical contrast has bold economic manifestations. Based on a study by the Plan and Budget Organization of Iran, in spring 2015 the maximum price for 1 m^2 of residential space in Tehran was more than thirty-six times its minimum price.[12] With

[10] From the French *magasin*.

[11] Parviz Davaʾi, *Bazgasht-i Yikkih Savar [The Return of the Solo-Rider]* (Tehran: Ruwzanihkar, 1380 [2001]), 8.

[12] Markaz-i Amar-i Iran, *Ittilaʿat-i Qiymat va Ijarih Maskan dar Shahr-i Tehran [Data on Housing Price and Rent in the City of Tehran]* (Tehran: Sazman-i Mudiriyat va Barnamihrizi-yi Kishvar, 1394 [2015]), 20.

no surprise, these maximum and minimum prices matched the north and south poles of the city. In other words, hypothetically one could sell just 2 m^2 of an apartment in northern Tehran and have enough to purchase a mid-size apartment of 72 m^2 in the south of the city. Moreover, this geographical polarity has expanded beyond the official boundaries of the city. The marginalized population of Tehran cannot even afford the housing prices of the southern city and are forced to move further south to the outskirts of Tehran.

This polarity has become a well-established socio-spatial discourse. Northern Tehran is a symbol of wealth and prosperity, while the southern city stands for poverty and insecurity. This spatial dichotomy has even entered into people's day-to-day language; the term *junūb shahrī* (the one from the southern city) is usually used as a derogatory term to humiliate uncultured or poor people. In contrast, *bachih-yi bālā shahr* refers to a wealthy and high-class kid from the northern city. The geographical distribution of wealth based on a north–south axis has become part of the daily socio-spatial experience of people and shapes people's everyday lives across the city.

However, the examination of Tehran in the mid-nineteenth century does not reveal meaningful economic differences between the neighborhoods of the city. Tehran was historically constrained in size due to it being a walled city. While it has grown far beyond that original footprint, the walled area now aligns with its contemporary historic district. In the nineteenth century, this section contained several neighborhoods. The spatial configuration of these neighborhoods was not primarily based on the economic status of their residents, but rather geographical differences had bold non-economic attributes. An interesting piece of evidence in this regard is the 1858 map of Tehran, known as Kriziz's map. This map records the location of the houses of the wealthy people, high-ranking officials, and foreign ambassadors. These buildings were scattered more or less evenly throughout the city. Even at that time, the location of the British ambassador's house was within walking distance of the same neighborhood that Banu Faqiyyih described in her 1962 talk. This contrast shows that Tehran went through a dramatic socio-spatial transformation between the mid-nineteenth and mid-twentieth centuries. This shift reproduced the spatiality of the city based on the distribution of wealth.

Beyond these descriptive historical examinations, significant questions come to mind that demand an analytical framework. Why did

the socio-spatial contours of Tehran transform so dramatically from the mid-nineteenth century? Why, how, and when did people's economic status become so determinative in the production of the spatiality of the city? What were the political and cultural ramifications of these transformations? How did these transformations change Tehran's public spaces? What were the roles of the state and society in the (re)production of the spatiality of Tehran?

By answering these questions, I argue that between the mid-nineteenth and the mid-twentieth century, Iranian urban society and the state went through an ontological spatial shift, meaning that they gradually abandoned their long-lived spatial knowledge and re-conceptualized and re-represented the notion of space and spatial relationships from a novel ontological perspective that had no historical precedence in Iran. To comprehend the current contours of Tehran and other Iranian cities, one needs to take this shift into account. Moreover, I argue that this ontological shift was the outcome of a powerful socio-spatial discourse with vast social, economic, and political underpinnings. From the late eighteenth century and through various means of knowledge production, certain sections of Iranian society fostered a new spatial knowledge based on the spatiality and sociality of European cities, particularly Western Europe and Russia. This knowledge incubated in Iranian society for more than a century and developed into a powerful discourse. Initially manifested in the 1870s expansion of Tehran, this discourse strengthened after the 1905–6 Constitutional Revolution and reached its apex in the 1920s and 1930s during the reign of Reza Shah. In this discourse, the West, particularly Western Europe, became a model for the social and spatial practices of the state and certain sections of Iranian urban society. In Tehran, it created a power relationship with vast spatial manifestations, which dichotomized the city and society into two poles. This new way of imagining, talking about, and building the city changed the physical fabric of Tehran and shaped its social, economic, and political landscapes as well.

Based on the understanding developed in recent urban inquiry that social processes and spatial forms are deeply interrelated, and by using an array of archival sources – newspapers, magazines, administrative files, diaries, travelogues, and maps – I conduct an analysis of the impact of the socio-spatial discourse mentioned above in terms of four spatial relationships: (1) the spatiality of ordinary people's social practices; (2) the spatiality of the contested relationship between society

and the state; (3) the relationship between the state and the city and the production, commodification, bureaucratization, and abstraction of spaces; and (4) the spatial strategies of the state for legitimation and social control.

For the first relationship, I look into the spatiality of ordinary people's daily lives or, in other words, the relationship between society and the city. I demonstrate how people's social spaces were the products of the particular social relationships of Iranian urban society. For example, Chapter 1 demonstrates that, in nineteenth-century Tehran, the production of various traditional social spaces – coffeehouses, bathhouses, *zūrkhānih*s,[13] and *takīyyih*s[14] – was closely related to the particular configuration of Iranian urban society. The transformation of these spaces to European-style social spaces – cafés, theaters, cinemas, hotels, restaurants, and sports clubs – was closely related to the transformation of Iranian urban society from the nineteenth to the mid-twentieth century.

For the second relationship mentioned above, I study the contested relationship between society and the state, the formation of the public sphere, and the production of political public spaces. I investigate the reciprocity of the public sphere and political public spaces and how people's political activities transformed spaces of daily life into stages of political action. Chapters 2 and 6 demonstrate why, how, and when the spatiality of social movements transformed from the sacred spaces of the city – mosques and holy shrines – to streets and squares. In other words, I suggest that alongside the transformation of the spatiality of people's daily lives, the geographical manifestation of their political movements transformed as well.

For the third socio-spatial relationship, the relationship between the state and the city, I turn to the study of the abstraction of Tehran through the examination of the state's process of spatial commodification and demonstrate that from the mid-nineteenth century the state adopted specific spatial policies in order to transform the spatiality of the city into an economic capital. Based on a new vocabulary of urban design similar to European cities, the massive state-sponsored urban projects in Tehran were a means for the production of space as

[13] *Zūrkhānih*s were traditional gymnasiums in Iranian cities.
[14] *Takīyyih*s were places for holding mourning ceremonies and passion plays during the month of Muharram.

a lucrative commodity for a minority in power. These undertakings played a significant role in the reconfiguration of the neighborhoods of Tehran based on people's economic status.

Finally, I look into the spatial strategies of the state for social control and the legitimation of its power and examine the state's systematic use of the spatiality of the city for subjugating people's daily lives and establishing its particular spatial definitions. Chapters 4 and 5 demonstrate how these strategies transformed from holding religious ceremonies to sponsoring carnivals and parades. European-style streets and squares of Tehran changed into spectacles for holding various commemorative ceremonies similar to imperial models of legitimation in Europe. Moreover, Chapter 5 examines how the state developed a complex system to transform and monitor social spaces by utilizing spatial guidelines. These guidelines regulated various socio-spatial relations.

As the chapters unfold, the reader will find that each chapter investigates these socio-spatial relationships in various stages of history. Beginning from the early nineteenth century and concluding in the mid-twentieth century, this book investigates the transformations of all these relationships under the influence of a powerful discourse that looked into European cities and established them as vital examples for the future to come. I adopted this timeframe based on the transformation of the quadruple spatial relationships mentioned earlier. By the mid-twentieth century, the ontological shift and the consequent transformations of the spatial relationships were fully established. The last spatial relationship that witnessed its full transformation was the contested relationship between society and the state, or better to say, people's repertoires of contention and the spatiality of social movements. This final transformation manifested in numerous episodes of protests, political meetings, and parades between 1941 and 1953. Prior to this transformation, the other three relationships had undergone fundamental changes, starting from the relationship between the state and the city and followed by the relationship between the state and society and the spatiality of ordinary people's daily lives. It is important to note that this chronological sequence and succession does not imply a causal link between these four spatial transformations; rather, they were all the byproducts of the spatial discourse that underpinned the ontological spatial shift of Iranian urban society and the state.

The future spatial reforms in Tehran and other Iranian cities subsequent to the timeframe depicted in this book can be analyzed based

on the framework discussed here. Muhammad Reza Shah's massive reforms of 1963, Tehran's first Master Plan of 1965, the 1979 revolution, and Tehran's transformations after the revolution should be studied based on the ontological shift presented in this book. Following the full establishment of this novel spatial discourse, it has been changing the contours of Iranian cities and has not yet been challenged by an alternative form of spatial knowledge.

Although the timeframe begins in the early nineteenth century and ends around the mid-twentieth century, the chapters do not follow a strict chronological order. Instead, they are primarily arranged based on the four spatial relationships. Each chapter focuses on a particular historical period. These temporal divisions help to facilitate the structure of the book. However, the social, spatial, economic, and political relations that each chapter examines are not limited to the timeframe of that chapter; socio-spatial relationships are fluid and do not conform to manmade historical eras.

Each chapter begins with a theoretical discussion, which defines its analytical framework. Through these frameworks, the chapters develop their arguments and examine their empirical data. The theoretical deliberations of the first two chapters are more extensive. These two build the foundation for the entire book, and the following chapters will refer to this foundation repeatedly. The goal is to establish a dialog between the current body of social theories of space, developed based on the sociality and spatiality of Western European and North American cities, and the specific context of this research. As the forthcoming chapters demonstrate, on many occasions this dialog suggests the necessity of the re-examination and reformulation of these theories.

Chapter 1 begins in the coffeehouses, traditional gymnasiums (*zūrkhānih*s), bathhouses, and *takīyyih*s (places for religious mourning ceremonies during the month of Muharram) of pre-1870s Tehran. This focus on the spaces of the daily lives of ordinary people yields the concept of the communal sphere and its relationship to the spatiality of daily life. It shows that the segmented urban society consisted of numerous smaller communities. This segmentation is clearly discernible in the daily communal spaces of the city that were studied via diaries, travelogues, newspapers, archival materials, maps, and so forth. These communal spaces were both the products and the reproducers of the communal sphere. The chapter also includes an examination of women's daily social lives in the nineteenth century. This analysis

reveals the interior sections of Iranian houses, *andarūnī*s, to be lively all-women social spaces and incubators of women's social and political mobilization.

By examining the 1905–6 Constitutional Revolution, Chapter 2 investigates the formation of the public sphere and the production of political public spaces in the context of the segmented Iranian urban society. The public sphere was the outcome of the coming together of various communal spheres through the binding force of religion and political activities of certain social groups. Also, the religious discourse played a crucial role in the transformation of primary sacred spaces of the city into political public spaces. However, the chapter suggests that the success of the revolution initiated a process that resulted in the transformation of the public sphere and political public spaces through their secularization and gender diversification. Finally, the chapter turns to women's political activities during and after the Constitutional Revolution and their role in the transformation of the public sphere and political public spaces.

After portraying the socio-spatial context of traditional Iranian cities in the first two chapters, the third chapter investigates the production of a new spatial knowledge in nineteenth-century Iran. This investigation is crucial for the examination of the transformation of Tehran in the next three chapters. Through the analysis of the accounts of eight Iranian travelers to Europe, this chapter finds that Iranian travelogues, in addition to other means of knowledge production, played a significant role in fostering a novel spatial knowledge. I show that the exposure to alternative forms of urban organization and political and social spectacles contributed to the formation of this knowledge that later played a great role in the transformation of Tehran, its spatiality, and its sociality. The next three chapters examine the impact of this spatial knowledge on Tehran and the physical manifestation of these common themes in the city during the next eight decades.

Chapter 4 focuses on the 1870s expansion of Tehran and examines the spatial strategies of the state for spatial commodification and bureaucratization before and after this expansion. It shows that the incorporation of the new spatial knowledge discussed in Chapter 3 resulted in the implementation of a new vocabulary of urban design for the expansion of the city. Through the 1870s expansion of Tehran, the state followed a rigorous process of spatial commodification. However, as the chapter demonstrates, the more significant change

was the transformation of the spatiality of the relationship between the state and society. After the expansion, the state developed new ceremonies similar to the imperial models of legitimation in European countries and redesigned the city as a spectacle for the demonstration of royal power in squares, plazas, and streets.

Chapter 5 focuses on Tehran after the Constitutional Revolution, particularly in the period between the two World Wars. It examines how urban society transformed the state spaces of the 1870s expansion into a lively social scene. The Iranian modern middle class's desire for a new lifestyle led to the production of spaces that had no precedent in Iranian cities, such as cafés, restaurants, theaters, cinemas, hotels, and sports clubs. At the same time, the state's spatial bureaucratization expanded dramatically and the state managed to transform the old types of communal life and spaces and monitor the new ones. The combination of these measures resulted in the dichotomization of the city and society into two poles: old and new, traditional and modern, and south and north. A socio-spatial discourse created a strong power relationship between the two poles of society, with vast spatial manifestations.

The last chapter focuses on the turbulent years after World War II, up to the 1953 military coup, and examines the formation of political public spaces and the public sphere in this era. In part through comparisons with the period of the Constitutional Revolution, the chapter demonstrates how and why political public spaces, the public sphere, and the traditional repertoires of contention transformed in less than four decades. The secularization and gender diversification of political public spaces that had begun after the Constitutional Revolution became fully established norms in the 1940s and the early 1950s. Moreover, the political practices of the modern middle class and urban working class contributed to the transformation of the segmented configuration of political public spaces into a class-based entity. This chapter finds that the political public spaces of Tehran transformed alongside the transformations of urban society, the city, and the state.

In the Conclusion I bring together different threads of this study and continue by discussing my overarching arguments and brief final theoretical and methodological remarks for possible future investigations.

1 *Segmented Society and the Social Production of Communal Spaces*

On July 6, 1894, ʿIyn al-Saltanih, a Qajar prince and the king's brother, wrote the following sentences about Tehran's Muharram mourning ceremonies in his book of memoir:

> Similar to the previous years, the Turk merchants hold magnificent mourning ceremonies in Shiykh ʿAbd al-Husayn mosque [...] In rivalry with other merchants and shopkeepers, each group has designated a particular mosque and, similar to the previous year, they are busy [holding their ceremonies]. The merchants from Isfahan have occupied Aqa Siyid ʿAziz Allah mosque, the merchants from Kashan have occupied Friday mosque, and each guild has occupied a specific place for its mourning rituals.[1]

In the nineteenth century, Muharram mourning rituals were one of the main religious gatherings for the Shiʿi population of Iran. Despite their shared religiosity, each guild or social group had a particular place for its mourning rituals. In other words, the spatiality of religious gatherings was segmented into numerous smaller spaces, and each community held its ceremonies separately. Why was the spatiality of Muharram ceremonies so segmented? What were the social underpinnings of this spatial segmentation? Is it possible to trace this segmentation in other instances of social life? What was the relationship between urban society and its spaces of daily life in nineteenth-century Tehran?

My objective in this chapter is to investigate these questions through the examination of the relationship between society and the city in nineteenth-century Tehran. This relationship focuses on the spatiality of ordinary people's daily lives. In the last four decades, the analysis of the relation between the sociality and the spatiality of cities has

[1] Qahraman Mirza ʿIyn al-Saltanih, *Ruznamih-yi Khatirat-i ʿIyn al-Saltanih [ʿIyn al-Saltanih Memoir]*, ed. Masʿud Salur and Iraj Afshar (Tehran: Asatir, 1376 [1997]), 1: 594.

undergone massive transformations as a result of the development of geographical and spatial understanding of social processes. Social theories of space have become a common domain for geographers, sociologists, anthropologists, and ethnographers as a means to investigate socio-spatial processes. In this chapter, I unfold this theoretical framework and explain the impact of the spatial approach on social and historical examinations of cities before presenting the main empirical analysis of daily life and social spaces in nineteenth-century Tehran.

The two decades of the 1970s and 1980s witnessed the advancement of the discipline of geography, particularly human geography, into the realms of social and historical studies. This disciplinary shift generated a novel framework for the investigation of the spatiality of social processes. Prior to this era, space was assumed to be a neutral background for social interactions; spatial settings were similar to fixed and blank canvases or empty containers. Derived from classical geography developed in the works of Kant as well as Newton's and Descartes's conceptions of space and time, this view conceptualizes space as a fixed and unchanging grid for social processes that can be analyzed and standardized through Euclidian geometry. In short, space was an absolute construct detached from sociality.[2]

[2] There is a well-established body of literature criticizing the absolutist view toward spaces. This criticism initially developed in the works of French philosopher Henri Lefebvre, particularly in his magnum opus, *The Production of Space*. In the Anglophone academic world, David Harvey was the pioneer in criticizing the absolutist view of space and the establishment of the new framework for the examination of the spatiality of social processes. For more on the topic see: Henri Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 1991); David Harvey, *Social Justice and the City*, revised ed. (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2009); David Harvey, *Explanation in Geography* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1970); David Harvey, "Space as a Keyword," in *David Harvey: A Critical Reader*, ed. Noel Castree and Derek Gregory (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), 270–93; Edward W. Soja, *Thirdspace: Journeys to Los Angeles and Other Real-and-Imagined Places* (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 1996); Edward W. Soja, *Postmodern Geographies: The Reassertion of Space in Critical Social Theory* (London: Verso, 1989); Derek Gregory, *Geographical Imaginations* (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 1994); Derek Gregory and John Urry, eds., *Social Relations and Spatial Structures* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1985); Mark Gottdiener, *The Social Production of Urban Space*, 2nd ed. (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1985).

The "spatial turn" in social sciences and humanities was a response to the fixed and neutral conception of space.[3] It stresses that social processes and spatial forms are deeply interrelated; they are mutually constructed and neither is a priori. Initially developed in the works of Henri Lefebvre and David Harvey, this view became known as the social constructionist conception of space and has dominated social sciences and humanities since the 1980s.[4] The "spatial turn" is an attempt to bridge the gap between two dominant research traditions: the sociological and geographical imaginations.[5] Space is an integral aspect of social processes; in the words of Henri Lefebvre, "*(Social) space is a (social) product*."[6] There is a reciprocal relationship between space and society. On the one hand, space is socially produced and can be analyzed only through its specific social context. On the other hand, space is a precondition of social interactions. Any social process demands spatiality; the spatiality of social relations is an active element in the constitution of social processes.

The notion of social space has been repeatedly presented in tripartite conceptualizations of space.[7] In these conceptualizations, the three modes of social space are investigated in mutual, dialectical relationship with each other. The first mode deals with space as a material construct. It reduces space to its physicality, which can be studied and

[3] Mike Crang and Nigel Thrift, eds., *Thinking Space* (London: Routledge, 2003); Phil Hubbard et al., eds., *Key Texts in Human Geography* (Los Angeles: Sage Publications, 2008); Barney Warf and Santa Arias, eds., *The Spatial Turn: Interdisciplinary Perspective* (London: Routledge, 2009).

[4] Eric Sheppard, "David Harvey and Dialectical Space-time," in *David Harvey: A Critical Reader*, ed. Noel Castree and Derek Gregory (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), 124.

[5] Harvey, *Social Justice and the City*, 23–7; David Harvey, "The Sociological and Geographical Imaginations," *International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society* 18, no. 3 (2005): 211–55. Edward Soja puts the same argument in different words. Through an extensive reading of Lefebvre's works, Soja argues that the spatial turn has introduced spatiality as the third element, besides "historicality" and sociality, in the construction of critical theory and philosophy. Soja, *Thirdspace*, chapters 1–3; Soja, *Postmodern Geographies*.

[6] Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, 26.

[7] Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*; Harvey, *Social Justice and the City*; Harvey, *Explanation in Geography;* Harvey, "Space as a Keyword"; Soja, *Thirdspace*; Ernst Cassirer, *An Essay on Man: An Introduction to a Philosophy of Human Culture* (Garden City: Doubleday, 1953); Adam T. Smith, *The Political Landscape: Constellations of Authority in Early Complex Polities* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003).

analyzed objectively. The Newtonian conception of space and Euclidian geometry are the manifestation of this view. Henri Lefebvre calls it spatial practices or perceived spaces.[8] Spatial practices ensure societal cohesion of lived reality.[9]

In contrast to spatial practices, Lefebvre introduces conceived spaces or representations of space. This is mental space; it is the realm of discourse and knowledge. Space is reduced to its representations and to subjective entities through objectified abstractions. In the words of Lefebvre, "[c]onceptions of space tend […] towards a system of verbal (and therefore intellectually worked out) signs."[10] Space loses its symbolic meanings made through the everyday lives of ordinary people; it is reduced to an abstract construct. Abstract space is the realm of hegemonic power, which attempts to provide a simple and clarified conception of space and social life; it provides a "communality of use."[11] There is a direct relationship between conceived spaces and architecture and urban planning professions, which attempt to provide lucid and coherent representations of space. They abstract spaces to the world of design, two- or three-dimensional drawings, and architectural typologies.[12]

As a reaction to the binary spatial conceptualization of perceived and conceived, objective and subjective, absolute and relative, natural and conceptual, and material and discourse, from the 1970s onward, Marxist theoreticians and geographers such as Henri Lefebvre, David Harvey, and Edward Soja attempted to deconstruct the binary approach by dialectical reading of the two spatial aspects and

[8] Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, 33, 38.

[9] Andy Merrifield, *Henri Lefebvre: A Critical Introduction* (New York: Routledge, 2006), 110–11. David Harvey's absolute space more or less resembles Lefebvre's spatial practices. Harvey, "Space as a Keyword," 271–2; Harvey, *Social Justice and the City*, 13; Sheppard, "David Harvey and Dialectical Space-time." The same conception of space is available in Soja's works under the title of firstspace, while Cassirer calls it organic space. Soja, *Thirdspace*; Cassirer, *An Essay on Man*.

[10] Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, 38.

[11] Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, 56.

[12] David Harvey uses the concept of relative spaces, which, despite its differences, has some overlaps with Lefebvre's conceived spaces. Harvey, "Space as a Keyword," 272; Harvey, *Social Justice and the City*, 13; Sheppard, "David Harvey and Dialectical Space-time." Ernst Cassirer's perceptual space and Edward Soja's secondspace more or less resemble Lefebvre's representations of space. Soja, *Thirdspace*; Cassirer, *An Essay on Man*.

constructing the third spatial element. The dialectical view states that the comprehension of social reality is based on the understanding of contradictions.[13] Criticizing Hegelian dialectic upon its idealistic conception, Lefebvre concludes Marx's unfinished project by developing a "three-dimensional dialectic" in which he proposes three distinct terms that are dialectically interrelated.[14] As Edward Soja puts it, Lefebvre breaks the "closed logic of either/or" through the process of "thirding-as-Othering."[15]

Through the dialectical reading of perceived and conceived spaces, Lefebvre introduces spaces of representation[16] or lived spaces. This is the space of users and inhabitants; space is infused by symbols and signs. While conceived spaces belong to the realm of subjective knowledge and verbal representations – which attempt to represent spaces as abstract and clear entities – and perceived spaces belong to the natural and material world – which can be realized objectively – lived spaces belong to the realm of nonverbal symbols of everyday life. They are socially produced through people's everyday lives with all their fears, dreams, and emotions. In the words of Lefebvre, spaces of representation "embodying complex symbolisms, sometimes coded, sometimes not, linked to the clandestine or underground side of social life, as also to art."[17] Spaces of representation are objective and subjective, material and conceptual.[18]

Since Lefebvre's and Harvey's initial deliberation in the 1970s, the "spatial turn" has become the common domain of socio-spatial

[13] Hegelian dialectic states that out of the binary contradiction a third option can develop that, at the same time, negates and preserves the previous binary.

[14] Christian Schmid, "Henri Lefebvre's Theory of the Production of Space: Towards a Three-Dimensional Dialectic," trans. Bandulasena Goonewardena, in *Space, Difference, Everyday Life: Reading Henri Lefebvre*, ed. Kanishka Goonewardena, Stefan Kipfer, Richard Milgrom, and Christian Schmid (New York: Routledge, 2008), 30–4. Also see: Rob Shields, *Lefebvre, Love & Struggle: Spatial Dialectics* (London: Routledge, 2005), 150–3.

[15] Soja, *Thirdspace*, 60–1.

[16] Translated to representational spaces in the English translation.

[17] Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, 33.

[18] Through close reading of Marx's *Capital*, David Harvey reconstructs the same approach through the interrelationship between use-value and exchange-value with absolute and relative spaces and proposes the concept of relational space. Harvey, "Space as a Keyword," 288–9; Marcus Doel, "Dialectical Materialism: Stranger than Fiction," in *David Harvey: A Critical Reader*, ed. Noel Castree and Derek Gregory (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), 55–79.

investigations.[19] In the case of Middle Eastern studies and socio-spatial investigations of the region's cities and people's everyday lives, social theories of space have had a limited impact with a considerable delay. In the early twentieth century, the European historians took an orientalist approach to the study of these cities based on the construction and generalization of specific typologies for the concept

[19] There are several works that exclusively examine various aspects of Lefebvre's and Harvey's theories: Shields, *Lefebvre, Love and Struggle*; Merrifield, *Henri Lefebvre: A Critical Introduction*; Stuart Elden, *Understanding Henri Lefebvre: Theory and the Possible* (London: Continuum, 2004); Goonewardena et al., *Space, Difference, Everyday Life*; Castree and Gregory, *David Harvey: A Critical Reader*; John L. Paterson, *David Harvey's Geography* (London: Routledge, 1984). For anthropological contributions, see: Edward S. Casey, "How to Get from Space to Place in a Fairly Short Stretch of Time: Phenomenological Prolegomeno," in *Senses of Place*, ed. Steven Feld and Keith H. Basso (Santa Fe: School of American Research Press, 1996), 13–52; Edward S. Casey, *Representing Place: Landscape Painting and Maps* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002); Edward S. Casey, *Getting Back into Place: Toward a Renewed Understanding of the Place-world* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009); Setha Low, *On the Plaza: The Politics of Public Space and Culture* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2000); Setha Low, *Spatializing Culture: The Ethnography of Space and Place* (London: Routledge, 2017); Smith, *The Political Landscape*. For the use of this framework in the works of feminist geographers, see: Doreen Massey, *Space, Place, and Gender* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994); Gillian Rose, *Feminism and Geography: The Limits of Geographical Knowledge* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993); Linda McDowell, *Gender, Identity and Place: Understanding Feminist Geographies* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999). For the criticism of globalization and the reciprocity of global and local, see: Arturo Escobar, "Culture Sits in Places: Reflections on Globalism and Subaltern Strategies of Localization," *Political Geography* 20 (2001): 139–74; Doreen Massey, *For Space* (Los Angeles: Sage Publications, 2005); Sharon Zukin, *Naked City: The Death and Life of Authentic Urban Places* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); David Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992); David Harvey, *Rebel Cities: From the Right to the City to the Urban Revolution* (London: Verso, 2012); David Harvey, *Spaces of Hope* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2000). And for the studies of the spatiality of social movements, see: Joanne P. Sharp et al., ed. *Entanglements of Power: Geographies of Domination/Resistance* (London: Routledge, 2000); Steve Pile and Michael Keith, eds., *Geographies of Resistance* (London: Routledge, 1997); Setha Low and Neil Smith, eds., *The Politics of Public Space* (New York: Routledge, 2006); Don Mitchell, *The Right to the City: Social Justice and the Fight for Public Space* (New York: Guilford Press, 2003); Harvey, *Rebel City*; Harvey, *Social Justice and the City*; Mustafa Dikeç, *Badlands of the Republic: Space, Politics and Urban Policy* (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2007).

of the Islamic city. These typologies were the outcomes of historians' limited studies and the examinations of the cities in French colonies of Northern Africa. Through the generalization of their constructed prototypes to the entire Islamic realm, these early attempts provided a fixed and universal framework for the investigation of the cities in the entire Middle East and North Africa.[20] In order to produce generalizable models, these studies largely depended on the morphological analysis and the abstraction of the spatial structure of the so-called Islamic cities.

Despite various revisions, this approach remained the dominant framework for the investigation of Middle Eastern and North African cities up to the 1980s. The reductionist approach of these earlier studies and their attempts to produce generalizable models of the Islamic city have reduced cities and urban life to the physicality of space and overlooked their sociality. In the Lefebvrian terminology, these studies abstract spaces to the level of conceived spaces. They provide representations of space; space is reduced to discourse; space is represented as a lucid and coherent knowledge. Models establish rules of consistency and cohesiveness and act as universal molds that reshape every single city to fit their specificities. As a result, they neglect diversity and incongruity between various cases.

Although the search for generalizable models has lost its dominance since the 1980s, the morphological approach toward the examination of Middle Eastern and North African cities is still a well-established method among the scholars of the field, particularly architectural historians. In her valuable book on Istanbul, Zeynep Çelik clearly points to this approach and claims that it is the task of architectural

[20] For a comprehensive review of these studies, see: Giulia Annalinda Neglia, "Some Historiographical Notes on the Islamic City with Particular Reference to the Visual Representation of the Built City," in *The City in the Islamic World*, vol. 1, ed. Salma K. Jayyusi et al. (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 3–46; André Raymond, "The Spatial Organization of the City," in *The City in the Islamic World*, vol. 1, ed. Salma K. Jayyusi et al. (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 47–70; Michael E. Bonine et al., eds., *The Middle Eastern City and Islamic Urbanism: An Annotated Bibliography of Western Literature* (Bonn: Ferd. Dümmlers Verlag, 1994); Masashi Haneda and Toru Miura, eds., *Islamic Urban Studies: Historical Review and Perspective* (London: Kegan Paul International, 1994); Aptin Khanbaghi, ed., *Cities as Built and Lived Environments: Scholarship from Muslim Contexts, 1875 to 2011* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2014).

historians to study the history of the city as an artifact.[21] The morphological approach tends to prioritize the physicality of space over its sociality. It ignores the role of social processes and people's everyday lives in the production of social spaces.

One of the first scholars in the field of Middle Eastern and North African studies who distanced herself from morphological studies and attempted to examine the spatiality of cities through the framework of social processes was Janet Abu-Lughod, particularly her valuable article on the concept of Islamic cities. Although her first work on Cairo[22] was under the influence of the orientalist approach – a fact she mentions in her article and about which she criticizes herself[23] – later she distanced herself and attempted to distinguish various social and religious forces that have a decisive role in the production of spaces and the configuration of Islamic cities.[24] However, her work remains incomplete and does not provide a comprehensive theoretical framework. Moreover, it does not engage in dialogue with social theories of space contemporary to her era. In recent years, however, a new wave of scholarship has emerged that is more grounded in social theories of space. Particularly, the examinations of gender relationships in Islamic cities and the reciprocal relationship between gender identity and social spaces have distanced themselves from the morphological approaches and focused on the mutually constitutive nature of space and gender.[25] Moreover, each year, new studies on

[21] Zeynep Çelik, *The Remaking of Istanbul: Portrait of an Ottoman City in the Nineteenth Century* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), xvii. Also see: Zeynep Çelik, *Urban Forms and Colonial Confrontations: Algiers under French Rule* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997); Janet L. Abu-Lughod, *Cairo: 1001 Years of the City Victorious* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971).

[22] Abu-Lughod, *Cairo*.

[23] Janet L. Abu-Lughod, "The Islamic City: Historic Myth, Islamic Essence, and Contemporary Relevance," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 19, no. 2 (1987): 160.

[24] Abu-Lughod, "Islamic City."

[25] Tovi Fenster and Hanaa Hamdan-Saliba, "Gender and Feminist Geographies in the Middle East," *Gender, Place, & Culture: A Journal of Feminist Geography* 20, no. 4 (2013): 528–46; Said Graiouid, "Communication and the Social Production of Space: The *Hammam*, the Public Sphere and Moroccan Women," *The Journal of North African Studies* 9, no. 1 (2004): 104–30; Rachel Newcomb and Rollins College, "Gendering the City, Gendering the Nation – Contesting Urban Space in Fes, Morocco,"

Middle Eastern and North African cities are published that incorporate the social theories of space for the examination of the spatiality of cities.[26]

The same theoretical delay is recognizable in the case of Iranian studies. The social and historical research on Iranian urban societies has remained spatially blind. The main literature on nineteenth-century Iranian society and cities does not examine people's socio-spatial practices. Classic works of Ervand Abrahamian, Nikkie R. Keddie, Willem M. Floor, Ann K. S. Lambton, Ahmad Ashraf, Homa Katouzian, and others are "aspatial"[27] historiographies and social

City & Society 18, no. 2 (2006): 288–311; Elif Ekin Aksit, "The Women's Quarters in the Historical Hammam," *Gender, Place, & Culture: A Journal of Feminist Geography* 18, no. 2 (2011): 277–93; Irvin Cemil Schick, "The Harem as Gendered Space and the Spatial Reproduction of Gender," in *Harem Histories: Envisioning Places and Living Spaces*, ed. Marilyn Booth (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010), 69–84; Lucienne Thys-Şenocak, "The Gendered City," in *The City in the Islamic World*, vol. 2, ed. Salma K. Jayyusi et al. (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 877–93.

[26] Isabelle Grangaud, "Masking and Unmasking the Historic Quarters of Algiers: The Reassessment of an Archive," in *Walls of Algiers: Narratives of the City through Text and Image*, ed. Zeynep Çelik et al. (Los Angeles: Getty Research Institute, 2009), 179–97; Heghnar Zeitlian Watenpaugh, *The Image of an Ottoman City: Imperial Architecture and Urban Experience in Aleppo in the 16th and 17th Centuries* (Leiden: Brill, 2004); Leila Hudson, *Transforming Damascus: Space and Modernity in an Islamic City* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2008); Leila Hudson, "Late Ottoman Damascus: Investments in Public Space and the Emergence of Popular Sovereignty," *Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies* 15, no. 2 (2006): 151–69; Derya Özkan, ed., *Cool Istanbul: Urban Enclosures and Resistances* (Bielefeld: Transcript, 2015); Farah Al-Nakib, *Kuwait Transformed: A History of Oil and Urban Life* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2016); Nelida Fuccaro, *Violence and the City in the Modern Middle East* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2016); Nancy Y. Reynolds, *A City Consumed: Urban Commerce, the Cairo Fire, and the Politics of Decolonization in Egypt* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012); Faedah Totah, *Preserving the Old City of Damascus* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2014); Peter Sluglett, ed., *The Urban History of the Middle East 1750–1950* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2008); Thomas Philip Abowd, *Colonial Jerusalem: The Spatial Construction of Identity and Difference in a City of Myth, 1948–2012* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2014); Ward Vloeberghs, *Architecture, Power and Religion in Lebanon: Rafiq Hariri and the Politics of Sacred Space in Beirut* (Lieden: Brill, 2016); Aseel Sawalha, *Reconstructing Beirut: Memory and Space in a Postwar Arab City* (Austin: Texas University Press, 2010); Anne B. Shlay and Gillad Rosen, *Jerusalem: The Spatial Politics of a Divided Metropolis* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2015).

[27] Soja, *Postmodern Geographies*.

analyses.[28] Although these studies provide detailed analyses of Iranian urban society in the nineteenth century, they remain relatively silent on how this society was spatially embedded. Similar to the absolutist notion of space or perceived spaces, in these studies, space is reduced to a mere background; it is a neutral container for social processes, and there is no reciprocity between society and social spaces of the cities.

The same argument applies to the historiography of the highlights of the modern history of Iran. For example, the 1905–6 Constitutional Revolution of Iran has been the subject of repeated examination, and hundreds of books and articles have investigated every aspect of the revolution. However, the spatiality of protests and political public spaces are erased from these historiographies. Similar shortcomings apply to Reza Shah's reign, the turbulent period of 1941–53, the Oil Nationalization Movement, the 1953 coup, and the like.[29]

[28] Ervand Abrahamian, *Iran between Two Revolutions* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983); Ervand Abrahamian, *A History of Modern Iran* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2008); Nikki R. Keddie, *Qajar Iran and the Rise of Reza Khan 1796–1925* (Costa Mesa: Mazda Publishers, 1999); Nikki R. Keddie, "Class Structure and Political Power in Iran since 1796," *Iranian Studies* 11, no. 1/4 (1978): 305–30; Ahmad Ashraf, "The Roots of Emerging Dual Class Structure in Nineteenth-Century Iran," *Iranian Studies* 14, no. 1/2 (1981): 5–27; Ahmad Ashraf and Ali Banuazizi, "Class System v. Classes in the Qajar Period," in *Encyclopedia Iranica* (December 15, 1992), www.iranicaonline.org/articles/class-system-v (accessed June 1, 2016); Willem Floor, *Justarhaʾi az Tarikh-i Ijtimaʿi-yi Iran dar Asr-i Qajar [Excerpts from Social History of Iran in the Qajar Era]*, 2 vols., trans. Abu al-Qasim Sirri (Tehran, Intisharat-i Tus, 1366 [1987]); Homa Katouzian, *State and Society in Iran: The Eclipse of the Qajars and the Emergence of the Pahlavis* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2000); Ann K. S. Lambton, *Islamic Society in Persia* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1954); Ann K. S. Lambton, *Qājār Persia: Eleven Studies* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1987); Hamid Algar, *Religion and State in Iran 1785–1906: The Role of the Ulama in the Qajar Period* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969); Guity Nashat, *The Origins of Modern Reform in Iran, 1870–80* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1982).

[29] Ervand Abrahamian, "The Causes of the Constitutional Revolution in Iran," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 10, no. 3 (1979): 381–414; Ervand Abrahamian, "The Crowd in the Persian Revolution," *Iranian Studies* 2, no. 4 (1969): 128–50; Janet Afary, *The Iranian Constitutional Revolution, 1906–1911* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); Mongol Bayat, *Iran's First Revolution: Shiʿism and the Constitutional Revolution of 1905–1909* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991); Amin Banani, *The Modernization of Iran 1921–1941* (Stanford: Stanford University

In contrast, literatures that exclusively focus on Iranian cities and the history of urbanism in Iran are devoid of sociality. Space is abstract, without people, and clear; it has no dilemma. Space is reduced to spatial knowledge and people are like phantoms that can fill spaces without any reciprocal dialogue with them. In comparison to North African colonies, only a few orientalist studies on Iranian cities were carried out in the first decades of the twentieth century.[30] In 1974, the publication of two issues of the *Iranian Studies* journal focusing on Isfahan invigorated the contemporary studies of Iranian cities.[31] The examination of the articles of these issues demonstrates the dominance of the morphological approach. In almost all of these studies spaces are devoid of sociality.[32] Later works on Iranian cities suffer from the same one-sided morphological approach. These studies focus on the physicality of spaces and cities and the search for particular typologies

Press, 1961); James Alban Bill, *The Politics of Iran: Groups, Classes, and Modernization* (Columbus: Charles E. Merrill Publishing, 1972); Stephanie Cronin, *Soldiers, Shahs and Subalterns in Iran: Opposition, Protest and Revolt, 1921–1941* (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010); Stephanie Cronin, *Tribal Politics in Iran: Rural Conflict and the New State, 1921–1941* (London: Routledge, 2007); Stephanie Cronin, ed., *The Making of Modern Iran: State and Society under Riza Shah, 1921–1941* (London: Routledge Curzon, 2003); Ali Rahnema, *Behind the 1953 Coup in Iran: Thugs, Turncoats, Soldiers, and Spooks* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015); John Foran, ed., *A Century of Revolution: Social Movements in Iran* (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1994); Mohamad Tavakoli-Targhi, *Refashioning Iran: Orientalism, Occidentalism and Historiography* (New York: Palgrave, 2001).

[30] Neglia, "Some Historiographical Notes on the Islamic Cities," 8. For an example of these works, see: Laurence Lockhart, *Famous Cities of Iran* (Brentford: Walter Pearce & Co., 1939).

[31] Neglia, "Some Historiographical Notes on the Islamic Cities," 24.

[32] Lisa Golombek, "Urban Patterns in Pre-Safavid Isfahan," *Iranian Studies* 7, no. 1/2 (1974): 18–44; Renata Holod, "Comments on Urban Patterns," *Iranian Studies* 7, no. 1/2 (1974): 45–8; Ali Bakhtiar, "The Royal Bazaar of Isfahan," *Iranian Studies* 7, no. 1/2 (1974): 320–47; Donald Wilber, "Aspects of the Safavid Ensemble at Isfahan," *Iranian Studies* 7, no. 1/2 (1974): 406–15; Bagher Shirazi, "Isfahan, the Old; Isfahan, the New," *Iranian Studies* 7, no. 1/2 (1974): 586–92; Giuseppe Zander, "Observations Sur l'Architecture 'Civile d'Ispahan'," *Iranian Studies* 7, no. 1/2 (1974): 294–319; Hans Roemer, "Das Fruhsafawidische Isfahan: Als Historische Forschungsaufgabe," *Iranian Studies* 7, no. 1/2 (1974):138–63; John Gulick, "Private Life and Public Face: Cultural Continuities in the Domestic Architecture of Isfahan," *Iranian Studies* 7, no. 1/2 (1974): 629–51.

and models that can be generalized beyond societal, historical, and geographical specificities.[33]

In short, the modern social history of Iran is "aspatial," and the literatures on cities and urban spaces are devoid of sociality. To

[33] Mahvash Alemi, "The 1891 Map of Tehran: Two Cities, Two Cores, Two Cultures," *Journal of the Islamic Environmental Design Research Centre* 1 (1985): 74–84; Mahvash Alemi, "Shiraz: The City of Gardens and Poets," in *The City in the Islamic World*, vol. 1, ed. Salma K. Jayyusi et al. (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 525–54; Heinz Gaube, *Iranian Cities* (New York: New York University Press, 1979); Heinz Gaube, "Iranian Cities," in *The City in the Islamic World*, vol. 1, ed. Salma K. Jayyusi et al. (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 159–80; Michael E. Bonine, "The Morphogenesis of Iranian Cities," *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 69, no. 2 (1979): 208–24; Michael E. Bonine, *Yazd and its Hinterland: A Central Place System of Dominance in the Central Iranian Plateau* (Marburg: Im Selbstverlag des Geographischen Institutes der Universität Marburg, 1980); Lisa Golombek, "The 'Citadel, Town, Suburbs' Model and Medieval Kirman," in *The City in the Islamic World*, vol. 1, ed. Salma K. Jayyusi et al. (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 445–63; Ahmad Ashraf, "Vizhigiha-yi Tarikhi-yi Shahrnishini dar Iran: Durih-yi Islami [The Historic Characteristics of Urbanization in Iran: Islamic Era]," *Mutaliʿt-i Jamiʿihshinakhti* no. 4 (1353 [1974]): 7–49; Amir Bani Masʿud, *Miʿmari-yi Muʿasir-i Iran: Dar Takapu-yi Biyn-i Sunnat va Mudirnitih*, 2nd ed. (Tehran, Nashr-i Hunar-i Miʿmari, 1390 [2011]); Mansureh Ettehadieh, *Inja Tehran Ast: Majmuʿih Maghalati Darbarih-yi Tehran 1269–1344 [Here is Tehran: A Collection of Essays on Tehran 1269–1344HJ]* (Tehran: Nashr-i Tarikh-i Iran, 1377 [1998]); Eckart Ehlers, "Cities IV. Modern Urbanization and Modernization in Persia," in *Encyclopedia Iranica* (December 15, 1991), www.iranicaonline.org/articles/cities-iv (accessed December 21, 2015); Eckart Ehlers and Willem Floor, "Urban Change in Iran, 1920–1941," *Iranian Studies* 26, no. 3/4 (1993): 251–75; John D. Gurney, "The Transformation of Tehran in the Later Nineteenth Century," in *Téhéran Capitale Bicentenaire*, ed. C. Adle and B. Hourcade (Paris: Institute Français de Recherche en Iran: 1992), 51–72; Sayyid Mohsen Habibi, *Az Shar ta Shahr: Tahlili Tarikhi az Mafhum-i Shahr va Sima-yi Kalbudi-yi An: Tafakkur va Taʾssur [From the Shar to the City: Historical Analysis of the Concept of the City and its Morphology]* (Tehran: University of Tehran Press, 1384 [2005]); Mohsen Habibi, "Réza Chah et le Développement de Téhéran (1925–1941)," in *Téhéran Capitale Bicentenaire*, ed. C. Adle and B. Hourcade (Paris: Institute Français de Recherche en Iran, 1992), 199–206; Gavin R. G. Hambly, "The Traditional Iranian City in the Qajar Period," in *The Cambridge History of Iran: From Nadir Shah to the Islamic Republic*, ed. Peter Avery et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 7: 542–89; Husayn Karimiyan, *Tehran dar Guzashtih va Hal [Tehran in Past and Present]* (Tehran: Intisharat-i Danishgah-i Milli, 2535 [1976]); Shahab Katouzian, "Tehran, Capital City: 1786–1997: The Re-invention of a Metropolis," *Journal of the Islamic Environmental Design Research Centre* 1 (1985): 34–45; Mustafa Kiyani, *Miʿmari-yi Duwrih-yi Pahlavi-yi Aval:*

borrow from Edward Soja, "the epistemological dualism of objectivist-materialist and subjectivist-idealist approaches"[34] has dominated Iranian historiography and has overlooked the reciprocity of society and space in historical, social, and spatial investigations.

In recent years, however, similar to the broader context of Middle Eastern studies, a new generation of historical studies is emerging that examines the spatiality of cities through social theories and investigates the instrumentality of spaces in social interactions. Afshin Marashi's *Nationalizing Iran*, Talin Grigor's works on architecture and Tehran, Babak Rahimi's analysis of the spatiality of Muharram rituals, and, particularly, Asef Bayat's *Street Politics* are some examples in this regard.[35] However, these works are more or less historical investigations devoid of spatial theoretical deliberations. They do not examine the social production of social spaces. This chapter and, in a bigger framework, this book stand alongside this new generation and aim to

Digarguni-yi Andishih-ha, Piydayish va Shiklgiri-yi Miʿmari-yi Duwrih-yi Bistsalih-yi Muʿasir-i Iran, 1299–1320 [Architecture in the First Pahlavi Era: Transformation of Thoughts, Formation of Architecture in the Twenty years Period of Contemporary Iran, 1921–1941] (Tehran: Muʾasisih-yi Mutaliʿat-i Tarikh-i Muʿasir-i Iran, 1386 [2008]); Ali Madanipour, *Tehran: The Making of a Metropolis* (Chichester: Wiley, 1998); Mina Marefat, "Building to Power: Architecture of Tehran 1921–1941" (PhD diss., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1988); Jennifer M. Scarce, "The Role of Architecture in the Creation of Tehran," in *Téhéran Capitale Bicentenaire*, ed. C. Adle and B. Hourcade (Paris: Institute Français de Recherche en Iran, 1992); Masoud Kheirabadi, *Iranian Cities: Formation and Development* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1991).

[34] Soja, *Thirdspace*, 62.

[35] Talinn Grigor, *Building Iran: Modernism, Architecture, and National Heritage under the Pahlavi Monarchs* (New York: Periscope Publishing, 2009); Talinn Grigor, "The King's White Walls: Modernism and Bourgeois Architecture," in *Culture and Cultural Politics under Reza Shah: The Pahlavi State, New Bourgeoisie and the Creation of a Modern Society in Iran*, ed. Bianca Devos and Christoph Werner (Abingdon: Routledge, 2014), 95–118; Talinn Grigor, "Tehran: A Revolution in Making," in *Political Landscape of Capital Cities*, ed. Jessica Joyce Christie et al. (Boulder: University Press of Colorado, 2016), 347–76; Afshin Marashi, *Nationalizing Iran: Culture, Power, and the State, 1870–1940* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2008); Babak Rahimi, *Theater State and the Formation of Early Modern Public Sphere* (Leiden: Brill, 2012); Babak Rahimi, "Takkiyeh Dowlat: The Qajar Theater State," in *Performing the Iranian State: Visual Culture and Representations of Iranian Identity*, ed., Staci Gem Scheiwiller (London: Anthem Press, 2013), 55–71; Asef Bayat, *Street Politics: Poor People's Movements in Iran* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997).

cover this neglected aspect of historical accounts by rewriting history in dialogue with social and spatial analysis and folding social space into social processes. My objective is to socialize the spatial analysis and, more importantly, to spatialize the social analysis.[36]

This chapter focuses on the relationship between urban society and Tehran in the nineteenth century. It examines people's everyday lives in the city and their religious and non-religious spatial practices. It investigates various social spaces of day-to-day interactions in the city. My point of departure for this spatial investigation is the analysis of urban society and its social configuration, which provides an essential framework for the understanding of people's social spaces. As a result, I start by presenting a social analysis of Iranian urban society in the nineteenth century. Afterwards, I examine social spaces in two main categories: spaces based on religious gatherings and spaces based on non-religious practices. Finally, this chapter ends with the examination of women's social lives and spaces in the city.

Nineteenth-Century Iranian Urban Society and the Communal Sphere

Nineteenth-century Iranian urban society was largely classless and segmented. It consisted of numerous smaller communities, which were not able to coalesce based on shared economic interests in order to form broader classes. In other words, it is not possible to talk about class consciousness in early nineteenth-century Iranian urban society.[37] Class consciousness as people's subjective awareness "of their class interests and the conditions for advancing them"[38] is heavily based on

[36] Ron Johnston, "Space," in *The Dictionary of Human Geography*, 5th ed., ed. Derek Gregory et al. (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 708.

[37] This point does not imply that there is no classification based on people's economic positions. Various scholars have proposed different schemes of class structures for Iranian urban society in the nineteenth century. However, these classifications are the scholars' objective impositions of class structures over the Iranian population, rather than representations of subjective class consciousness at the time. For some examples, see: Abrahamian, *Iran between Two Revolutions*, 33–4; Ashraf, "The Roots of Emerging Dual Class Structure," 7; Ashraf and Banuazizi, "Class System v. Classes in the Qajar Period."

[38] Erik Olin Wright, "Foundations of a Neo-Marxist Class Analysis," in *Approaches to Class Analysis*, ed. Erik Olin Wright (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 21.

inequalities in income, generated through people's uneven access to life chances and inequalities in rights and powers over productive resources. Both Marxist and Weberian approaches of class analysis largely depend on economic criteria in defining class relations and class positions.

Class analysis is a well-established method for studying social structures and explaining social relations and behaviors, as well as spatial practices based on those structures. In the academic sphere, two dominant forms of class analysis are common: the Marxist and Weberian approaches.[39] Class relations and class locations in the Marxist approach are largely based on the rights and powers of people over productive resources and economic activities. Variations and inequalities in the distribution of these rights and powers create class relations. Class locations can be determined by situating individuals within the "structured patterns of interaction" and class relations.[40] The Weberian approach to class analysis has many overlaps with the Marxist tradition. However, Weber uses the concept of life chances "as the chances that individuals have of gaining access to scarce and valued outcomes" to define class situations.[41] The market distributes life chances based on the resources that people bring to it. In this condition, members of a class receive common life chances.[42]

Class analysis provides an instrument for sociologists to explain various social outcomes at the macro and micro levels, from nation-states

[39] Vinay Gidwani, "Class," in *The Dictionary of Human Geography*, 5th ed., ed. Derek Gregory et al. (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 88; Wright, "Foundations of a Neo-Marxist Class Analysis." Besides these two, it is possible to talk about other approaches in class analysis based on works of Bourdieu and Durkheim. However, they are usually examined as derivatives of Marxist and Weberian approaches. For different approaches to the class analysis, see: Erik Olin Wright, *Approaches to Class Analysis* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

[40] The Marxist approach to class analysis is mostly developed in the works of sociologist Erik Olin Wright: Wright, "Foundations of a Neo-Marxist Class Analysis"; Erik Olin Wright, "Varieties of Marxist Conceptions of Class Structure," *Politics and Society* 9, no. 3 (1980): 323–70; Erik Olin Wright, *Class Counts: Comparative Studies in Class Analysis* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

[41] Richard Breen, "Foundations of a Neo-Weberian Class Analysis," in *Approaches to Class Analysis*, ed. Erik Olin Wright (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 31.

[42] Breen, "Foundations of a Neo-Weberian Class Analysis," 31; Max Weber, *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, trans. and ed. H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press), 181.

to individuals. Since the 1970s, radical and human geographers have demonstrated how class relations and positions have spatial consequences and produce patterns of uneven geographies.[43] However, the major approaches to class analysis seem to be inefficient in studying nineteenth-century Iranian urban society. In contrast to the established definitions of class consciousness and the role of economic relations in defining classes, in the nineteenth century Iranians' communal consciousness was based on social identities.[44]

Instead of broad classes, numerous smaller communities constituted a great portion of the urban population. These communities consisted of rich and poor people who shared common social identities. Sometimes, they were immigrants from the same region of the country or the same town that had moved to bigger cities; other times, they had the same profession, language, or ethnicity, or they had the same religion or sectarian affiliation. Communal ties and people's social affiliations were stronger than their shared economic interests, and this prevented the formation of class consciousness. In the words of Abrahamian, communal ties "cut through the horizontal classes, strengthened the vertical communal bonds, and thereby prevented latent economic interests from developing into manifest political forces."[45] Similarly, Nikki Keddie uses the term "vertical classes" for describing the Iranian population in the nineteenth century. In the "vertical divisions in society," the homogeneous groups consisted of rich and poor people who were connected based on their shared social identity.[46]

[43] Manuel Castells, *The City and the Grassroots: A Cross-Cultural Theory of Urban Social Movements* (Victoria: Edward Arnold, 1983); Doreen Massey, *Spatial Divisions of Labor: Social Structures and the Geography of Production*, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 1995); David Harvey, *Paris, Capital of Modernity* (New York: Routledge, 2003); Henri Lefebvre, *Writings on Cities*, trans. Eleonore Kofman and Elizabeth Lebas (Malden: Blackwell Publishers, 1996); Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*.

[44] The analysis of Iranian urban society in the nineteenth century is largely based on the valuable works of Ervand Abrahamian, Nikkie R. Keddie, and Ann K. S. Lambton. My contribution is the spatial examination of their social analysis. I am deeply indebted to these scholars for their valuable insight and scholarly works.

[45] Abrahamian, *Iran between Two Revolutions*, 36.

[46] Keddie, "Class Structure and Political Power," 305. Shireen Mahdavi uses the term "status groups" instead of vertical classes: Shireen Mahdavi, "Everyday Life in Late Qajar Iran," *Iranian Studies* 45, no. 3 (2012): 356.

The juxtapositions of rich and poor people in the same communities were spatially manifested in their coexistence in urban wards.[47] The wards were smaller sections of the city with a more homogeneous population. Each ward was like a community whose members had a similar social identity. They were self-sufficient units with marketplaces for the daily needs of their inhabitants, bathhouses, religious buildings, gymnasiums, and coffeehouses.[48] Not only were the wards independent of each other, they had semi-independent administrative systems too. The head of the ward was the *Kadkhudā*, selected by the prominent families in the ward, the elders, or high-ranking members of the community.[49] *Kadkhudā*s were the official connection of the urban communities to the state and the other communities.[50]

By considering the role of the craft guilds, another element of Iranian urban life, "communal diversity"[51] becomes more complicated. People pursuing the same craft often formed a closed community.[52] The occupational identity of the guilds had its own unique spatial manifestation. Each guild had a specific section, *rāstih*, in the urban bazaars, which "strengthened their sense of corporate life."[53] Moreover, similar to the wards, each guild had a *Kadkhudā* as the head of the guild. Following more or less the same tasks, he handled the

[47] Ashraf and Banuazizi, "Class System v. Classes in the Qajar Period."

[48] For more details in this regard, see: Ashraf, "Vizhigiha-yi Tarikhi-yi Shahrnishini dar Iran," 38–41; Hambly, "The Traditional Iranian City in the Qajar Period," 7: 566–7; Ervand Abrahamian, "Oriental Despotism: The Case of Qajar Iran," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 5, no. 1 (1974): 15–16, 23–4.

[49] Hambly, "The Traditional Iranian City in the Qajar Period," 567; Abrahamian, "Oriental Despotism," 23; Abrahamian, *Iran between Two Revolutions*, 22.

[50] The *Kadkhudā* had a mediating role between the people of the ward and the state. Inside the ward, they were peacemakers, resolving minor conflicts, overseeing shopkeepers, and so forth. Regarding the outside world, they were responsible for the taxes of their community and the implementation of royal orders. Hambly, "The Traditional Iranian City in the Qajar Period," 566; Lambton, *Islamic Society in Persia*, 11.

[51] Abrahamian, *Iran between Two Revolutions*, 18.

[52] Lambton, *Islamic Society in Persia*, 20. For more information for guilds, see: Floor, *Justarhaʾi az Tarikh-i Ijtimaʿi-yi Iran*, 2: 31–4.

[53] Lambton, *Islamic Society in Persia*, 20. Guity Nashat echoes the same argument: Guity Nashat, "From Bazaar to Market: Foreign Trade and Economic Development in Nineteenth-Century Iran," *Iranian Studies* 14, no. 1/2 (1981): 68.

internal conflicts of the guild and its relationship to the outer world, particularly to the state. Both the *Kadkhudā*s of the wards and guilds worked under the direct supervision of the state's representative in the cities.[54]

The segmented nature of the urban society – the communal diversity – also had a downside. A common feature of premodern urban life in Iranian cities was the rivalry between different wards. Sometimes, the rivalry was manifested in fights between the wards. Due to religious conflicts, ethnic enmities, sectarianism, and the like, wards often had trouble getting along with each other peacefully. The conflict between the *Ḥaydarī* and *Nīʿmatī* groups is a well-studied case of such an urban rivalry. These were groups following the practices of two different mystic figures. They often engaged in violent confrontations in the cities.[55]

In examining such a segmented urban society, I suggest the notion of the communal sphere for the analysis of Iranian urban society in the nineteenth century.[56] As Chapter 2 discusses at length, in contrast to

[54] For more information on the guilds' organization, see: Floor, *Justarhaʾi az Tarikh-i Ijtimaʿi-yi Iran*, 2: 49–59. The state representative was called *Kalāntar*. For more information on the *Kalāntar*, see: Hambly, "The Traditional Iranian City in the Qajar Period," 564–6.

[55] For *Ḥaydarī* and *Nīʿmatī* conflicts, see: Hossein Mirjafari and J. R. Perry, "The Ḥaydarī-Niʿmatī Conflicts in Iran," *Iranian Studies* 12, no. 3/4 (1979): 135–62; John R. Perry, "Toward a Theory of Iranian Urban Moieties: The Ḥaydariyyah and Ni'matiyyah Revisited," *Iranian Studies* 32, no. 1 (1999): 51–70; Rahimi, *Theater State and the Formation of Early Modern Public Sphere*, 299–303; Terry Graham, "The Niʿmatuʿllāhī Order under Safavid Suppression and in Indian Exile," in *The Heritage of Sufism: Late Classical Persianate Sufism (1501–1750)*, vol. 3, ed. Leonard Lewisohn and David Morgan (Oxford: Oneworld, 2000), 165–200. Lambton uses "factional strife" and Abrahamian uses "communal conflicts" for the rivalries between various communities of the cities: Lambton, *Islamic Society in Persia*, 15; Abrahamian, *Iran between Two Revolutions*, 26. Also, for general religious and sectarian urban conflicts, see: Ashraf, "Vizhigiha-yi Tarikhi-yi Shahrnishini," 28–33.

[56] Clearly, the phrase "communal sphere" is a loaded term. It has been used in various disciplines with different connotations. For example, in the context of the Soviet and post-Soviet era, the communal sphere is related to the Communist Party and its policies. In their analysis of social welfare in post-Soviet Georgia, Stephen J. Collier and Lucan Way state that "The first two sectors of social welfare we consider – heat and water – are elements of what was referred to in the Soviet period (and still is today in many places) as the 'communal sphere,' which included the material basis of a city and the infrastructures that service it." For the usage of the communal sphere in the Soviet

the bourgeois or proletarian public spheres common in the studies of European urban societies in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries,[57] the communal sphere was not formed based on economic interests. People's shared affiliations were the pivotal principle for the formation of the communal spheres. More importantly, there was not a single communal sphere; segmented urban society produced various communal spheres alongside each other. The most important task of this sphere was to provide the identification of the individuals within broader society; each person was affiliated with at least one community. Moreover, the communal sphere worked toward the wellbeing of its members. The rivalry between various communities is the manifestation of this task; each community had to advance its communal interests against the others.

and post-Soviet context, see: Stephen J. Collier and Lucan Way, "Beyond the Deficit Model: Social Welfare in Post-Soviet Georgia," *Post-Soviet Affairs* 20, no. 3 (2004): 258–84; Rey Koslowski, "Market Institutions, East European Reform, and Economic Theory," *Journal of Economic Issues* 26, no. 3 (1992): 673–705; Ellen Comisso, "Property Rights, Liberalism, and the Transition from 'Actually Existing' Socialism," *East European Politics & Societies* 5, no. 1 (1990): 162–88. Besides the studies of the Soviet and post-Soviet era, the communal sphere is a common term in the studies of multicultural societies, particularly in the European context. It can refer to immigrant communities in European cities, for example. As Tiryakian mentions, it is "a sphere of everyday customs, of informal patterns of socialisation, of grass-roots values and modes of expression." For some examples, see: John Rex and Gurharpal Singh, "Multiculturalism and Political Integration in Modern Nation-States: Thematic Introduction," *International Journal on Multicultural Societies* 5, no. 1 (2003): 3–19; Edward A. Tiryakian, "Assessing Multiculturalism Theoretically: E Pluribus Unum, Sic et Non," *International Journal on Multicultural Societies* 5, no. 1 (2003): 20–39; Sami Zubaida, "Islam in Europe," *Critical Quarterly* 45, no. 1–2 (2003): 88–98. The third area of the usage of the communal sphere is in economics, in which the communal sphere stands in contrast to the market: Virgil Henry Storr, "The Market as a Social Space: On the Meaningful Extraeconomic Conversations that Can Occur in Markets," *The Review of Austrian Economics* 21, no. 2 (2008): 135–50; Virgil Henry Storr, "Why the Market? Markets as Social and Moral Spaces," *Journal of Markets & Morality* 12, no. 2 (2009): 277–96; Stephen Gudeman, *The Anthropology of Economy: Community, Market, and Culture* (Malden: Blackwell Publishers, 2001).

[57] Jürgen Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society*, trans. Thomas Burger and Frederick Lawrence (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991); Margaret Kohn, *Radical Space: Building the House of the People* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003).

While in Chapter 2 I will come back to the notion of the communal sphere and investigate its political role in the formation of the public sphere and the production of political public spaces, in this chapter I investigate the socio-spatial manifestations of the communal sphere in nineteenth-century Tehran, before its 1870s expansion. I suggest that the examination of urban society based on the concept of the communal sphere is the essential analytic component for the study of social life and spaces in Tehran. I also demonstrate how the communal sphere constructed social life and spaces; the production of social spaces was in direct relationship to the communal sphere.

This chapter continues by examining social spaces based on religious practices. It examines the rituals attached to the religious months of Muharram and Ramadan. It shows that the social practices accompanying these religious months created temporary social spaces that were highly colored by communal diversity and rivalry. The chapter then turns to the non-religious instances of social life that occurred in coffeehouses, bathhouses, and traditional gymnasiums, and shows that there was a strong reciprocal relationship between these spaces and the communal sphere. While the above social spaces and practices were highly frequented by men, the chapter ends with the examination of women's social lives and spaces. It demonstrates that the private houses played the role of communal spaces for women and depicts them as lively centers of feminine social interactions and communal life.

Communal Life and Spaces Based on Religious Practices

The boundaries of nineteenth-century Tehran initially formed in the sixteenth century, when the Safavid king, Shah Tahmasp (1524–76), built a rampart around the existing village and a bazaar inside it. However, it was in the late eighteenth century when Agha Muhammad Khan (1789–97), the founder of the Qajar dynasty, chose Tehran as his capital. During the reign of the next three Qajar monarchs, Tehran's population grew from 50,000 to around 150,000 people, and the city expanded inside its sixteenth-century ramparts by transforming its gardens and farmlands into new neighborhoods. In the late 1860s and the early 1870s, during the reign of Nasser al-Din Shah (1848–96), the state demolished the old ramparts and

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expanded the city, using the European vocabulary of urban planning and design.[58]

In this section, I focus on religious instances of social life and space, perhaps better referred to as communal life and spaces, in nineteenth-century Tehran. A temporal duality had a considerable impact on the spatial configurations of these gatherings: the operation of two different time-keeping systems, the lunar and solar calendars. Historically, the solar calendar was utilized for celebrating Iranian New Year, Nowruz;[59] calculating the agricultural seasons and governmental fiscal years;[60] and tracking the time of some other annual ceremonies with pre-Islamic roots. However, the Islamic lunar calendar was the one constructing people's daily lives. People used it to calculate all religious events and ceremonies, dating daily and weekly periodicals, and structuring their day-to-day activities. The two calendars, however, do not match each other; the lunar calendar is eleven days shorter than the solar one. As a result, the events that are based on the lunar calendar move eleven days backward each year. The difference between the calendars caused Islamic rituals and events to occur in different seasons, and people had to deal with various climatic conditions. As this section discusses, this simple fact had certain spatial impacts on people's social lives.

Muharram and the Formation of Takīyyih*s*

The first month of the Islamic lunar calendar, Muharram, has a great significance in defining the religious identity of the Shiʿi population. The martyrdom of Imam Husayn, the third Shiʿi Imam, symbolizes the center of the faith, which is commemorated annually by holding certain ceremonies during Muharram. The *Taʿzīyih*, or passion play, was a theatrical art form developed in Iran by the end of the Safavid era (1501–1736) and reached its pinnacle in the nineteenth century

[58] For the history of Tehran from its establishment to the Qajar era, see: Karimiyan, *Tehran dar Guzashtih va Hal*; Chahryar Adle and Bernard Hourcade *Téhéran: capitale bicentenaire* (Paris: Institut Français de Recherche en Iran: 1992); Madanipour, *Tehran*; Habibi, *Az Shar ta Shahr*, 111–48.

[59] Nowruz, or Iranian New Year, starts on the first day of spring, usually March 21.

[60] Abrahamian, *A History of Modern Iran*, 10.

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during the reign of the Qajar dynasty (1796–1925).[61] For the Shiʿi rulers of Iran, *taʿzīyih* and other Muharram ceremonies were political instruments used to construct the national and religious identity of the new kingdom.[62]

In nineteenth-century Tehran, one of the main instances of social life occurred in temporary spaces called *takīyyih*. *Takīyyih*s were the places for holding Muharram ceremonies, particularly for the performance of *taʿzīyih*. Generally, scholars of the field examine *takīyyih* as a particular architectural typology. Whenever they fail to find a distinct form, they conclude that "a distinctly recognizable *takia* style of architecture did not emerge"[63] or that "the *takiyeh* was constantly in experimental stages in different regions for various patrons with the result that few final solutions were ever found."[64] Similar to studies of Islamic cities, mere architectural examinations of *takīyyih*s have reduced them to abstract spaces – to an architectural typology – that can be investigated through its physical features. This framework tends

[61] Peter Chelkowski, "Taʿzia," in *Encyclopedia Iranica* (July 15, 2009), www.iranicaonline.org/articles/tazia (accessed June 11, 2015). For the role of Muharram ceremonies during the Safavid era, see: Rahimi, *Theater State and the Formation of Early Modern Public Sphere*; Jean Calmard, "Shiʿi Rituals and Power II: The Consolidation of Safavid Shiʿism – Folklore and Popular Religion," in *Safavid Persia: The History and Politics of an Islamic Society*, ed. Charles Melville (London: I.B. Tauris, 1996), 139–90. For the socio-political role of *taʿzīyih* in the Qajar era and a valuable discussion on the use of *taʿzīyih* and the production of a theory of modern nation, see: Negar Mottahedeh, *Representing the Unpresentable: Historical Images of National Reform from the Qajars to the Islamic Republic of Iran* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2008), introduction and chapter 2.

[62] Enayatullah Shahidi and Ali Bulookbashi, *Pazhuhishi dar Taʿzīyih va Taʿzīyihkhani: Az Aghaz ta Payan-i Durih-yi Qajar dar Tehran [Taʿzīyih and Taʿzīyihkhani in Tehran: A Research on Shiʿa Indigenous Drama of Taʿzīyeh from the Beginning to the End of Qajar Era]* (Tehran: Daftar-i Pazhuhish-ha-yi Farhangi, 1380 [2001]), 107; Rahimi, "Takkiyeh Dowlat," 55–7.

[63] Chelkowski, "Taʿzia."

[64] Samuel R. Peterson, "The Taʿzīyih and Related Arts," in *Taʿzīyih: Ritual and Drama in Iran*, ed. Peter J. Chelkowski (New York: New York University Press, 1979), 74. Similarly, Jakob Eduard Polak, an Austrian physician who was teaching in the Dar al-Funun College of Tehran in the 1850s, mentions that the numbers of the *takīyyih*s are growing "from day to day," but these buildings "hardly deserve anything to mention about." Jakob Eduard Polak, *Persien. Das Land und seine Bewohner. Ethnographische Schilderungen [Persia. The Country and Its Inhabitants. Ethnographic Descriptions]* (Leipzig: Brockhaus, 1865), 84.

to ignore the sociality of *takīyyih*s. In contrast, I present *takīyyih*s through their particular social role and introduce them as one of the most vibrant social spaces of nineteenth-century Iranian urban society.

*Takīyyih*s reflected the communal identities of their users. During the two months of Muharram and Safar, communal spheres manifested spatially at the place of *takīyyih*s; each *takīyyih* belonged to a certain community and served as a medium for the reproduction of communal ties. All the activities at the place of *takīyyih*s were collective; rich and poor; young and old; and men and, to some extent, women, all had specific jobs in the preparation of their community's *takīyyih* for the mourning months and holding the related ceremonies. The term *takīyyih bastan*[65] – which literally means putting together or erecting a *takīyyih* – was used for an annual ceremony in which the *takīyyih*s were prepared a few days before Muharram. Designating a place for a *takīyyih* and its preparation were communal practices.[66] Aghaie argues that the "planning and financing of Muharram rituals […] reinforced a sense of cohesion among" the members of different social groups.[67] Peter Chelkowski provides a valuable description of this communal event:

> Each individual contributed according to his means and ability. The men brought their most precious objects – crystal, lamps, mirrors, china, and tapestry – to decorate the walls of the *takīyyih*. Even the most humble objects were accepted as they were given or lent with religious devotion. Athletes from the gymnasium eagerly donated their strength and agility to put up the *takīyyih*. The women provided refreshments; the children of the aristocracy served water, a symbol of the Kerbela martyrs' thirst, and sweetmeats to all spectators, rich and poor alike.[68]

[65] Afsanih Munfarid, "Takīyyihs," in *Danishnamih-yi Jahan-i Islam* [*Encyclopedia of Islamic World*] (1394 [2015]), http://rch.ac.ir/article/Details/10408 (accessed June 12, 2015); Bahram Beizaʿi, *Namayish dar Iran [A Study on Iranian Theater]*, 3rd ed. (Tehran: Rushangaran va Mutaliʿat-i Zanan, 1380 [2001]), 127.

[66] Peter J. Chelkowski, "Taʿzīyih: Indigenous Avant-Garde Theatre of Iran," in *Taʿzīyih: Ritual and Drama in Iran*, ed. Peter J. Chelkowski (New York: New York University Press, 1979), 7–8; Willem Floor, *The History of Theater in Iran* (Washington, DC: Mage Publishers, 2005), 152–3; Kamran Scot Aghaie, *The Martyrs of Karbala: Shiʿi Symbols and Rituals in Modern Iran* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2004), 20.

[67] Aghaie, *The Martyrs of Karbala*, 35.

[68] Chelkowski, "Taʿzīyih," 7–8.

Even with a permanent building, *takīyyih*s were not socially recognized as mourning sites unless they had gone through the communal process of *takīyyih bastan*. The act of decorating the *takīyyih* space or building, covering the floors with carpets, adorning the walls with black fabrics and shawls, hanging tapestry and pictures of the martyrs, erecting a temporary tent roof, and so forth[69] equated to the changing of an ordinary courtyard, an empty plot of land, and even a designed and built *takīyyih* building into the real *takīyyih*, into a communal space. People's communal acts and social practices produced *takīyyih* spaces. Their communal identities constituted these relatively small-scale and temporary social spaces. In return, the collective process for the preparation of *takīyyih*s and the mourning rituals at these places reproduced the communal identity of each community of the city.

It is important to note that most of the *takīyyih*s existed at the neighborhood level.[70] The communal act of *takīyyih bastan* happened separately in each neighborhood.[71] This act was the spatial manifestation of the segmented urban society. Consequently, there were occasional instances of factional strife and fights between the members of different communities during the mourning months. These fights usually occurred between the mourning processions, called *dastih*s, of different neighborhoods.[72] *Dastih*s were the most common form of Muharram mourning ceremonies; it was easier and cheaper to organize *dastih*s in the neighborhoods, as opposed to the heavier costs of erecting *takīyyih*s. Each *dastih* consisted of the members of the same community. They usually started their march from the *takīyyih*s of their communities and moved around their neighborhood, performing

[69] Munfarid, "Takīyyihs"; Beizaʿi, *Namayish dar Iran*, 127.

[70] For the list of *takīyyih*s in Tehran, see: Sayyid Hujjat Husayni Balaghi, *Guzidih-yi Tarikh-i Tehran [Summary of Tehran History]* (Tehran: Intisharat-i Maziyar, 1386 [2007]), 298–306; Shahidi, *Pazhuhishi dar Taʿzīyih va Taʿzīyihkhani*, 247–8.The exceptions were *Takīyyih Duwlat* and a few *takīyyih*s belonging to high-ranking people in the royal court and state. These *takīyyih*s were more elaborate and could accommodate thousands of people, so they existed at the city level.

[71] Abdollah Mostofi, *From Agha Mohammad Khan to Naser ed-Din Shah (1794–1896)*, vol. 1 of *The Administrative and Social History of the Qajar Period* [The story of My Life], trans. Nayer Mostofi Glenn (Costa Mesa: Mazda Publishers, 1997), 170–1.

[72] Floor, *Justarhaʾi az Tarikh-i Ijtimaʿi-yi Iran*, 2: 64; Ella C. Sykes, *Persia and Its People* (New York: Macmillan, 1910), 150.

the mourning rituals.[73] Sometime, *dastih*s got out of their neighborhoods and encountered another *dastih*. This was the perfect recipe for the outbreak of a fight between them.[74] On occasion, the authorities had to implement certain regulations to prevent possible fights between the *dastih*s of different neighborhoods.[75]

Besides neighborhood identity, other social stratifications constituted *dastih*s and *takīyyih*s. People from the same ethnic background and the migrants from the same region of Tehran – Afsharhā, Barbarhā, Arabhā (Arabs), Qafqāzhā (Caucasians), Qumīhā (people from Qum city), Kirmānīhā (people from Kerman city), Kāshānīhā (people from Kashan city), and Kharāqānīhā (from Kharaqan region) – or people belonging to the same profession – *zargarhā* (goldsmiths), *qātirchīhā* (people who work with mules), *dabāghkhānih* (tanners), and *kūrhā* (blind people, not a profession of course) – had special *takīyyih*s of their own.[76] As a result, the segmented communal identity was intensely present in the *takīyyih*s. Neighborhood identity, ethnicity, and occupational relations produced the social spaces of *takīyyih*s, and in return these spaces reproduced and reaffirmed those same identities.

*Takīyyih*s were more like fluid social concepts in which the sociality of the rituals had priority over the physicality of space. In other words, the collective act of coming together as the members of the same community in order to hold Muharram ceremonies was the determinative

[73] Aghaie, *The Martyrs of Karbala*, 36; Peter J. Chelkowski, "Dasta," in *Encyclopedia Iranica* (December 15, 1994), www.iranicaonline.org/articles/dasta (accessed January 6, 2016).

[74] Abdollah Mostofi points to the fights that occurred between different *dastih*s of the neighborhoods during the Muharram ceremonies: Mostofi, *From Agha Mohammad Khan*, 1: 159.

[75] For example, in 1895 the authorities forbade the *dastih*s leaving their neighborhoods and marching freely in other parts of the city: *Iran*, Muharram 18, 1313 [July 11, 1895].

[76] In 1893, *Iran* newspaper counted three of the main *takīyyih*s in Tehran in this way: (1) A *takīyyih* in the Friday Mosque by the merchants and people from Kashan, (2) a *takīyyih* in Shiykh ʿAbd al-Husayn School by the Turk merchants and people from Azarbayjan; and (3) a *takīyyih* in Sayyid ʿAziz Allah Mosque by the merchants and people from Isfahan. *Iran*, Muharram 18, 1311 [August 1, 1893]. For the list of *takīyyih*s in Tehran, see: Husayni Balaghi, *Guzidih-yi Tarikh-i Tehran*, 298–306; Shahidi, *Pazhuhishi dar Taʿzīyih va Taʿzīyihkhani*, 247–8. Also see: Munfarid, "Takīyyihs"; Aghaie, *The Martyrs of Karbala*, 33.

factor in the production of the space of *takīyyih*s, rather than the availability of a particular architectural entity. Without the occurrence of this collective act, even the permanent structure of a *takīyyih* did not qualify as a legitimate *takīyyih*. This fact is clearly traceable in the seasonal fluctuations of the numbers of *takīyyih*s in Tehran. Due to the inconsistency between the lunar and solar calendars, the month of Muharram moves around the solar year. As a result, the heat of summer days replaces the cold and snow of winter in sixteen years' time.

Located at the southern foot of the Alburz mountain range, Tehran has a four-season climate, with hot and dry summers and cold winters with occasional snowstorms. By the end of May and early June, the weather starts to get hot in the central city, while the northern boundaries of the city just beneath the mountain range, Shimiranat, remains cooler. This condition does not last long, and, as summer approaches, one needs to travel north, deep into the mountains, to escape the hot and dry weather. After a hot July and by the end of August, summer loses its grip on Shimiranat in the north. It is only by the end of September that the hot summer days are almost over in the central city.

In the nineteenth century, the population of Tehran followed the same seasonal rhythm. John MacDonald Kinneir, who visited Tehran in the early nineteenth century, roughly estimates "that in the months of June, July, and August, the capital cannot boast above ten thousand people. When the King is there, in the winter, the population is supposed to amount to sixty thousand souls."[77] The villages near or deep in the mountains were havens for many people of the city during the hot summer days.

As temporary communal spaces, the number of Tehran's *takīyyih*s depended deeply on the season during which the months of Muharram and Safar coincided. Consequently, with such a fluctuation in the population, the numbers of *takīyyih*s were not consistent during different times of the year. Particularly, the departure of the affluent people of each community during the summer could result in the lack of financial support for that community to erect its *takīyyih*. An 1856

[77] John MacDonald Kinneir, *A Geographical Memoir of the Persian Empire Accompanied by a Map* (London: Cox and Baylis, 1813), 119. Similar to Kinneir, William Ouseley, who visited Tehran in 1811–12, estimates the same 60,000 people for winter. He mentions that the population was much less than that in summer. William Ouseley, *Travels in Various Countries of the East; More Particularly Persia* (London: Rodwell and Martin, 1823), 3: 119–20.

Table 1.1 ***Number of* takīyyih*s in Tehran's old neighborhoods***

Year	Document	Corresponding months to Muharram	Number of *takīyyih*s
1843/1259	Berezin travelogue	February	58
1852/1269	Buildings survey	October and November	54
1858/1275	Kriziz map	August–September	42
1869/1286	Population survey	April and May	34
1899/1317	Buildings survey	May and June	36[a]

[a]The real number is forty-three. Seven *takīyyih*s belonged to the new neighborhoods of the city after the expansion in the 1870s.
Sources: Willem Floor, *The History of Theater in Iran*, (Washington, DC: Mage Publishers, 2005): 148; Sirus Sʿadvandiyan and Mansureh Ettehadieh, *Amar-i Dar al-Khalafih-yi Tehran: Asnadi az Tarikh-i Ijtimaʿi-yi Tehran dar ʿAsr-i Qajar [Statistics from Tehran the Capital: Documents from Social History of Tehran in the Qajar Era]* (Tehran: Nashr-i Tarikh-i Iran, 1990), 38, 350, 355; Auguste Kriziz, "Naqshih-yi Dar al-Khalafih-yi Tehran," [ca. 1858], Tehran Map Collection, American Geographical Society Library, University of Wisconsin Milwaukee, Milwaukee.

entry in the *Vaqayiʿ Itifaqiyyih* newspaper shows that the number of *takīyyih*s fluctuated with the seasons. In that year, Muharram was in the summer, and many people were out of the city at the time. However, *Arbaʿīn*[78] ceremonies were in fall. The newspaper mentions that people erected *takīyyih*s for *Arbaʿīn* ceremonies, even in the places where there were no *takīyyih* during Muharram.[79]

Table 1.1 shows the numbers of *takīyyih*s in the old city of Tehran as referred to in different documents such as maps, travelogues, and building surveys. This table demonstrates which months from the Gregorian calendar coincided with the Muharram month of the year that the documents were surveyed in. Looking at the table, it is no surprise that Berezin, a Russian orientalist, recorded fifty-eight *takīyyih*s in his travelogue. In 1842, possibly the year that he was in Tehran during Muharram, the mourning month was in February. The coinciding of Muharram with one of the coldest months of the year resulted in the

[78] Forty days after the 10th of Muharram, Husayn's murder-day, is called Arbaʿīn. Once again, people held *takīyyih*s and *taʿzīyih* performances on this day.
[79] *Vaqayiʿ Itifaqiyyih*, Safar 23, 1272 [November 4, 1855].

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presence of a bigger population in the city and an increase in the number of *takīyyih*s. However, as the table demonstrates, other documents were compiled in the years in which Muharram coincided with warmer seasons. Based on these facts, the coinciding of Muharram with the warmer months resulted in a smaller residential population in Tehran and a smaller number of *takīyyih*s in the 1858, 1869, and 1899 surveys.

As social spaces, the numbers of *takīyyih*s were in direct relation to the size of the population. If one examines these spaces merely as permanent architectural entities, it is not possible to explain the changes in the numbers, particularly regarding the fact that the popularity of Muharram ceremonies increased throughout the nineteenth century. Shahidi argues that the number of *takīyyih*s increased dramatically during the Nasser al-Din Shah era.[80] Similarly, Babak Rahimi mentions that "[w]ith the rise of Nasir al-Din Shah, the popularity of Muharram, especially in its taʿziyeh form, had grown so expansively that Tehran included a number of major takkiyeh sites at the cross section of neighborhoods."[81] However, as is evident from the surveys – particularly the 1869–70 survey – there is a contradiction to these claims; the number of *takīyyih*s has dropped from fifty-four in 1852–3 to thirty-four in 1869–70.

In the context of nineteenth-century Tehran, people did not necessarily count a permanent structure as a *takīyyih*; the architectural permanency was not a criterion for the formation of *takīyyih*s.[82] *Takīyyih*

[80] Shahidi and Bulookbashi, *Pazhuhishi dar Taʿzīyih va Taʿzīyihkhani*, 172.

[81] Rahimi, "Takkiyeh Dowlat," 62.

[82] This fact does not mean that I reject the architectural commonalities between *takīyyih*s. Certain architectural characteristics were common among the *takīyyih*s. The "curtainless" performance stage was located in the middle of the spectators. In caravanserais, mosques, and private courtyards, the central pools, *ḥuż*, were converted into the performance stages simply by covering them with wooden boards. People would sit around the central stage, and the players would simply jump down from the stage to announce their absence from the scene or jump back onto the stage to announce their return. There were empty corridors running through the spectators to an outer circle to provide passage for the entrance of new players, animals, troops, and the like. In *takīyyih*s with built architectural forms, one or two levels of arches – *tāqnamā* – usually circumscribed the central space, providing special sitting areas. For a more detailed architectural description of *takīyyih*s, see: Muhammad Tavasuli, "Husayiyyih-ha, Takaya, Musala-ha," in *Miʿmari-i Iran dar Durih-yi Islami [Iran Architecture in Islamic Era]*, ed. Muhammad Yusif Kiyani (Tehran: SAMT), 157–68; Beizaʿi, *Namayish dar Iran*, 124–6; Floor, *The History of Theater in Iran*, 145–7; Chelkowski, "Taʿzia"; Rahimi, "Takkiyeh Dowlat."

was the place of the coming together of the members of the same community for the collective act of mourning; the collective, communal act was the determining factor in the production of the social life and space of the *takīyyih*. As a result, the surveys did not count *takīyyih*s through their physical qualities and the permanency of their structures. They counted the number of places where communities gathered for mourning rituals, regardless of the quality of their structures. It is the twenty-first-century mentality that prioritizes the architectural manifestation over the sociality of spaces and reifies every social activity with a particular physicality. The projection of this mentality over the nineteenth-century landscape of Iranian cities can cause serious flaws in the study of social spaces of the time.

Communal Life in Tehran during the Month of Ramadan

During the nineteenth century, before the first phase of urban development in Tehran, there were strict nighttime regulations in the city. Four hours past sunset, drums announced the start of a curfew, and police forces arrested people half an hour after the drumming.[83] For one month each year, however, the government suspended these strict nighttime regulations. The fasting month of Ramadan was a break in the daily routine of the city, particularly when Ramadan coincided with the warm seasons.[84] Fasting from dawn to dusk, people started their social lives after sunset. The government relaxed the nighttime curfew and people could move around the city freely.[85] As a result, for one month each year, the people of Tehran could experience a temporary nightlife.

The neighborhoods' mosques were the main centers of communal life during Ramadan. Mosques were the centers of the daily

[83] *Vaqayiʿ Itifaqiyyih*, Dhu l-Qaʿda 15, 1270 [August 9, 1854]. William Ouseley mentions the same nighttime regulation and arrests in 1811–12 during Fath ʿAli Shah's reign: Ouseley, *Travels in Various Countries*, 3: 160. Gaspard Drouville, who was in Iran in 1812–13, mentions the same strict nighttime regulations in the bazaar. Gaspard Drouville, *Voyage en Perse, Fait en 1812 et 1813* (Paris: Chez Masson et Yonet, 1828), 106.

[84] Dustʿali Khan Muʿir al-Mamalik, *Yaddasht-ha-ʾi az Zindigani-yi Khususi-yi Nasser al-Din Shah [Notes from Nasser al-Din Shah's Private Life]* (Tehran: Nashr-i Tarikh-i Iran, 1361 [1982]), 68.

[85] *Vaqayiʿ Itifaqiyyih*, Ramadan 13, 1268 [July 1, 1852].

collective prayers of the members of each urban community, and they were much more crowded during Ramadan month.[86] The most important ceremony of the month happened on *Qadr* Nights,[87] when people gathered in the mosques to hold a prayer vigil throughout the night:

> The three nights of Ihyā[88] were the praying nights; people were going to the mosques after breaking their fasts […] the preachers would go to the pulpit to do their sermons […] and since people considered crying from fear of God as worship, the preachers would make them cry. Then people would put a Quran over their heads and pray for all the Muslims. Near the dawn, they would return to their houses.[89]

In 1853,[90] Tehran had 112 mosques and nine *imamzadih* shrines.[91] As a result, people were able to gather with their own communities at a mosque in the neighborhood they belonged to; they did not need to travel long distances in the city. Besides the mosques, people had other options for nightlife during Ramadan. Coffeehouses and bathhouses were open throughout the night. People, particularly tradesmen, would gather in coffeehouses listening to storytellers, reciting poetry, or playing games every night.[92] Bathhouses were open twenty-four hours each day, and people occupied them after their morning prayer until sunset, when they would break their fasts, and again after

[86] Mostofi, *From Agha Mohammad Khan*, 1: 183.

[87] Qadr Nights (Shab-i Qadr) are three nights in the last ten days of Ramadan. Muslims believe that God revealed the first sentences of the Quran to the Prophet Muhammad during one of these nights. They believe that God grants all prayers on this night.

[88] Another name for the Qadr Nights.

[89] Since the available translation does not match the Persian text, I translated this section from Persian directly and did not use the available English translation. Mostofi, *Az Agha Mohammad Khan*, 1: 329.

[90] 1269HJ.

[91] Sirus Sʿadvandiyan and Mansureh Ettehadieh, *Amar-i Dar al-Khalafih-yi Tehran: Asnadi az Tarikh-i Ijtimaʿi-yi Tehran dar ʿAsr-i Qajar [Statistics from Tehran the Capital: Documents from Social History of Tehran in the Qajar Era]* (Tehran: Nashr-i Tarikh-i Iran, 1368 [1990]), 38.

[92] Ali Al-i Dawud, "Coffeehouse," in *Encyclopedia Iranica* (December 15, 1992), www.iranicaonline.org/articles/coffeehouse-qahva-kana-a-shop-and-meeting-place-where-coffee-is-prepared-and-served (accessed June 16, 2015); Ali Bulookbashi, *Qahvih and Qahvihkhanihnishini dar Iran [Iranian Coffeehouses: Traditions of Meeting and Passing Time at the Coffeehouses]* (Tehran: Daftar-i Pazhuhish-ha-yi Farhangi, 1393 [2014]).

that until dawn.[93] As a result, Ramadan was another religious catalyst for the reproduction of the communal ties of urban society.

Non-religious Practices and Communal Spaces

In addition to the religious manifestations of the communal sphere, there were non-religious instances of social life and communal spaces in nineteenth-century Tehran. Each ward, as a section of the city with more or less homogeneous populations, and each *rāstih*, as a section of the bazaar with homogeneous crafts, contained certain types of communal spaces that were the centers of non-religious social life for the members of their communities. This section examines three main types of these communal spaces: coffeehouses, bathhouses, and traditional gymnasiums.

Coffeehouses

The Qajar coffeehouses[94] were the remnants of a social trend that began in the sixteenth century – Safavid era – through the mass consumption of coffee in Iranian cities, particularly in Isfahan as the capital of the empire.[95] The Safavid coffeehouses owed their success to the specific social role they adopted: they filled the existing void between two different types of social life: the one of the religious organizations such as mosques and religious schools, and the one of disreputable places such as taverns.[96] Due to such a unique position, coffeehouses spread rapidly in Isfahan and other urban centers during the Safavid era.[97]

[93] Jaʿfar Shahri, *Tehran-i Qadim [Old Tehran]* (Tehran: Intisharat-i Muʿin, 1371 [1992]), 1: 515.

[94] *Qahvihkhānih*

[95] For more details on the coffee consumption in Iran during the Safavid Iran, see: Rudi Matthee, "Coffee in Safavid Iran: Commerce and Consumption," *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 37, no.1 (1994): 1–32; Nasrullah Falsafi, "Tarikh-i Qahvih va Qahvihkhanih dar Iran [The History of Coffee and Coffeehouses in Iran]," *Sukhan* 5, no. 4 (1332 [1953]): 258–68; Al-i Dawud, "Coffeehouse."

[96] Matthee, "Coffee in Safavid Iran," 23–4.

[97] For the discussion on the number of the coffeehouses in Safavid Isfahan and their locations, see: Matthee, "Coffee in Safavid Iran," 21–2; Falsafi, "Tarikh-i Qahvih va Qahvihkhanih dar Iran," 261; Rahimi, *Theater State and the Formation of Early Modern Public Sphere*, 195–7; Farshid Emami,

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In this era, as the centers for more affluent people, coffeehouses adopted additional social roles besides leisure and coffee drinking. They were suitable places for the artists, intellectuals, and poets to meet up and exchange their works.[98] However, one of the most important roles of the coffeehouses, which continued beyond the Safavid era up to the twentieth century, was that of hosting epic storytelling or *naqqālī*.[99] *Naqqālī* was the recitation of – usually epic and non-religious – stories in front of public audiences. Using different epic stories, particularly those of *Shahnama*, the storyteller recited the story in the middle of a circle in a non-theatrical form.[100] He could cut his stories into pieces, telling each part on a different night. As a result, coffeehouses were great places to guarantee a permanent stage and bring the audience back the other nights. People knew where and when to find their favorite storytellers to follow their stories.[101]

The architecture of coffeehouses was in direct dialogue with what happened inside them, particularly the act of *naqqālī*. European travelers and ambassadors to the court of the Safavid monarchs recorded detailed descriptions of coffeehouses in their travelogues. The

"Coffeehouses, Urban Spaces, and the Formation of a Public Sphere in Safavid Isfahan," *Muqarnass* 33 (2016): 177–220; Rudi Matthee, *The Pursuit of Pleasure: Drugs and Stimulants in Iranian History, 1500–1900* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), 162–63, 165; Saïd Amir Arjomand, "Coffeehouses, Guilds and Oriental Despotism: Government and Civil Society in Late 17th to Early 18th Century Istanbul and Isfahan, and as Seen from Paris and London," *Archives Européennes de Sociologie* 45, no. 1 (2004): 23–42.

[98] Al-i Dawud, "Coffeehouse"; Falsafi, "Tarikh-i Qahvih va Qahvihkhanih dar Iran," 261.

[99] William Hanaway, "Dāstān-Sarāʾī [Storytelling]," in *Encyclopedia Iranica* (December 15, 1994), www.iranicaonline.org/articles/dastan-sarai (accessed June 17, 2015).

[100] In *naqqālī*, the storyteller tells the story and performs the roles of all the characters by himself. He does not use any theatrical element such as stage decorations, costumes, or music. For more about *naqqālī*, see: Floor, *The History of Theater*, 85–103; Beizaʿi, *Namayish dar Iran*, 65–83; Soheyla Nadjm, *Hunar-i Naqqali dar Iran [The Art of Storytelling in Iran]* (Tehran: Matn, 1390 [2011]); Farideh Razi, *Naghali va Ruhuzi [Storytelling and Ru-Hawzi]* (Tehran: Nashr-i Markaz, 1390 [2011]); Mary Ellen Page, "Professional Storytelling in Iran: Transmission and Practice," *Iranian Studies* 12, no. 3/4 (1979): 195–215; Kumiko Yamamoto, "Naqqāli: Professional Iranian Storytelling," in *A History of Persian Literature*, vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yarshater (London: I.B. Tauris, 2010), 240–57.

[101] Hanaway, "Dāstān-Sarāʾī."

coffeehouses did not have any chairs or tables. Instead, there were platforms made out of masonry or wood all around these interior spaces. The platforms were three feet high and three to four feet wide, and covered with carpets where people could sit. In the middle there was a water basin, and the walls were whitewashed or covered with tiles up to three to five feet from the ground.[102] Sometimes there was a stage for the storyteller, usually in the middle. As a result, similar to *takīyyih*s, people could surround the main happenings inside the coffeehouses.[103]

By the demise of the Safavid Empire, Iranian coffeehouses went through a period of hibernation. The political turmoil that began with the 1722 collapse of Isfahan and lasted until the full establishment of the Qajar dynasty in the nineteenth century has caused scholars such as Rudi Matthee to argue that Iranian society "involuntarily" withdrew "into the confines of the private realm."[104] By the mid-nineteenth century, the number of the coffeehouses once again grew in Iranian cities, particularly in the new capital, Tehran. However, this time tea had replaced coffee as the main drink, while the name of the establishments remained the same: *qahvihkhānih*, or coffeehouse.[105]

European travelogues contain fewer accounts of coffeehouses in the Qajar Tehran as compared to the Safavid Isfahan. Similarly, fewer secondary sources examine this topic. The scarcity of the accounts in the Qajar period is the result of the differences between the social roles of these spaces in the Qajar and Safavid eras. During the Safavid era, coffeehouses were places for affluent people of society. Safavid kings, especially Shah ʿAbas I (1588–1629), hosted their European guests in the coffeehouses around Naqsh-i Jahan Square.[106]

[102] For the accounts of the coffeehouses in Isfahan in the travelogues, see: Sir John Chardin, *Travels in Persia 1673–1677* (New York: Dover Publications, 1988), 241; Emami, "Coffeehouses, Urban Spaces, and the Formation"; Matthee, "Coffee in Safavid Iran," 21; Al-i Dawud, "Coffeehouse"; Falsafi, "Tarikh-i Qahvih va Qahvihkhanih dar Iran," 261; Nadjm, *Hunar-i Naqqali dar Iran*, 324–6.

[103] Beizaʿi, *Namayish dar Iran*, 79; Matthee, "Coffee in Safavid Iran," 25.

[104] Rudi Matthee, "From Coffee to Tea: Shifting Patterns of Consumption in Qajar Iran," *Journal of World History* 7, no.2 (1996): 207.

[105] For more information about the gradual process through which tea consumption replaced coffee consumption in Iranian society, see: Matthee, "From Coffee to Tea."

[106] Falsafi, "Tarikh-i Qahvih va Qahvihkhanih dar Iran," 263.

The Qajar coffeehouses were the centers of communal life of their owners and customers, and they adopted functions beyond mere venues for entertainment and conviviality. Each coffeehouse belonged to a certain community, and they were colored by the communal identity of their users. Sometimes, coffeehouses belonged to specific professions; for example, most guilds had their own specific coffeehouse. These coffeehouses functioned as "employment exchanges." Traders belonging to a certain guild knew where to find their suitable workers. Similarly, people seeking a particular job opportunity just had to be present in a certain coffeehouse where their profession's guild was situated.[107] Moreover, coffeehouses had the same function for strangers coming from other cities to Tehran. To find the people from their community they just had to go to the specific coffeehouses where they were gathering.[108] Using several sources and field studies, ʿAli Bulookbashi names more than forty coffeehouses in Tehran that were the gathering places of various professions, ethnic groups, and people from other cities of the country.[109]

The interior arrangement of coffeehouses remained almost the same as that of the Safavid era. Moreover, *naqqālī* remained an inseparable part of their activities in nineteenth-century Tehran.[110] Based on an estimate, around 80 percent of the coffeehouses of Tehran had their own specific sessions of *naqqālī*.[111] In addition, coffeehouses were places for other social activities such as poetry recitation, comedy shows, and playing specific games.[112] These collective, communal activities, similar to the collective act of *takīyyih bastan*, could foster, reproduce, and enhance the collective identity of the members of the same community.

The only document that provides the number of coffeehouses in the nineteenth century is a book of memoirs from a member of the royal

[107] Shahri, *Tehran-i Qadim*, 2: 141–2; Bulookbashi, *Qahvih and Qahvihkhanihnishini dar Iran*, 78–84; Floor, *Justarhaʾi az Tarikh-i Ijtimaʿi-yi Iran*, 2: 61; Al-i Dawud, "Coffeehouse."

[108] Al-i Dawud, "Coffeehouse."

[109] Bulookbashi, *Qahvih and Qahvihkhanihnishini dar Iran*, 78–84.

[110] Beizaʿi argues that *naqqālī* did not develop in cities that did not have coffeehouses. Beizaʿi, *Namayish dar Iran*, 81.

[111] Bulookbashi, *Qahvih and Qahvihkhanihnishini dar Iran*, 93.

[112] Jaʿfar Shahri, *Tarikh-i Ijtimaʿi-yi Tehran dar Qarn-i Sizdahum: Zindigi, Kasb va Kar [The Social History of Tehran in the 13th-Century: Life, Work and Profession]* (Tehran: Rasa, 1369 [1990]), 1: 401–7; Bulookbashi, *Qahvih and Qahvihkhanihnishini dar Iran*, 100–14.

family. In 1886, the king commanded that all the coffeehouses of the city be closed.[113] The memoir mentions that, at the time of the command, there were 360 coffeehouses in the city.[114] The second document that contains the number of coffeehouses belongs to the *Guilds' Stores Survey of Tehran* (1917–18), which counted 416 coffeehouses in the city.[115] Twelve years later, in 1929, another survey counted 711 coffeehouses,[116] and in 1933 there were as many as 614.[117]

As communal spaces, the Qajar coffeehouses had their own particular group of customers, and they functioned as their meeting places. Men of each community gathered in coffeehouses for socializing, playing games, reciting poetry, or listening to storytellers. No outsider could enter a coffeehouse that did not belong to his community. The coffeehouses, similar to the *takīyyih*s, were the products of communal diversity. Segmented Iranian urban society produced small-scale social spaces highly colored with communal identity. In return, these spaces were the primary venues for the reproduction of the same social identities. The communal affiliations could be reproduced through the social interactions of the people from the same community at the place of the coffeehouse.

Bathhouses

Bathing was an indispensable part of people's lives in nineteenth-century Iranian society. Due to religious beliefs, a Muslim must be in a state of purity if he wants to do his daily prayers. Certain activities,

113 *Iran-i Sultani*, Ramadan 17, 1303 [June 20, 1886]; Bulookbashi, *Qahvih and Qahvihkhanihnishini dar Iran*, 44.
114 ʿIyn al-Saltanih, *Ruznamih-yi Khatirat-i ʿIyn al-Saltanih*, 1: 211.
115 Sirus Sʿadvandiyan, *ʿAdad-i Abniyyih, Shumarih-yi Nufus: Az Dar al-Khalafih ta Tehran 1231–1311 Khurshidi [Number of the Buildings, Population: From Dar al-Khalafih to Tehran 1231–1311 Solar Calendar]* (Tehran: Vizarat-i Farhang va Irshad-i Islami, 1380 [2001]), 241.
116 Al-i Dawud, "Coffeehouse." I could not personally find the original source for this number. I contacted the *Encyclopedia Iranica* and they also could not help me in this regard. As a result, I trust the original author of the *Encyclopedia* entry and quote his finding.
117 Baladiyyih Tehran, *Sarshumari-yi Nofus-i Shahr-i Tehran: Dar Sanavat-i 1262 va 1270 va 1301 va 1311 [The Survey of Tehran Population in the Years 1262 and 1270 and 1301 and 1311]* (Tehran: Matbaʿih-yi Majlis, 1312 [1933]), 33. For access to this booklet you can refer to the National Library and Archive of Iran.

such as sexual intercourse, violate the purity of the body; therefore, Muslims have to take special baths, *ghusl*, to restore that purity.[118] Having the right *ghusl* demanded immersion in water in a way that the head went beneath the surface. In the nineteenth century, with their pools of water, no place was better than bathhouses to perform the right *ghusl*. As a result, it is no surprise that Samuel Greene Wheeler Benjamin, the first American diplomat in Tehran, states that there were many public baths in Tehran and everyone "resorts to them at least once weekly; some do it daily."[119]

The public baths were relatively cheap and there was no distinction between rich and poor in having access to them.[120] However, inside the bathhouse there were specific places, *shāhnishīn*, for affluent people who could receive a better service by paying extra fees.[121] Only wealthy people and people of the court had private baths in their houses.[122] Moreover, they could rent a public bathhouse for their private use by paying extra fees for certain hours.[123] Religious minorities were restricted from Muslims' bathhouses; they had their own designated bathhouses, separate from the Muslims'.[124] Moreover, men's and women's baths were distinct from each other's, or they used the same bathhouse during separate hours.[125]

Bathing was a time-consuming activity, demanding two to three hours.[126] As a result, it was a social activity rather than a private one.

[118] For more information on the topic, see: Hamid Algar, "Cleansing II. In Islamic Persia," in *Encyclopedia Iranica* (December 15, 1992), www.iranicaonline.org/articles/cleansing-ii (accessed June 18, 2015).

[119] Samuel Greene Wheeler Benjamin, *Persia and the Persians* (London: John Murray, 1887), 90.

[120] Willem Floor and W. Kleiss, "Bathhouses," in *Encyclopedia Iranica* (December 15, 1988), www.iranicaonline.org/articles/bathhouses (accessed June 18, 2015); Muhsin Tabassi, *Garmabih-ha-yi Irani dar Ayinih-yi Safarnamih-ha [The Iranian Baths in the Mirror of Diaries]* (Mashhad: Sukhangustar, 1390 [2011]), 29; Polak, *Persien*, 360.

[121] Tabassi, *Garmabih-ha-yi Irani dar Ayinih*, 20.

[122] Floor and Kleiss, "Bathhouses."

[123] Shahri, *Tehran-i Qadim*, 1: 518.

[124] In her travelogue, Carla Serena mentions that the Christian could not use the Muslim bathhouses in Tehran. She points to the fact that the Armenians had their specific bathhouses in the city. Carla Serena, *Hommes et Choses en Perse* (Paris: Charpentier, 1883), 161; Polak, *Persien*, 360.

[125] Floor and Kleiss, "Bathhouses"; Shahri, *Tehran-i Qadim*, 1: 525

[126] Bathing consisted of other services, such as shaving body and facial hair, dying hair, massaging, and spending time in the hot and cold pools. The inner

In the words of Floor: "Bathhouses played an important role in social life. The bath was frequented for religious, hygienic, and medical reasons and for socializing and relaxation. It was also often a place for passing information and spreading rumors."[127] People got together and socialized for hours while doing their bath activities. The architecture of the bathhouses provided the setting for such social gatherings. The inner chamber consisted of two or three pools of water, at different temperatures, where many people could get in at the same time.

The best space for socializing, however, was the main lobby after the entrance, called *sarbīnih*. The architecture of the *sarbīnih* was similar to that of coffeehouses, with masonry or wooden sitting platforms all around the interior space that were usually covered with carpets, a water basin in the middle, walls covered with tiles, and some pictures from the epic stories of *Shahnama* hanging from the walls.[128] Before getting into the inner chambers, and especially after returning from them, people used to spend enough time in *sarbīnih* to adjust their body temperature, while drinking tea or coffee, smoking, having food or snacks, napping, and socializing.[129] Gaspar Drouville, a French military officer visiting Iran in the early nineteenth century, reports that bathhouses were suitable places for merchants to get together and do business while they were smoking or having tea or coffee. They could update themselves with the recent news: "public baths are still used as a rendezvous for middleclass individuals. The foreigners and the merchants also gather to make friends or talk business."[130] Moreover, different spaces in the bathhouse had special games, which helped people pass the long hours of bathing joyfully.[131]

chambers of the baths were scorching and humid spaces. Before getting to such an intense condition and spending one or two hours there, people had to go through a hierarchy of spaces, usually two stages, to adapt their body to the conditions of the inner chamber. Each intervening space had a set of functions and services. For more information about different stages of bathing and their additional services, see: Floor and Kleiss, "Bathhouses"; Shahri, *Tehran-i Qadim*, 1: 470–516; Drouville, *Voyage en Perse*, 78–83; Tabassi, *Garmabih-ha-yi Irani dar Ayinih*, 19–26; Polak, *Persien*, 356–60.

[127] Floor and Kleiss, "Bathhouses."

[128] Floor and Kleiss, "Bathhouses"; Tabassi, *Garmabih-ha-yi Irani dar Ayinih*, 20.

[129] Shahri, *Tehran-i Qadim*, 1: 511.

[130] Drouville, *Voyage en Perse*, 83. Similarly, Willem Floor calls the bathhouse "a place for passing information and spreading rumors." Floor and Kleiss, "Bathhouses."

[131] Shahri, *Tehran-i Qadim*, 1: 482–5, 497–8.

Besides the routine bathing and its accompanying social interactions, bathhouses provided the families of each neighborhood with appropriate loci for certain ceremonies, such as wedding baths, labor baths, circumcision baths, and the like. In these instances, the bathhouse changed into a party stage where the distribution of sweets, drinks, and fruits was part of the ceremonies, along with live music.[132]

Similar to mosques, coffeehouses, and *takīyyih*s, most of the bathhouses served Iranians at the neighborhood level, meaning that each neighborhood had its own bathhouses and people did not need to travel long distances in the city to access a bathhouse. Based on the nineteenth-century building surveys of Tehran, in 1852 there were 153 bathhouses in the city. This number reached 182 in 1899.[133] These numbers show the accessibility of bathhouses for various urban communities. The accounts of social life at bathhouses demonstrate how these spaces were venues for various social interactions at the communal level. Similar to the other communal spaces, Iranian urban dwellers preferred to maintain their close ties with the people of their own communities and use small-scale communal spaces for socializing.

Traditional Gymnasiums, or Zūrkhānihs

*Zūrkhānih*s, literally meaning the house of strength, were the traditional Iranian gymnasiums.[134] At first glance they were places for male

[132] Shahri, *Tehran-i Qadim*, 1: 518; Henry Rene D'Allemagne, *Safarnamih az Khurasan ta Bakhtiyari [From Khurasan to Bakhtiyari Travelogue]*, trans. Farihvashi (Tehran: Amirkabir, 1956), 1: 262.

[133] Sʿadvandiyan and Ettehadieh, *Amar-i Dar al-Khalafih-yi Tehran*, 38, 355.

[134] There is no consensus among the scholars of the field about the origins of *zūrkhānih*. From Iranian guerilla fighters after the seventh-century Arab invasions to the pre-Islamic era, various scholars propose different origins for the organization. However, the first actual descriptions of *zūrkhānih*, as we know it today, go back to the Safavid era. For discussions of the origins of *zūrkhānih*, see: Sadred-din Elahi, "Nigahi Digar bih Sunati Kuhan: Zurkhanih [Another Glance at an Ancient Tradition: Zurkhanih]," *Iranshinasi* 6, no. 4 (1373 [1995]): 726–45; Ghulamreza Insafpur, *Tarikh va Farhang-i Zurkhanih va Guruh-ha-yi Ijtimaʿi-yi Zurkhanih-ru [History and Culture of Zurkhanih and Its Social Groups]* (Tehran: Vizarat-i Farhang va Hunar, 1353 [1974]): 38–40; Husayn Partu Beizaʿi Kashani, *Tarikh-i Varzish-i Bastani-yi Iran: Zurkhanih [The History of Iranian Traditional Sport: Zurkhani]* (Tehran: Intisharat-i Zavvar, 1382 [2003]); Kazim Kazimini,

bodybuilding practices and wrestling competitions. They were arenas where men could train their bodies through specific exercises and learn wrestling techniques from the elder wrestlers of their neighborhoods.[135] *Zūrkhānih*s were masculine spaces; only men after puberty were allowed to enter and practice in them. The deeper examination of *zūrkhānih*s shows that they were institutions that exalted the ideals of traditional masculinity based on certain social and moral principles, such as "generosity, mutual help, courage, loyalty, respect for elders, and keeping one's word."[136] Any Shiʿi adult man was free to enter and become a member of the *zūrkhānih* in his neighborhood.[137]

From lay people to aristocrats, there was no limitation on joining the club. People's social status had no place inside the *zūrkhānih* and members disregarded their social status in order to serve their communities.[138] Ridgeon calls it an "anti-structure" where people had to ignore their social status via symbolic stooping while entering

Naghsh-i Pahlavani va Nihzat-i ʿAyari dar Tarikh-i Ijtimaʿi va Hayat-i Siyasi-yi Iran: Taʿrif-i Zurkhani va Tahlil-i Varzish-i Bastani [Championship and ʿAyars Movement in Social History and Political Life of Iranian Nation: Description of Zurkhanih and Analysis of Traditional Sport] (Tehran: Bank-i Milli, 1343 [1964]). For the pre-Qajar accounts of *zūrkhānih* in Europeans' travelogues,see: Chardin, *Travels in Persia*, 200–1; William Francklin, *Observations Made on a Tour from Bengal to Persia in the Years 1786–7* (London: Strand, 1817), 66–70.

[135] For the traditional bodybuilding practices in *zūrkhanīh*, see: Kazimini, *Naghsh-i Pahlavani va Nihzat-i ʿAyari*, 293–368; Insafpur, *Tarikh va Farhang-i Zurkhanih*, 317–52; Shahri, *Tehran-i Qadim*, 1: 170–8; Drouville, *Voyage en Perse*, 216–20.

[136] Philippe Rochard, "The Identities of the Iranian Zūrkhānah," *Iranian Studies* 35, no. 4 (2002): 317.

[137] Minorities were not accepted in Shiʿi Muslim *zūrkhānih*s. However, in the cities with a considerable population of Jews, Armenians, and Zoroastrians, they had their own specific *zūrkhānih*s. Houchang E. Chehabi, "Zur-Ḵāna," in *Encyclopedia Iranica* (August 15, 2006), www.iranicaonline.org/articles/zur-kana (accessed June 19, 2015).

[138] A. Reza Arasteh, "The Social Role of the Zurkhana (House of Strength) in Iranian Urban Communities during the Nineteenth Century," *Der Islam* 37 (1961): 259. Arasteh's analysis of a nineteenth-century list that contains the names of Pahlivans (*zūrkhānih* senior wrestlers) shows their diverse social backgrounds from ordinary farmers and herdsmen to merchants, aristocrats, and princes. Arasteh, "The Social Role of the Zurkhana," 258–9. Similarly, Abdollah Mostofi names wealthy merchants, aristocrats, and members of the royal family who joined the *zūrkhānih*s in the nineteenth century: Mostofi, *From Agha Mohammad Khan*, 1: 174.

the interior space and putting on special uniforms. He argues that in *zūrkhānih*, as an anti-structure, "emerges an egalitarian society of undifferentiated social relations among the athletes."[139] However, *zūrkhānih*s had a specific internal social hierarchy that structured all of their rituals and social relations. This hierarchy was based on the history of participation, merits, athletic power, and social work of the members.[140]

*Zūrkhānih*s were not mere gymnasiums, they were the centers of complex social relations penetrating the whole traditional Iranian urban society. *Lūtī*s were the main members of *zūrkhānih*s.[141] Each *lūtī* group was devoted to serving their neighborhood.[142] It is no surprise that there were occasional rivalries and fights between *lūtī* groups of different neighborhoods; they defended their neighborhoods against outsiders. Similar to Muharram ceremonies, communal conflicts were

[139] Lloyd Ridgeon, "The Zūrkhāna between Tradition and Change," *Iran: Journal of the British Institute of Persian Studies* 45 (2007): 245.

[140] Mostofi, *From Agha Mohammad Khan*, 1: 174; Ridgeon, "The Zūrkhāna between Tradition and Change," 245.

[141] There is a well-established ambiguity surrounding the role of *lūtī*s, which, in the words of Hambly, presents "the historian with some real epistemological problems." Many scholars see *zūrkhānih*s as powerful social organizations with a wide range of altruistic deeds. At the same time, they are stigmatized, with contradictory labels defining them as the centers for people who sold their strength to political parties, rascals who were skillful in using daggers to reach their goals, *chāqūkish*s, agents of the state, and people who were practicing some of the social taboos of nineteenth-century Iran, such as homosexuality. For more information on *lūtī*s and different explanations of their related ambiguity, see: Hambly, "The Traditional Iranian City in the Qajar Period," 7: 571; Lambton, *Islamic Society in Persia*, 18–19; Abrahamian, *Iran between Two Revolutions*, 22–3; Rochard, "The Identities of the Iranian Zūrkhānah," 323; Reza Arasteh, "The Character, Organization and Social Role of the Lutis (Javan-Mardan) in the Traditional Iranian Society of the Nineteenth Century," *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 4, no. 1 (1961): 52; Ali Bulookbashi, "Naqsh va Karburd-i Ijtimaʿi-yi Zurkhanih dar Jamiʿih-yi Sunnati-yi Iran [The Role and Social Function of Zurkhanih in Traditional Iranian Society]," *Hafiz* 9 (1383 [2004]): 39; Elahi, "Nigahi Digar bih Sunati Kuhan," 740; Shahri, *Tehran-i Qadim*, 1: 184; Insafpur, *Tarikh va Farhang-i Zurkhanih*, 168; Mostofi, *From Agha Mohammad Khan*, 1: 172–4; Floor, *Justarhaʾi az Tarikh-i Ijtimaʿi-yi Iran*, 1: 243–66.

[142] Floor, *Justarhaʾi az Tarikh-i Ijtimaʿi-yi Iran*, 1: 251; Abrahamian, *Iran between Two Revolutions*, 22–3; Lambton, *Islamic Society in Persia*, 18–19; Ridgeon, "The Zūrkhāna between Tradition and Change," 244.

inseparable parts of the social interactions of *lūtī* groups. Each group regarded the members of other communities as outsiders and they could not tolerate any trespassing into their territory.[143]

Being a *lūtī* was more than being a good wrestler; the *lūtī*s were respected in their communities, and in return they adopted certain social roles to serve their communities. Their social roles were confined to the neighborhood to which they belonged. *Lūtī*s served their communities in different ways, such as: preserving the order and safety of the neighborhood, helping poor people by collecting money and distributing food among them, and holding charity events at the *zūrkhānih* in order to collect money for specific people in need.[144] However, the most active times for *zūrkhānih* people were during religious events, particularly Muharram. During Muharram ceremonies, the *lūtī*s of each neighborhood took on the responsibility for cleaning their *takīyyih*s, preparing the covering tents, decorating the space, collecting money, and even holding the mourning ceremonies.[145]

There is not much data on the exact number of *zūrkhānih*s in Tehran during the nineteenth century. Until 1933, the official surveys of Tehran never counted these institutions. In 1907, Eugène Aubin estimated that there were probably around 100 *zūrkhānih*s in the city.[146] However, this is likely to be two times more than the actual number. By the end of the nineteenth century, as Ridgeon mentions, there were forty-nine *zūrkhānih*s in Tehran.[147] In 1921, thirty-eight *zūrkhānih*s remained,[148] and finally in 1933, there were eighteen *zūrkhānih*s, mostly in the old neighborhoods of the city.[149]

143 Rochard, "The Identities of the Iranian Zūrkhānah," 339; Floor, *Justarhaʾi az Tarikh-i Ijtimaʿi-yi Iran*, 1: 251; Arasteh, "The Social Role of the Zurkhana," 259.

144 Dick H. Luijendijk, "The Zurkhaneh in Shiraz," *Iran and the Caucasus* 15 (2011): 101–2; Insafpur, *Tarikh va Farhang-i Zurkhanih*, 101–2; Arasteh, "The Character, Organization and Social Role," 51; Floor, *Justarhaʾi az Tarikh-i Ijtimaʿi-yi Iran*, 1: 256; Shahri, *Tehran-i Qadim*, 1: 179–82.

145 Mostofi, *From Agha Mohammad Khan*, 1: 159, 170–3; Arasteh, "The Character, Organization and Social Role," 51; Arasteh, "The Social Role of the Zurkhana," 259; Abrahamian, *Iran between Two Revolutions*, 22.

146 Eugène Aubin, *La Perse d'aujoud'hui – Iran: Mésopotamie* (Paris: Libraire Armand Colin, 1908), 233.

147 Ridgeon, "The Zūrkhāna between Tradition and Change," 252.

148 Ridgeon, "The Zūrkhāna between Tradition and Change," 249.

149 Baladiyyih Tehran, *Sarshumari-yi Nofus-i Shahr-i Tehran*, 33.

As the social roles of *zūrkhānih* demonstrate, the organization was somehow the ultimate socio-spatial manifestation of the communal sphere. The members of *zūrkhānih*s protected their communities, facilitated the communal activities, looked after the people in need, and collected money from the affluent members for the poor people in their community. Moreover, each *zūrkhānih* had its affiliated coffeehouses and bathhouses, and the members of each *zūrkhānih* were responsible for holding the mourning ceremonies in their affiliated *takīyyih*s.

The *zūrkhānih*s, *takīyyih*s, mosques, coffeehouses, and bathhouses of each neighborhood were interconnected. They belonged to the same communities and the same people used to frequent these spaces. Each neighborhood had its own network of these small-scale communal spaces and, collectively, these spaces accommodated the bulk of social interactions for the masculine members of each community. But, where were the places for women's social lives? Was there any feminine space in the patriarchal landscape of nineteenth-century Iran? Were there social interactions between the women of the same community? Or were they the prisoners of the private realm?

Women's Havens in the Patriarchal Landscape

The analysis of nineteenth-century Iranian social spaces is still half-done, because half of society is absent from the scene. As the previous sections demonstrate, the general urban spaces were masculine; women were only present, unrecognizably, beneath their dark veils. Ella C. Sykes perfectly summarizes this masculine landscape when she wonders: "The ladies, who add so much to the attractiveness of European cities, are huddled in Persia in a disguising and shapeless black wrap, by which the prettiest and the plainest are reduced to the same level."[150] *Zūrkhānih*s and coffeehouses were men-only spaces. Women were allowed in *takīyyih*s, but they were only bystanders, watching the plays beneath their dark and impenetrable veils. Men played the female roles in *taʿziyih*s, and to hide their masculinity they covered their faces.[151]

[150] Sykes, *Persia and Its People*, 46.

[151] Chelkowski, "Taʿzia." For a description of spectator women in *takīyyih*s, see: Lady Sheil, *Glimpses of Life and Manners in Persia* (London: John Murray, 1856), 127–8. Sometimes women had to watch the performances from the

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There is no doubt that there was a considerable disparity between men and women in nineteenth-century Iran. Women were deprived of their basic social rights; they could not work independently outside their houses; they did not receive proper education; and they had to marry as children and adapt to an adult lifestyle at a very young age.[152] In the words of Gavin R. G. Hambly, "every woman, without exception, was subordinate to the authority of and under the restraint of a particular man (i.e., father, brother, husband, son)."[153] As a result, it is not surprising that scholars usually depict nineteenth-century Iranian women as the prisoners of the private realm who were confined to the secluded life of the family.[154]

In the rest of this chapter I investigate women's so-called "secluded" life. I demonstrate that there were numerous women-only social spaces in nineteenth-century Tehran, and I examine the dynamics and politics of these spaces and their interconnection with the masculine world. I argue that besides bathhouses and mosques, the *andarūnī*s – inner sections – of houses were women's primary centers of social life; they were the feminine centers of social interactions. This view contradicts the general public–private discourse and its related gendered quality superimposed over the spatiality of nineteenth-century Iranian cities. In this discourse, houses are depicted as the private, feminine realm, and social lives and communal spaces are devoted to men. I suggest that taking this gendered dichotomy at face value prevents

rooftops and the main seating areas were devoted to men: Peterson, "The Taʿzīyih and Related Arts," 65.

[152] The literature on nineteenth-century Iranian women is relatively rich: Lois Beck and Guity Nashat, eds., *Women in Iran from 1800 to the Islamic Republic* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2004); Hamideh Sedghi, *Women and Politics in Iran: Veiling, Unveiling, and Reveiling* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Mahdavi, "Everyday Life in Late Qajar Iran"; Mansureh Ettehadieh, "The Social Condition of Women in Qajar Society," in *Society and Culture in Qajar Iran: Studies in Honor of Hafez Farmayan* ed. Elton L. Daniel (Costa Mesa: Mazda Publishers), 69–97; Susynne M. McElrone, "Nineteenth-Century Qajar Women in the Public Sphere: An Alternative Historical and Historiographical Reading of the Roots of Iranian Women's Activism," *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East* 25, no. 2 (2005): 297–317.

[153] Hambly, "The Traditional Iranian City in the Qajar Period," 7: 586; Jasamin Rostam-Kolayi, "Origins of Iran's Modern Girls' Schools: From Private/National to Public/State," *Journal of Middle East Women's Studies* 4, no. 3 (2008): 58–88.

[154] Sedghi, *Women and Politics in Iran*, 29.

examining *andarūnī*s as women's social spaces infused with various social interactions.

Calling them women's havens, I demonstrate that the boundaries of *andarūnī*s were porous for women; these spaces could change into feminine *takīyyih*s, party and theater stages, and marketplaces. In other words, *andarūnī*s were lively all-women social spaces. This alternative view provides a novel framework to examine women's political activities and their claim over the public sphere and public spaces during the 1905–6 Constitutional Revolution. Chapter 2 returns to this topic and demonstrates how the examination of *andarūnī*s as women's social spaces can cast a new light on their political role in the years to come and how these spaces accommodated the first girls' schools and women's political clubs after the revolution.

In this section, I focus on women's spaces and the role of space in facilitating all-women social interaction and social life. However, it is important to remember that, since the 1980s, the bipolar categorization of spaces in Islamic societies into male/female and public/private has been repeatedly criticized. The works of Janet Abu-Lughod, Leslie Peirce, and Lucienne Thys-Şenocak have questioned this dichotomous view and entered a third space in which the interactions between men and women were more common and the accepted gendered norms were more fluid.[155] In this section, however, my primary goal is to diversify the social role of women's spaces, demonstrate their sociopolitical importance, and to explain their significance as the primary incubators of women's political participation.

The data on the everyday lives of nineteenth-century Iranian women is scarce. Most of the travelogues and memoirs belong to men. They are silent or biased against women's social lives. Due to their lack of contact with Iranian women, European travelers were "reduced

[155] Abu-Lughod, "The Islamic City"; Thys-Şenocak, "The Gendered City"; Lucienne Thys-Şenocak, *Ottoman Women Builders: The Architectural Patronage of Hadice Turhan Sultan* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006); Lucienne Thys-Şenocak, "Space: Architecture, the Ottoman Empire," in *Encyclopedia of Women and Islamic Cultures*, vol. 4 (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 514–518; Leslie P. Peirce, "Beyond Harem Walls: Ottoman Royal Women and the Exercise of Power," in *Servants of the Dynasty: Palace Women in World History*, ed. Anne Walthall (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008), 81–95; Irvin Cemil Schick, *The Erotic Margin: Sexuality and Spatiality in Alteritist Discourse* (London: Verso, 1999).

to supposition, gossip, and stereotypical commentary."[156] Similarly, Iranian memoirs were mostly written by men who were silent about the details of their wives' and daughters' lives. The only window to the hidden world is a handful of travelogues and memoirs written by European and Iranian women. However, these sources disclose just a fraction of feminine society and do not provide a comprehensive picture. European women were mostly in touch with the women from the court. They were invited to the parties inside the royal harem, of which they provided detailed accounts, but they did not reveal the daily lives of ordinary women. The memoirs belong to affluent Iranian women who recorded their daily lives, without talking much about the lives of impoverished women. As a result, the investigation of Iranian women's social spaces in the nineteenth century covers a limited section of society.

Irvin Cemil Schick, in his valuable essay on harems, uses the concept of archipelago for women's spaces in traditional Islamic societies, "where the islands collectively represent the subspace devoted to women, and the sea the subspace devoted to men." In his view, women's subspaces consisted of "harems, public baths, saints' tombs and shrines, recreational areas, cemeteries, and so forth; movement between them was carefully regulated, most notably by the practice of veiling."[157] Here, I adopt the same concept; however, instead of the term harem I use *andarūnī*, meaning the inside space. In the Qajar context, the term harem had a royal connotation, mostly referring to the royal women and their living spaces in the royal compound. Harems of Nasser al-Din Shah and Fath ʿAli Shah (1797–1834) consisted of hundreds of wives, daughters, and servants. In contrast, *andarūnī* was part of the architecture of houses, and it referred to the inside courtyard where no man, except the head of the family and the sons, was allowed to enter. The term refers both to space and to the women of the household. It is important to note that the harem or *andarūnī* did not necessarily mean polygamy.[158] The concept existed even in families with a single wife.[159]

[156] Hambly, "The Traditional Iranian City in the Qajar Period," 7: 586.
[157] Schick, "The Harem as Gendered Space," 72.
[158] Schick, "The Harem as Gendered Space," 71.
[159] Based on the accounts of European travelogues, it seems that polygamy was not a common phenomenon. For example, Jakob Eduard Polak mentions

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
Figure 1.1 The sketch of a typical traditional Iranian house and the configuration of the interior spaces.

Iranian houses had a particular hierarchy of spaces. The entrance room, *hashtī*, was like a filter dividing the access to the *bīrūnī* (the outer section or courtyard belonging to men) and the *andarūnī* (the inner section or courtyard). Using the courtyards to provide light and ventilation, the houses had no opening to the outer world, except the entrance gates. As a result, the inner courtyards, *andarūnī*s, and their adjacent rooms match Schick's feminine islands. Being physically detached from the outer universe, each *andarūnī* and its surrounding rooms was an island belonging to the women of a household (Figure 1.1).

Without a doubt, *andarūnī*s were part of private houses, and access to them was highly controlled by social norms. However, accepting a rigid dichotomy leads us to equalize life in the *andarūnī*s to confinement and women to prisoners. In contrast, analysis of the social relations of these spaces suggests that one should not take this dichotomy for granted. *Andarūnī*s were much more than mere private spaces creating a secluded life for women. The boundaries of the *andarūnī*s were

that: "In the cities only the Khans and the governmental officials marry three or four wives; the artisans and tradesmen cannot afford the expenditures of several wives; they shun the disorder and squandering in the household and hence usually live in monogamy. On the plains and in the nomadic tribes monogamy is general; at most, a chief takes two to three wives [...] In general it can be assumed that monogamy is the rule, polygamy the exception." Polak, *Persien*, 209.

porous. They were lively feminine social spaces infused with varied social interactions.[160] Dominic Parviz Brookshaw demonstrates the same notion in his study of female poets and female patrons during the Qajar era. He demonstrates how an all-women network of poets and patrons existed around the royal harem.[161] This point may contradict the accepted public and private dichotomy or, in the case of this research, the private and communal dichotomy.

During the mourning month of Muharram, *andarūnī*s could change into women's *takīyyih*s for the performance of *taʿzīyih* and all the other related rituals. Munis al-Duwlih, one of the few Iranian women from the nineteenth century who wrote her memoirs, mentions that wealthy women of the city, as well as the women in the royal harem, used to hold *taʿziyih*s for women during Muharram in the *andarūnī*s. Women were self-sufficient for these rituals. There were women to do the religious sermons and recitations; *taʿzīyih* performers were female; the stories, unlike the men's performances, were mostly based on women characters and stories; and they even had trained ponies for the scenes that required horses.[162] Similar to the caravanserais and mosques, the central pools of the *andarūnī*s were converted into the performance stages by covering them with wooden boards.

[160] As the rest of the chapter demonstrates, *andarūnī*s were the places of various all-women social gatherings, such as Muharram ceremonies, comedy shows, dancing parties, poetry recitation, and music concerts. Using Iranian women's memoirs and European women's travelogues, the rest of this chapter investigates various types of women's social gatherings in *andarūnī*s and other all-women social spaces. For the memoirs and travelogues, see: Munis al-Duwlih, *Khatirat-i Munis al-Duwlih Nadimih-yi Haramsara-yi Nasser al-Din Shah [Munis al-Duwlih's Memoirs, the Servant of Nasser al-Din Shah's Harem]*, ed. Sirus Sʿadvandiyan (Tehran: Intisharat-i Zarrin, 1380 [2001]); Taj al-Saltanih, *Khatirat-i Taj al-Saltanih [Taj al-Saltanih's Memoirs]*, ed. Mansureh Ettehadieh and Sirus Sʿadvandiyan (Tehran: Nashr-i Tarikh-i Iran, 1361 [1982]); Badr ol-Moluk Bamdad, *From Darkness into Light: Women's Emancipation in Iran*, trans. F. R. C. Bagley (Hicksville: Exposition Press, 1977); Ella C. Sykes, *Through Persia on a Side-Saddle* (London: A. D. Innes & Company, 1898); Serena, *Hommes et Choses en Perse*; Sheil, *Glimpses of Life and Manners in Persia*.

[161] Dominic Parviz Brookshaw, "Women in Praise of Women: Female Poets and Female Patrons in Qajar Iran," *Iranian Studies* 46, no. 1 (2013): 17–48.

[162] Munis al-Duwlih, *Khatirat-i Munis al-Duwlih*, 96–107; Bamdad, *From Darkness into Light*, 20–2. For a discussion of *taʿziyih* patronage by wealthy women, see: Aghaie, *The Martyrs of Karbala*, 40–1.

In other months, *andarūnī*s could change into places for women's parties. Sometimes all-women music bands and comic-show groups were paid to perform at these parties. Dancing girls were invited to dance and women storytellers, *naqqāl*s, to tell stories.[163] The accounts of similar ceremonies are available in the European women's travelogues, who were mostly invited to the big parties in the royal harem, sometimes taking twelve hours, as illustrated in Carla Serena's travelogue.[164]

While it seems that women's and men's worlds were completely separate, there were numerous interconnections between the two realms. Eunuchs, young boys, and elderly women were the third parties who conducted much of the relationship between the two worlds.[165] Eunuchs were an inseparable part of the royal harem and affluent families' *andarūnī*s. Besides their routine duties to serve women, they regulated all the communications between the inside and outside worlds.[166] Munis al-Duwlih's memoir provides an interesting example. She explains how eunuchs transferred *taʿzīyih* poems, acting skills, and performance tips by learning them from the male players and directors and teaching them to the actresses. Moreover, sometimes eunuchs played music during the performances.[167] Similarly, sometimes blind men were allowed into the women's circles for playing music or reciting sermons.[168]

Besides the relationship between the two realms, the islands of the archipelago were not completely separate from each other either.

[163] Munis al-Duwlih, *Khatirat-i Munis al-Duwlih*, 43, 46, 54–5, 181–5.

[164] Sykes, *Through Persia on a Side-Saddle*, 17–21; Serena, *Hommes et Choses en Perse*, 247–61.

[165] Ella C. Sykes mentions little boys and eunuchs in a royal harem all-women party. Munis al-Duwlih uses the term *ghulām bachih*, little boy servants, to refer to the little boys who were responsible for carrying and delivering bathing necessities for women. She also mentions the role of eunuchs in all-women Muharram ceremonies. One of the interesting cases was the role of old women as a mediator between unmarried women and men in the streets to find husbands for spinsters: Sykes, *Through Persia on a Side-Saddle*, 17, 20–1; Munis al-Duwlih, *Khatirat-i Munis al-Duwlih*, 98, 112, 241.

[166] One of the best sources for studying eunuchs' tasks in the royal harem is Taj al-Saltanih's memoir. She was one of Nasser al-Din Shah's daughters, who provided great details of the internal life of the harem in her memoir. Taj al-Saltanih, *Khatirat-i Taj al-Saltanih*. Also, Badr ol-Moluk Bamdad gives interesting information on eunuchs: Bamdad, *From Darkness into Light*, 12.

[167] Munis al-Duwlih, *Khatirat-i Munis al-Duwlih*, 98.

[168] Munis al-Duwlih, *Khatirat-i Munis al-Duwlih*, 98–9.

Some women could move between various circles and connect them together. Similar to bridges, they conducted the flow of information and social relations between different islands. The *andarūnī*s were meeting places for women vendors and their customers. These vendors were permitted into the *andarūnī*s to sell their goods to women. Deprived of independent stores in the bazaar, they were bringing the market into the women's world. Once again, the boundary between the private spaces and social spaces is blurry. These vendors did not have a single location for their business; they were transcending all the communal–private boundaries of the city and entering different *andarūnī*s. Munis al-Duwlih mentions that they were *andarūnī* women's best sources of news. They transferred news from one island to the other, connecting different women's circles.

A group of these vendors, called *dallālih*, sold expensive objects such as jewelry, clothes, and fabrics. These women had a second duty too. Using their familiarity with different islands, they found brides for the families who had a son ready for marriage. After informing the groom's family, the elderly women of the household would make the first contact with the bride's family by paying a visit to their house.[169] Moreover, *dallālih*s informed other women about the women-only ceremonies around the city and received some money for their information.[170] It was an important social phenomenon. It shows how a parallel feminine network performed alongside the men's world. However, due to the politics of patriarchal society, men do not reflect these social relations in their memoirs.[171]

An important question to ask is whether women's social relations followed the same principles as men's. In other words, can we find a segmented society in the women's realm? Based on the available data, it is hard to provide a definite answer to this question, but it is possible to make some general assumptions. First, since the demographic compositions of the neighborhoods and sub-neighborhoods

[169] Munis al-Duwlih, *Khatirat-i Munis al-Duwlih*, 32–3, 253.

[170] One of these ceremonies was *Jahāzburān*. *Jahāzburān* was a ceremony in which the bride's dowry was transferred into her new house after the marriage. Munis al-Duwlih mentions that this ceremony was one of the favorite ones between the women, and *dallālih*s spread the news in the city in exchange for money; Munis al-Duwlih, *Khatirat-i Munis al-Duwlih*, 48–9.

[171] For more information on the vendors, see: Bamdad, *From Darkness into Light*, 13–14.

were more or less based on coherent social identities, it is possible to say that the women who lived in the same area had a common social affiliation. Consequently, a sense of neighborhood identity conducted women's relationships. That is the reason the visit of the vendors to someone's house could coincide with the gathering of other women in that neighborhood. Munis al-Duwlih describes the visits of *dallālih*s to the houses as small parties, which could take several hours.[172] Second, based on Munis al-Duwlih's accounts, the vendors were specialized in selling specific objects. This specialization was closely related to their city of origin or religion. For example, *dallālih*s and women physicians were mostly Jews. Vendors from Tabriz sold *sifīdāb* (whitening substances for bathing), women from Isfahan sold wigs, and women from Kerman sold needlework.[173] Similar to the Grand Bazaar of Tehran, where a close relationship existed between the city of origin and men's professions, vendors' specializations followed the social segmentation; however, these segments did not have independent spatial manifestations.

As these accounts demonstrate, *andarūnī*s hosted social interactions that in the masculine world each had their own particular space outside private houses. *Takīyyih*s in Iranian cities were the main places for the Muharram mourning rituals and the performance of *taʿzīyih*. Coffeehouses were men's primary spaces for socializing, playing games, and storytelling. Bazaars were the main marketplace for merchants and craftsman. However, the *andarūnī*s hosted all of these functions for women.

The *andarūnī*s were not the only places for women's social interactions. Mosques and bathhouses were the other two favorite places for women's gatherings. Their gatherings in mosques were similar to the men's. In certain times, such as Ramadan and particularly during the *Qadr* Nights, women crowded the mosques. On the twenty-seventh day of Ramadan, women had special ceremonies in the mosques to celebrate the execution of Ibn al-Muljan, the murderer of Imam ʿAli. Women had their specific Ramadan markets, too.[174]

[172] Munis al-Duwlih, *Khatirat-i Munis al-Duwlih*, 253.
[173] Munis al-Duwlih, *Khatirat-i Munis al-Duwlih*, 246–53.
[174] Munis al-Duwlih, *Khatirat-i Munis al-Duwlih*, 151–4. Bamdad gives a different description of the ceremonies on the twenty-seventh of Ramadan. Calling it Wish-Blouse ceremony, she describes that women gathered in the mosques

Women's bathhouses were interesting women-only spaces. Even European men were fascinated by the amount of time that Iranian women spent in the bathhouses: "Women's baths are meeting places for entertainment and exchanging the news of the city. They usually spend half a day in baths, drinking sherbets and killing time with singing and playing music."[175] Carla Serena provides a detailed description of women's bathhouses in her travelogue, *Hommes et Choses en Perse*. In the late 1870s she had the chance to spend a day in a bathhouse after the invitation of one of the royal ladies. She begins her description with these words: "[Going to a bathhouse for women] is like [going to a] joyful picnic. They go there in great numbers."[176] In great detail she describes how bathing was an excuse for socializing. Besides bathing, wearing make-up, and dyeing their hair, women spent hours chitchatting, telling stories (*naqqālī*), playing music, singing, and having lunch and a nap. She mentions that eunuchs brought the lunch to the bathhouse and later came back to take out the dishes. The bathing took ten hours, from eight in the morning to six in the evening.[177]

Carla Serena describes the interesting farewell scene in these words: "it was the [farewell] time. All of them put on loose and wide trousers over their short skirts, put on their slippers, then wrap themselves in dark *chādur*s [veil] connected to *rūband*s [face cover]. Under this uniform costume, princesses and maids were the same."[178] She notes the same contrast when she departed a women's party in the royal harem, wondering how the royal women who had metamorphosed into beautiful butterflies in the morning had to return to their "disgraceful covers" one more time.[179] The metamorphosis of women back to the veils guaranteed their safe passage from one island to the other. In Iranian patriarchal society, the feminine islands were supposed to remain undiscovered by the public male gaze. Women were like patches of the

"to cut and stitch the cloth which they had bought" earlier with the money obtained through begging. They made wish-blouses to wear in the afternoon; Bamdad, *From Darkness into Light*, 15.

175 Polak, *Persien*, 360.

176 Serena, *Hommes et Choses en Perse*, 161.

177 Serena, *Hommes et Choses en Perse*, 159–65.

178 Serena, *Hommes et Choses en Perse*, 165.

179 Serena, *Hommes et Choses en Perse*, 260. For more information on the bathhouses, see: Bamdad, *From Darkness into Light*, 14–15.

feminine world that could move around the masculine realm, as long as they were hiding beneath their *chādur*s.

Accepting the public–private discourse and assigning the gender dichotomy to the resulting spatiality limits our understanding of social spaces in traditional Iranian cities and prevents the investigation of women's social lives and spaces. There were parallel universes in Iranian cities for men and women. Men and women could not pass the threshold and enter each other's spaces without consequences. While separate from each other, they had interconnections through specific media. For women, besides mosques and bathhouses, the *andarūnī*s undertook the main role as social spaces. These spaces were more than a private space deep in the house; they could be lively social spaces, formed based on the communal and gender identities of women, and in return they were reproducing the same identities. It is not possible to see these social roles if *andarūnī*s are left in the private section of the communal–private dichotomy.

Moreover, as Chapter 2 discusses, women's havens or feminine social spaces provided the primary centers for the first women's movements in Iran; they were venues facilitating women's mobilization. It would be misleading to assume that women had nothing to do, except have fun, while they were together. With the unjust balance of power between men and women, how can one deny the possibility of resistance in women's social spaces? In 1894–5, Bibi Khanom Astarabadi, a woman from Tehran, wrote a book called *Maʿayeb al-Rejal*, or *Vices of Men*. This book was a response to an earlier book named *Taʾdib al-Nesvan*, or *The Education of Women*, written in 1886–7 by an unknown author. The latter was a controversial guidebook for husbands to teach the proper behavior to their wives. The interesting point is that Bibi Khanom mentions that her friends had urged her to write the book in response to *The Education of Women*.[180] Based on her accounts, their conversations occurred in women's circles, where they gathered and discussed different topics:

one day I was in the house of a friend, where there was a gathering of women, and the meeting became very lively. This humble author was the garden's nightingale and the singing bird of the congregation. Each story

[180] Hasan Javadi and Willem Floor, trans., *The Education of Women; and, The Vices of Men: Two Qajar Tracts* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2010), 64–6.

had a moral, and each tale an advice, so much so that we ended up gossiping, and I tried to stop them. I said the Prophet has said, "Gossiping is worse than adultery." One of the women who had a sallow face and a heart full of sorrows because of her unmanly husband sighed deeply and said, "Oh my sister, you do not know anything of our grieving and burning hearts. You consider this unburdening of sorrows as gossip."[181]

This account shows how women's gatherings could be venues for discussions regarding their social rights. In the introduction to the English translation of *Vices of Men* and *The Education of Women*, Hasan Javadi and Willem Floor argue that it is an important piece of information which "shows not only that women talked about more than their hairdos, their clothes, and the like, but also that Bibi Khanom must have been well known in these women's circles as somebody with strong feelings about the matter of women's rights."[182]

The question that can be asked in the context of this research is where the places for women to have such political discussions were. The answers are limited. In nineteenth-century Iran, women did not have a designated newspaper or any other sort of media as a platform for such a debate. There was no public venue through which they could act against *The Education of Women*. With certainty, the debates happened in an *andarūnī*. These spaces could be active political venues for critical gatherings rather than mere socializing circles. The next chapter examines the political role of these spaces during the Constitutional Revolution and their importance for women's movements and Iranian women's attempts to claim their position in the public sphere and public spaces.

Conclusion

In this chapter I intentionally avoided examining nineteenth-century Tehran through the morphological analysis of the spatial structure of the city. I avoided drawing diagrams that demonstrate the relationship between the city gates, bazaar, royal compound, and main mosques of the city. As I claimed earlier, these diagrams and typological studies dominate the main body of literature on Middle Eastern and North African cities. In contrast, the socio-spatial investigation of cities is

[181] Javadi and Floor, *The Education of Women*, 63.
[182] Javadi and Floor, *The Education of Women*, xii.

absent from these studies. As a result, I approached nineteenth-century Tehran and its spatiality through a social analysis of the daily lives of ordinary people and the related spatiality. I investigated the places that people gathered for common social activities and I examined the reciprocal relationship between these spaces and social identities. Through this framework, I demonstrated how shared communal identities and the communal sphere played a decisive role in the social production of communal spaces.

The communal sphere was the sphere of individual people and families who could identify themselves with a common identity, such as religion or sectarian affiliation, profession, city of origin, or language. Unlike the bourgeois or proletariat public spheres, people's economic statuses were not the basis for the formation of the communal sphere; each community consisted of both wealthy and impoverished people. The most important task of the communal sphere was the identification of individuals in the broader urban society; this provided people with a social base and identified them with a social status. Moreover, the communal sphere benefited the wellbeing of the community. More affluent members supported the collective ceremonies; members of *zūrkhānih* protected their neighborhoods against outsiders, helped impoverished people, and provided the workforce for ceremonies, such as Muharram mourning rituals; and all the people collaborated to hold their ceremonies collectively.

The spatial manifestation of the communal sphere in the nineteenth century was small-scale architectural spaces – communal spaces – inside the wards. These spaces were the centers of genuine social life at the communal level. From permanent spaces, such as coffeehouses, *zūrkhānih*s, bathhouses, and mosques, to temporary spaces, such as *takīyyih*s, each segment of the urban population had its particular spaces. These small-scale architectural segments were the products of Iranian communal practices and, in return, they reproduced and reaffirmed their communal identity through playing games in coffeehouses and bathhouses, practicing shared rituals in *zūrkhānih*s, producing the place of rituals in *takīyyih*s, and reciting poetry and stories in coffeehouses. In the words of Massey, "spatial differentiation, geographical variety, is not just an outcome: it is integral to the reproduction of society and its dominant social relations."[183] The interiors of these spaces

[183] Massey, *Spatial Divisions of Labor*, 289.

were reflections of a segmented society, suitable for small gatherings and sharing in a communal activity. As a result, each of these spaces had its particular games, events, and different sorts of entertainment. They were small places where people could feel their common bonds based on their shared affiliations.

Religiosity had a considerable role in the production of communal spheres in the nineteenth century. Some of the most significant instances of social life were based on people's religious beliefs and practices. It is important to note that, despite the fact that most of the communities practiced the same religion, they were still detached from one another during major religious ceremonies. Their communal differences prevented their amalgamation. Each neighborhood had its own *takīyyih*, formed its own *dastih*, and held its own ceremonies.

The communal spaces and practices of coffeehouses, *takīyyih*s, and *zūrkhānih*s were extremely masculine. Women were absent from the communal scene or, in the best-case scenario, they were silent, unrecognizable figures beneath their thick and dark veils. As a result, it is convenient to claim that women belonged to the private sphere of the family. While private houses were the spatial representation of the private sphere, as this chapter demonstrated, the boundary between the private and communal realms was porous for women. There were considerable interrelations between the two realms within private houses. Private spaces could temporarily change into *takīyyih*s, theaters, concert and dance halls, urban markets, and other similar places for non-private activities for the women of the same community.

The communal sphere was the hallmark of Iranian urban society in the nineteenth century, which distinguishes it from its European counterparts. Examination of this sphere and its spaces is crucial for studying the formation of the public sphere in the early twentieth century and its transformation toward the mid-twentieth century. This is the task of Chapter 2. This chapter returns to the role of the communal sphere, but this time it investigates the political aspects of the communal sphere and its role in the formation of the broader public sphere and the production of political public spaces. In other words, Chapter 2 examines the relationship between society and the state as mediated through the spatiality of the city.

2 *Segmented Society and Spaces of Political Mobilization*

On July 10, 1906 clashes between military forces and protesters in Tehran resulted in the death of a theology student. The furious crowd carried the body of the student to the Friday Mosque, and soon many had gathered in the mosque to protest against the state. Nazim al-Islam Kermani, an eyewitness, recorded the events of the day. As he mentions in his book, the crowd grew bigger and bigger when various religious leaders of the city, accompanied by students, shopkeepers, and ordinary people, departed their neighborhoods and joined the protesters.[1] Ahmad Kasravi, a historian at the time of the events, describes the scene in the mosque in these words: "Merchants and bazaaris were all present and joined the struggle. The cloth merchants brought over a huge tent, set it up in the mosque courtyard, and brought out the samovars [for making tea] and furniture they needed from their houses."[2]

These short accounts of the protest contain interesting points. Why did people protest in the Friday Mosque and not in the streets and squares of the city? What was the role of the religious leaders? Why did the protesting crowd form through the gathering of smaller groups, each following a cleric? What was the role of the merchants? Why did the merchants bring a tent, samovars, and furniture to the mosque, and not weapons or anything else that suits fighting against the state?

By utilizing the notions of the communal sphere and segmented urban society developed in Chapter 1, this chapter investigates the relationship between society and the state as mediated through the spatiality of the city. It studies Iranians' political practices in public

[1] Nazim al-Islam Kermani, *Tarikh-i Bidari-yi Iranian [The History of Iranians' Awakening]*, vol. 3 (Tehran: Itisharat-i Bunyad-i Farhang-i Iran, 1357 [1978]), 481.
[2] Ahmad Kasravi, *History of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution*, vol. 1, trans. Evan Siegel (Costa Mesa: Mazda Publishers, 2006), 122–3.

spaces that contested the state during the 1905–6 Constitutional Revolution. It seeks to better understand the troubled relationship between society and the state and its geographical manifestations. As a result of this troubled relationship, Iranian society managed to delimitate the absolutist monarchy and bind it to certain political and social norms. Two theoretical concepts stand out in this context: the public sphere and the political public space. This chapter deals with the relationship between these two concepts in a different geography, beyond the dominance of Western European and North American narratives.

Drawing in part on Jürgen Habermas's discussion in *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*, here I understand the public sphere as a medium between society and the state that enables the former to exert influence on the latter.[3] Political public spaces provide the spatial manifestations of the public sphere.[4] It is possible to investigate material manifestations of the public sphere in other media, such as newspapers and books;[5] however, political public spaces provide unique platforms for people's collective political activities, and do so in ways that intersect with other aspects of urban life.

I do not take the main theoretical concepts – the public sphere and political public spaces – at face value by adopting the Habermasian model of the public sphere without questioning its legitimacy for Iranian urban society. I demonstrate, in fact, that the Habermasian model cannot fully theorize the normative relationship between the state and society in Iran. In other words, I approach the subject through the

[3] Jürgen Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society*, trans. Thomas Burger and Frederick Lawrence (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991), 27.

[4] Neil Smith and Setha Low, "Introduction: The Imperative of Public Space," in *The Politics of Public Space*, ed. Setha Low and Neil Smith (New York: Routledge, 2006), 1–16; Don Mitchell, *The Right to the City: Social Justice and the Fight for Public Space* (New York: Guilford Press, 2003); David Harvey, "The Political Economy of Public Space," in *The Politics of Public Space*, ed. Setha Low and Neil Smith (New York: Routledge, 2006), 17–34; Margaret Kohn, *Radical Space: Building the House of the People* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003).

[5] For example, see Habermas's discussion of "the public sphere in the world of letters," or Benedict Anderson's discussion of the role of print-capitalism in the production of "imagined communities" and the formation of nationalism: Habermas, *The Structural Transformation*, 51–6; Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections of the Origins and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1991), 26–46.

analysis of Iranian urban society and the main socio-political forces during the episodes of contention. Moreover, I demonstrate the close relationship between political public spaces and the production of social spaces in the nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries.

In nineteenth-century Iran, the absence of wider socio-economic classes had significant political consequences. In order to prevent local grievances from changing into large-scale opposition, the Qajar dynasty manipulated the communal conflicts between various communities. As a result, in the absence of class consciousness and the ongoing conflict between various segments of society, the Qajar court did not face any serious internal threats throughout the nineteenth century.[6]

This socio-political context was in great contrast to the relationship between society and the state in Western European countries during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Jürgen Habermas's public sphere largely depends on the existence of a European bourgeoisie as a particular class at the time. The development of early capitalism and trade and the ownership of private property distinguished this class from the rest of society and gave it autonomy from the state.[7] Besides the Habermasian model, alternative modes of the public sphere in Europe deeply depended on class consciousness. A valuable example in this regard is Margaret Kohn's study of the Italian working class at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century as a vehicle to define the proletariat public sphere.[8] Once again, the

[6] For a valuable discussion of this topic, see: Ervand Abrahamian, *Iran between Two Revolutions* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), 36–49; Ervand Abrahamian, "Oriental Despotism: The Case of Qajar Iran," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 5, no. 1 (1974): 3–31.

[7] Habermas, *The Structural Transformation*, 55.

[8] Kohn, *Radical Space*. Also see: E. P. Thompson, "Patrician Society, Plebeian Culture," *Journal of Social History* 7, no. 4 (1974): 382–405; E. P. Thompson, *The Making of the English Working Class* (New York: Vintage Books, 1963); Kenneth H. Tucker, *French Revolutionary Syndicalism and the Public Sphere* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Lynn Hunt, *Politics, Culture, and Class in the French Revolution* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004); Nick Crossley, "On Systematically Distorted Communication: Bourdieu and the Socio-analysis of Publics," in *After Habermas: New Perspectives on the Public Sphere*, ed. Nick Crossley and John Michael Roberts (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), 88–112; Madeleine Hurd, "Class, Masculinity, Manners, and Mores: Public Space and Public Sphere in Nineteenth-Century Europe," *Social Science History* 24, no. 1 (2000): 75–110; Megan Smitley, *The Feminine Public Sphere: Middle-class Women and Civic Life in Scotland, C. 1870–1914* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2009).

concept of the public sphere was based on people's shared economic interests.

Regarding the segmented social context in nineteenth-century Iranian urban society, it is important to re-evaluate the concepts of public and private. Is it possible to define the public sphere as the aggregate of private people coming together to regulate the public sphere against the state? Who were the private people in this context? Were they the property owners independent of the public authority? Did they have common economic interests? What does the public sphere mean beyond the geographical and historical confines of the eighteenth-century bourgeois society of Western Europe? How is the spatiality of the public sphere different from London, Paris, and Berlin? These are legitimate questions that this chapter seeks to answer. However, responding to these questions demands a theoretical framework that contextualizes the investigation beyond the geographical scope of Western Europe. This expanded contextualization helps to commence a dialogue between the findings of the chapter and the current body of knowledge on the subject and diversify the historical and geographical range of the theories by encompassing an alternative narrative.

In other words, before proceeding, a predicament needs to be addressed: that of the universality of the theoretical frameworks and terminology that underpin this research. I deal with this predicament at the beginning of this chapter and build the essential theoretical foundation for the analysis of the formation of the public sphere and the production of political public spaces in the particular context of Tehran in the early twentieth century. More specifically, in what follows, I focus on two primary theoretical principles. First, I examine the universality of the Habermasian conception of the public sphere and its generalizability beyond its historical and geographical confines. Second, I investigate the spatial aspect of the public sphere and the relationship between the public sphere and the production of political public spaces.

The Public Sphere: Universal or Contextual?

Jürgen Habermas's bourgeois public sphere is a mediator between civil society and the state, which holds the state accountable to society. It is "the sphere of private people come together as a public; they soon claimed the public sphere regulated from above against the public

authorities themselves."[9] Habermas's study provides a model of critical social theory by establishing a source for the rise of a new mode of power against the absolutist sovereignty.[10] In this concept, a system of norms, legitimated by public opinion, binds the state's activity.[11] The new political consciousness was the outcome of critical public debates of the bourgeois public through the medium of the institutions of the public sphere: French *salon*s, British coffeehouses, German *Tischgesellschaften*, and the world of letters. This political consciousness "articulated the concept of and demand for general and abstract laws and [...] ultimately came to assert itself (i.e. public opinion) as the only legitimate source of this law."[12] The bourgeois private people were autonomous from the public authority by means of their ownership of private property.[13] The emancipation of commodity exchange and social labor from the state as the result of the structural transformation of European society and the development of early capitalism and trade were crucial for the production of bourgeois society.

Habermas's public sphere, as a result, seems to be an extremely contextual concept, formed and transformed between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries in Western Europe. The adjective of bourgeois in the bourgeois public sphere emphasizes its contextuality. Nevertheless, Habermas seeks to extract universal rules from the bourgeois public sphere. The formation of public opinion, in Habermas's view, largely depends on rational debate between various members of society at the place of the institutions of the public sphere: "The bourgeois public's critical debate took place in principle without regard to all preexisting social political rank and in accord with universal rules [...] These rules, because universally valid, secured a space for the individuated person."[14] As a result, a tension forms between the contextuality and universality of this concept that has frequently been the subject of criticism.

Called bracketing,[15] the process of disregarding the preexisting social status as a means of eliminating inequality and the imperative

[9] Habermas, *The Structural Transformation*, 27.
[10] Kohn, *Radical Space*, 28.
[11] Habermas, *The Structural Transformation*, 82.
[12] Habermas, *The Structural Transformation*, 54.
[13] Habermas, *The Structural Transformation*, 55.
[14] Habermas, *The Structural Transformation*, 54.
[15] Habermas, *The Structural Transformation*, 36; Nancy Fraser, "Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing

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of public debates cannot necessarily provide a foundation for democracy. In this view, social equality is not a necessity of public debates; rather, social equality should be achieved temporarily through the practice of bracketing. As a result, the practice of bracketing, in contrast to its universal ideal, worked for a tiny section of bourgeois society. Racial, gender, and class exclusions were the preconditions for this practice.[16]

Consequently, besides being highly exclusive, the production of a singular public sphere by temporary bracketing of differences and inequalities seems to be unattainable. Moreover, the production of public opinion through public debates narrows down to the privileged section of society and cannot be generalized to the public, if we understand the public to mean all inhabitants of a given territory.[17]

Moreover, rational debate cannot be regarded as the sole medium for the production of public opinion and challenging hegemonic power. As this chapter discusses, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the existence of pre-established social and religious frames was the basis for the formation of public opinion in the Iranian context. Similarly, Babak Rahimi's valuable study of the public sphere in Isfahan during the Safavid reign demonstrates how the performative and communicative aspects of Muharram mourning rituals provided the basis for challenging the state and producing alternative publics.[18]

Democracy," in *Habermas and the Public Sphere*, ed. Craig Calhoun (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992), 117–21; Carl Cassegård, "Contestation and Bracketing: the Relation between Public Space and the Public Sphere," *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 32 (2014): 692–4.

[16] Kohn, *Radical Space*, 29–35; Mitchell, *The Right to the City*, 34; Seyla Benhabib, "Models of Public Space: Hannah Arendt, the Liberal Tradition, and Jürgen Habermas," in *Habermas and the Public Sphere*, ed. Craig Calhoun (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992), 92; Also see: Joan B. Landes, *Women and the Public Sphere in the Age of the French Revolution* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988); Smitley, *The Feminine Public Sphere*; Mary P. Ryan, "Gender and Public Access: Women's Politics in Nineteenth-Century America," in *Habermas and the Public Sphere*, ed. Craig Calhoun (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992), 259–88.

[17] As Margaret Kohn explains, "The bourgeois could conceive of his interests as universalizable because they were already reflected in the structures of the economic system." In an even more pessimistic interpretation, Kohn argues that the idealized and universal concept of the bourgeois public sphere can serve "to reinforce the power differentials." Kohn, *Radical Space*, 35.

[18] Babak Rahimi, *Theater State and the Formation of Early Modern Public Sphere in Iran* (Leiden: Brill, 2012).

Using Bakhtin's notion of carnivalesque[19] and incorporating Hannah Arendt's[20] and Dana R. Villa's[21] views on the role of action and theatricality as alternative approaches to the Habermasian deliberative conception, Rahimi demonstrates how "Muharram entails carnivalesque strategies that include motifs of misrule that disrupt a cohesive meaning of orchestrated performances with unpredictable consequences."[22] These alternative views diversify the monotonic Habermasian approach, which depends on oral and textual spheres as the main realms of the production of public opinion and the public sphere.

While the Habermasian universal norms of the public sphere, which are reliant on the bracketing of inequalities and rational debates, cannot set a framework for the examination of the relationship between the state and civil society beyond the specific historical and geographical context of the theory, Howell[23] argues that by boiling down the concept, the normative aspect of the public sphere can be universalized beyond its historical context. Habermas's public sphere creates a normative relationship between civil society and the state through the collective action of people.[24] In this view, the public sphere is a

[19] Mikhail Bakhtin, *Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics*, ed. and trans. Caryl Emerson (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984); Michael E. Gardiner, "Wild Publics and Grotesque Symposiums: Habermas and Bakhtin on Dialogue, Everyday Life and the Public Sphere," in *After Habermas: New Perspectives on the Public Sphere*, ed. Nick Crossley and John Michael Roberts (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), 28–48.

[20] Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition*, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998).

[21] Dana R. Villa, "Theatricality in the Public Realm of Hannah Arendt," in *Public Space and Democracy*, ed. Marcel Henaff and Tracy B. Strong (Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press, 2001), 144–71.

[22] Rahimi, *Theater State and the Formation of Early Modern Public Sphere*, 73.

[23] P. Howell, "Public Space and the Public Sphere: Political Theory and the Historical Geography of Modernity," *Environment and Design D: Society and Space* 11 (1993): 303–22. Similarly, Nancy Fraser argues that "Habermas's idea of the public sphere is indispensable to critical social theory and democratic political practice." Fraser, "Rethinking the Public Sphere," 111. Also see: Peter Uwe Hohendahl, "The Public Sphere: Models and Boundaries," in *Habermas and the Public Sphere*, ed. Craig Calhoun (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992), 101.

[24] As Nancy Fraser notes, there is no need to suppose a sharp separation between civil society and the state, as Habermas does. Such an assumption results in what Fraser calls "*weak publics*, publics whose deliberative practice consists exclusively in opinion formation and does not also encompass decision making." Moreover, the second element of this equation is not necessarily

normative political concept through which the former can control, influence, or challenge the latter.[25]

In other words, it is important to distinguish between Habermas's concept of the public sphere as a model and a core normative definition. While the Habermasian model of the public sphere seems to be highly contextual, its normative definition can set a standard for the investigation of the public sphere in various contexts. As an example, the deliberative conception of the Habermasian public sphere and the role of rational debates at the place of coffeehouses and saloons should be regarded as the aspects of the contextual model of the public sphere. It would be inaccurate to search for the same elements in another geographical and historical context. However, it is possible to adopt the core definition and demonstrate how, for example, the formation of public opinion through other media and mechanisms in nineteenth-century Tehran provided discursive norms that enabled society to exert influence on the state.

In the case of Iran in the late nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries, as this chapter suggests, the public sphere was way beyond a coherent body of people. The public sphere was the outcome of the coming together of various communal spheres; it was socially segmented. Moreover, shared economic interests were not the main factors in the production of the public sphere. While the formation of the propertied middle class played a crucial role in this regard, it was religious discourse that was able to transcend communal boundaries and produce a united body of people out of various social segments. In the absence of a free press and other types of media, religiosity – specifically Shiʿi rituals and doctrines – provided a shared platform – public opinion – for the majority of society and created the discursive norms that enabled society to generate a power relationship with the state and exert influence on the latter.

As my research demonstrates, the early Iranian public sphere in the constitutional era had a fundamental difference with Habermas's

limited to the state. Any forms of hegemonic power, such as capitalism or patriarchy, can be the target of this regulative relationship. Finally, there is no need to assume a seamless, singular public sphere; the public sphere can be segmented, and various public spheres coexist at the same time in the same society. Fraser, "Rethinking the Public Sphere," 134.

[25] Howell, "Public Space and the Public Sphere," 309.

concept of the bourgeois public sphere. The mechanism of the former, the coming together of various smaller communal spheres, enabled the broader public sphere to avoid the practice of bracketing. The formation of small-scale political societies, *anjuman*s, after the revolution shows how each segment of society produced its specific political realm for decision-making. The public sphere was achieved by a multiplicity of communities,[26] it was segmented, and it enabled each community to preserve its social identity. Nancy Fraser argues that "the ideal of participatory parity is better achieved by a multiplicity of publics than by a single public."[27] Political activities of *anjuman*s show how Fraser's model was implemented in Iranian urban society at the beginning of the twentieth century. One reason for the implementation of multiplicity in the Iranian context was the weak class character of society and the dominance of the communal sphere at that time. As a result, while the Habermasian model cannot be utilized in the case of Iran, its normative implication provides a blueprint for the investigation of the public sphere in the Iranian context.

As the arena of the collective action of civilians to control, influence, or challenge the state, the public sphere demands spatiality for its full manifestation, which takes us to the second significant deficiency of Habermas's model. Lack of spatiality in Habermas's bourgeois public sphere has repeatedly been criticized,[28] and various models have been proposed for its completion. The next section discusses these models and seeks a framework that can bring spatiality into the public sphere, regardless of historical and geographical specificities. In short, I will discuss the relationship between the public sphere and political public spaces.

From the Public Sphere to Public Space

Habermas's ideal public sphere does not rise from a spatial investigation; it is "deemed universal and thereby, in any meaningful sense, spatially undifferentiated."[29] Although Habermas introduces particular

[26] Fraser, "Rethinking the Public Sphere," 127.
[27] Fraser, "Rethinking the Public Sphere," 127.
[28] Smith and Low, "Introduction," 1–16; Kohn, *Radical Space*; Howell, "Public Space and the Public Sphere"; Cassegård, "Contestation and Bracketing".
[29] Smith and Low, "Introduction," 5.

social spaces as "the social structures of the bourgeois public sphere," such as clubs, coffeehouses, and *salon*s, the spatiality of these places is not the subject of examination, and he combines them alongside the world of letters and family as the institutions of the public sphere.[30] Similar to the Lefebvrian concept of perceived spaces, in Habermas's model, space is a neutral background for social processes. There is no reciprocal relationship between social spaces and their participants; these spaces are mere containers.[31]

There is a well-established body of literature on historical and theoretical aspects of the spatial relationship between power and resistance.[32] These investigations, however, do not produce a concrete

[30] Habermas, *The Structural Transformation*, 27–56. In the words of Margaret Kohn: "[t]he concept of the public sphere elides the distinction between very different kinds of spaces." Kohn, *Radical Space*, 29.

[31] Neil Smith and Setha Low argue that the division between public space and the public sphere is way beyond the Habermasian model. They call it a disciplinary gap, "one of materialist versus idealist approaches." Putting it differently, Kohn argues that the concept of the public sphere in Habermas's work is "an analytic construct" rather than a physical place. Howell joins the same line of criticism and argues that Habermas's concept lacks "an effective geography," and Habermas is "all too often effectively silent about space." Howell goes as far as arguing that Habermas's public sphere, due to its universalism, lacks both content and context. Smith and Low, "Introduction," 4–6. Also see the theoretical discussion at the beginning of Chapter 1 and the three-dimensional conception of social space. Kohn, *Radical Space*, 29; Howell, "Public Space and the Public Sphere," 311–18.

[32] Harvey, "The Political Economy of Public Space," 17–34; David Harvey, *Paris, Capital of Modernity* (New York: Routledge, 2003); Manuel Castells, *The City and the Grassroots: A Cross-Cultural Theory of Urban Social Movements* (Victoria: Edward Arnold, 1983); Roger V. Gould, *Insurgent Identities: Class, Community, and Protest in Paris from 1848 to the Commune* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995); Richard Sennett, *The Fall of Public Man* (London: Penguin Books, 1986); Kohn, *Radical Space*, 29; Setha Low, *On the Plaza: The Politics of Public Space and Culture* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2000); Nelson Lee, "How Is a Political Public Space Made? The Birth of Tiananmen Square and the May Fourth Movement," *Political Geography* 28 (2009): 32–43; Kim Dovey, "On Politics and Urban Space," in *Debating the City: An Anthology*, ed. Jennifer Barrett and Caroline Butler Bowdon (Victoria: Historic Houses Trust of New South Wales and University of Western Sydney, 2001), 53–67; Paul Routledge, "A Spatiality of Resistances: Theory and Practice in Nepal's Revolution of 1990," in *Geographies of Resistance*, ed. Steve Pile and Michael Keith (London: Routledge, 1997), 68–86; Sharon Zukin, *Naked City: The Death and Life of Authentic Urban Places* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); Sharon Zukin, *The Cultures of Cities* (Malden: Blackwell, 1995); Dolores Hayden,

framework for the theorization of the relationship between the public sphere and political public spaces. Regarding the normative, universal concept of the public sphere, is it possible to theorize its spatiality in a way that it will not be historically and geographically contextual and temporally limited to the present era? In this book, in line with the works of Don Mitchell and David Harvey, I utilize the Lefebvrian notion of the right to the city to theorize the relationship between the public sphere and political public spaces.

Lefebvre idealizes the city and urban life as an *oeuvre*, which should be produced and appropriated by the participation and the decision-making of its various inhabitants, instead of being commodified, planned, and controlled by the forces of capitalism for its exchanged value. Lefebvre elaborates this tension by introducing his well-known

"Building the American Way: Public Subsidy, Private Space," in *The Politics of Public Space*, ed. Setha Low and Neil Smith (New York: Routledge, 2006), 35–48; Setha Low, "How Private Interests Take Over Public Space: Zoning, Taxes, and Incorporation of Gated Communities," in *The Politics of Public Space*, ed. Setha Low and Neil Smith (New York: Routledge, 2006), 81–104; Cindi Katz, "Power, Space, and Terror: Social Reproduction and the Public Environment," in *The Politics of Public Space*, ed. Setha Low and Neil Smith (New York: Routledge, 2006), 105–22; Mitchell, *The Right to the City*; Joanne P. Sharp et al., eds., *Entanglements of Power: Geographies of Domination/Resistance* (London: Routledge, 2000); Steve Pile and Michael Keith, eds., *Geographies of Resistance* (London: Routledge, 1997); Setha Low and Neil Smith, eds., *The Politics of Public Space* (New York: Routledge, 2006); Michel de Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life*, trans. Steven Rendall (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), xix; Doreen Massey, *For Space* (Los Angeles: Sage, 2005), 45–6; Doreen Massey, "Entanglements of Power: Reflections," in *Entanglements of Power: Geographies of Domination/Resistance*, ed. Joanne P. Sharp et al. (London: Routledge, 2000), 282; Kohn, *Radical Space*, 20–1; David Harvey, *Rebel Cities: From the Right to the City to the Urban Revolution* (London: Verso, 2012); David Harvey, *Spaces of Capital: Toward a Critical Geography* (New York: Routledge, 2001), 190–3; Henri Lefebvre, *Writings on Cities*, trans. Eleonore Kofman and Elizabeth Lebas (Malden: Blackwell, 1996), 154; David Featherstone, *Resistance, Space and Political Identities: The Making of Counter-Global Networks* (Malden: Blackwell, 2008); Massey, *For Space*, 9–11; Mustafa Dikeç, *Badlands of the Republic: Space, Politics and Urban Policy* (Malden: Blackwell, 2008); Walter J. Nicholls, "The Geographies of Social Movements," *Geography Compass* 1, no. 3 (2007): 607–22; Walter Nicholls, "Place, Networks, Space: Theorising the Geographies of Social Movements," *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* 34, no. 1 (2009): 78–93; Bob Jessop et al., "Theorizing Sociospatial Relations," *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 26 (2008): 389–401.

triadic spaces, particularly the distinction between abstract and lived spaces.[33] Don Mitchell and David Harvey have recognized this conception in Lefebvre's notion of the right to the city. The right to the city is a reaction against the commodification of urban spaces and, more importantly, urban life. It is a reaction against the prioritization of the exchange value over the use value of the city. It is a cry, or better to say a demand, to restore the city "to all those who inhabit." It is the "right to urban life."[34]

Similar to Lefebvre, Harvey defines the right to the city as the collective right to "change and reinvent the city more after our hearts' desire."[35] He argues that people should appropriate public spaces and public goods for a common purpose, what he calls the social practice of commoning. The common should be collective and non-commodified, and those who have played a role in its production should have the right to use it. This is "the basis for the claim to the right to the city on the part of the collective laborers who have made it. The struggle for the right to the city is against the powers of capital that ruthlessly feed upon and extract rents from the common life that others have produced."[36]

This reading of the right to the city is tightly related to the production of public spaces. It demands two secondary rights, what Mark Purcell calls the right to participation and the right to appropriation. The former gives the citizens a central role in decision-making for the production of urban spaces, and the latter is "the right to occupy already-produced urban space" and "the right to produce urban space so that it meets the needs of inhabitants."[37] As a result, the public spaces of the cities encompass a political inevitability. The struggles

[33] Henri Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith (Malden: Blackwell, 1991), 33–9; Edward W. Soja, *Thirdspace: Journeys to Los Angeles and Other Real-and-Imagined Places* (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1996), 53–82; Japhy Wilson, "'The Devastating Conquest of the Lived by the Conceived': The Concept of Abstract Space in the Work of Henri Lefebvre," *Space and Culture* 16, no. 3 (2013): 364–80.

[34] Lefebvre, *Writings on Cities*, 158.

[35] Harvey, *Rebel Cities*, 4. Also see: David Harvey, "The Right to the City," in *Social Justice and the City*, revised edition (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2009), 315–32.

[36] Harvey, *Rebel Cities*, 78.

[37] Mark Purcell, "Excavating Lefebvre: The Right to the City and Its Urban Politics of the Inhabitant," *GeoJournal* 58 (2002): 103.

over the authority to produce, reproduce, and define the meaning and vitality of the city transform public space, as a medium between civil society and the state or forces of capitalism, into a political arena. Public space turns into both the subject matter and the stage of this struggle.

In his reading of the right to the city, Don Mitchell goes one step further. For Mitchell, the political significance of public space is the role it plays in representing various social groups; public space is the space of representation.[38] Through the study of the landscape of homelessness in American cities, Mitchell shows how homeless people need to appropriate public spaces to have a spatial representation in society.[39] As a result, what makes a space public is when "some group or another *takes* space and through its action *makes* it public. The very act of representing one's group [...] to a larger public creates a space for representation."[40] The struggle over the representation of social groups in public spaces is the fight for their inclusion or exclusion in the public sphere. In this view, the distinction between the public sphere and public space is essentially the distinction between the immateriality of the former and the materiality of the latter. The public sphere is abstract and immaterial and needs a material space from which the political activities flow.[41]

The public sphere and political public spaces are closely interrelated. The normative forces that control, influence, or challenge the state or any form of power need to produce their own spaces. This production is a necessity. It is the outcome of the confrontation between the norms of the public sphere and the hegemonic power. Space is produced through the coexistence and interrelation of these trajectories. As a result, public space has a significant political dimension: It is the

[38] Mitchell, *The Right to the City*, 33–4.

[39] Mitchell, *The Right to the City*; Don Mitchell, "The End of Public Space? People's Park, Definitions of the Public, and Democracy," *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 85, no. 1 (1995): 108–33; Don Mitchell and Lynn A. Staeheli, "Clean and Safe? Property Redevelopment, Public Space, and Homelessness in Downtown San Diego," in *The Politics of Public Space*, eds. Setha Low and Neil Smith (New York: Routledge, 2006), 123–42.

[40] Mitchell, *The Right to the City*, 35 (emphasis in the original text).

[41] Mitchell, *The Right to the City*, 134. It is important to note that space is not limited to the material form. The virtual space of the Internet can be regarded as an alternative type of spatiality that can provide an arena for the struggle between people and the state.

material necessity of the normative public sphere. The public sphere and political public space are the two wings of the same bird; clipping one, the whole system fails to function properly.[42]

As the products of the same social forces and because of their inherent interconnectedness, there are commonalities between the public sphere and political public spaces. The investigation of their commonalities is crucial to understanding their formation and transformation. The examination of one component without the investigation of the other will result in the production of partial knowledge of the public sphere and spaces. As my research suggests, the production of the public sphere and political public spaces in early twentieth-century Tehran was closely related. Similar to the formation of the public sphere, political public spaces were produced through the religious discourse. During the revolution, people chose sacred spaces of the city as their sites of political activity; the two main mosques of the city and a holy shrine transformed into political public spaces and enabled people to act collectively against the Qajar court. They were the only spaces that belonged to all segments of society and were not colored by communal identities. As a result, political public spaces and the public sphere shared certain social commonalities: in this case, religiosity and the coming together of social segments.

Although the Constitutional Revolution was the apex of the religious discourse, the revolution initiated its demise as well. The Iranian public sphere and political public spaces of Tehran commenced their process of transformation in the years after the revolution. As this chapter discusses, after the revolution and by the proliferation of free newspapers, clerics lost their role as the sole producers of public

[42] Considering a political necessity for public space does not mean that I have narrowed the definition of public space and limited it to its political aspect. I do not claim that publicly accessed and used spaces without political manifestations are not public spaces. However, I insist that the political role is an inseparable and inevitable aspect of public space. By curtailing this aspect, public space will stop meeting its full potential, it will erode, and it will change to docile space. Mitchell, *The Right to the City*; Cassegård, "Contestation and Bracketing"; John R. Parkinson, *Democracy and Public Space: The Physical Sites of Democratic Performance* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012); John R. Parkinson, "How Is Space Public? Implications for Spatial Policy and Democracy," *Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy* 31 (2013): 682–99; Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, 416–17; Harvey, *Rebel Cities*.

opinion. By the establishment of communal political organizations, *anjuman*s, religiosity was not the only social force for the coming together of communities. The establishment of the Parliament, as the house of the people, provided an alternative ground to the mosques and the shrine as the primary sites of political activity. Similarly, the decline of the communal sphere originates in the same era. After the revolution, the propertied middle class seized power. For the first time, class politics overwhelmed the communal sphere. Finally, for the first time, women entered into the public sphere as an influential social force. They established their own *anjuman*s, newspapers, schools, and other organizations. They mobilized in support of democracy, questioned the masculinity of public spaces, and redefined the concepts of the public sphere and public spaces.

This chapter continues with a brief introduction to the primary social forces that played a key role during the political upheavals at the turn of the century. After that, I continue with the Constitutional Revolution, and introduce the formation of the public sphere and the production of political public spaces. The chapter will end with the years following the revolution and the role of *anjuman*s, newspapers, the Parliament, and women's movements in initiating a process that resulted in the transformation of the public sphere and political public spaces.

Political Players on the Verge of the Constitutional Revolution

The Iranian Constitutional Revolution can be regarded as the first large-scale political struggle in the recent history of Iran. Different studies of the topic tend to highlight the roles of particular social groups during the revolution and overlook the effectiveness of others.[43]

[43] For some examples, see: Gad G. Gilbar, "The Big Merchants (Tujjār) and the Persian Constitutional Revolution of 1906," *Asian and African Studies* 11, no. 3 (1976–7): 275–303; Gad G. Gilbar, "Qajar Dynasty VIII: 'Big Merchants' in the Late Qajar Period," in *Encyclopedia Iranica* (February 20, 2015), www.iranicaonline.org/articles/qajar-big-merchants (accessed October 17, 2015); Gad G. Gilbar, "The Opening Up of Qājār Iran: Some Economic and Social Aspects," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London* 49, no. 1 (1986): 76–89; Guity Nashat, "From Bazaar to Market: Foreign Trade and Economic Development in Nineteenth-Century Iran," *Iranian Studies*

In recent years, however, more nuanced readings of the revolution have created a more colorful tapestry. In this view, different groups are credited for their roles in the success of the revolution, instead of highlighting one or two social forces as the main agents.[44] To demonstrate the multiplicity of voices during the Constitutional Revolution, John Foran uses the term "populist alliance," which denotes "the popular, mass social bases of participation" during the revolution.[45]

14, no. 1/2 (1981): 53–85; Mohammad Reza Afshari, "The Pishivaran and Merchants in Precapitalist Iranian Society: An Essay on the Background and Causes of the Constitutional Revolution," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 15, no. 2 (1983): 133–55; Ann K. S. Lambton, *Qājār Persia: Eleven Studies* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1987); Hamid Algar, *Religion and State in Iran 1785–1906: The Role of the Ulama in the Qajar Period* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969); Nikki R. Keddie, "The Origins of the Religious-Radical Alliance in Iran," *Past & Present*, 34 (1966): 70–80; Mongol Bayat, *Iran's First Revolution: Shiʿism and the Constitutional Revolution of 1905–1909* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991); Ervand Abrahamian, "The Causes of the Constitutional Revolution in Iran," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 10, no. 3 (1979): 381–414; Abrahamian, *Iran between Two Revolutions*; Mongol Bayat, "The *Rowshanfekr* in the Constitutional Period: An Overview," in *Iran's Constitutional Revolution: Popular Politics, Cultural Transformation and Transnational Connections*, ed. H. E. Chehabi and Vanessa Martin (London: I.B. Tauris, 2010): 165–91; Abbas Amanat, "Constitutional Revolution I. Intellectual Background," in *Encyclopedia Iranica* (December 15, 1995), www.iranicaonline.org/articles/constitutional-revolution-i (accessed October 17, 2015); Ali Gheissari, *Iranian Intellectuals in the 20th Century* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1998), 13–39; Fereydoun Adamiyat, *Fikr-i Dimukrasi-yi Ijtimaʿi dar Nihzat-i Mashrutiyyat-i Iran [The Idea of Social Democracy in the Iranian Constitutional Movement]* (Tehran: Intisharat-i Payam, 1984); Fereydoun Adamiyat, *Andishih-yi Taraqqi va Hukumat-i Qanun [The Idea of Progress and the Rule of Law]* (Tehran: Khawrazmi, 1977); Nazim al-Islam Kermani, *Tarikh-i Bidari-yi Iranian [The History of Iranians' Awakening]*, 5 vols. (Tehran: Itisharat-i Bunyad-i Farhang-i Iran, 1357 [1978]); Ahmad Kasravi, *History of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution*, vol. 1, trans. Evan Siegel (Costa Mesa: Mazda Publishers, 2006); Mehdi Malikzadih, *Tarikh-i Inghilab-iMashrutiyat-i Iran [The History of Iranian Constitutional Revolution]*, vol. 2 (Tehran: Intisharat-i Sukhan, 1383 [2004]); Yahya Dulatabadi, *Hayat-i Yahya [Yahya's Life]*, 4 vols. (Tehran: Intisharat-i ʿAtar, 1361 [1982]).

[44] Joanna de Groot, "Whose Revolution? Stakeholders and Stories of the 'Constitutional Movement' in Iran, 1905–11," in *Iran's Constitutional Revolution: Popular Politics, Cultural Transformation and Transnational Connections*, ed. H. E. Chehabi and Vanessa Martin (London: I.B. Tauris, 2010), 15–32; Janet Afary, *The Iranian Constitutional Revolution, 1906–1911* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); John Foran, "The Strengths and Weaknesses of Iran's Populist Alliance: A Class Analysis of the Constitutional Revolution of 1905–1911," *Theory and Society* 20, no. 6 (1991): 795–823.

[45] Foran, "The Strengths and Weaknesses of Iran's Populist Alliance," 796.

Foran argues that the revolution created a temporary alliance between different social groups, such as "artisans, progressive ulama [clerics], merchants, workers, and lower class."[46] Reading the revolution without considering its diverse social background can result in a biased account of the events. Among the diversity of local and international forces, three main social groups can be regarded as the main players of the revolution. The coalition between the propertied middle class, clerics, and intelligentsia worked side by side to mobilize various communities to participate in the revolution.

The propertied middle class developed alongside the gradual transformation of Iranian society throughout the nineteenth century. After decades of instability, civil wars, and economic collapse in the eighteenth century, Iran regained relative stability by the establishment of the Qajar monarchy. The revival of internal and foreign trade was one of the most significant consequences of the relative stability of the nineteenth century. Trade could generate the highest level of employment and income, among other components of the service sector, and its revival was a major economic development for the country.[47] The growth of foreign trade was impressive, increasing by twelve times during the nineteenth century, with the greater portion belonging to the last decades of the century.[48]

There is a delicate difference between Iran and other countries of the region regarding foreign trade, particularly the Ottoman Empire, Egypt, and some North African colonies: Europeans and other foreigners had very limited direct involvement in the Iranian trade

[46] Foran, "The Strengths and Weaknesses of Iran's Populist Alliance," 817.

[47] Gad G. Gilbar, "The Persian Economy in the Mid-19th Century," *Die Welt des Islams, New Series* 19, no. 1/4 (1979): 201.

[48] Still, the rate of growth in Iran was slower than the other countries of the region in the same period. For example, Egypt had forty-two-fold and the Ottoman Empire had thirty-fold expansion in their foreign trade, see: Guity Nashat, "From Bazaar to Market," 61; Charles Issawi, *An Economic History of the Middle East and North Africa* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 23–7; Gilbar, "The Opening up of Qājār Iran," 76. For the reasons for this growth, see: Nashat, "From Bazaar to Market," 59; Hassan Hakimian, "Economy VIII: In the Qajar Period," in *Encyclopedia Iranica* (December 15, 1997), www.iranicaonline.org/articles/hajj-sayyah (accessed September 10, 2015). For the history and transformation of trade in the Middle East and Iran and the impact of the colonial powers, see: Issawi, *An Economic History of the Middle East*; Charles Issawi, ed., *The Economic History of Iran 1800–1914* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971).

market,[49] and Iranian merchants succeeded in gaining a monopoly over trade.[50] This monopoly had far-reaching social consequences. The long-respected Iranian merchants grew gradually to become an effective social force. Their accumulated liquid funds enabled them to adopt additional tasks, such as banking and money lending.[51] Moreover, the merchants, accompanied by the traditional landlords, began to invest in the production of cash crops for export as raw material. The economic crisis of the court provided the merchants with an excellent opportunity to increase their access to land by buying and renting the royal lands. As a result, toward the last decades of the nineteenth century the line between landlords and merchants became blurry. Merchants possessed huge capital, vast agricultural lands, and even villages.[52]

In contrast to the merchants' constant financial improvements, in the second half of the nineteenth century two parallel economic processes deteriorated the financial position of the court. On the one hand, royal expenditures increased rapidly. The king's European trips, increasing royal pensions, and increasing military expenditures put the central government under unprecedented economic pressure. On the other hand, not only did the annual revenue of the court not increase,

[49] Issawi, *An Economic History of the Middle East*, 8; Issawi, *The Economic History of Iran*, 15–17; Gilbar, "The Persian Economy," 201–2; Gilbar, "The Opening up of Qājār Iran," 76–7; Guity Nashat, *The Origins of Modern Reform in Iran, 1870–80* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1982), 9; Nashat, "From Bazaar to Market," 70; Hakimian, "Economy"; Gavin Hambly, "An Introduction to the Economic Organization of Early Qājār Iran," *Iran* 2 (1964): 75.

[50] In the other countries, the native merchants lost their dominance to the foreigners and religious minorities. Nashat believes that the poor condition of transportation infrastructure in the country, the absence of foreign communities, the lack of the means of international communication, and the small size of the profit discouraged foreigners from direct trade in Iran. In addition, Hakimian argues that the imperial rivalries between Russia and Britain resulted in their lack of interest in direct involvement in Iranian trade. Nashat, "From Bazaar to Market," 74; Hakimian, "Economy."

[51] Nikki R. Keddie, "The Economic History of Iran, 1800–1914, and Its Political Impact: An Overview," *Iranian Studies* 5, no. 2/3 (1972): 71; Gilbar, "The Persian Economy," 202.

[52] Gilbar, "The Opening Up of Qājār Iran," 78–80; Gilbar, "The Persian Economy," 186; Nashat, *The Origins of Modern Reform*, 10; Nashat, "From Bazaar to Market," 59, 75; Keddie, "The Economic History of Iran," 67.

it lost considerable portions of its revenue due to its inability to adapt to the structural changes of the time.[53]

The financial crisis of the Qajar court pushed the central state to reform the taxation system, which could result in closing the tax loopholes that had worked in favor of the merchants for decades. Unable to implement these reforms, from the early 1890s the state began to take out loans from Britain and Russia. These loans were usually accompanied with significant concessions to the lenders in the form of the monopoly on the trade of specific products or reformation of the customs administration. These concessions could deeply hurt the merchants.[54]

As a result, toward the end of the nineteenth century the structural transformations of Iranian society resulted in an unprecedented phenomenon. A "small capitalist class"[55] consisting of merchants and landlords gradually formed. Despite their communal affiliations, they could transcend the old communal boundaries and act as a united body. Abrahamian calls it the propertied middle class and broadens its definition to include merchants, landowners, bazaar shopkeepers, and workshop owners.[56] Disregarding social segmentation, the newly formed class could mobilize its resources toward common objectives and bring their communities closer to each other.[57]

Besides the propertied middle class and big merchants, the *ʿulamā* – clerics – are usually seen as the leaders of the masses. With strong ties to merchants and a great influence on the masses, the *ʿulamā* were the

[53] The government did not properly adjust land taxation to agricultural growth, did not consider the fall of the value of the national currency in its tax assessments, and could not enforce tax collection throughout the country. As Gad Gilbar suggests, "the government revenue from direct taxes, in constant prices, was in the late 1890s, if not earlier, lower by at least fifty percent" in comparison with the 1860s. Gilbar, "The Opening Up of Qājār Iran," 84–5.

[54] Gilbar, "The Opening Up of Qājār Iran," 86–8.

[55] Nashat, "From Bazaar to Market," 53.

[56] Abrahamian, "The Causes of the Constitutional Revolution in Iran," 388.

[57] For various studies that examine the role of the merchants and the propertied middle class, see: Abrahamian, "The Causes of the Constitutional Revolution"; Abrahamian, *Iran between Two Revolutions*; Gilbar, "The Big Merchants (Tujjār) and the Persian Constitutional Revolution"; Gad G. Gilbar, "Qajar Dynasty VIII: 'Big Merchants'"; Gilbar, "The Opening Up of Qājār Iran"; Nashat, "From Bazaar to Market"; Mohammad Reza Afshari, "The Pishivaran and Merchants in Precapitalist Iranian Society."

leading group who could encourage various communities to rise against the state. They were the only social group that had constant day-to-day interactions with ordinary people. Through their daily sermons after prayer time in mosques they had the opportunity to address people on various religious, social, and even political topics.

However, the centrality of the ʿ*ulamā*'s position during the Constitutional Revolution is a matter of disagreement. Ann Lambton and Hamid Algar are the biggest advocates of the ʿ*ulamā*'s role. By rejecting the concept of revolution,[58] Lambton examines the Constitutional Revolution as a "messianic" movement and a rise against tyranny. In her view, protests were not necessarily against poverty and economic stress; rather, they occurred because people felt that the existing situation was "contrary to the true government of Islam." Consequently, people did not "demand for the transfer of power to a group with a new ideology, but simply [asked] for the restoration of righteous or just government."[59] Through this point of view, ʿ*ulamā* were the natural leaders of the opposition and the revolution turns into the rise of the religious class against the court.[60]

Similarly, Hamid Algar argues that the ʿ*ulamā* were the main leaders of the revolution. As a result, the revolution was "a repetition of the ulama's traditional role of leading opposition to the state."[61] However, he agrees that the Constitutional Revolution was different from the previous movements, mostly because of the alliance of the ʿ*ulamā* with liberal reformers. Algar argues that the ʿ*ulamā* failed to perceive the nature of constitutional demands, and despite their "greatest display of their political power," the Constitutional Revolution brought the beginning of their demise as the sole leaders of the oppositional movements in Iran.[62]

In a different analysis, Nikki Keddie argues that the success of the revolution was the result of a bizarre coalition between the ʿ*ulamā* and the intelligentsia. Initially, the coalition formed during the Tobacco Movement[63] and remained functional up to the success of

[58] Lambton, *Qājār Persia*, 322.
[59] Lambton, *Qājār Persia*, 298–9.
[60] Lambton, *Qājār Persia*, 286–93.
[61] Algar, *Religion and State in Iran 1785–1906*, 252.
[62] Algar, *Religion and State in Iran 1785–1906*, 258–60.
[63] The history of the Constitutional Revolution is entangled with the Tobacco Movement of 1891–92. The movement was a reaction to a concession

the revolution. However, after the establishment of the Parliament, the two groups could not solve their inherent contradictions, and their fragile alliance broke down.[64] Mongol Bayat goes one step further and argues that the ʿ*ulamā* were victims of the partnership with the intelligentsia. The latter used religious leaders as an instrument toward their political goals.[65] She goes as far as claiming that the ʿ*ulamā* were "the least important agents of constitutional change in society."[66]

As these accounts demonstrate, there is not agreement on the role and the impact of religious groups during the revolution. From the main leaders to the victims, ʿ*ulamā* are depicted in various positions during the revolution. However, one point is almost common between these accounts: ʿ*ulamā* were the only force who could bring the masses into the political scene. As this chapter argues, by utilizing religious discourse based on the Shiʿi doctrine, they created a shared platform for different communities. Religious stories and rituals, such as Muharram ceremonies and the martyrdom of Imam Husayn, helped ʿ*ulamā* to form public opinion and produce the just and unjust dichotomies to frame society and the state.

Finally, the third group was Iranian reformists or intelligentsia. The nineteenth-century Iranian intelligentsia was the outcome of the court's earlier reforms. They belonged to the affluent families who were more aware of Europe through their travels to the continent, attending

that gave a fifty-year monopoly on the production, sale, and export of Iranian tobacco to Major Gerald Talbot, a British subject, which resulted in protests all over the country and the cancelation of the concession. For more information on the movement, see: Nikki R. Keddie, *Religion and Rebellion in Iran: The Tobacco Protest of 1891–1892* (London: Frank Cass, 1966); Ann K. S. Lambton, "The Tobacco Regie: Prelude to Revolution I," *Studia Islamica*, 22 (1965): 119–57; Ann K. S. Lambton, "The Tobacco Regie: Prelude to Revolution II," *Studia Islamica*, 23 (1965): 71–90; Edward G. Browne, *The Persian Revolution of 1905–1909* (Cambridge: The University Press, 1910), 31–58; Fatema Soudavar Farmanfarmaian, "Revisiting and Revising the Tobacco Rebellion," *Iranian Studies* 47, no. 4 (2014): 595–625; Shiykh Hasan Karbalaʾi, *Gharardad-i Regie 1890 or Tarikh-i Inhisar-i Dukhaniyat dar Sal-i 1309 [The Regie Concession 1890 or the History of the Monopoly of Tobacco in 1309HJ]* (Tehran: Intisharat-i Mubarizan, 1361 [1982]); Yaʿqub Azhand, *Qiyam-i Tanbaku [Tobacco Uprising]* (Tehran: Intisharat-i Amirkabir, 1367 [1989]); Kermani, *Tarikh-i Bidari-yi Iranian*, 1: 19–60.

[64] Keddie, "The Origins of the Religious-Radical Alliance in Iran."

[65] Bayat, "The *Rowshanfekr* in the Constitutional Period," 169–73.

[66] Bayat, *Iran's First Revolution*, 9.

Dar al-Funun College of Tehran or European universities, and reading travelogues and European literary works. Abrahamian argues that the Iranian intelligentsia viewed "royal despotism, clerical dogmatism, and foreign imperialism" as the main obstacles to Iran's progress and advocated "constitutionalism, secularism, and nationalism" as their remedies. However, they were too few and "heterogeneous" to form an independent social class. Consequently, they had to make coalitions with other social groups, sometimes the court, sometimes the clerics, and other times with the merchants, to advance their objectives.[67]

Similar to the clerics, there are various analyses of the impact of the intelligentsia on the political struggles at the turn of the century. While Lambton and Algar do not consider the intelligentsia as the main players on the political scene, Keddie and Bayat highlight their crucial alliance with the clerics, necessary for the success of the revolution. In contrast, the majority of historians close to the time of the revolution who had the chance to witness the revolution personally overstate the role of the penetration of Western ideas and concepts as the primary player in Iranians' awakening and their cry for liberation, nationalism, and democracy.[68] The latter group of scholars usually originates the process of Iranians' awakening to the mid-nineteenth century and to the works of Mirza Malkam Khan and Sayyid Jamal al-Din al-Afghani. These works highlight the role of the intelligentsia, with liberal ideas and familiarity with European countries as the main force behind the revolution.

With this background, the rest of the chapter deals with the main political struggles at the turn of the century. Through the theoretical framework developed at the beginning of the chapter, I analyze the formation of the public sphere and the production of political public spaces in Tehran and demonstrate their interconnectedness during the Constitutional Revolution.

[67] Abrahamian, "The Causes of the Constitutional Revolution," 395–9; Ervand Abrahamian, *Iran between Two Revolutions*, 61–9. Also see: Bayat, "The *Rowshanfekr* in the Constitutional Period"; Bayat, *Iran's First Revolution*, 34–44; Gheissari, *Iranian Intellectuals in the 20th Century*, 13–39; Adamiyat, *Fikr-i Dimukrasi-yi Ijtimaʿi*; Adamiyat, *Andishih-yi Taraqqi va Hukumat-i Qanun*; Amanat, "Constitutional Revolution I: Intellectual Background."

[68] Kermani, *Tarikh-i Bidari-yi Iranian*, 5 vols.; Kasravi, *History of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution*; Malikzadih, *Tarikh-i Inghilab-iMashrutiyat-i Iran*; Dulatabadi, *Hayat-i Yahya*. Browne, *The Persian Revolution*.

Constitutional Revolution and the Events of 1905–6

The popular discontent with the Qajar court reached its climax in the early twentieth century. The culmination of a series of protests and clashes between the state and people resulted in the establishment of the first Parliament and restriction of the court's power in August 1906. The years 1905 and 1906 witnessed major protests in Tehran and other big cities around the country. In the capital, three main episodes of contention brought the monarchy to its knees and forced the court to surrender to protesters' demands. This section focuses on these episodes and examines the spatiality of protests in Tehran.

The first episode began as a reaction to the mistreatment of merchants at the hands of Belgian customs officials, particularly the head of the department, Monsieur Naus. Merchants appealed to the prime minister for his help. Rejected and insulted by the prime minister in a private meeting, the merchants of Tehran decided to take action and protest publicly against unjust customs tariffs. Prior to this decision, the disrespectful manners of Naus had caused the *ʿulamā* of Tehran to raise their voices against him.[69] Consequently, when on April 25, 1905, merchants decided to close their shops, leave the city, and gather in Shah ʿAbd al-ʿAzim shrine, the *ʿulamā* supported their decision and gave them the necessary instructions. Merchants raised three main complaints, all regarding customs officials and their regulations. Since this protest occurred on the verge of the king's European trip, the merchants calmed down and returned to the city when the crown prince promised them the fulfillment of their requests after the king's return.[70]

In the context of the nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries, the actions of merchants and their gathering in the saint's shrines is called *bast nishīnī*. Originally, *bast* was an inviolable sanctuary for the people, *bastī*s, who were escaping prosecution. By entering the place of *bast*, usually a sacred place, the criminal could remain safe until

[69] Earlier in that year, a picture of Naus attending a ball in *ʿulamā* costume had been circulating in the city. It had offended clerics and urged them to preach against him in their mosques.

[70] For the detailed accounts of this episode of contention and the merchants gathering in the shrine, see: Kermani, *Tarikh-i Bidari-yi Iranian,* 1: 293–5; Kasravi, *History of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution*, 1: 46, 62–4. Kasravi dates the departure of the merchants nine days earlier, on April 16.

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he or she was pardoned. The sacredness of the shrine was a barrier against the government forces entering the sanctuary and arresting the criminal.[71] In the words of Eshaghi, sanctuaries acted as "a government inside the government."[72]

However, the acts of the merchants were different from those of criminals seeking refuge inside the *bast*. Merchants' *bast* was a form of political protest against the state. As the place of protest, the shrine was more than a refuge against the tyranny of the state; it was a platform for merchants to confront the state and follow their political objectives. Since the shrine was the most important destination of pilgrimage for the citizens of Tehran, merchants could announce their grievances publicly and seek possible allies. As long as they were in the *bast*, there was a sign of an unresolved issue between the state and the merchants, which could have political costs for the state. As a result, the state attempted to solve the problem quickly and prevent the spread of its news to the other cities of Iran, which could have led to bigger protests all over the country.[73]

The state did not meet the merchants' demands after the king's return. Consequently, in December 1905 the second episode of contention occurred, and on a larger scale. The protest started when the governor of Tehran summoned a group of sugar merchants and demanded they lower their prices,[74] a request that did not receive a positive response and ended in the physical punishment of the merchants. The reaction was enormous; merchants closed their shops and gathered in Shah Mosque in the bazaar. The next day, the crowd became bigger; soon, the leading ʿ*ulamā*, Tabatabaʾi and Bihbahani, and other clerics of the city accompanied by various groups of theology students joined the

[71] For more information on *bast* and *bast nishīnī*, see: Jean Calmard, "Bast," in *Encyclopedia Iranica* (December 15, 1988), www.iranicaonline.org/articles/bast-sanctuary-asylum (accessed October 13, 2015); ʿabas Khalisi (Shirazi), *Tarikhchih-yi Bast va Bastnishini* (Tehran: Intisharat-i ʿilmi, 1366 [1988]); Peyman Eshaghi, "Quietness beyond Political Power: Politics of Taking Sanctuary (Bast Neshini) in the Shiʿite Shrines of Iran," *Iranian Studies* 49, no. 3 (2016): 493–514.

[72] Eshaghi, "Quietness beyond Political Power," 493.

[73] Kermani, *Tarikh-i Bidari-yi Iranian*, 1: 295.

[74] Earlier in that month the sugar price had a significant increase, mostly due to the Russo-Japanese War and the 1905 revolution in Russia. Since Russia was the main supplier of sugar in the market, the upheavals in that country had increased the price of sugar in Iran.

merchants. The demand was clear: dismissal of the governor and a meeting with the monarch to declare their complaints directly to him. However, the people inside the mosque were assaulted by military forces at night. The assault dispersed them from the mosque.[75]

That night, at the suggestion of Tabatabaʾi, the leading *ʿulamā* decided to leave the city and go to a *bast* in the Shah ʿAbd al-ʿAzim shrine. Nazim al-Islam Kermani records the conversations that resulted in this decision. Based on his accounts, Tabatabaʾi was afraid that the state would fabricate a false story about the clashes in the mosque and pretend that it was a *Ḥaydarī* and *Nīʿmatī* fight – a sectarian fight – or a fight between two different neighborhoods. In doing so, they could suppress protests, cover up the real story, and accuse the *ʿulamā*.[76] The next day, most of the prominent *ʿulamā* of Tehran, a large number of theology students, and some merchants[77] left the city for the shrine. This time, the *bast* was much longer; it took one month, and the number of *bastī*s reached 2,000. Prominent merchants of the city covered all the costs and provided for the daily needs of the protesters. The protesting group issued eight requests, with three of greater importance: (1) establishment of houses of justice throughout the country; (2) dismissal of Belgian customs officers; and (3) dismissal of Tehran's governor. The negotiations were successful; after receiving the king's official script on January 12, 1906, *ʿulamā* and other *bastī*s returned to Tehran to the people's warm welcome.[78]

[75] Kermani, *Tarikh-i Bidari-yi Iranian*, 2: 331–9; Malikzadih, *Tarikh-i Inghilab-iMashrutiyat-i Iran*, 2: 263–71; Browne, *The Persian Revolution*, 112–13; Kasravi, *History of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution*, 1: 73–6; Dulatabadi, *Hayat-i Yahya*, 2: 10–14; Hassan Iʿzam Qudsi, *Kitab-i Khatirat-i Man ya Rushan Shodan-i Tarikh-i Sad Salih [The Book of My Memories or Demystifying One Hundred Years of History]*, vol. 1 (Chapkhanih-yi Hiydari, 1342 [1963]), 106–7.

[76] Kermani, *Tarikh-i Bidari-yi Iranian*, 2: 339–40.

[77] Kermani and Malikzadih mention that only a few merchants joined the protest and most of them did not dare to leave the city. In contrast, Browne argues that merchants and "tradesfolk" had a strong presence in the *bast*: Kermani, *Tarikh-i Bidari-yi Iranian*, 2: 344; Malikzadih, *Tarikh-i Inghilab-i Mashrutiyat-i Iran*, 275; Browne, *The Persian Revolution of 1905–1909*, 114.

[78] Kermani, *Tarikh-i Bidari-yi Iranian*, 2: 340–67; Malikzadih, *Tarikh-i Inghilab-i Mashrutiyat-i Iran*, 2: 271–303; Browne, *The Persian Revolution of 1905–1909*, 113–14; Kasravi, *History of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution*, 1: 73–6; Qudsi, *Kitab-i Khatirat-i Man*, 1: 107–14.

At this point there was no request for the establishment of the Parliament or constitutional law from the protesters. All they asked for was the founding of the house of justice. Browne mentions that, under their demands, the house of justice "was to consist of representatives elected by the clergy, merchants, and landed proprietors, and presided over by the Sháh himself; to abolish favouritism; and to make all the Persian subjects equal in the eyes of the law."[79] However, the court did not adhere to its words, and a third episode broke out in the summer of 1906. By this time, protesters' demands had grown to embrace constitutional government and the abolition of absolute despotism.

In summer 1906, the state's pressure on activists and the people grew significantly. The nighttime curfew prevented the *ʿulamā* from holding their evening gatherings in mosques to denounce the state. Some activists were arrested and exiled far away from the capital or even killed suspiciously. One of these arrests started the third episode. On July 10, 1906, state forces arrested one of the prominent preachers and activists of the city. His arrest quickly changed into a scene of clashes between the state forces and students of a nearby theology school accompanied by ordinary people, which resulted in the death of one student and the injury of another.

The crowd took the body of the student to Friday Mosque in the bazaar and, soon, most of the *ʿulamā* of the city were accompanied by a huge crowd gathered in the mosque. The shops closed and *bāzārī*s gathered there too. Once again, activists used this gathering to move against the central government. For the next two days – July 11 and 12 – bazaars remained closed and people gathered to protest in the mosque. Cloth merchants pitched a tent in the mosque courtyard and brought all the necessary furniture for the *bast*. Protesters used the bloody clothes of the killed student as a flag. They formed mourning processions, similar to Muharram ceremonies, circulated in the bazaars, entered Shah Mosque, and returned to Friday Mosque.

However, on July 12, military forces blocked the mourning procession's path in the bazaar, which resulted in their firing toward the crowd and killing protesters. People retreated to Friday Mosque and the military forces besieged it. The state threatened the *ʿulamā*, stating

[79] Browne, *The Persian Revolution of 1905–1909*, 114.

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that unless *bāzārī*s opened their shops the next day they would break into the mosque and disperse the crowd by force. To prevent further bloodshed, the *ʿulamā* urged people to leave the mosque and reopen the bazaar, while they themselves remained in the *bast* to achieve their goals.

On the next day the bazaar resumed its routine life; however, there was a heavy presence of military forces in the city. For two days, July 13 and 14, the state blocked the flow of water to the mosque. Moreover, it prevented people from entering the mosque and smuggling in food or water. On July 14, the *ʿulamā* declared that they would leave the city and country and go to the holy cities of Ottoman Iraq, *ʿAtabat*, if the state would guarantee their safety. Receiving the state's guarantee, the next day a huge caravan of the *ʿulamā* accompanied by their families and followers left the city. It is estimated that around 1,000 people left Tehran; however, they bluffed and went to Qom, a city south of Tehran, instead of leaving the country. The capital was left without religious guidance.[80]

Although it seemed that the state gained an absolute victory against the *ʿulamā* and activists without any compromises, the course of events entered a new phase. Two days after the departure of the *ʿulamā* to Qom, two merchants went to the British legation and asked for permission to enter the embassy inside the city.[81] A first group of nine merchants entered the embassy on the night of July 16. Soon, the news

[80] Kermani, *Tarikh-i Bidari-yi Iranian*, 3: 478–500; Dulatabadi, *Hayat-i Yahya*, 2: 68–70; Malikzadih, *Tarikh-i Inghilab-i Mashrutiyat-i Iran*, 2: 352–64; Browne, *The Persian Revolution of 1905–1909*, 115–18; Kasravi, *History of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution*, 1: 120–32; Qudsi, *Kitab-i Khatirat-i Man*, 1: 121–6; Sayyid Ahmad Tafrishi Husayni, *Ruznamih-yi Akhbar-i Mashrutiyat va Inghilab-i Iran [The New Accounts of the Constitutional Revolution of Iran]*, ed. Iraj Afshar (Tehran: Intisharat-i Amirkabir, 1351 [1973]), 23–6.

[81] Kermani argues that the arrangement for the British embassy *bast* was prepared by Bihbahani, one of the chief clerics who had a close relationship with the embassy. Tafrishi Husayni argues that after the departure of the *ʿulamā*, the state began to persecute those merchants who had ties with clerics and covered their costs during their *bast* in Shah ʿAbd al-ʿAzim shrine. Kermani, *Tarikh-i Bidari-yi Iranian*, 3: 501–2, 509. Similarly, Dulatabadi, Kasravi, and Qudsi argue that Bihbahani arranged the British embassy *bast*: Dulatabadi, *Hayat-i Yahya*, 2: 71–2; Kasravi, *History of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution*, 1: 134–5; Qudsi, *Kitab-i Khatirat-i Man*, 1: 127; Tafrishi Husayni, *Ruznamih-yi Akhbar-i Mashrutiyat va Inghilab-i Iran*, 26.

spread in the city and merchants, theology students, bazaar artisans, and others closed their shops and left their schools to gather in the embassy. In just a few days, the number of people inside the embassy garden reached 14,000.[82]

The organization of the crowd inside the embassy garden deserves closer attention. Once again, the segmented society was manifested spatially; each guild pitched a separate tent. Kasravi estimates that up to 500 tents were pitched inside the garden.[83] People were separated based on their professions and social affiliations. On each tent there was a sign to define whose space it was and each tent had its own preacher to denounce the state and preach religious sermons. Although a large portion of the active working population of the city was gathered in the embassy garden, once again the small communal segments reproduced their micro-spaces inside the garden. However, this time, various communities were united against the state authorities. A broader public formed from bonding various communal spheres that could act collectively.

Similar to the previous episode, the big merchants of the city covered all the necessities of the *bastī*s. People prepared a kitchen in a corner of the garden, and every meal was catered for the crowd. Huge amounts of rice, bread, tea, sugar, and other food items were carried by cart to the garden and its kitchen from across the city. Moreover, merchants accounted for the families of impoverished *bastī*s. Since men were usually the only family breadwinners, during the days of the *bast* in the embassy garden their families were deprived of their daily incomes. As a result, merchants specified daily pensions for the protesters who did not have a strong economic condition.

Nazim al-Islam Kermani compares the atmosphere in the embassy to a school of political science, where the intelligentsia, the Dar al-Funun students, and the members of secret societies educated people.[84] At this time, protesters demanded the Parliament and constitutional law so that they could restrict the absolute despotism of the Qajar

[82] Browne, *The Persian Revolution of 1905–1909*, 119; Kasravi, *History of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution*, 1: 145. Dulatabadi and Malikzadih estimate that 20,000 people gathered in the embassy: Dulatabadi, *Hayat-i Yahya*, 2: 73; Malikzadih, *Tarikh-i Inghilab-i Mashrutiyat-i Iran*, 2: 374.

[83] Kasravi, *History of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution*, 1: 136.

[84] Kermani, *Tarikh-i Bidari-yi Iranian*, 3: 514, 534.

court. Moreover, they asked for the dismissal of the prime minister, the return of the ʿ*ulamā*, and compensation for the families of martyrs. Finally, on August 5, 1906, the court surrendered to the demands of the protesters and the king released the royal proclamation and agreed to the constitutional monarchy. After a couple of days of back-and-forth between protesters and the court upon the exact wording of the proclamation, finally the crowd left the embassy on August 10, 1906, after 25 days of *bast*.[85]

From Communal to Public: The Street-less Revolution

The success of the Constitutional Revolution should be regarded as the ultimate manifestation of the Iranian public sphere at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries. As discussed at the beginning of the chapter, in this book the notion of the public sphere is based on Habermas's framework; it is a normative construct which binds the state to public opinion and enables people to exert influence on the state. However, the model of the public sphere is completely different from the Habermasian bourgeois public sphere. Two primary differences are recognizable in this context.

First, the Iranian public sphere, unlike the bourgeois one, did not depend on the political activities of a single dominant class; it was not a coherent entity. People on the margins did not need to bracket their differences to be included in the public sphere. In contrast, it was inherently segmented; it was the outcome of the coming together of various communities. At the apex of its spatial manifestation, the gathering in the British embassy, each community reproduced its spatiality on a smaller scale beneath separate tents. The public sphere was segmented similarly to the segmentation of urban society into various communities.

Second, although I assert the necessity of public opinion as a prerequisite for the establishment of the public sphere, the formation of

[85] For the details of the *bast* inside the embassy, see: Kermani, *Tarikh-i Bidari-yi Iranian*, 3: 509–68; Dulatabadi, *Hayat-i Yahya*, 2: 71–81. Malikzadih, *Tarikh-i Inghilab-i Mashrutiyat-i Iran*, 2: 373–79; Browne, *The Persian Revolution of 1905–1909*, 118–21; Kasravi, *History of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution*, 1: 133–48; Tafrishi Husayni, *Ruznamih-yi Akhbar-i Mashrutiyat va Inghilab-i*, 26–41; Qudsi, *Kitab-i Khatirat-i Man*, 1: 127–35.

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public opinion during the Constitutional Revolution was not the outcome of rational debate. In other words, the Iranian public sphere was not necessarily deliberative. Instead, incorporation of the existing religious frames based on Shiʿi doctrine provided the essential platform for the formation of public opinion and acted as an invisible string to connect various communities of the city, and even the country, together. In this context, the network of mosques was the main spatial setting for the mobilization of people. The clerics preached against the state in mosques and provoked the masses to take action. In the words of Katja Föllmer, "religious, didactic and popular modes of communication were based on direct face-to-face contacts. Only those who had good social networks could communicate with larger groups across the regions. The Shiʿite clergy [...] was therefore the most influential group and a certain kind of medium for the distribution of information among the masses."[86] I articulate this point by bringing three examples from the oral, textual, and ritual dimensions of the religiosity of the public sphere.

On July 6, 1906, four days before the beginning of the third episode of contention, Tabatabaʾi delivered a fiery speech against the governor of Tehran. The complete text of this speech is available in Kermani's *Tarikh-i Bidari-yi Iranian*, who claims to have shown the transcript of the speech to Tabatabaʾi before its publication.[87] In his speech, Tabatabaʾi repeatedly utilized pre-established religious frames and stories to describe the political upheavals during the revolution, such as the narratives from Imam ʿAli's life (the first Shiʿi imam), the story of Fatimah's death (ʿAli's wife and the prophet Muhammad's daughter), and Imam Husayn's martyrdom: "They killed my forefather [Imam Husayn], but his name spread in the entire universe from the East to the West. He remained thirsty for one day and night, and through his thirst he watered the plant of Islam forever. Now, if they murder me, my name will remain alive to the end of time. My blood will consolidate justice and repel oppression."[88]

[86] Katja Föllmer, "Religious Aspects in Communication Process in Early Pahlavi Iran," in *Culture and Cultural Politics under Reza Shah: The Pahlavi State, New Bourgeoisie and the Creation of a Modern Society in Iran*, ed. Bianca Devos and Christoph Werner (Abingdon: Routledge, 2014), 288.

[87] Kermani, *Tarikh-i Bidari-yi Iranian*, 2: 443–54.

[88] Kermani, *Tarikh-i Bidari-yi Iranian*, 2: 450.

Although in his speech he pointed to the concept of constitutional laws and acknowledged the benefits of the constitution in European countries, he narrowed down the concept of law to religious rules and talked about the necessity of the rule of Islam in the country.[89] Moreover, he repeatedly constructed the dichotomies of good and evil and oppressed and oppressor. In these dichotomies, the evils and oppressors were those who oppose Islam, such as the governor of Tehran and some high-ranking officials. In contrast, ordinary people and Muslims were depicted as the oppressed who would be freed through the establishment of the rule of Islam.

As this example shows, using pre-established religious frames was an effective instrument to create a shared political attitude among the masses. In this process, the well-recognized religious discourse provided the metaphors for framing and interpreting the novel and emerging crisis between the state and society.[90] As a result, public opinion was deeply entangled with religious discourse. In this condition and in the absence of a free press and other forms of media, it is no surprise that religious authorities could mobilize the masses and become the real leaders of the opposition. They had the essential platforms to address ordinary people. The network of mosques and people's regular attendance for daily prayers at mosques provided the clerics with the appropriate venues for addressing ordinary people and becoming the main producers of public opinion.

Kermani mentions that when the military forces besieged Friday Mosque on July 13 and 14, the public deeply believed that the

[89] Kermani, *Tarikh-i Bidari-yi Iranian*, 2: 453.

[90] For framing social problems and "metaphorical linkage" between them, see: Gary Alan Fine and Lazaros Christoforides, "Dirty Birds, Filthy Immigrants, and the English Sparrow War: Metaphorical Linkage in Constructing Social Problems," *Symbolic Interaction* 14, no. 4 (1991): 375–93; David A. Snow et al., "Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation," *American Sociological Review* 51, no. 4 (1986): 464–81; David A. Snow and Robert D. Benford, "Master Frames and Cycles of Protest," in *Frontiers in Social Movement Theory*, ed. Aldon Morris and Carol McClurg Mueller (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), 133–55; Robert D. Benford, "An Insider's Critique of the Social Movement Framing Perspective," *Sociological Inquiry* 67, no. 4 (1997): 409–30; Deborah G. Martin, "'Place-Framing' as Place-Making: Constituting a Neighborhood for Organizing and Activism," *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 93, no. 3 (2003): 730–50.

members of the Qajar court were the descendants of the *Umayyad*[91] dynasty from early Islam, and that the governor of Tehran possessed the dagger that murdered Imam ʿAli.[92] This belief shows how the religious dichotomies of good and evil or Muslim and heretic were incorporated as political metaphors by the public. Ordinary people interpreted the political situation of their time based on their familiar religious discourse.

Similarly, a night letter that was distributed in Tehran after the departure of *ʿulamā* to Qom clearly reiterates the same dichotomies in a textual form. It depicts the governor of Tehran as a heretic who opposes the *ʿulamā* and the true rule of Islam and who kills innocent Muslims.[93] Finally, the same religious discourse is recognizable in protesters' mourning rituals for their martyrs in Friday Mosque. On the nights of July 11 and 12, 1906, the protesters in Friday Mosque formed mourning processions similar to those of Muharram ceremonies and marched around the bazaar and the main mosques of the city. Kasravi provides people's dirges for the commemoration of their martyr: "Once more, Hosein has been martyred by Yazid's tyranny. ʿAbdol-Hamid [the martyr] has been killed by ʿAbdol-Majid [the Prime Minister]. May he be accepted before God a thousand times. A new sacrifice for thee, O Prophet."[94] Once again, by commemorating the martyr as similar to the martyrs of Karbalā, particularly Imam Husayn, the mourning rituals portrayed the state as heretic and the murderer of Imam Husayn and depicted the protesters as genuine Muslims who sought the rule of religion.

Besides the role of *ʿulamā* and the religious discourse, the members of the propertied middle class played a crucial role in the coming together of various communities of the city. They had the mobility to transcend their communal boundaries, coalesce into a bigger sphere, and form the public sphere; they pulled their communities together; and they collectively covered all the expenses of various episodes of *bast*. Moreover, the smaller group of the intelligentsia played a decisive role. The latter had looser communal ties, which gave them more

[91] Shiʿi doctrine advocates that *Umayyad* caliphates gained the power unjustly and betrayed the prophet's wish for the rule of Imam ʿAli and his descendants.
[92] Kermani, *Tarikh-i Bidari-yi Iranian*, 3: 492.
[93] Kermani, *Tarikh-i Bidari-yi Iranian*, 3: 531–2.
[94] Kasravi, *History of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution*, 1: 123.

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mobility and enabled them to work for the coalition between various communities and clerics. The coalition between the two most important religious figures of the city, Tabatabaʾi and Bihbahani, was the outcome of the intelligentsia's and secret societies' activities.[95] Without that coalition, the victory of the revolution was out of reach. Moreover, they generated new ideas about the rule of law and the necessity of the Constitution for the country. As Kermani mentions, their presence in the embassy garden was necessary for the consolidation of the protesters' request for the constitutional monarchy.

What about the spatiality of the revolution? What do these spatial settings – the two mosques, the shrine, and the embassy garden – mean? Why did people choose the Shah and Friday Mosques of the city and not any other mosque? The first chapter reviewed the main traditional communal spaces of Iranian cities. I demonstrated that there was a reciprocal relationship between Iranian urban society and its social spaces; both consisted of smaller patches that were highly colored with communal identities. *Zūrkhānih*s, *takīyyih*s, neighborhood mosques, coffeehouses, and bathhouses belonged to small segments of society; they did not belong to the public as a whole. As a result, people could not choose a single mosque or any other social space at the neighborhood level as the place of protest. If they did, their protest would be labeled as a communal grievance rather than a public matter.

However, the two central mosques of the city, Shah and Friday Mosques, did not belong to a certain section of society. They were the only mosques, besides Sipahsalar Mosque, which could be accountable to the public. Situated in the bazaar, the business district and the most crowded area of the city during the daytime, these mosques belonged to the whole Shiʿi population of the city. Shah Mosque was the biggest mosque of Tehran, built by Fath ʿAli Shah (1797–1834) as a sign of his religious passion.[96] Similarly, Friday Mosque functioned beyond a certain community or neighborhood. Friday Mosques in all

[95] Kermani, *Tarikh-i Bidari-yi Iranian*, 2: 263.

[96] For more information on Shah Mosque, see: Husayn Karimiyan, *Tehran dar Guzashtih va Hal [Tehran in Past and Present]* (Tehran: Intisharat-i Danishgah-i Milli, 2535 [1976]), 201–3; Jennifer M. Scarce, "The Role of Architecture in the Creation of Tehran," in *Téhéran Capitale Bicentenaire*, ed. C. Adle and B. Hourcade (Paris: Institute Français de Recherche en Iran: 1992), 80–1.

Figure 2.1 Shah and Friday Mosques in the bazaar at the heart of the city.

the cities were places for holding Friday prayers, which is a sign of unity between Muslims. Consequently, Tehran's Friday Mosque did not belong to a certain section of society.

When in 1905 and 1906 merchants and guild members were under unprecedented pressures as the result of the state's policies, they needed a space to represent all of them. They could not gather in their communal mosques because that would mark their protest as a communal conflict. They needed to protest as a unified body, so their choice of space was critical in this regard. Shah and Friday Mosques were perfect choices: they were spacious enough, with vast central courtyards that could contain a few thousand people; they did not belong to a specific community; and they were located in the bazaar, close to the merchants' shops and guild members' workshops (Figure 2.1). More importantly, they were sacred spaces. In line with the tradition of taking *bast* at holy sites, the two mosques could provide a barrier against the entry of government forces and prevent the arrest of the sanctuary-takers. In short, the Shah and Friday Mosques were places for the public; they could make genuine political public spaces.

When on July 10, 1906, after the shooting and death of the theology student, people and the ʿ*ulamā* gathered in Friday Mosque, Tabatabaʾi and his followers gathered in a different mosque in Tabatabaʾi's neighborhood. People in Friday Mosque forced him to leave his place and join other groups at the Friday Mosque.[97] The reason is clear: Friday Mosque was a better choice as it belonged to the entire city. Similarly, upon his arrival at the Friday Mosque, Tabatabaʾi's first words were an invitation to unity and forgetting old enmities: "O people! Today is the day of unification. Set aside your old enmities. Cast away the old hatreds. Let us unite and demand the constitutional monarchy."[98] These words are an invitation to transcend communal boundaries and create a unified public out of various smaller communities. All the pieces of the jigsaw puzzle were available. The protest was a move beyond a certain segment, its causes had affected a large section of society, its goals could benefit many social segments, it demanded a space to represent diverse communities, and it needed a leader who could transcend communal boundaries.

The Shah ʿAbd al-ʿAzim Shrine should be examined through the same framework. It was a holy shrine for all the Shiʿi Muslim population of Tehran. It was different from the city's *imāmzādih*s,[99] which belonged to different neighborhoods. Even its location emphasized its detachment from communal ties; it was located five miles south of the city. As a result, when in December 1905 people left the city to the Shah ʿAbd al-ʿAzim Shrine, it was a clarifying act announcing that the incident of Shah Mosque was not based on old established communal conflicts. Gathering in the shrine, similar to gathering in mosques, was the manifestation of a bigger social crisis; it was a venue to announce the political conflict between the state and society.

[97] Kermani, *Tarikh-i Bidari-yi Iranian*, 3: 481.

[98] Kermani, *Tarikh-i Bidari-yi Iranian*, 3: 481.

[99] *Imāmzādih*s are the shrines and tombs of the descendants of Shiʿi imams. The 1852–3 building survey of Tehran counted nine *imāmzādih*s inside the city. These *imāmzādih*s were smaller and less important than Shah ʿAbd al-ʿAzim Shrine. Although the latter was an *imāmzādih* too, it was situated outside the city and it was the most important *imāmzādih* for the citizens of Tehran. Sirus Sʿadvandiyan and Mansureh Ettehadieh, *Amar-i Dar al-Khalafih-yi Tehran: Asnadi az Tarikh-i Ijtimaʿi-yi Tehran dar ʿAsr-i Qajar [Statistics from Tehran the Capital: Documents from Social History of Tehran in the Qajar Era]* (Tehran: Nashr-i Tarikh-i Iran, 1368 [1990]), 38.

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However, people's gathering in the Friday and Shah Mosques did not prevent the state's efforts to "spoil"[100] the sacredness of these spaces. The state violated the right of sanctuary-takers to remain safe in sacred spaces by attacking them in the mosques. Similarly, during the second episode of contention there was a constant fear of an attack by the military forces on the Shah ʿAbd al-ʿAzim Shrine. On one occasion the two sides did in fact get close to an armed confrontation.[101] Moreover, these spaces had a common shortcoming. They were not large enough to support the multiple-day *bast* of a population larger than a few thousand. The central courtyard of the Shah Mosque is 64 × 64 m (210 × 210 feet), which makes it around 4,000 m^2 (43,000 ft^2). If each person in the protesting crowd occupies 1 m^2, the courtyard can only hold around 4,000 people when it is full. Friday Mosque is even smaller. Its central courtyard is 30 × 40 m (100 × 130 ft). Based on the same logic, the courtyard can only support 1,200 people. Even if people crowded into all the interior spaces of the mosque and the rooftops, there could not have been more than 4,000 people in the mosque on the days of July 10–12, 1906.[102]

As a result, after the attacks of the military forces on the Friday and Shah Mosques and the growth in the number of protesters, people needed an inviolable sanctuary that could host thousands of people. In the absence of such a public space in the city, people had no other choice than to leave the city, which happened in July 1906. People's departure occurred in two different forms. First, the *ʿulamā,* accompanied by their followers and families, literally left the city for Qom. Second, 14,000 people – some say 20,000[103] – left the city symbolically by entering the British embassy garden. It is important to note that the garden was the ground of a foreign country, so the state could not break into it and arrest the protesters.[104] While in the case of the mosques and the shrine these places transformed from a sacred place

[100] Eshaghi, "Quietness beyond Political Power," 494.
[101] Kermani, *Tarikh-i Bidari-yi Iranian*, 2: 347–8.
[102] Malikzadih exaggerates the number of the people in the Friday Mosque and estimates that 20,000–30,000 people gathered there, which is completely unrealistic: Malikzadih, *Tarikh-i Inghilab-i Mashrutiyat-i Iran*, 2: 358.
[103] Dulatabadi, *Hayat-i Yahya*, 2: 73; Malikzadih, *Tarikh-i Inghilab-i Mashrutiyat-i Iran*, 2: 374.
[104] For the history of taking *bast* in embassies and foreign territories, see: Eshaghi, "Quietness beyond Political Power," 499.

into a political public space, in the case of the British embassy and departure to Qom, spaces of protest and resistance formed through the physical absence of citizens; people boycotted the city. The city lost its primary workforce; it was a protest through their absence. While the British embassy was in the city, it was not the territory of the state. Political public space formed through the absence of people.

The question is: How big was the number of the *bastī*s? In other words, what do 14,000 people mean in the context of early twentieth-century Tehran? The closest survey of Tehran's population to the time of the revolution was conducted in 1922, sixteen years later. In that year, the city and its surroundings had a population of 210,000 people.[105] Based on this figure, Tehran had around 200,000 people at the time of the revolution, if not fewer. Ten years later, in 1932, the state conducted another survey; this time the population was categorized based on different age groups. In 1932, the male population between the ages of twenty and sixty-five made up 28 percent of the total population.[106] Using the same ratio, in 1906 there were approximately 56,000 men between twenty and sixty-five living in Tehran. Assuming that these age groups included the majority of the protesters in the embassy, more than one-quarter of the productive male population of the city was in the British embassy. Considering the higher estimate of *bastī*s at 20,000 people, this would mean that more than one-third of the productive population of the city was absent. More importantly, by considering the seasonal displacement of the population from the city to northern villages during the summer, the number of protesters in the embassy becomes more meaningful. These people were from more affluent sections of society, mostly merchants, shopkeepers, artisans, and students. It is not hard to imagine the political and economic pressure of their absence on the state. Finally, based on Kasravi's and Nazim al-Islam Kermani's accounts, the protest gradually spread throughout the country, and people in other cities followed the protesters in Tehran, which added extra pressure on the state.[107]

[105] Baladiyyih Tehran, *Sarshumari-yi Nofus-i Shahr-i Tehran: Dar Sanavat-i 1262 va 1270 va 1301 va 1311 [The Survey of Tehran Population in the Years 1262 and 1270 and 1301 and 1311]* (Tehran: Matbaʿih-yi Majlis, 1312 [1933]), 16.

[106] Baladiyyih Tehran, *Sarshumari-yi Nofus-i Shahr-i Tehran*, 67.

[107] Kasravi, *History of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution*, 1: 138; Kermani, *Tarikh-i Bidari-yi Iranian*, 3: 509, 537–40.

To summarize, in early twentieth-century Tehran, the same social processes were at work to generate the public sphere and to produce political public spaces. The religious discourse was the primary force that could transcend various communal boundaries and adversaries, as well as generate a shared political understanding among the people. The formation of public opinion and the dichotomization of society and the state into good and evil were conducted through pre-established religious frames. Similarly, the same discourse played the main role in the production of the political public spaces of the city. The notion of the sacredness of the main mosques and the holy shrine of the city was regarded as a barrier against governmental forces. Moreover, these spaces belonged to all different walks of life and were not colored by communal identity. It is not surprising that people did not use streets or squares as their protest platforms; the 1905–6 Constitutional Revolution can be regarded as a street-less and square-less social movement.

However, the success of the revolution started the process of the transformation of the public sphere and political public spaces. The next sections examine the initial transformations in the years after the revolution, and Chapter 6 examines the transformation of the public sphere and political public spaces by the mid-twentieth century.

The Impact of Newspapers, *Anjuman*s, and the Parliament

The Constitutional Revolution resulted in the establishment of the first Parliament in the modern history of Iran. The electoral law of September 9, 1906 qualified six groups as being eligible to present candidates: (1) princes and Qajar tribes, (2) the *ʿulamā* and theology students, (3) nobles, (4) merchants, (5) landowners and farmers, and (6) guilds. However, the law put some restrictions on their candidacy: lands of landowners and farmers had to be worth at least 1,000 *tūmān*; merchants were required to own a definite office and business; and shopkeepers and people of the bazaar had to be affiliated with a certain guild and the rent of their stores had to be more than the local average.[108] These conditions worked in favor of certain revolutionary

[108] Browne, *The Persian Revolution*, 355–6. For the Persian text of the electoral laws, see: Kermani, *Tarikh-i Bidari-yi Iranian*, 3: 602.

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groups: the propertied middle class, the merchants, and the *ʿulamā*. As Abrahamian demonstrates, the *ʿulamā* and affluent bazaar people occupied 60 percent of the seats in the first Parliament, and landowners, civil servants, and a few professionals occupied the remaining 40 percent: "The propertied middle class, together with their religious allies, had gained control of the Majlis [Parliament]."[109] Economic interests were prioritized over communal affiliation and the Parliament did not accurately reflect the population. Within a two-year period, 1906–8, the seizure of power by the propertied middle class resulted in the polarization of society and a backlash against the revolution.[110]

Democracy did not last long, and two years later the court seized back the power through a military coup supported by Russia, bombarded the parliament building, and executed, imprisoned, and exiled many representatives and activists. From 1908 to 1921 the country did not see peace. Iran went through a civil war in which revolutionary forces defeated the monarchy one more time in 1909. The second Parliament continued reforms by employing American counselors. Soon, Russia issued an ultimatum to the Parliament to dismiss the counselors, which was rejected and led to the military occupation of northern Iran. By the beginning of World War I, democracy was the least concern of Iranians. The occupied country, first by Russia and then by Britain, went through famines and disease outbreaks. Finally, Reza Khan's 1921 coup brought an end to the failed experience of democracy and began a new era of autocracy.

However, the two-year period of relative stability and democracy after the 1906 revolution brought unprecedented phenomena that had decisive impacts on the future of the public sphere and political public spaces in Iranian society, and led to their transformation.

Anjumans*: The Medium between the Communal and Public Spheres*

Shortly after the establishment of the first Parliament, small political societies emerged in Iranian cities. Called *anjuman*s, these societies provided arenas for the direct political participation of Iranians.

[109] Ervand Abrahamian, "The Crowd in the Persian Revolution," *Iranian Studies* 2, no. 4 (1969): 142.

[110] Abrahamian, "The Crowd in the Persian Revolution," 143.

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Before the revolution there were some secret societies in Iran,[111] which aimed to awaken people, invite them to move toward freedom and modernization, encourage *ʿulamā* to take part in political movements, and establish new schools based on European schools.[112] However, the post-revolution *anjuman*s were different from their earlier counterparts.[113] They cast off their clandestine status and followed their political objectives freely. The *anjuman*s of the two-year period between the 1906 revolution and the 1908 coup can be divided into two main groups: official and popular.[114] The official *anjuman*s were the result of the electoral laws. Based on Article 9 of these regulations,

> [i]n every place where elections are carried out, a Council (*anjuman*) shall be formed of well-known local representatives of the six classes of electors to supervise the elections. This Council shall be under the temporary supervision of the Governor or Deputy-Governor of that place. In this way two Councils shall be formed, one local and one provincial, the former in each of the individual towns in the province, the latter in the chief town of the province.[115]

111 Mongol Bayat, "Anjoman (Organization): I. Political" in *Encyclopedia Iranica* (December 15, 1985), www.iranicaonline.org/articles/anjoman-gathering-association-society-general-designation-of-many-private-and-public-associations#pt2 (accessed October 26, 2015); Lambton, *Qājār Persia*, 301, 306; Abrahamian, "The Causes of the Constitutional Revolution," 401–2; Abrahamian, *Iran between Two Revolutions*, 75–80.

112 Lambton, *Qājār Persia*, 308. Also see: Ismaʿil Raʾin, *Anjuman-ha-yi Serri dar Inghilab-i Mashrutiyat [Secret Anjumans in the Constitutional Revolution]* (Tehran: Sazman-i Chap va Intisharat-i Javidan, 2535 [1976]); Fatimih Shirali, *Anjuman-ha-yi Tehran dar ʿAsr-i Mashrutiyat [Tehran's Anjumans during the Constitutional Era]* (Tehran: Baran-i Andishih, 1384 [2005]), 35–137. Nazim al-Islam Kermani's book provides detailed accounts on the establishment and activities of one of the most influential secret societies, *Anjuman-i Makhfi*, before and after the revolution: Kermani, *Tarikh-i Bidari-yi Iranian*.

113 There are three main theories regarding their roots, which link their origins to the Russian soviets before the Russian Revolution, to French revolutionary societies, or to traditional Iranian secret societies. Shirali, *Anjuman-ha-yi Tehran dar ʿAsr-i Mashrutiyat*, 143–6; Suhrab Yazdani, "Anjuman-ha-yi Melli dar Marrutiyat-i Iran [National Anjumans during Iran's Constitutional Movement]," *Zaban va Adabiyat-i Farsi*, 12–19 (1375–6 [1996–8]): 24; Bayat, "Anjoman (Organization)."

114 Ann K. S. Lambton, "Persian Political Societies 1906–11," *St Antony's Papers, Middle Eastern Affairs*, 16 (1963): 46; Farugh Kharabi, "Naghsh-i Anjuman-ha dar Inghilab-i Mashrutiyat [The Role of the Anjumans in the Constitutional Revolution]," *Mutaliʿat-i Jamiʿihshinakhti*, 16 (1379 [2000–1]): 67–8.

115 Browne, *The Persian Revolution*, 357–8. For the Persian text, see: Kermani, *Tarikh-i Bidari-yi Iranian*, 3: 605.

Article 10 allowed official *anjuman*s to investigate complaints in connection with the election.[116] As a result, official *anjuman*s were established in major cities and towns around the country to supervise the election process, except in Tehran as the seat of the Parliament.[117] Many of these *anjuman*s continued to work and oversee local governments even after the election.[118]

In contrast to the official ones, popular *anjuman*s appeared spontaneously. They did not have any legal foundation until the passage of the supplementary fundamental laws of October 7, 1907, which complemented the initial fundamental laws of December 30, 1906. Article 21 of the supplementary laws states: "Societies (*anjumans*) and associations (*ijtimáʿát*) which are not productive of mischief to Religion or the State, and are not injurious to good order, are free throughout the whole Empire."[119]

The establishment of numerous popular *anjuman*s throughout the country developed a sense of a political public life in Iranian cities, particularly in Tehran. In some provinces, such as Gilan and Azerbaijan, even some small towns and villages had their own *anjuman*s.[120] Their numbers in Tehran were extraordinary and increased throughout the two-year period. Close to the time of the military coup in July 1908 there were around 200 *anjuman*s in Tehran.[121] Kharabi counts forty *anjuman*s in Isfahan, fourteen in Kashan, thirteen in Rasht, ten

116 Browne, *The Persian Revolution*, 357–8. For the Persian text, see: Kermani, *Tarikh-i Bidari-yi Iranian*, 3: 605.

117 Lambton, "Persian Political Societies," 46

118 An interesting case in this regard is the electoral *anjuman* of Tabriz: Kharabi, "Naghsh-i Anjuman-ha dar Inghilab-i Mashrutiyat," 66.

119 Browne, *The Persian Revolution*, 375.

120 Kharabi, "Naghsh-i Anjuman-ha dar Inghilab-i Mashrutiyat," 64.

121 Afary, *The Iranian Constitutional Revolution, 1906–1911*, 74; Bayat, *Iran's First Revolution*, 161; Bayat, "Anjoman (Organization)"; Kharabi, "Naghsh-i Anjuman-ha dar Inghilab-i Mashrutiyat," 76. Kasravi mentions that close to the time of the coup, there were 180 *anjuman*s in Tehran: Kasravi, *Tarikh-i Mashrutih-yi Iran*, 1: 569. Different sources present different numbers for *anjuman*s in Tehran. This is mostly because in a short period of less than two years these *anjuman*s appeared on the political scene of Tehran. As a result, total numbers depend on when different sources counted them. However, most sources agree that by the time of the coup, there were around 200 *anjuman*s in Tehran. For discussions on the numbers in different sources, see: Yazdani, "Anjuman-ha-yi Melli dar Marrutiyat-i Iran," 27; Shirali, *Anjuman-ha-yi Tehran dar ʿAsr-i Mashrutiyat*, 147.

in Kermanshah, ten in Qom, seven in Babul, eight in Mashhad, and five in Qazvin.[122]

There was a significant difference between the number of *anjuman*s in Tehran and in the rest of the country, which was not necessarily related to the difference between Tehran's population and those of other cities. For example, by the early twentieth century, Isfahan had around 80,000 inhabitants, which equaled 40 percent of Tehran's population.[123] However, the number of its *anjuman*s was around one-fifth of Tehran's. Knowing the social composition of these miniature societies is essential to understand the reasons for the disproportionate number of *anjuman*s in Tehran.

Similar to other social practices, *anjuman*s were closely aligned with social segmentation; thus, the social segmentation constituted the social practices of *anjuman*s, and in return was reproduced through their internal and external social relations. Fatimih Shirali has gathered the names and descriptions of seventy-five *anjuman*s in Tehran. Within her list, fifteen *anjuman*s belonged to communities that originated in other cities in the country, eleven *anjuman*s were based on neighborhood identities, ten *anjuman*s were based on professions and guilds, five *anjuman*s belonged to various religious groups in the city, and seven *anjuman*s were dedicated to cultural activities. Of the remaining twenty-eight, at least the titles of eleven *anjuman*s indicate their communal origins, such as Qajar princes, women, and Muzaffar al-Din Shah's servants' *anjuman*s.[124]

The fever of establishing new *anjuman*s became so widespread that even musicians[125] of the city established their own.[126] A report from the British embassy crew in Tehran describes smaller *anjuman*s in

[122] Kharabi, "Naghsh-i Anjuman-ha dar Inghilab-i Mashrutiyat," 76.

[123] Peter Christensen, *The Decline of Iranshahr: Irrigation and Environments in the History of the Middle East, 500 B.C to A.D 155* (Odense: Museum Tusculanum Press, 1993), 149.

[124] Shirali, *Anjuman-ha-yi Tehran dar ʿAsr-i Mashrutiyat*, 219–67. Also in his memoirs, Qudsi provides a list of forty-four *anjuman*s of Tehran: Qudsi, *Kitab-i Khatirat-i Man*, 1: 142–3.

[125] *Muṭrib*s

[126] Majd al-Islam Kermani, *Tarikh-i Inhitat-i Majlis: Fasli az Tarikh-i Inghilab-i Mashrutiyat-i Iran [The History of the Parliament's Decline: An Episode from the History of the Constitutional Revolution]* (Isfahan: Intisharat-i Danishgah-i Isfahan, 1351 [1972]), 43.

these words: "very many of the smaller ones have been formed simply to forward their own private interests."[127] These words clearly describe the segmented nature of *anjuman*s. Each entity had to follow the interests of its own community. In the colorful communal canvas of Tehran, the juvenile democracy created an opportunity for each community to raise its voice. Since, in the course of the nineteenth century, Tehran grew from a small town to the biggest city in the country, it had the most diverse population of all the major cities. Small segments of the population managed to produce their own *anjuman*s; therefore, Tehran had the most and the greatest variety.[128]

Although *anjuman*s, similar to other social practices, were based on social segmentation, they engendered a greater public, greater than the communal sphere of each community. In major cities, the *anjuman*s were the manifestations of a transitory era from the old established forms of political participation based on segmentation and communal diversity to a more coherent public. They were able to unite and transcend communal differences toward a shared goal. In the case of Tehran, there were many interconnections between the *anjuman*s of the city. They coordinated their activities, protested together, had group meetings with representatives from various *anjuman*s, and held shared ceremonies. For example, the *anjuman*s of Tehran cooperated with one another to hold the celebration of the first anniversary of the revolution and a ceremony for its martyrs.[129] More importantly, many *anjuman*s of the city created a shared Central Anjuman to coordinate their activities, particularly for the defense of the Parliament against the threats of the court. Two representatives from forty-one major *anjuman*s of Tehran were present in the Central Anjuman. Moreover, the Central Anjuman functioned as a referee in disputes between other *anjuman*s.[130] As a result, the decisions of the Central Anjuman were

[127] Lambton, "Persian Political Societies," 63.

[128] The membership in *anjuman*s was not strict, and some of them accepted people outside their own community. Moreover, the number of members varies from one *anjuman* to another. While some *anjuman*s had a few thousand members, many were just small circles of people with shared identities. Shirali, *Anjuman-ha-yi Tehran dar ʿAsr-i Mashrutiyat*, 151–2; Lambton, "Persian Political Societies," 50; Kharabi, "Naghsh-i Anjuman-ha dar Inghilab-i Mashrutiyat," 78–9; Yazdani, "Anjuman-ha-yi Melli dar Marrutiyat-i Iran," 28.

[129] Kasravi, *Tarikh-i Mashrutih-yi Iran*, 408, 412–15.

[130] Shirali, *Anjuman-ha-yi Tehran dar ʿAsr-i Mashrutiyat*, 268; Yazdani, "Anjuman-ha-yi Melli dar Marrutiyat-i Iran," 36.

accepted and followed.[131] Mutual cooperation substituted factional strife.[132] The *anjuman*s were proof that various segments of society could cooperate with each other without rivalry and fights; they could cooperate toward a shared objective.

There is not sufficient data on the spatiality of *anjuman*s. Most likely, due to their short life, these organizations did not form specific spatial settings. ʿIyn al-Saltanih, Kasravi, and Kermani provide few clues regarding the spaces of *anjuman*s. Based on their accounts, some *anjuman*s used residential houses, theology schools, mosques, and similar locations as their meeting places.[133] The Sipahsalar Mosque and the parliament courtyard were two spaces that all the *anjuman*s of the city used collectively. As the rest of this chapter discusses, *anjuman*s used these sites repeatedly to coordinate their activities.

Although the *anjuman*s formed based on the old social pattern of Iranian society, they were the manifestations of a transitory phase of Iranians' socio-political practices.[134] Through their interconnections, *anjuman*s "fostered a certain sense of solidarity among those who were

[131] Kermani, *Tarikh-i Inhitat-i Majlis*, 47–8.

[132] Abdollah Mostofi mentions that after the revolution, the old rivalry between neighborhood mourning processions was changed into a state of friendship; various neighborhoods hosted the mourning processions of other neighborhoods in their own *takīyyih*s. Abdollah Mostofi, *From Agha Mohammad Khan to Naser ed-Din Shah (1794–1896)*, vol.1 of *The Administrative and Social History of the Qajar Period* [The Story of My Life], trans. Nayer Mostofi Glenn (Costa Mesa: Mazda Publishers, 1997), 159–60.

[133] For example, Nazim al-Islam Kermani mentions that *Junūb Anjuman* (South *Anjuman*), which consisted of people from the south, particularly Shiraz, was established in the Haj Nayib al-Sadr-i Shirazi's house in Tehran: Kermani, *Tarikh-i Bidari-yi Iranian*, 4: 102. In another example, Kasravi and Malikzadih mention that *Madrisih-yi Sadr* (Sadr religious school) was the center of *Tulāb*s (religious students) *anjuman*: Kasravi, *Tarikh-i Mashrutih-yi Iran*, 1: 375; Malikzadih, *Tarikh-i Inghilab-i Mashrutiyat-i Iran*, 3: 479. ʿIyn al-Saltanih mentions that *Tulāb*s *anjuman* used to hold its meetings in one of the mosques of the city on Mondays and Fridays: ʿIyn al-Saltanih, *Ruznamih-yi Khatirat-i ʿIyn al-Saltanih*, 3: 1828.

[134] Various resources can be utilized for studying the activities of the *anjuman*s. From secondary sources, Lambton's and Shirali's works are valuable resources in this regard. In addition, the history books and memoirs written closer to the time of the revolution provide valuable information. For more on the different activities of the *anjuman*s during this two-year period, see: Lambton, "Persian Political Societies"; Shirali, *Anjuman-ha-yi Tehran dar ʿAsr-i Mashrutiyat*, 155–216; Kermani, *Tarikh-i Bidari-yi Iranian*, 4: 1–164; Kasravi, *Tarikh-i Mashrutih-yi Iran*, 1/2: 259–675; Browne, *The Persian Revolution*, 98–232.

seeking to assert themselves against the arbitrary, and often tyrannical, rule." They played an unprecedented role "in creating a public opinion in favour of constitutional reform and in defending" Parliament.[135] It was one of the first times that various segments of society united for a common cause without the mediation of the religious discourse. The *anjuman*s transcended social boundaries without adhering to the unifying characters of the *ʿulamā*. They were the heralds of future social practices that would distance themselves from religiosity and communal bonds; they defined a public that could embrace all the various social groups; *anjuman*s were the manifestation of the transitory stage from the communal sphere to the public sphere.

In other words, although the public sphere maintained its classless and segmented nature, religion was no longer the sole binding force that could bring various communities together. Novel ideas and concepts, alongside the old, established religious frames, helped to bring various communities together. In addition to the *anjuman*s, the formation of new social venues, such as free newspapers, played a decisive role in spreading new concepts and undermining the monopoly of religious discourse.

Newspapers and Public Opinion

The two-year period from 1906 to 1908 fostered another phenomenon that deserves close scrutiny. In the years following the revolution, the number of newspapers increased extraordinarily. In all cities, particularly in Tehran, independent free newspapers were published.

Before the revolution there were a few state-sponsored newspapers in Iran. Their articles were written under the direct supervision of the Ministry of Publication.[136] These newspapers did not have any political significance as a counterforce against the establishment, and their contents were restricted to praise of the royal family.[137] In the prerevolutionary era, Persian newspapers published outside the country

[135] Lambton, "Persian Political Societies," 53–4.

[136] Negin Nabavi, "Readership, the Press and the Public Sphere in the First Constitutional Era," in *Iran's Constitutional Revolution: Popular Politics, Cultural Transformation and Transnational Connections*, ed. H. E. Chehabi and Vanessa Martin (London: I.B. Tauris, 2010), 214.

[137] For an extensive review of pre-revolution scholarship and journalism, see: Edward G. Browne, *The Press and Poetry of Modern Persia* (Cambridge: The University Press, 1914), 7–25.

filled the free press gap inside Iran. These newspapers were smuggled to Iran from London, Cairo, Calcutta, and Istanbul.[138] Saʿidi Sirjani argues that these newspapers did not have much influence on ordinary people and were circulated mostly between educated citizens. He believes that before the Constitutional Revolution neither Persian papers outside the country nor the few papers inside "were effective in molding general public opinion."[139] Hassan Kamshad and Peter Avery argue that, despite this ineffectiveness, the newspapers printed outside Iran were at least useful in arousing the political awareness of their few readers, developing journalism within the country, and providing the basis of the Constitutional Revolution.[140]

In the absence of a free press before the revolution, the most efficient factor in the formation of public opinion was oral tradition.[141] In the words of Saʿidi Sirjani, "any eloquent speaker could persuade hundreds of listeners to support justice and freedom and, by playing on their emotions, either incite them to rebellion and self-sacrifice or the opposite."[142] As demonstrated earlier, the religious authorities were the main beneficiaries of this oral tradition. The oral tradition did not disappear after the success of the revolution; activist preachers continued to use mosques as the perfect stages to address the masses, "attracting the largest crowds to their mosques, transforming the place of worship into a public forum for mass rallies and political demonstrations."[143]

However, this monopoly ended with the establishment of free newspapers. The number of newspapers that emerged is astonishing. While

[138] For information about the newspapers printed outside Iran, see: Peter Avery, "Printing, the Press and Literature in Modern Iran," in *The Cambridge History of Iran: From Nadir Shah to the Islamic Republic*, ed. Peter Avery et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 7: 831–6.

[139] ʿAli-Akbar Saʿidi Sirjani, "Constitutional Revolution VI: The Press," in *Encyclopedia Iranica* (December 15, 1992), www.iranicaonline.org/articles/constitutional-revolution-vi (accessed October 27, 2015).

[140] Avery, "Printing, the Press and Literature in Modern Iran," 831; Hassan Kamshad, *Modern Persian Prose Literature* (Bethesda: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 30.

[141] Föllmer, "Religious Aspects in Communication Process," 288.

[142] Saʿidi Sirjani, "Constitutional Revolution VI: The Press."

[143] Bayat, *Iran's First Revolution*, 168. Mongol Bayat argues that the use of mosques as stages for addressing the public was a new social phenomenon limited to the victory of the revolution. However, this role was well established prior to the revolution and played an important role during the Tobacco Movement and the Constitutional Revolution.

Table 2.1 ***Numbers of new newspapers published in 1906–11 in different cities***

	1906	1907	1908	1909	1910	1911	Total
Tehran	6	59	17	6	16	16	120
Tabriz	13	6	7	7	3	1	37
Rasht		6	2	2	7	8	25
Isfahan	1	8	2	3	1	1	16
Mashhad	2			2	3	1	8
Shiraz		1	1	2	2	2	8
Hamadan	1	4			1		6
Yazd		1	1	1	2		5
Qazvin			1	1	1	1	4
Urmiya		1	1		1	1	4
Kerman						3	3
Khuy				1		2	3
Kashan					1	1	2
Lahijan		2					2
Anzali		1					1
Ardabil			1				1
Kermanshah				1			1
Total	23	89	33	26	38	37	246

Source: Edward G. Browne, *The Press and Poetry of Modern Persia* (Cambridge: The University Press, 1914), 27–153.

during the seventy years before the revolution at most ninety-one publications had been issued in the whole country, in just the first year following the revolution ninety-nine new newspapers went into print.[144] Edward Browne's comprehensive list of newspapers helps to construct an image of how fast they spread throughout the country, particularly in big cities.[145] Table 2.1 is based on Browne's list.[146]

Browne provides the year in which each paper started its publication. As a result, in 1907 alone 59 newspapers were printed for the first

[144] Nabavi, "Readership, the Press and the Public Sphere," 213.

[145] Browne, *The Press and Poetry of Modern Persia*, 27–153.

[146] Sometimes Browne gives two consecutive years as the starting year of the publication of a newspaper. This is because of the mismatch between the Islamic and Gregorian calendars. In these cases, the earlier year is considered.

time in Tehran, and between 1906 and 1911, 120 newspapers were printed in the city. Obviously, not all papers had the same number of readers and many of them were published for just a few issues. Most of these newspapers printed around 500 copies per issue; however, the number of copies of the popular newspapers of the city typically reached a few thousand, with *Majlis* being 7,000–10,000, *Sur-i Israfil* 5,500, and *Musavat* 3,000.[147] Nevertheless, these numbers illustrate the popularity of the newspapers. A total of 120 newspapers in six years for a city with a population of 200,000 was an unprecedented phenomenon in Iran.

Beyond being great in number, newspapers had a widespread readership in the period following the revolution. Quoting from a correspondent's letter, Browne mentions that

> [t]he most remarkable manifestation of the popular awakening is the large increase in the number of newspapers. Not the old, stilted, futile style of paper, but popular journals, written in comparatively simple language. Everyone seems to read a paper now. In many of the *Qahwa-khánas* (coffee-houses) professional readers are engaged, who, instead of reciting the legendary tales of the *Sháh-náma*, now regale their clients with political news.[148]

Similarly, semi-public reading rooms, *qirāʾatkhāna*s, were established around the cities. These spaces "were privately endowed libraries established with a public mission through the initiative of benefactors, many of whom were merchants and booksellers." They "contributed to the expansion of the public's engagement with print" and "an increase in the number of newspapers published."[149] Moreover, newspapers attempted to become more affordable to a larger public by lowering their prices and providing direct distribution in public spaces in the city. There are accounts that newspapers were even passed from person to person to reach those who could not afford to buy them.[150]

147 Saʿidi Sirjani, "Constitutional Revolution VI: The Press."
148 Browne, *The Persian Revolution of 1905–1909*, 143.
149 Afshin Marashi, "Print Culture and Its Publics: A Social History of Bookstores in Tehran, 1900–1950," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 47, no. 1 (2015): 95.
150 Nabavi, "Readership, the Press and the Public Sphere," 218–19.

Although the literacy level of the population was relatively low, the public reading of newspapers in coffeehouses and reading rooms helped to spread new revolutionary concepts among various social groups. The old established communal circles, such as coffeehouses, became places for the spread of news. Through this process, separate social segments were gathering in their own coffeehouses while simultaneously becoming connected by the invisible thread of newspapers. Newspapers transcended communal boundaries, connected communities, and helped to form a more coherent public.[151] They were effective in promoting new political meanings between people and shaping a common understanding of subjects such as the Constitution, progress, and freedom. In the words of Negin Nabavi, "newspapers saw their task to consist of informing public opinion and imparting notions that were considered fundamental to the shaping of a modern era."[152] As a result, similar to *anjuman*s, newspapers played a significant role in the transformation of the communal sphere; they helped to form common understanding among separate communities. These commonalities were decisive in the formation of public opinion and the public sphere. The *anjuman*s and newspapers were the manifestations of a transitory era.

Political Public Spaces in the Post-Revolution Era

By the establishment of the first Parliament, the opening of *anjuman*s, and the publication of newspapers, a new historical era began. For a short period of two years, Iranians experienced democracy and freedom of speech. People could protest freely against the tyranny of the court and local governments without fear of persecution. Alongside

[151] This process is similar to what Benedict Anderson demonstrates about the impact of print culture on the formation of "imagined communities" in Europe as the foundation of nationalism. Newspapers can create "ideas of simultaneity" among people that do not necessarily have any social relationship. Newspapers can connect people who do not have any face-to-face communication and are not from the same community. As a result, they can create a sort of imagined community. While in the case of Anderson's study these imagined communities are nations, in the case of this research it is the public sphere: Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 34–7.

[152] Negin Nabavi, "Spreading the Word: Iran's First Constitutional Press and the Shaping of a 'New Era,'" *Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies* 14, no. 3 (2005): 312. Also see: Föllmer, "Religious Aspects in Communication Process," 304–5.

Figure 2.2 The parliament building, courtyard, and Sipahsalar Mosque located next to Baharistan Square.

these changes in the public sphere, this unique era brought a delicate spatial shift. The main spaces of protests shifted from Friday and Shah Mosques in the old city and the Shah ʿAbd al-ʿAzim Shrine outside of the city to the parliament building, its courtyard, and the adjacent mosque, Sipahsalar.

The two-year period after the success of the revolution and before the 1908 coup witnessed countless episodes of protests in the parliament building, and particularly in its courtyard. Various groups of people used these spaces as venues to contact their representatives, protest against the court and local governments, announce provinces' grievances, and support the Parliament. Beyond the parliament ground, Sipahsalar Mosque was an alternative place of gatherings and protests. The mosque soon changed into the center for the revolutionary forces and *anjuman*s. Sipahsalar Mosque is located south of the parliament, and was connected to the parliament courtyard through a gate (Figure 2.2). The history books and memoirs of the constitutional era record many instances of gatherings and protests in these spaces.[153]

[153] Kasravi, *Tarikh-i Mashrutih-yi Iran,* 1/2: 220–3, 282–4, 315, 340–8, 361, 438, 505–21, 550, 581–637; Browne, *The Persian Revolution of 1905–1909*,

Similar to the old city's main mosques and the shrine outside the city, new spaces of protest belonged to all segments of society; they were not colored by communal identities. Edward G. Browne perfectly describes the diversity of people in these spaces:

> It is typical of this movement that the rallying-point of the people should have been the House of Parliament and the Mosque, standing side by side. In and around these two buildings gathered the strangest throng which has ever been seen fighting the old, old battle against the powers of tyranny and darkness. Europeanized young men with white collars, white-turbaned mullás, Sayyids with the green and blue insignia of their holy descent, the *kulák-namadís* (felt-capped peasants and workmen), the brown *ʿabás* (cloaks) of the humble trades-folk;—all in whose hearts glowed the sacred fire gathered there to do battle in the cause of freedom.[154]

Various groups and communities gathered in these spaces to pursue their political objectives. The *anjuman*s were the primary social forces that could draw different sections of society to these spaces. However, similar to the *bast* in the British embassy, *anjuman*s occasionally reproduced their own smaller-scale communal spaces inside the bigger context of the public space. In other words, despite gathering various communities as a whole, the political public space of the parliament or the mosque could be further fractured into smaller communal spaces. For example, on June 9, 1908, when the *anjuman*s of Tehran gathered in the Sipahsalar Mosque to protest against the court, each *anjuman* occupied a separate room around the central courtyard and put up a sign to indicate its location. Kasravi mentions that around 180 different signs were attached to the separate rooms.[155] This segmentation of protesters inside a shared public space is similar to people's gathering in the British embassy, when different guilds pitched their own tents and attached their distinct signs to mark their locations. The united public was the outcome of the coming together of communities; yet the public sphere and spaces were clearly an organization of many distinct communal identities.

133, 164, 196, 203–6; Malikzadih, *Tarikh-i Inghilab-i Mashrutiyat-i Iran*, 2/3: 428, 448–9, 475, 516, 586, 626, 679, Dulatabadi, *Hayat-i Yahya*, 2: 149, 167–8, 270; Tafrishi Husayni, *Ruznamih-yi Akhbar-i Mashrutiyat va Inghilab-i Iran*, 65; Qudsi, *Kitab-i Khatirat-i Man*, 1: 97.

[154] Browne, *The Persian Revolution of 1905–1909*, 164.

[155] Kasravi, *Tarikh-i Mashrutih-yi Iran*, 2: 587.

The active role of new political public spaces does not mean that the old ones were forgotten. There were some instances of gatherings in Shah and Friday Mosques and even the Shah ʿAbd al-ʿAzim Shrine. However, this time, the anti-constitutional forces were the primary users of these spaces to confront the revolutionaries. A group of clerics with close ties to the court, who demanded a stronger position for religion and the *ʿulamā* in the constitutional laws, used these spaces to protest against the Parliament and revolutionary forces. Once, they attempted to start a *bast* in the Friday Mosque, but they were prevented by constitutionalists and had to depart.[156] On two other occasions they left the city and began their own *bast* in the Shah ʿAbd al-ʿAzim Shrine. On the second occasion they gathered a group of 500 people and even published a newspaper against the revolutionaries from the shrine. However, they were not successful in drawing considerable attention and had to return to the city in both cases.[157]

Except for these minor gatherings of the anti-constitutional forces, a significant shift is recognizable in the spatiality of political struggles after the revolution. Prior to the revolution, people used the main mosques in the old city and the shrine outside the city as their main political public spaces. However, after the revolution they used the parliament courtyard and the adjacent mosque. All of these spaces belonged to the public rather than to a certain social segment. Sipahsalar Mosque, similar to the Friday and Shah Mosques, was not affiliated with specific communities. Built by a wealthy and popular court member, Mirza Husayn Khan Sipahsalar, it was one of the main mosques of the city. Its physical location helped it to remain unaffiliated; it was located beyond the limits of the old city, in the new northern neighborhood.[158] The parliament building, originally Mirza Husayn Khan Sipahsalar's palace, had the same characteristic: It was

[156] Kasravi, *Tarikh-i Mashrutih-yi Iran*, 1: 374; Malikzadih, *Tarikh-i Inghilab-i Mashrutiyat-i Iran*, 3: 478.

[157] Kasravi, *Tarikh-i Mashrutih-yi Iran*, 1: 225–6, 375–6; Malikzadih, *Tarikh-i Inghilab-i Mashrutiyat-i Iran*, 3: 502, 599; *Hayat-i Yahya*, 2: 148–9, 129–32; Kermani, *Tarikh-i Bidari-yi Iranian*, 4: 96.

[158] For more information on the building of the mosque, see: Amir Bani Masʿud, *Miʿmari-yi Muʿasir-i Iran: Dar Takapu-yi Biyn-i Sunnat va Mudirnitih*, 2nd ed. (Tehran: Nashr-i Hunar-i Miʿmari, 1390 [2011]), 118–20.

the house of the people and it belonged to the public.[159] Moreover, the close proximity of these spaces, as seen in Figure 2.2, helped them to work with each other during the two-year period. As a result, similar to the mosques of the old city, the combination of small-scale architectural spaces, rather than streets and squares, functioned as political public spaces of the city.

There are two significant differences between the parliament and other protest sites. For the first time, a secular space provided the platform for people's protests. The mosques and the shrine worked as political public spaces because they acted as the places of prayer and pilgrimage of the majority of the Shiʿi population. In contrast, the parliament building and courtyard symbolized the centers of the people's power and presented their gatherings as a means toward people's political participation. People galvanized the possibility of the Parliament through the 1906 revolution and, in return, the Parliament reproduced the public, independent of any communal affiliation and religiosity. By establishing the Parliament, the reciprocal relationship between society and public space entered into a new phase. For the first time, an alternative social force could unite various social segments; people did not depend on a sacred space to produce their desired public spaces. The parliament and its courtyard were the first non-sacred spaces in Tehran, besides the British embassy, that transformed into platforms of protest and political action. This new conception of political public space became possible because of people's collective action and resistance against the court's tyranny during the revolution. People produced new political public spaces, and new spaces reproduced the public.

There is another significant difference between the parliament and the sacred spaces of the old city. People's *bast*s in sacred spaces were based on the concept of sanctuary. In other words, people considered the mosques and the shrine as inviolable sacred spaces; the sacredness of these spaces was a barrier against any potential assaults from the court. The same concept of sanctuary pushed people to designate the garden of the British embassy as a protest site. After the court's assault on the protesters in the mosques, the only spaces that could protect them from further assault were the embassies. However, in the case

[159] For more information on the building of the parliament, see: Bani Masʿud, *Miʿmari-yi Muʿasir-i Iran*, 113–17.

of the parliament, it was not the space of the parliament itself that protected the revolutionaries; people did not necessarily gather inside the parliament to be protected from the court's assaults. In contrast, in many cases, people gathered there to protect the parliament against the court.[160] For the first time, public space became a ground that needed to be protected by the people. The protection of the space of the parliament was equal to the protection of the symbol of the revolution. Losing that symbol was the same as losing the achievements of the revolution.

It is important to note that people never used the spacious streets and squares of the northern neighborhood of Tehran for their political activities. These streets and squares were the outcome of the 1870s expansion of the city. Chapter 4 will return to the topic of the difference between the new streets and squares in northern Tehran and the communal spaces of the old city. As that discussion will articulate, despite the proximity of the spacious squares and wide streets of the northern neighborhood to the parliament, people chose to protest inside the small-scale architectural spaces of the mosque and the parliament, which were similar to the main mosques of the old city. The new streets and squares did not belong to the public. They were

[160] On two occasions the court attempted to defeat the revolutionaries by attacking the parliament building. While the first assault in December 1907 was unsuccessful and the armed resistance of *anjuman*s prevented the occupation of the building by anti-constitutionalists, on the second occasion, using Russian military forces, the court managed to defeat the revolutionaries and bombarded the parliament building. For the detailed accounts of the failed 1907 coup, see: Kasravi, *Tarikh-i Mashrutih-yi Iran*, 2: 499–521; Browne, *The Persian Revolution of 1905–1909*, 164–96; Malikzadih, *Tarikh-i Inghilab-i Mashrutiyat-i Iran*, 3: 530–71; Dulatabadi, *Hayat-i Yahya*, 2: 165–202; Tafrishi Husayni, *Ruznamih-yi Akhbar-i Mashrutiyat va Inghilab-i Iran*, 51–8; Qudsi, *Kitab-i Khatirat-i Man*, 1: 158–9. For detailed accounts of the 1908 coup, see: Kermani, *Tarikh-i Bidari-yi Iranian*, 4: 136–60; Kasravi, *Tarikh-i Mashrutih-yi Iran*, 2: 578–640; Browne, *The Persian Revolution of 1905–1909*, 201–7; Malikzadih, *Tarikh-i Inghilab-i Mashrutiyat-i Iran*, 3: 656–751; Dulatabadi, *Hayat-i Yahya*, 2: 253–332; Tafrishi Husayni, *Ruznamih-yi Akhbar-i Mashrutiyat va Inghilab-i Iran*, 87–118; Qudsi, *Kitab-i Khatirat-i Man*, 1: 190–206. For a different point of view from the Russians' side, see: N. P. Mamontov, *Hukumat-i Tizar va Muhammad ʿAli Mirza [Tzar Government and Muhammad ʿAli Mirza]*, trans. Sharaf Al-Din Mirza Ghahrimani (Tehran: Ruznamih-yi Ittilaʿat, 1930), 77–95. For a hand-drawn map of the locations of different forces on the day of the attack, see: Tafrishi Husayni, *Ruznamih-yi Akhbar-i Mashrutiyat va Inghilab-i Iran*, 137.

devoid of a social life; they were alien spaces that demanded a few more decades to become populated with vibrant social interactions.

Further, people did not use the parliament square, Baharistan, as a gathering or protest site. The few cases of people's presence in Baharistan Square were the overflows of the population from the mosque and the parliament courtyard. Whenever these spaces could not contain the entire crowd, people gathered around the mosque and the parliament building. For example, when on May 26, 1907 *anjuman*s invited people to gather at the parliament to support the people of Tabriz, Kasravi writes: "People filled the rooms and halls of the Parliament and the entire parliament garden and Parliament *julukhān* [Baharistan Square] and the surrounding streets."[161]

The only exception to the square's use as a secondary space was the anniversary of the revolution in 1907. For the first time, people used Baharistan Square for a public ceremony. The *anjuman*s collectively held the ceremony and decorated the square. Each *anjuman* and guild built a temporary arch around the square – another manifestation of segmentation – and lit up the entire square and the parliament courtyard with decorative lights. There were fireworks inside the square, and for two days and nights people were entertained by different ceremonies.[162] It was the first public ceremony held by people in a space other than the traditional spaces of Iranian cities.

Iranian Women and the Redefinition of the Public Sphere and Political Public Space

The Constitutional Revolution provided a new atmosphere for women's political activities. The months and years after the revolution witnessed women's unprecedented political and public performance. The main historiography of the Constitutional Revolution, however, ignores women; women's activities are absent, and they are depicted as mere bystanders. Afsaneh Najmabadi argues that the dominant narrative of the revolution is centered on urban male groups and the alliance of merchants, the intelligentsia, and the *ʿulamā* against the

[161] Kasravi, *Tarikh-i Mashrutih-yi Iran*, 1: 341.
[162] Kasravi, *Tarikh-i Mashrutih-yi Iran*, 1: 412–15; Browne, *The Persian Revolution of 1905–1909*, 144; Malikzadih, *Tarikh-i Inghilab-i Mashrutiyat-i Iran*, 3: 520–1.

Qajar court. As a result, stories that seemed to be unrelated to this triangular alliance were omitted from the main historiography of the revolution.[163]

However, the Iranian public sphere and political public spaces underwent gender diversification after the Constitutional Revolution. I argue that the revolution years brought this significant shift to fruition, rather than initiating or causing the change in the first place.[164] As Chapter 1 demonstrated, this shift was deeply based on women's social interactions in private houses. Women's havens had incubated their political mobilization long before the Constitutional Revolution. These incubators of social life and political activity provided the foundation for women's mobilization after the revolution.

Before the revolution, the presence of women in riots was not unprecedented. There are many accounts of bread riots in which

163 Afsaneh Najmabadi, "'Is Our Name Remembered?': Writing the History of Iranian Constitutionalism as If Women and Gender Mattered," *Iranian Studies* 29, no. 1/2 (1996): 100–1. Similarly, Mongol Bayat and Hamideh Sedghi point to the same silence. Their works are valuable resources for studying the feminine aspect of the Constitutional Revolution: Mangol Bayat-Philipp, "Women and Revolution in Iran, 1905–1911," in *Women in the Muslim World*, ed. Lois Beck and Nikki Keddie (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1978), 295; Hamideh Sedghi, *Women and Politics in Iran: Veiling, Unveiling, and Reveiling* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 43.

164 Similarly, Susynne M. McElrone rejects the abrupt change narrative common in studies of Iranian women's awakening. McElrone shows that the main principles of women's awakening, such as education, were already developed extensively among minority groups, long before the revolution. In contrast, Janet Afary argues that "the roots of modern Iranian feminism were firmly planted during that early, turn-of-the-century revolution." Bayat sees the revolution as "a fertile ground" for the seeds of women's emancipation. Similarly, Sedghi believes that by the time of the Constitutional Revolution, women began "to articulate feminist ideas that spoke to their own gender interest." Afary, *The Iranian Constitutional Revolution, 1906–1911*, 178; Bayat, "Women and Revolution in Iran," 306; Sedghi, *Women and Politics in Iran*, 50; Susynne M. McElrone, "Nineteenth-Century Qajar Women in the Public Sphere: An Alternative Historical and Historiographical Reading of the Roots of Iranian Women's Activism," *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East* 25, no. 2 (2005): 317. For similar works that originate Iranian women's awakening and feminism to the Constitutional Revolution, see: Parvin Paidar, *Women and the Political Process in Twentieth-Century Iran* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 50–77; Badr ol-Moluk Bamdad, *From Darkness into Light: Women's Emancipation in Iran*, trans. F. R. C. Bagley (Hicksville: Exposition Press, 1977), 25–54.

women played significant roles. Usually, a sharp rise in the price of bread could cause angry mobs of women to attack bakeries. Moreover, they could assault those officials who were the victims of rumors about the hoarding of wheat.[165] In the words of Stephanie Cronin, women were present whenever "the protests were more spontaneous and plebeian in character."[166] As an example, women were active during the Tobacco Movement. On January 4, 1892, when Mirza Hasan Ashtiyani – a chief cleric of Tehran – decided to leave the city in protest at the Tobacco concession, a bloody riot took place in Tehran and women joined men to break into the royal compound. Hasan Karbalaʾi recorded women's cries on that day in the square: "O Almighty God! They want to take away our religion, exile our *ʿulamā*, so tomorrow *farangī*s [Europeans] contract our marriages, *farangī*s bury our dead and pray over their bodies."[167] Similar to the bread riots, women's upsurge during the Tobacco Movement was an abrupt reaction to the threats that could jeopardize their immediate wellbeing and religion.

During the main episodes of the Constitutional Revolution there were instances of the same reactionary protests by women. On January 9, 1906, when the main *ʿulamā* had left the city for Shah ʿAbd al-ʿAzim Shrine, there was a meeting between four representatives of the *ʿulamā* and the prime minister to negotiate the protesters' requests and their conditions for returning to the city. However, the governor used this opportunity to hold the negotiators in an unofficial detention, to exile them later. The next day, the news spread in the city and women managed to block the king's coach, screaming: "We want Their Eminences and the Leaders of the Faith […] Their Eminences have performed our marriages, Their Eminences lease our houses […] O King of the Muslims, please have the leaders of the Muslims respected."[168]

Besides these reactionary episodes, there is no recorded organized women's gathering before the initial success of the revolution. The

[165] Homa Natiq, "Nigahi bih Barkhi Nivishtih-ha va Mubarizat-i Zanan dar Duran-i Mashrutiyat [A Glimpse at Some of the Women's Writings and Activities during the Constitutional Era," *Kitab-i Jumʿih*, 30 (1358 [1980]): 53.

[166] Stephanie Cronin, *Soldiers, Shahs and Subalterns in Iran Opposition, Protest and Revolt, 1921–1941* (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 204.

[167] Karbalaʾi, *Gharardad-i Regie 1890*, 112.

[168] Kasravi, *History of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution*, 1: 84; Kermani, *Tarikh-i Bidari-yi Iranian*, 2: 361.

British embassy rejected their only attempt for such a gathering. Based on the British ambassador's accounts, a few thousand women intended to join the *bast* in the embassy. He later adds: "I will do my best to persuade those presently involved in the occupation to oppose women's participation."[169] Although there is no more information on the women's request to join the *bast*, and other sources only point to it partially,[170] the fact that a few thousand women were ready to take a *bast* in the embassy implies that some sort of organization or network was functioning to unite them.

After the revolution, the electoral and fundamental laws did not provide a legal basis for women's political participation. Article 3 of the electoral laws categorizes women alongside foreigners, insolvents, murderers, thieves, criminals, and those "not within years of discretion" as "persons who are entirely deprived of electoral rights."[171] In contrast, women began to establish their own independent institutions. Women's *anjuman*s opened in Tehran and other big cities. These *anjuman*s organized routine meetings to discuss national topics and coordinate women's activities. For example, when the Parliament decided to establish the National Bank, women and their *anjumans* were active in collecting donations to fund the bank; they even donated their jewelry. Moreover, women's *anjuman*s boycotted European textiles and other products to free the nation from the burden of dependence. Particularly, after the defeat of royalists in 1909 and the reopening of the Parliament, the number of women's *anjuman*s and the range of their activities expanded. Members of these *anjuman*s were mostly among affluent women.[172] W. Morgan Shuster, an American counselor who was employed by the Parliament as treasurer-general of Iran, writes:

[169] Paidar, *Women and the Political Process*, 54; Ra'in, *Anjuman-ha-yi Serri dar Inghilab-i Mashrutiyat*, 99.

[170] For example, Nazim al-Islam Kermani points to women's possible *bast* just in one sentence. "There is a conversation between women to come and set up their tents in ʿAlaʾ al-Dawlih Street, next to the embassy": Kermani, *Tarikh-i Bidari-yi Iranian*, 3: 536.

[171] Browne, *The Persian Revolution of 1905–1909*, 356.

[172] For women's *anjuman*s and their activities, see: Farugh Kharabi, "Anjuman-ha-yi Zanan dar Durih-yi Nakhustin-i Inghilab-i Mashrutih [Women's Anjumans in the First Period of the Constitutional Revolution]," *Namih-yi Anjuman*, 28 (1386 [2008]): 17–38; Afary, *The Iranian Constitutional Revolution, 1906–1911*, 179, 184–6; Sedghi, *Women and Politics in Iran*, 48; Paidar, *Women and the Political Process in Twentieth-Century Iran*, 67–9;

It was well known in Teheran that there were dozens of more or less secret societies among the Persian women, with a central organization by which they were controlled. To this day I know neither the names nor the faces of the leaders of this group, but in a hundred different ways I learned from time to time that I was being aided and supported by the patriotic fervor of thousands of the weaker sex.[173]

The most significant development of the feminine sphere, however, was not the *anjuman*s, but the girls' schools. The constitutional era provided a fertile context for women's education. In January 1907, a women's meeting in Tehran adopted ten resolutions, one of which was the establishment of girls' schools. By April 1910 there were fifty girls' schools; by 1913 there were sixty-three schools educating around 2,500 students.[174] These schools were privately funded by wealthy women's donations and fundraising by women's communities.[175] It took several years – until the end of World War I – for the establishment of state-sponsored girls' schools.[176] The importance of these figures becomes clear when one considers that, before the Constitutional Revolution, only women of affluent families had the chance to learn reading and writing, from old male private tutors at home. The few missionary schools established for minorities around the country accepted only a small number of Muslim girls among their students.[177] Even after the revolution, the pioneers of women's education received serious threats from the conservative *ʿulamā* who were against women's education.

Moreover, women established health clinics, orphanages, and adult education classes.[178] More importantly, the constitutional era,

Bayat, "Women and Revolution in Iran," 299; Bamdad, *From Darkness into Light*, 28–30.

[173] W. Morgan Shuster, *The Strangling of Persia* (New York: The Century Co., 1912), 193.

[174] Afary, *The Iranian Constitutional Revolution, 1906–1911*, 182.

[175] For pioneers of women's education, see: Sedghi, *Women and Politics in Iran*, 53–4; Bamdad, *From Darkness into Light*, 41–50.

[176] Bamdad, *From Darkness into Light*, 41.

[177] Bamdad, *From Darkness into Light*, 19–20. McElrone argues that the missionary schools played an important role in the awakening of Iranian women before the revolution. However, the number of graduates from these schools is negligible in comparison to the number after the establishment and the prevalence of girls' education. For McElrone's discussion of missionary schools, see: McElrone, "Nineteenth-Century Qajar Women," 306–11.

[178] Afary, *The Iranian Constitutional Revolution, 1906–1911*, 207.

particularly after the 1909 defeat of the royalists, witnessed the establishment of women's periodicals for the first time in the history of Iran. *Danish Weekly* was one of the first papers that specifically dealt with women's topics, such as "hygiene, medicine, family matters, and especially child care."[179] Between 1910 and early 1920, women published at least thirteen journals. Similar to schools and other women's organizations, affluent women's support made the publication of these journals possible.[180]

It is important to note that many of the early women's institutions, particularly *anjuman*s and schools, were located in private houses. For example, ʿIyn al-Saltanih provides the exact address of the first women's *anjuman* in Tehran, at Nazim Darbar's house, Ghapuchi Street, in the Sangilaj neighborhood. Similarly, many of the first girls' schools were in the private houses of their founders and financers. Before the Constitutional Revolution, as Jasamin Rostam-Kolayi argues, "the Parvarish (Cultivation) School was installed in the home of Mirza Hasan Rushdiyah in Tehran, with Tuba Rushdiyah, his sister-in-law, as principal."[181] Hamideh Sedghi mentions that in 1907 Toubi Azmoudeh established Tehran's first Muslim girls' school, Namus, at her house. Similarly, Yusef Khan Riyshahr founded the Ecole Franco-Persane at his house for his daughters and relatives' girls.[182]

The establishment of women's political and educational societies at private houses was the continuation of the gendered configuration of Iranian social spaces. As the first chapter suggested, the *andarūnī*s – the women's sections of houses – were far beyond a prison-like space to seclude women from the rest of the world. They could be lively women-only communal spaces with various social functions. There were networks of these feminine spaces all over the city, connected to each other via individuals who could transcend communal boundaries and move between them. As a result, women's first available option

[179] Afary, *The Iranian Constitutional Revolution, 1906–1911*, 200.
[180] For examples of early women's journals, see: Sedghi, *Women and Politics in Iran*, 54–7; Camron Michael Amin, *The Making of the Modern Iranian Woman: Gender, State Policy, and Popular Culture, 1865–1946* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2002).
[181] Jasamin Rostam-Kolayi, "Origins of Iran's Modern Girls' Schools: From Private/National to Public/State," *Journal of Middle East Women's Studies* 4, no. 3 (2008): 69.
[182] Sedghi, *Women and Politics in Iran*, 53–4.

for the establishment of new organizations was their houses. These houses hosted schools and *anjuman*s, and through this hosting they reproduced the old, established gendered spatial discourse.

However, there was a significant difference; the schools, political *anjuman*s, and newspapers had functions and consequences far beyond the confines of the feminine world. They were the precursors of a new order to be established in the years to come. By enabling women to have a bigger audience, bigger than their immediate communal circles, and to perform in a field larger than their enclaves, these spaces and organizations modified social boundaries and would transform public space in the future. Women's presence in the public sphere after the Constitutional Revolution had been incubated for many years in women's havens.

How did this transformation begin? What was the importance of these (semi)independent women's organizations in this process? To answer these questions, it is important to step back and examine the articulation of women's positions in the nationalist discourse that developed before, during, and after the Constitutional Revolution. Afsaneh Najmabadi's valuable works show how the dominant patriarchal discourse carved a specific position for women, *zanan*, and womanhood, *zanānigī*, during the constitutional era.

On the one hand, women entered into the nationalist discourse through the "political language of grievances against" the Qajar court. In this language, recitation and remembrance of injustices, cruelties, and transgressions against women's sexual integrity attached them to the nation as signs of national honor. On the other hand, the same discourse reproduced the patriarchal power relation in which women, as the weaker sex, should be protected by men rising against autocracy and defending their honor, *nāmūs*, and the country.[183] In the words of Najmabadi, "[t]he language of honor, in this new political re-writing, became the language of political mobilization."[184] The language of political mobilization reaffirmed the old, established social norms in which women were attached to the private realm and

[183] Afsaneh Najmabadi discusses these processes fully in two valuable papers: Afsaneh Najmabad, "Zanhā-yi Millat: Women or Wives of the Nation?," *Iranian Studies* 26, no. 1/2 (1993): 51–71. Najmabadi, "'Is Our Name Remembered?'"

[184] Najmabad, "Zanhā-yi Millat," 62.

men were responsible for public affairs – most importantly, resistance against the hegemonic power of the state. Consequently, as I mentioned earlier, women were absent in the main episodes of contention during the Constitutional Revolution. Women were not allowed in the multiple-day *bast*s in Friday and Shah Mosques and the Shah ʿAbd al-ʿAzim Shrine and *bastī*s did not permit women to enter the *bast* in the embassy. Women could assist the movement only through their clandestine financial support,[185] abrupt riots in the city, or through royal women's direct pressure on the king.[186]

However, the constitutional atmosphere disturbed the old and established norms. After the establishment of the Parliament there were various instances when women gathered in the parliament and even in Sipahsalar Mosque to protest against the court and support the Parliament. For example, when in late 1911 Russia issued an ultimatum to the Parliament to dismiss Shuster, the American financial counselor, women held a large meeting in Sipahsalar Mosque to put pressure on the Parliament to reject Russia's demand.[187] Shuster recorded a similar gathering, but this time a big group of armed women entered the parliament:

> Out from their walled courtyards and harems marched three hundred of that weak sex [...] Many held pistols under their skirts or in the folds of their sleeves. Straight to the Medjlis [parliament] they went, and, gathered there, demanded of the President that he admit them all [...] these cloistered Persian mothers, wives and daughters exhibited threateningly their revolvers, tore aside their veils, and confessed their decision to kill their own husbands and sons, and leave behind their own dead bodies, if the deputies wavered in their duty to uphold the liberty and dignity of the Persian people and nation.[188]

Moreover, after the 1908 coup and during the civil war, women were actively present, sometimes in men's clothing, as revolutionary

[185] Nazim al-Islam Kermani tells the story of an unknown woman who came to the British embassy and donated some money to be spent for the expenses of the *bast*: Kermani, *Tarikh-i Bidari-yi Iranian*, 3: 539.

[186] The best example in this regard occurred during the Tobacco Movement. The royal ladies broke their hookahs and did not smoke tobacco when the religious *fatwa* for the ban of tobacco was announced: Keddie, *Religion and Rebellion in Iran*, 96.

[187] Bayat, "Women and Revolution in Iran," 303.

[188] Shuster, *The Strangling of Persia*, 198.

armed forces. They fought bravely and were killed in Tabriz; they were present among the troops that marched toward Tehran to liberate the city.[189]

A comparison between these accounts and previous women's gatherings, such as the bread riots or their reaction to the exile of the *ʿulamā*, reveals a significant shift. After the revolution, women's gatherings were not reactive moves to protect their immediate wellbeing. In 1911 they did not gather in the parliament and the mosque to protect their religious beliefs or lower the price of bread. They supported their country; they mobilized as a part of the nation. If, in the past, men had to mobilize to defend their women as a part of their belongings and consequently their national honor, now women's independent mobilizations, in the words of Najmabadi, became "the grounds for claiming citizenship."[190] They managed to transform their image "from private beings to public participants,"[191] and through this process, they transformed the public sphere and public spaces.

Although confined within the boundaries of *andarūnī*s, women's organizations provided the context for their political participation. Women's *anjuman*s became tools for redefining the meaning of the public sphere. Moreover, after the revolution, political public spaces, the parliament, and the mosque courtyard belonged to both sexes; public space expanded socially. Public space expanded from within, from the private realm of houses. Without any doubt, the shift in women's political mobilization and their claim to the public sphere occurred on the foundation of women's havens. These fundamental transformations at the turn of the century had been incubated in the *andarūnī*s of Iranian houses for years. Women's circles – similar to Bibi Khanom Astarabadi's circle of friends in a private house mentioned in Chapter 1 – later transformed into women's *anjuman*s, newspapers, and girls' schools. Women's havens provided the foundation for the redefinition of the public realm.[192]

[189] Paidar, *Women and the Political Process*, 56–8; Bayat, "Women and Revolution in Iran," 302–3.

[190] Najmabad, "Zanhā-yi millat," 66.

[191] Paidar, *Women and the Political Process*, 74.

[192] It is important to note that women's claims did not necessarily match men's expectations. They encountered serious opposition, particularly by conservative clerics. The Parliament denied their suffrage claims; no woman was permitted to the first anniversary of the Constitutional Revolution and its

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Conclusion

This chapter examined the contested relationship between urban society and the state and its geographical manifestations by the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries. Using the Habermasian core definition of the public sphere, I defined the Iranian public sphere as the medium between segmented society and the state that enabled the former to exert influence on the latter and bound the state to certain discursive norms: public opinion.

However, as I discussed in this chapter, the Iranian public sphere was completely different from the Habermasian model of Western European societies in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. First, the Iranian public sphere was a segmented entity formed through the coming together of various communal spheres. Despite forming a greater public and acting collectively against the state, each community managed to maintain its social independence. This fact is clearly discernible in people's gatherings in the British embassy garden and Sipahsalar Mosque, where each community reproduced its independent spatiality regardless of the collectivity of their movement. Moreover, the independent political organizations of the post-revolution era, *anjuman*s, were the manifestations of this segmented public sphere. Each *anjuman* belonged to a certain community of the city and, despite their shared political objectives, they managed to observe old communal boundaries. This is in stark contrast to the Habermasian model of the public sphere, which is based on the bracketing of differences and the formation of a homogenous entity.

Second, the mechanism for the formation of public opinion as a binding element between various segments of society was completely different in the Iranian case. Unlike the bourgeois public sphere, the formation of public opinion was not based on the "universal" principle of rational debate. The religious authorities' incorporation and articulation of preexisting religious frames – through utilizing various oral, textual, and ritual media – resulted in the formation of discursive norms and socio-political dichotomies. In these dichotomies,

public ceremonies in Baharistan Square. The masculine Parliament and society attempted to maintain its dominance, reclaim the public domain, and redefine *andarūnī*s as women's universes. However, the winds of change had already blown, and the old established discourses were on the verge of transformation. Kharabi, "Anjuman-ha-yi Zanan," 37.

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the state was stigmatized as the enemy of religion. By portraying the state as similar to the infamous characters of the early Islamic traditions, particularly Shiʿi narratives, the religious discourse represented the state as the shared enemy of the majority of the Shiʿi population. The same oral, textual, and ritual venues depicted ordinary people as the oppressed Muslims and represented the religious authorities as the imams and saints that should be defended against the villain and heretic state. The formation of public opinion through religious discourse was the binding force that transcended communal boundaries and brought various communal spheres together to form the broader public sphere.

Besides the role of the religious authorities in the formation of this discourse and the coming together of communities, the activities of the propertied middle class and Iranian intelligentsia were decisive in this process. These groups had looser communal ties, which enabled them to work collectively, support various groups, and encourage different clerics to work together for the greater good. The propertied middle class had close ties with the clerics, and their financial support was a determinative factor for the success of various episodes of *bast*. The intelligentsia managed to act as a bridge between the clerics and helped them to unite. Moreover, their familiarity with new concepts, such as the rule of law and constitutionalism, was crucial for the consolidation of protesters' demands for the constitutional monarchy.

During the Constitutional Revolution there was a close affinity between the formation of the public sphere and the production of political public spaces. The same religious discourse that formed public opinion and provided a shared platform for the political activities of communities was at play to designate the primary religious spaces of the city as the main stages of protest. Shah, Friday, and Sipahsalar Mosques, as well as the Shah ʿAbd al-ʿAzim Shrine, did not belong to any community; they were not colored with communal identities. They could address the whole Shiʿi population of Tehran regardless of their communal affiliation; they were everybody's and nobody's spaces. As a result, there were close social commonalities between the public sphere and political public spaces. Both were the outcome of religious discourse and social segmentation; both were highly masculine, and women were excluded from the mainstream political scene.

However, the success of the revolution started the process that resulted in the initial transformation of the public sphere and political

public spaces. First, the religious discourse lost its monopoly as the sole producer of public opinion. After the revolution, the proliferation of free newspapers and *anjuman*s provided alternative venues for the articulation of new concepts among various social groups. These concepts did not necessarily originate from religious discourse. For the first time, alternative social forces were at work to produce shared political understandings among various communities. Similarly, the parliament building and courtyard provided alternative platforms for people's protests. Unlike sacred spaces, the parliament was not a religious sanctuary against the tyranny of the state. Instead of the protective role of space, people had to protect the space of the parliament against possible assaults from the counter-revolutionary forces. For the first time, people designated a non-religious space as their platform of political activity. The public sphere and political public spaces initiated the process of secularization.

Moreover, in the post-revolution era, women's social and political mobilization violated the masculinity of the public sphere and political public spaces. Interestingly, the innermost spaces of Iranian cities – women's sections in private houses – provided the platforms for women's mobilizations. By establishing girls' schools, newspapers, and *anjuman*s, women claimed their position in the public realm. After the revolution they became active in the political scene, helped the revolutionary forces, supported the Parliament against the state, participated in protests, and even took their separate *bast*s in the parliament building. The public sphere and political public spaces underwent gender diversification at the same time. Although women's movements in this era may seem trivial in comparison to men's political activities, in retrospect these first steps had colossal impacts in the decades to come.

The initial and simultaneous transformation of the public sphere and political public spaces was not accidental. They were closely interrelated; the (trans)formation of the former happened alongside the (re)production of the latter. They formed together based on religious, communal, and masculine discourses, and they began their simultaneous transformation through gender diversification and secularization. Through the investigation of the Iranian public sphere and the political public spaces of Tehran at the turn of the century, I argue that the public sphere and political public spaces are deeply interconnected through certain social commonalities. The investigation of one demands the examination of the other. The geographical manifestation

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of social movements should be studied through an investigation of the social and political dimensions of the contested relationship between the state and society, and vice versa.

The constitutional era was a transitory period. It was the tipping point that manifested the long process of social change in Iran. Iranian society commenced its structural transformations from the late eighteenth century through the interplay of local and global forces. The revolution and its aftermath provided a fertile ground for the manifestation of these changes. It would be imprecise to claim that the revolution caused the entire socio-spatial shift and that Iranian society left its traditional trajectory and began a new one in the course of a few years. The next chapter comes back to this long process of transformation. By going back as far as the late eighteenth century, I study the formation of a new spatial knowledge. Understanding this spatial knowledge is necessary for the investigation of the transformation of Tehran in the late nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth centuries.

3 *Iranian Travelers and the Production of Spatial Knowledge*

Recording the daily events in his book of memoir, on June 10, 1893, ʿIyn al-Saltanih, a Qajar prince and the Nasser al-Din Shah's brother, mentioned the inauguration of the World's Columbian Exposition, commonly known as the Chicago Exposition. Calling it the best exposition ever, he continues with a brief description of Chicago:

> The population of the city is 1,250,000 people […] This city is more beautiful than any other city in America and the West. For example, it has a street that is thirty kilometers long […] It has an amphitheater that can accommodate six thousand people. It has a hotel with five hundred units. It has twenty houses [?], ten banks, seven department stores, and thirty factories, and many other similar features. There are many apartments with ten, twelve, eighteen, up to twenty-four levels […] God has provided everything for the Westerners. The best houses in Iran have at most three levels; similar to the other things. It is kind of boring [here in Tehran].[1]

There are three delicate points in this brief description. First, despite his previous trips to various European cities, ʿIyn al-Saltanih wrote these words having never actually visited Chicago in person. His description of the city was based on knowledge that he had acquired via other means. From the late eighteenth century, various sections of Iranian society, particularly the court and the elites, developed an acquaintance with European and American cities, their social lives, and spaces through direct visits, postcards, geographical texts, pictures, and other means of knowledge transfer.

Second, as ʿIyn al-Saltanih's brief description of Chicago demonstrates, the production of new spatial knowledge developed particular spatial and social norms. For example, ʿIyn al-Saltanih equalizes

[1] Qahraman Mirza ʿIyn al-Saltanih, *Ruznamih-yi Khatirat-i ʿIyn al-Saltanih [ʿIyn al-Saltanih Memoir]*, ed. Masʿud Salur and Iraj Afshar (Tehran: Asatir, 1376 [1997]), 1: 532–3.

the beauty of Chicago to the length of its streets, the height of its buildings, the enormity of its hotels and theaters, and so on. These wonder-like descriptions by a nobleman from the royal family contain a normative quality, which renders the spatiality of Iranian cities, particularly Tehran, as dull and reproduces Western cities as lively and interesting. Third, Iranians' exposure to new spatiality and sociality in the Western cities was not innocent. Alongside the transformation of urban society, this acquaintance resulted in the production of an influential spatial discourse that transformed Iranian cities as well as the state's and the people's spatial practices in the decades to come. In other words, in the long term, the formation of the socio-spatial discourse led to a power relationship between various sections of Iranian society and the spatiality of their daily lives. This discourse and the resulting power relations generated systems of exclusion and inclusion with vast social and spatial ramifications.

This chapter primarily deals with the first two points; the next three chapters will examine the impact of the formation of this discourse on Tehran and the state's and people's spatial practices. The analysis of Iranians' wonder-like appreciation of Western cities helps to illustrate how this novel spatial knowledge determined the future of Iranian cities. This chapter suggests that the post-1870s spatial transformations of Tehran had been incubated in Iranian society – at least among the elites and the Qajar court – for decades. I argue that these transformations were the outcome of the gradual formation and development of a spatial discourse, rather than an abrupt change and a sudden disjuncture from the past.

I use a Foucauldian notion of discourse in this book. Discourses produce regimes of truth that naturalize particular understandings of the world. In the words of David Campbell, discourses "shape the contours of the TAKEN-FOR-GRANTED WORLD, naturalizing and universalizing a particular subject formation and view of the world."[2] Michel Foucault, through his concept of the archaeology of knowledge, shows how in various socio-historical contexts there are substantial constraints on how people think and which govern "our will to know." These discursive practices are closely linked to the exercise

[2] David Campbell, "Discourse," in *The Dictionary of Human Geography*, 5th ed., ed. Derek Gregory et al. (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 167.

of power and generate "a system of exclusion, a historical, modifiable, and institutionally constraining system."[3] In this view, certain implicit rules restrict people's range of thought.[4]

By adopting the Foucauldian conception of discourse, this chapter focuses on Iranians' acquaintance with European cities, their social lives, and social spaces. There is a rich literature on the exposure of Iranian society to new ideas that originated in Europe, particularly Western Europe, and Russia.[5] These studies demonstrate how Iranians' acquaintance with the West played a great role in the formation of an intellectual group and reformers who were more aware of Europe and desired to transform Iranian society and the state.[6] As Chapter 2

[3] Michel Foucault, "The Order of Discourse," in *Untying the Text: A Post-structuralist Reader*, ed. Robert Young (Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981), 54.

[4] Michel Foucault, *Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason*, trans. Richard Howard (New York: Vintage Books, 1965); Michel Foucault, *The Birth of the Clinic: An Archaeology of Medical Perception*, trans. A. M. Sheridan Smith (New York: Pantheon Books, 1973); Michel Foucault, *The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1970); Michel Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language*, trans. A. M. Sheridan Smith (New York: Pantheon Books, 1972).

[5] Ali Gheissari, *Iranian Intellectuals in the 20th Century* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1998); Ali Mirsepassi, *Intellectual Discourse and the Politics of Modernization: Negotiating Modernity in Iran* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Negin Nabavi, "The Changing Concept of the 'Intellectual' in Iran of the 1960s," *Iranian Studies* 32, no. 3 (1999): 333–50; Negin Nabavi, ed., *Intellectual Trends in Twentieth-Century Iran: A Critical Survey* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2003); Mehrzad Boroujerdi, "*Gharbzadegi:* The Dominant Intellectual Discourse of Pre- and Post-Revolutionary Iran," in *Iran: Political Culture in the Islamic Republic*, ed. Samih K. Farsoun and Mehrdad Mashayekhi (London: Routledge, 2005), 20–38; Mehrzad Boroujerdi, "'The West' in the Eyes of the Iranian Intellectuals of the Interwar Years (1919–1939)," *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East* 26, no. 3 (2006): 391–401; Mehrzad Boroujerdi, *Iranian Intellectuals and the West: the Tormented Triumph of Nativism* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1996); Shaul Bakhash, *Iran: Monarchy, Bureaucracy and Reform under the Qajars: 1858–1896* (London: Ithaca Press, 1978).

[6] John H. Lorentz, "Iran's Great Reformer of the Nineteenth Century: An Analysis of Amīr Kabīr's Reforms," *Iranian Studies* 4, no. 2/3 (1971): 85–103; Hamid Algar, *Mīrzā Malkum Khān: A Study in the History of Iranian Modernism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973); Hamid Algar, "Malkum Khān, Ākhūndzāda and the Proposed Reform of the Arabic Alphabet," *Middle Eastern Studies* 5, no. 2 (1969): 116–30; Fereydoun Adamiyat, *Andishih-ha-yi Mirza Fathʿ Ali Akhundzadih [The Thoughts of*

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discussed, the development of new ideas played a crucial role during the Constitutional Revolution. The Iranian intelligentsia were one of the main players in the uprisings at the turn of the century, and their role was crucial for the establishment of parliamentary democracy and the restriction of the court's power.[7]

The exposure to new ideas was not limited to the political landscape and had an impact on various aspects of Iranian society. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the growing relationship between Iran and European countries generated new forms of knowledge and transferred them to Iranian society. From culinary culture to the establishment of a new educational system, and from painting and theater to industrial and monetary organizations, various aspects of this impact have been investigated before.[8]

Mirza Fathali Akhund-zadeh, 1812–1878] (Tehran: Intisharat-i Khawrazmi, 1349 [1970]); Fereydoun Adamiyat, *Andishih-ha-yi Mirza Aqa Khan Kermani [The Thoughts of Mirza Aqa Khan Kermani]* (Tehran: Intisharat-i Payam, 1357 [1978]); Fereydoun Adamiyat, *Andishih-ha-yi Talibuf-i Tabrizi [The Thoughts of Talibuf-i Tabrizi]* (Tehran: Damavand, 1363 [1984]); Mohammad Ali Jazayery, "Ahmad Kasravi and the Controversy Over Persian Poetry: 1. Kasravi's Analysis of Persian Poetry," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 4, no. 2 (1973): 190–203; Mohammad Ali Jazayery, "Ahmad Kasravi and the Controversy Over Persian Poetry. 2. The Debate on Persian Poetry between Kasravi and His Opponents," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 13, no. 3 (1981): 311–27; Nikki R. Keddie, *An Islamic Response to Imperialism: Political and Religious Writings of Sayyid Jamāl ad-Dīn "Al-Afghānī"* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983).

[7] Gheissari, *Iranian Intellectuals in the 20th Century*, 13–39; Fereydoun Adamiyat, *Fikr-i Dimukrasi-yi Ijtimaʿi dar Nihzat-i Mashrutiyyat-i Iran [The Idea of Social Democracy in the Iranian Constitutional Movement]* (Tehran: Intisharat-i Payam, 1984); Fereydoun Adamiyat, *Andishih-yi Taraqqi va Hukumat-i Qanun [The Idea of Progress and the Rule of Law]* (Tehran: Khawrazmi, 1977); Mongol Bayat, "The *Rowshanfekr* in the Constitutional Period: An Overview," in *Iran's Constitutional Revolution: Popular Politics, Cultural Transformation and Transnational Connections*, ed. H. E. Chehabi and Vanessa Martin (London: I.B. Tauris, 2010), 165–91; Abbas Amanat, "Constitutional Revolution I. Intellectual Background," in *Encyclopedia Iranica* (December 15, 1995), www.iranicaonline.org/articles/constitutional-revolution-i (accessed October 17, 2015).

[8] For a few examples of these studies, see: Rudi Matthee et al., *The Monetary History of Iran: From the Safavids to the Qajars* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2013); Willem Floor, *Labor & Industry in Iran, 1850–1941* (Washington, DC: Mage Publishers, 2009); Willem Floor, *Wall Paintings and Other Figurative Mural Art in Qajar Iran* (Costa Mesa: Mazda Publishers, 2005); Willem Floor, *Public Health in Qajar Iran* (Washington, DC: Mage Publishers, 2004); Hassan Kamshad, *Modern Persian Prose Literature* (Bethesda: Cambridge

In line with these works, this chapter analyzes the spatial knowledge that Iranians produced by becoming acquainted with European cities. For this purpose, the chapter examines the travelogues of Iranian travelers as a medium of knowledge production and transfer. During the nineteenth century there were other media that facilitated the transfer of spatial knowledge from Europe to Iran, such as *Shahr-i Farang*,[9] geographical texts, photos, and postcards. Unlike the other means of knowledge transfer, the authors of the travelogues experienced European urban spaces directly. In other words, Iranian travelers lived in the new spatiality – rather than being passive observers – reflected on

University Press, 1996); Hormoz Ebrahimnejad, *Medicine, Public Health and the Qajar State: Pattern of Medical Modernization in Nineteenth-century Iran* (Leiden: Brill, 2004); Camron Michael Amin, *The Making of the Modern Iranian Woman: Gender, State Policy, and Popular Culture, 1865–1946* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2002); Stephanie Cronin, ed., *The Making of Modern Iran: State and Society under Riza Shah, 1921–1941* (London: Routledge, 2003); Ramin Jahanbegloo, ed., *Iran between Tradition and Modernity* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2004); Willem Floor, *The History of Theater in Iran* (Washington, DC: Mage Publishers, 2005); Majid Mohammadi, *Judicial Reform and Reorganization in 20th Century Iran: State-Building, Modernization, and Islamicization* (New York: Routledge, 2008); Houchang E. Chehabi, "The Westernization of Iranian Culinary Culture," *Iranian Studies* 36, no. 1 (2003): 43–61; Maryam Ekhtiar, "The Dar al-Funun: Educational Reform and Cultural Development in Qajar Iran" (PhD diss., New York University, 1994); Maryam Ekhtiar, "Nasir al-Din Shah and the Dar al-Funun: The Evolution of an Institution," *Iranian Studies* 34, no. 1/4 (2001): 153–63; Mohammad H. Faghfoory, "The Impact of Modernization on the Ulama in Iran, 1925–1941," *Iranian Studies* 26, no. 3/4 (1993): 277–312; Sasan Fatemi, "Music, Festivity, and Gender in Iran from the Qajar to the Early Pahlavi Period," *Iranian Studies* 38, no. 3 (2005): 399–416; Farrokh Gaffary, "Evolution of Rituals and Theater in Iran," *Iranian Studies* 17, no. 4 (1984): 361–89; Mohamad Tavakoli-Targhi, "Refashioning Iran: Language and Culture during the Constitutional Revolution," *Iranian Studies* 23, no. 1/4 (1990): 77–101; Mohamad Tavakoli-Targhi, *Refashioning Iran: Orientalism, Occidentalism, and Historiography* (New York: Palgrave, 2001); Michael C. Hillmann, "The Modernist Trend in Persian Literature and Its Social Impact," *Iranian Studies* 15, no. 1/4 (1982): 7–29.

[9] *Shahr-i Farang* literally means European city in Persian and refers to a device – a peepshow – for watching pictures of European cities, pornography, and exotic places. Vendors moved these boxes all around the cities to show the pictures to people and make some money. Staci Gem Scheiwiller has a valuable essay on the subject: Staci Gem Scheiwiller, "Cartographic Desires: Some Reflections on the *Shahr-i Farang* (Peepshow) and Modern Iran," in *Performing the Iranian State: Visual Culture and Representations of Iranian Identity*, ed. Staci Gem Scheiwiller (London: Anthem Press, 2013), 33–54.

their personal experiences, and recorded them in their texts. In contrast, the other means were passive representations of European cities, which were generated in Europe without passing through an Iranian filter.

By regarding space as one of the constraints of thought, this chapter examines how Iranian spatial knowledge began its long-term process of transformation as the result of close acquaintance with an alternative form of spatiality. I argue that Iranian travelers encountered a new spatiality, so exotic and so different from their hometowns that it resulted in the formation of a new spatial knowledge. In this context, their travelogues contain traces of this knowledge, which is manifested in the overarching similarities between them. The discourse analysis of these texts reveals these similarities; they can be investigated by reading and analyzing the texts in search of common themes and, at the same time, contextualizing the analysis by looking back at Iranian cities of the time. The reciprocal reading of the texts, as constructed materials created in the tension between the two universes, Iran and Europe, reveals and explains the overarching similarities as the elements of new spatial knowledge. However, I should reiterate that travelogues were just one of the means for transferring new spatial knowledge and can be regarded as the most appropriate ones for textual analysis.

The analysis of these texts reveals six main common themes, which cover a broad range of social and spatial items. The physical order of European cities, public life, nightlife, the presence of women in public spaces, and the relationship between power and cities are the main sources of wonder among Iranian travelers. The sixth theme is the common silences between the travelogues. For example, there is a deep silence on the downsides of European cities. Most of the travelers did not explore these cities entirely; as such, their reports overlook the harsh lives of the working classes. This incomplete impression resulted in the production of an unrealistic image of European cities and the excessive idealization of European urban life and spaces.

The analysis of these texts provides clues about the general structure of the system of thought and knowledge in which Iranian travelers wrote their travelogues. This system of thought was the result of the socio-spatial tension between Iranian and European urban societies and cities. Iranian elites and the Qajar court were the main producers and receivers of new knowledge and, as Chapters 4 and 5 will discuss, they played a crucial role in the expansion and transformation of

Tehran. In this view, the history of the 1870s expansion of Tehran is not necessarily the history of Nasser al-Din Shah's (1848–96) decision to transform the city. The king of Iran was the subject of the greater system of thought; he was the subject of new spatial knowledge. He was not detached from this system.

This framework admittedly overlooks the roles of individuals in the expansion of the city; instead, it demonstrates the significance of the impact of the system of thought and knowledge on the agents of history. The decisions of individuals were the products of this system; consequently, it is more important to know the systems prior to the agents, instead of ignoring the former in favor of the latter. This analysis provides the foundation for the next three chapters, which examine how this shared understanding developed into a full-fledged spatial discourse that transformed Tehran in the years to come.

Iranian Travelers and Their Travelogues

The nineteenth century witnessed a surge in the number of Iranians who traveled to European countries. Some of the travelers recorded the accounts of their journeys in travelogues. Some of these travelogues were published, a few of them were translated into European languages at the time, and many of them remained as manuscripts in libraries around the world. Iraj Afshar estimates that around 500 Persian travelogues were written during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.[10] The authors of Persian travelogues were not necessarily Iranians; people from India, the Transoxiana, and the Caucasus also wrote travelogues in Persian.[11]

This section examines eight Persian travelogues from the nineteenth century. All of these travelogues were written by men; I did not find any Iranian women who wrote accounts of their journeys to Europe in the nineteenth century. Two main criteria were considered in selecting these particular pieces. First, I examined the accounts of travelers who went to Europe before the expansion of Tehran in the late 1860s and

[10] The twelfth and thirteenth centuries on the Islamic calendar: Iraj Afshar, "Persian Travelogues: A Description and Bibliography," in *Society and Culture in Qajar Iran: Studies in Honor of Hafez Farmayan*, ed. Elton L. Daniel (Costa Mesa: Mazda Publishers, 2002), 149.

[11] Afshar, "Persian Travelogues," 148.

the early 1870s. I intentionally avoided the late nineteenth and the early twentieth century's travelogues, when Tehran's new northern neighborhood was fully formed and integrated into urban life. Second, while most of the travelogues were written by people who were part of the royal family or were assigned to travel on a mission by the court, to broaden the scopes of this research, I analyzed two travelogues from ordinary travelers who went to Europe at their own expense and who were not officially hosted by European governments.

Table 3.1 presents the travelogues that are discussed in this section. They cover the period between 1799 and 1873. The latter date coincides with Nasser al-Din Shah's first visit to Europe. I examined two travelogues from this trip: the king's travelogue[12] and that of the king's brother, ʿAbd al-Samad Mirza Salur ʿIzz al-Dulih, which was written partly by him and partly by his scribe.[13] Besides ʿAbd al-Samad Mirza Salur's travelogue, Reza Ghuli Mirza[14] is the other Qajar prince whose travelogue I examine here. He went to Europe more or less as an individual, but was often accepted as an official guest by European governments, especially Britain.

Three travelogues belong to Iranian diplomats who traveled to Europe for official missions. Two of them, *Hiyratnamih*[15] and

[12] Nasser al-Din Shah-i Qajar, *Safarnamih-yi Nasser al-Din Shah [Nasser al-Din Shah Travelogue]* (Isfahan: Sazman-i Intisharat-i Andishih, 1343 [1964]).

[13] ʿAbd al-Samad Mirza Salur ʿIzz al-Dulih, "Safarnamih-yi Shahzadih ʿAbd al-Samad Mirza bih Urupa dar Safar-i Aval-i Nasser al-Din Shah Qajar dar Sal-i 1290 Hijri Ghamari [Prince ʿAbd al-Samad Mirza's Travel Diaries to Europe, Accompanying Nasser al-Din Shah in his First Trip in 1290 Hijri]," in *ʿAbd al-Samad Mirza Salur ʿIzz al-Dulih va Du Safarnamih-yi U bih Urupa dar Salha-yi 1290 va 1300* [*ʿAbd al-Samad Mirza Salur ʿIzz al-Dulih and his Two Travelogues to Europe in 1290 and 1300]*, ed. Masʿud Salur (Tehran: Nashr-i Namak, 1374 [1996]).

[14] Reza Ghuli Mirza, *Safarnamih-yi Reza Ghuli Mirza Navih-yi Fath ʿAli Shah Darbarih-yi Ahval-i Khud va ʿAmu-ha va Baradaranash dar Iran va Urupa va Vaqayiʿ-yi Sal-ha-yi Avval-i Saltanat-i Muhammad Shah [Reza Ghuli Mirza's the Grandson of Fath ʿAli Shah Travelogue about Himself and his Brothers in Iran and Europe and the Events of the First Years of Muhammad Shah's Reign]*, ed. Asghar Farmanfarmaʾi Qajar (Tehran: Intisharat-i Danishgah-i Tehran, 1346 [1967]).

[15] Mirza Abu al-Hassan Khan Shirazi, *Hiyratnamih: Safarnamih-yi Mirza Abu al-Hassan Khan Ilchi bih Landan* [*The Book of Wonder, Mirza Abu al-Hassan Khan Ilchi's Travelogue to London*], ed. Hassan Mursilvand (Muʾasisih-yi Khadamat-i Farhangi-yi Rasa, 1364 [1986]).

Table 3.1 ***Iranian travelogues from the nineteenth century discussed in this section***

Travelogue	Traveler	Dates	Main countries visited
Masir-i Talibi	Mirza Abu Talib Khan (ordinary merchant)	February 1799 to August 1803	Britain, France, and the Ottoman Empire
Hiyratnamih	Mirza Abul Hassan Khan Shirazi – Ilchi (Iran's ambassador)	May 1809–10	Britain
Dalil al-Sufara	Mirza Abul Hassan Khan Shirazi – Ilchi (Iran's ambassador)	May 1814 to February 1816	Russia
Safarnamih-yi Reza Ghuli Mirza	Reza Ghuli Mirza (Qajar prince)	October 1835 to April 1837	Britain
Chahar Fasl	Mirza Fattah Khan Garmrudi (Iran's ambassador's companion)	September 1838 to February 1840	The Ottoman Empire, France, and Britain
Safarnamih-yi Haj Sayyah	Mirza Muhammad ʿAli Mahallati (ordinary religious student)	1859–77	Most of the European countries
Safarnamih-yi Nasser al-Din Shah	Nasser al-Din Shah Qajar (king of Iran)	April to September 1873	Russia, Germany, Belgium, Britain, France, Switzerland, Austria, Italy, and the Ottoman Empire
Safarnamih-yi ʿAbd al-Samad Mirza ʿIzz al-Dulih	ʿAbd al-Samad Mirza ʿIzz al-Dulih (king's brother)	April to September 1873	Russia, Germany, Belgium, Britain, France, Switzerland, Austria, Italy, and the Ottoman Empire

Dalil al-Sufara,[16] belong to Mirza Abu al-Hassan Khan Shirazi, known as Ilchi. *Hiyratnamih*, or *Book of Wonder*, is the account of Ilchi's travel to London in 1809 to meet King George and to establish a diplomatic relationship between Fath ʿAli Shah's (1797–1834) court and the British government. *Dalil al-Sufara* contains the accounts of Ilchi's trip to Russia after the first round of Perso-Russian wars and the signing of the *Gulistān* Treaty between the two countries. The court sent Ilchi to Moscow and Saint Petersburg to renegotiate the terms of the treaty. Ilchi's travelogue to Russia was written by his scribe, Mirza Muhammad Hadi ʿAlavi Shirazi. It is more than a mere transcription of Ilchi's words; rather, as Anna Vanzan claims, "it is almost entirely ʿAlavi Shirazi's own production."[17] The third travelogue written by a diplomat is *Chahar Fasl*[18] or *Four Seasons*, which is the account of the 1838 travel of Mirza Fattah Khan Garmrudi, a companion of Muhammad Shah's (1834–48) ambassador, Husayn Khan Ajudanbashi, to Britain to express complaints against the British minister in Iran.

The last two travelogues, *Masir-i Talebi* by Mirza Abu Talib Khan[19] and *Safarnamih-yi Haj Sayyah* by Mirza Muhammad Ali Mahallati, known as Haj Sayyah,[20] were written by independent travelers. Haj Sayyah left Iran when he was just twenty-three years old and, without any destination in mind, he traveled for eighteen years around the world.

[16] Mirza Muhammad Hadi ʿAlavi Shirazi, *Dalil al-Sufara: Safarnamih Mirza Abu al-Hassan Khan Shirazi «Ilchi» bih Rusiyyih [Dalil al-Sufara: Mirza Abu al-Hassan Khan Shirazi «Ilchi» Travelogues to Russia]*, ed. Muhammad Gulbun (Markaz-i Asnad-i Farhangi-yi Asiya).

[17] Anna Vanzan, "Mīrzā Abu'l-Ḥasan Khan Šīrāzī Ilčī's Safar-nāma ba Rūsīya: The Persians Amongst the Russians," in *Society and Culture in Qajar Iran: Studies in Honor of Hafez Farmayan*, ed. Elton L. Daniel (Costa Mesa: Mazda Publishers, 2002), 347.

[18] Mirza Fattah Khan Garmrudi, *Safarnamih-yi Mirza Fattah Khan Garmrudi bih Urupa Mosum bih Chahar Fasl va Du Risalih-yi Digar binam-i: Shabnamih va Safarnamih-yi Mamasani dar Zaman-i Muhammad Shah Qajar [The Travelogue of Mīrzā Abu'l-Ḥasan Khan to Europe which is Famous as Chahar Fast and Two Other Essays Titled as: Shabnamih and Mamasani Travelogue in Muhammad Shah Qajar Era]*, ed. Fath al-Din Fattahi (Bank-i Bazargani-yi Iran: 1347 [1970]).

[19] Mirza Abu Talib Khab, *Masir-i Talibi ya Safarnamih-yi Mirza Abu Talib Khan (1210 A.H) [The Talibi Path and Mirza Abu Talib Khan's Travelogue]*, ed. Hussein Khadiv Jam (Tehran: Shirkat-i Sahami-yi Kitab-ha-yi Jibi, 1352 [1973]).

[20] Mirza Muhammad Ali Mahallati, *Safarnamih-yi Haj Sayyah bih Farang [Haj Sayyah's Travelogue to Farang]*, ed. ʿAli Dihbashi (Tehran: Nashr-i Nashir, 1363 [1984]).

He learned to speak five different languages and his trajectory took him to most European countries. His travelogue contains the accounts of his journeys to Europe. Afterwards, he went to the United States, where he spent ten years and became the first Iranian to receive US citizenship.[21] Unfortunately, the accounts of his travels in America have not yet been found. He returned to Iran via Japan, Southeast Asia, and India.

Finally, *Masir-i Talebi* was written by Mirza Abu Talib Khan, an independent merchant who went to Britain in the late eighteenth and the early nineteenth centuries. It is the second oldest available Persian travelogue from Europe.[22] This travelogue is different from the others in one fundamental aspect: Mirza Abu Talib Khan was born and raised in India, where he began and ended his journey. I used his travelogue for three reasons. First, *Masir-i Talebi* is one of the oldest Persian travelogues of Europe, and it provides an older picture of the continent than the available Iranian accounts. Second, as Sohrabi shows, in nineteenth-century Iran there was a relative awareness about the travelers and their travelogues, and accounts of travels circulated between people in the country. For example, Sohrabi[23] demonstrates how Mir ʿAbd al-Latif Shushtari, an Iranian history writer, incorporated information from Mirza Abu Talib Khan in his book, *Tuhfat al-ʿAlam*, to write about Europe. Finally, Mirza Abu Talib Khan's different origin provides a valuable perspective for comparison with other Iranian travelogues.

Four of the travelogues – *Masir-i Talebi*,[24] Nasser al-Din Shah's,[25] *Hiyratnamih*,[26] and Haj Sayyah's[27] – have English translations. The

[21] Ali Ferdowsi, "ḤĀJJ SAYYĀḤ," in *Encyclopedia Iranica* (December 15, 2002), www.iranicaonline.org/articles/hajj-sayyah (accessed October 3, 2014).

[22] Afshar, "Persian Travelogues," 152.

[23] Naghmeh Sohrabi, *Taken for Wonder: Nineteenth-Century Travel Accounts from Iran to Europe* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 15.

[24] Mirza Abu Talib Khan, *Travels of Mirza Abu Talib Khan in Asia, Africa, and Europe during the Years 1799, 1800, 1801, 1802, and 1803*, 2nd ed., 2 vols., trans. Charles Stewart (London: R. Watts, 1814).

[25] Nasser al-Din Shah, *The Diary of H.M. the Shah of Persia during his Tour Through Europe in A.D. 1873*, trans. J. W. Redhouse (London: Third Thousand, 1874).

[26] Mirza Abu al-Hassan Khan Shirazi, *A Persian at the Court of King George 1809–10*, trans. and ed. Margaret Morris Cloake (London: Barrie & Jenkins Ltd, 1988).

[27] Mirza Muhammad Ali Mahallati, *An Iranian in Nineteenth Century Europe: The Travel Diaries of Hâj Sayyâh 1859–1877*, trans. Mehrbanoo Nasser Deyhim (Bethesda: IBEX Publishers, 1998).

first two were translated into English shortly after their transcription in Persian, and the other two were translated and published in the contemporary era. In the process of this research, I analyzed the Persian texts of the travelogues. For the quotations cited, I compared the English translations to the Persian texts and used the English translations whenever they had relative accuracy; otherwise I translated the quotations into English from the Persian texts.

The City and the Persian Gaze

I saw the city of wonders, which forced me to forget all the other settlements I have ever seen. All the streets had the same two hundred foot width; they were paved with hard stones so elegantly that one could sit and rest upon them. The sides of the street were paved higher for pedestrians and the middle was paved lower for the movements of coaches and carriages, one side for coming and the other for going. And the buildings were about the same one hundred meters[28] high, in four levels, built out of stone. The windows were placed in a way that made your mind go crazy, all opened towards the street and all looked exactly the same. Moreover, the rooftops were aligned exactly in the same line without any ups and downs. The doors opened exactly in front of each other, what magnificent doors with carved wood, and you could find the name of the owner of each building written by the door. I was going crazy, didn't know where to look.[29]

This is Reza Ghuli Mirza's initial impression of Bath on his way to London in 1835. It contains many of the main features that fascinated Iranian travelers during their visits to European countries in the nineteenth century. Similar sentences are abundant in most of the travelogues. As this chapter discusses, the overarching similarities between various travelogues written over the span of seventy-five years are not accidental. They are the textual representations of a spatial knowledge produced through Iranians' acquaintance with European cities.

[28] Reza Ghuli Mirza uses *Zar*ʿ, which is a traditional Persian unit of measurement. One *Zar*ʿ is almost one meter, more accurately 1.04, which is about 3.5 feet. As the number shows, there is an exaggeration in his accounts that is common among Iranian travelogues.

[29] Reza Ghuli Mirza, *Safarnamih,* 338–9.

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This section presents the most prominent overarching similarities in six categories. As discussed earlier, this unique spatial knowledge was created in the spatial and social tension that the travelers experienced between European and Iranian cities. The accounts of the previous two chapters provide an image of the sociality and spatiality of Iranian cities in the nineteenth century. This account serves to contextualize the descriptions of Iranian travelers.

A New Spatial Order

One of the first impressions of the travelers was the physical order of European cities, which was manifested in qualities such as the straightness, length, and consistent width of streets. Most of the travelers were coming from Iranian cities with networks of labyrinthine, organic, narrow, and crooked passages.[30] Straight, long, and wide streets, with organized façades on their sides, were in great contrast to the travelers' former spatial experiences.

Iranian travelers were fascinated by this spatial order. In many instances they equated the merits of a European city with its long, straight, wide, and clean streets: "Karlsruhe is a good and prosperous city. It has thirty seven thousand people with long and straight streets"[31]; "Brussels is a beautiful city, with long and straight streets"[32]; "the best city in the world is Paris. It is not just a city, better to say, the envy of paradise. Bright air, wide boulevards, streets as one can desire, and nice and kind people."[33] In these sentences, the travelers attached the merits of a city to its spatial order. A good city is a city with order, and this order was manifested spatially in its streets by being clean, straight, wide, and long. There are other aspects of this spatial order that are present more or less in all the travelogues, such as paving, the height of the buildings and number of levels, order of the façades, order of the trees, and many other physical qualities.

[30] It is important to mention that there were a few examples of urban design in Iranian cities that were based on straight streets and rectangular squares, such as the Safavid Shah Square and Chaharbagh Avenue; however, in comparison to the rest of the country these were indeed exceptions to the norm and by the nineteenth century most Iranian cities consisted of organic urban fabrics.

[31] Nasser al-Din Shah, *Safarnamih*, 68.

[32] Nasser al-Din Shah, *Safarnamih*, 80.

[33] ʿIzz al-Dulih, "Safarnamih-yi Shahzadih," 210.

The gap between the two universes is clearly recognizable in the terms that the travelers used for describing the new order. In other words, Iranian travelers' familiar vocabulary was not efficient in describing the new spatiality. Iranians, nowadays, use *Kūchih* and *Khīyābān* as the main synonyms for street. *Kūchih* means alleyway, and people use the term to refer to the narrow streets of the cities. *Khīyābān* is a synonym for avenue and is usually used in reference to the main streets of cities. However, these terms were used differently in the context of Iranian cities prior to the late nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries' urban developments. *Khīyābān* was part of the terminology of garden design, and it was used to name the straight passages in Iranian gardens with trees and flower beds at their sides.[34] Later in the seventeenth century, the term was used in Safavid urban design when Shah Abbas I (1588–1629) built a new street in Isfahan called *Khīyābān-i Chaharbagh*.[35] *Chaharbagh* was regarded as a *Khīyābān* because it had lanes of trees on its sides. Moreover, *Chaharbagh* was surrounded by the royal gardens of the Safavid courts.[36] Based on these instances, the major characteristic of *Khīyābān* is its straightness. The historic usage of the second term, *Kūchih*, was more related to the built environment of the cities and villages. In *Dehkhoda Lexicon* there are two main meanings for *Kūchih* that are related to the built environment: neighborhood and narrow passages of cities or villages.[37]

With the tension between the nineteenth-century usage of these terms and the new spatial context, one can expect that Iranian travelers had to re-categorize their word usage in order to describe

[34] Parsi Wiki Open Dictionary, http://parsi.wiki/dehkhodasearchresult-fa.html?searchtype=0&word=2K7bjNin2KjYp9mG (accessed March 15, 2016).

[35] Sayyid Mohsen Habibi, *Az Shar ta Shahr: Tahlili Tarikhi az Mafhum-i Shahr va Sima-yi Kalbudi-yi An: Tafakkur va Taʾssur [From the Shar to the City: Historical Analysis of the Concept of the City and its Morphology]* (Tehran: University of Tehran Press, 184 [2005]), 93–6.

[36] For more information on *Chāhārbāgh* and Safavid urban spaces, see: Mahvash Alemi, "Urban Spaces as the Scene for the Ceremonies and Pastimes of the Safavid Court," *Environmental Design: Journal of the Islamic Environmental Design Research Centre* 1–2 (1991): 98–107; Sussan Babaie, *Isfahan and Its Palaces: Statecraft, Shiʿism and the Architecture of Conviviality in Early Modern Iran* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2008).

[37] Parsi Wiki Open Dictionary, http://parsi.wiki/dehkhodasearchresult-fa.html?searchtype=0&word=2qnZiNqG2Yc%3d (accessed March 15, 2016).

European cities. *Dalil al-Sufara*, Ilchi's 1814–16 journey to Russia, contains an interesting example of such a challenge. In his first encounter with a small city on his way to Moscow, the scribe writes: "[The city] has wide and long *Kūchihs* in the manner of *Khīyābāns* in front of each other."[38] Later, in another city, he writes: "[This city has] wide *Kūchihs* and *Khīyābāns* in front of each other."[39] And finally, in another instance, he mentions: "All the *Kūchihs* are built as *Khīyābāns*."[40] There is not a clear demarcation between *Kūchih* and *Khīyābān* in these sentences, which shows the confusion of the author about finding the right words to talk about the European context. A *Kūchih* as a *Khīyābān* points to the fact that the streets of the neighborhood, surrounded by buildings, were straight and wide, similar to the *Khīyābān*s of Iranian gardens.

There is the same confusion in the other travelogues. Sometimes, *Kūchih* and *Khīyābān* are used interchangeably, and sometimes travelers use *Khīyābān* to talk about the streets with trees, without maintaining the same usage throughout their texts. For example, in Toulon, France, Haj Sayyah mentions that the best *Khīyābān* of the city is Strasbourg Boulevard, which is wide with trees and "superb buildings" on both sides.[41] Later, in Dijon, he mentions that there are trees planted on both sides of all the *Kūchihs* of the city.[42] This confusion shows that the travelers' familiar spatial terminology did not suit European urban spaces. The travelers' spatial consciousness belonged to another universe and adapting its available terminology to the new universe resulted in the innovative and diverse usage of old terms.[43]

These readjustments of language to describe new urban spaces left a permanent impact on Iranians' word usage and spatial imagination.

[38] ʿAlavi Shirazi, *Dalil al-Sufara*, 57.
[39] ʿAlavi Shirazi, *Dalil al-Sufara*, 70.
[40] ʿAlavi Shirazi, *Dalil al-Sufara*, 71.
[41] Mahallati, *Safarnamih-yi Haj Sayyah*, 135; Mahallati, *An Iranian in Nineteenth Century Europe*, 108.
[42] Mahallati, *Safarnamih-yi Haj Sayyah*, 153.
[43] Much of this European urban design and the construction of straight and wide boulevards were relatively new in European cities as well; they were the spatial manifestation of European imperialism and global capitalism. For more information, see: Roger V. Gould, *Insurgent Identities: Class, Community, and Protest in Paris from 1848 to the Commune* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995); David Harvey, *Paris, Capital of Modernity* (New York: Routledge, 2003).

Chapter 4 will examine the 1870s expansion of Tehran. Through this expansion, the state incorporated the European vocabulary of urban design, and the reconfigured concept of *Khīyābān* manifested physically in the development of the city. *Khīyābān* and *Kūchih* gradually lost their traditional usage. Iranian urban society redefined its spatial language to talk about the new form of urban spaces.

Although the Iranian travelers were fascinated by the new physical order, they did not limit their explorations to the physicality of European cities. They noticed novel social relations and recorded intricate patterns of social interactions in European cities. They meticulously recorded new forms of social life and spaces. Through these descriptions, they formed a new spatial knowledge that goes way beyond mere physicality and examines various socio-spatial relations in European cities.

Public–Private Relationships

Iranian travelers found that, unlike Iranian cities, the boundary between private and public spaces was not rigid and impenetrable. The private spaces of houses were accessible visually from public spaces and the latter was under the constant gaze of the former.

There was a decisive physical demarcation between the private realm of houses and the outside world in traditional Iranian cities. Although Chapter 1 demonstrated that this boundary was socially porous for women, its physical manifestation was rigid and seamless. Moreover, the two realms were extremely gendered; the private realm was in women's control and the main public realm beyond the private houses was dominantly masculine. Enclosed architecture was the key to such a dichotomy. N. P. Mamontov, a Russian missionary in Tehran, describes this dichotomy perfectly: "All the houses and gardens, which have beautiful interiors, are surrounded by mud walls […] The streets are located amid the high walls of houses and look like long corridors. The reason for the isolation of Iranians is that they are scared of an alien male gaze at the private spaces of their houses […] One rarely find a real façade among the bare walls."[44]

[44] N. P. Mamontov, *Hukumat-i Tizar va Muhammad ʿAli Mirza [Tzar Government and Muhammad ʿAli Mirza]*, trans. Sharaf Al-Din Mirza Ghahrimani (Tehran: Ruznamih-yi Ittilaʿat, 1930), 26–7.

The visual interconnectedness of public and private spaces was completely blocked. The bare walls of houses revealed no clue of what existed in the interior.

Iranian travelers were aware of the fundamental difference between their homeland and what they experienced in the European context. While there is no direct description of the new experience, the texts are full of architectural elements that implicate the new relationship between public and private spaces. In *Dalil al-Sufara*, Ilchi describes Saint Petersburg's residential architecture in these words: "Their houses do not have any space, pool,[45] or garden,[46] [in the middle] as Iranian houses do, and in their houses the sky is not visible."[47] Later in the same paragraph he adds: "They have placed huge windows from glass all around the rooms, through which the streets are visible."[48] These words talk about a relationship between the interior and exterior spaces of the buildings that was new to the travelers. The extroverted architecture of European cities stood in contrast to the introverted Iranian architecture. There is a subtle comparison in these words between two different architectural styles. These houses did not have space or a courtyard in the middle and, as a result, people could not see the sky. Instead, they received light through large windows opening to the streets. The tension between the two different socio-spatial understandings is manifested in the comparison between the architectural details of Iranian and European houses.

Sometimes, like Ilchi's description, the visual relationship between public and private realms is constructed from the interior toward public space. Nasser al-Din Shah describes his experience in Milan in these words:

> Dinner being concluded, we went to a window that faced the church and the square. At least twenty thousand individuals were congregated in this space. They had illuminated the whole church with Bengal lights, which produce different colours. At one moment the entire building from summit to foot was red; at another moment, green, yellow, or some other colour.[49]

[45] *Ḥuż* is a small pool of water at the center of the courtyards in Iranian houses.
[46] *Bāghchih* is a small patch of soil in the courtyards for planting fruit trees, flowers, or herbs.
[47] ʿAlavi Shirazi, *Dalil al-Sufara*, 143.
[48] ʿAlavi Shirazi, *Dalil al-Sufara*, 143.
[49] Nasser al-Din Shah, *The Diary of H.M.*, 306–7.

This was in stark contrast to Nasser al-Din Shah's spatial experience inside his royal compound in Tehran. While in Tehran he had to hide behind the walls of his palace, here in Milan he could face a square and a magnificent church, the architecture of which he had spent pages admiring. Here he could witness an urban stage prepared by lights, crowds, architecture, and color.

Iranian travelers also noticed and recorded their visual access to the interior of houses from public spaces. In the welcoming of Nasser al-din Shah to Turin, he mentions that "[g]reat crowds of women and men were in the streets and at the windows."[50] In the case of Ilchi's reception in London, while passing through the streets in a carriage, he noticed that "the citizens of London heard the news [of our presence], they gathered in large numbers to see us pass. And when the ladies indoors heard the tumult, they came out on to their balconies to watch. We in turn were looking at them."[51] Mirza Fattah Khan Garmrudi and Haj Sayyah both noticed that the tall buildings of Paris were overlooking the streets through the windows. Garmarudi mentions that one can barely find a building whose windows do not open toward the street[52] and Haj Sayyah, wandering aimlessly in the streets throughout the night, was fascinated by the charm of Haussmann's Paris: "All the houses had gaslights [even up to the seventh floor].[53] From the houses the sounds of piano and singing were heard."[54]

Similar to the novel spatial order, the new relationship between public and private spaces became a taken-for-granted norm in the future developments of Tehran and other Iranian cities. Initially, this new relationship was incorporated in the 1870s expansion of Tehran. As Chapter 4 will discuss, after the expansion of the city, the new northern neighborhoods provided land for the affluent people of the city to build their mansions with extroverted architecture. Instead of hiding behind their bare walls and viewing the sky from the hidden gardens inside their houses, Iranian elites turned the face of their residences toward the outside world.

[50] Nasser al-Din Shah, *The Diary of H.M.*, 292.
[51] Shirazi, *A Persian at the Court*, 112.
[52] Garmrudi, *Safarnamih-yi Mirza Fattah Khan*, 807.
[53] From the Persian text: Mahallati, *Safarnamih-yi Haj Sayyah*, 156.
[54] Mahallati, *An Iranian in Nineteenth Century Europe*, 124.

The Feminine City

We arrived at the town of Baden-Baden after the sunset […] For lovers, pleasure-hunters, sybarites, it is a capital nook. Pretty women and graceful ladies continually promenade about its avenues, lawns, and hills, on foot, on horseback, and in carriages. In truth, it is a fairy abode.[55]

These sentences are Nasser al-Din Shah's first impressions of the small city of Baden-Baden in Germany. Similar to many other places around the continent, the king of Iran found the city a fairy landscape. Alongside various physical aspects – such as the new spatial order, the architecture of buildings, and the fancy shops around the city – the king particularly noticed the presence of women in public spaces. For Iranian travelers of the nineteenth century, European cities were in many ways feminine landscapes. Public life and spaces were populated by men and women, in stark contrast to the travelers' familiar masculine spatiality back home.

The representations of European women in Iranian travelogues are a noteworthy subject of investigation. Mohamad Tavakoli-Targhi has several essays on the subject. He analyzes the image of European women in Iranian travelogues and demonstrates how this image formed the discourse of femininity inside Iran.[56] However, in this chapter, the framing of European women themselves is not the matter of concern. My focus is the presence of women in public spaces and their relation with the city. This feminine, public presence was a source of wonder for Iranian travelers and it became a significant aspect of their new spatial knowledge. However, as it is discussed later in the book, in comparison to other aspects of the new spatial knowledge, the presence of Iranian women in public life and spaces took longer to normalize.

There were four main spatial settings in which Iranian travelers came across European women: (1) parties, (2) formal ceremonies,

[55] Nasser al-Din Shah, *The Diary of H.M.*, 113–14.

[56] Tavakoli-Targhi, *Refashioning Iran*; Mohamad Tavakoli-Targhi, "Eroticizing Europe," in *Society and Culture in Qajar Iran: Studies in Honor of Hafez Farmayan*, ed. Elton L. Daniel (Costa Mesa: Mazda Publishers, 2002), 311–46; Mohamad Tavakoli-Targhi, "The Persian Gaze and Women of the Occident," *South Asia Bulletin* 11, no. 1/2 (1991): 21–31. Also see: Amin, *The Making of the Modern Iranian Woman*, 50–5.

(3) venues related to the entertainment industry, and (4) daily urban life. The first two categories are dominant in almost all of the travelogues, with the exception of Haj Sayyah's, who traveled individually as a poor unknown dervish. Although Mirza Abu Talib Khan traveled as an individual, he became famous as the "Persian Prince" during his stay in London and was repeatedly invited to parties. There are countless instances in which the Qajar princes spent days and nights at parties, masquerades, and balls. British noblewomen repeatedly invited Ilchi and Reza Ghuli Mirza to their parties. The general descriptions of women in these gatherings are concentrated around their beauty, clothing, and dances, wherein European women are usually compared to heavenly nymphs and angels. Mirza Abu Talib Khan goes further in his narratives and composes several sonnets for individual beautiful women whom he found pleasing.[57]

In contrast, there are extremely negative and pornographic accounts depicting European women as lustful, shameless, and sensual people. However, the latter accounts should be read based on their specific context, particularly in the case of Iranian ambassadors. Most of these accounts are from Mirza Fattah Khan's travel to London and Ilchi's stay in Tbilisi. Mirza Fattah Khan accompanied Iran's ambassador to London to submit complaints against the British ambassador in Iran and Britain's interference in Afghanistan. However, they were ignored and humiliated by the British government, and all their requests were rejected. As a result, they returned to Iran without any significant success. Mirza Fattah Khan wrote a separate book, *Shabnamih*, the accounts of the night, which contains dark pornographic descriptions of British women. Through the narration of different stories, which he witnessed or heard from his friends, "Mirza Fattah constructed an image of the West centered on women and their sexual debauchery. He portrayed Europeans, both men and women, as irrational, immoral, and aberrant."[58]

The same attitude is recognizable in Ilchi's travelogue from his trip to Russia. During his journey he had to pass through Georgia and stay

[57] For some examples, see: Nasser al-Din Shah, *Safarnamih*, 24, 36, 93, 115, 159; ʿAlavi Shirazi, *Dalil al-Sufara*, 29, 73–4, 78, 91–2, 96, 151–2; Reza Ghuli Mirza, *Safarnamih*, 323, 361, 383, 394–5, 433–4, 497; Shirazi, *Hiyratnamih*, 162–3, 189, 236, 240; Garmrudi, *Safarnamih-yi Mirza Fattah Khan*, 775; ʿIzz al-Dulih, "Safarnamih-yi Shahzadih," 199, 226–7, 242, 244; Talib Khab, *Masir-i Talibi*, 34, 58, 109, 143.

[58] Tavakoli-Targhi, *The Persian Gaze and Women*, 24.

for a while in Tbilisi. This travel occurred in 1814, between the two rounds of the Perso-Russian wars. During the first round, Iran lost Georgia and Tbilisi to Russia. Ilchi's negative description of Georgian women could be an instrument to demonstrate how Georgian society had become decadent under the rule of Russia: "under Russian law, a woman has too much independence and she can do whatever she wants, and go wherever and talk to whoever she wants [...] They can want whoever they want. Now the people of Tbilisi have adopted the same law and due to the Russian dominance no one can control his wife."[59] Based on Naghmeh Sohrabi's[60] view, this can be considered as an instance in which the travelogue was written more with an eye on the Iranian readership, to be used as propaganda inside Iran.[61] However, these negative descriptions are mostly exceptions, reflecting the broader political context of the time. The general tendency among Iranian travelers was more inclined toward praising the beauty and sexual appeal of European women, rather than denigrating them.

While the first two spatial settings – parties and formal ceremonies– are situated between the public and private realms, the next two, the entertainment industry and daily urban life, completely belong to the public realm of cities. Iranian travelers, from Haj Sayyah to Nasser al-Din Shah, spent many nights in opera houses, theaters, circuses, and so forth, where they watched plays and shows performed by women. The notion of women's presence at the forefront of the public entertainment industry was a new phenomenon for Iranian travelers. From nineteenth-century Iran there are accounts of dancing women at parties for men[62] or even prostitution[63] in Iranian cities; however, these cases – particularly in Qajar Iran – were underground activities or intentionally ignored by society and the state.

59 ʿAlavi Shirazi, *Dalil al-Sufara*, 29.
60 Sohrabi, *Taken for Wonder*.
61 Anna Vanzan has another assumption in this regard. She argues that in the case of Ilchi's travelogues from his trip to Russia, one should differentiate between what Ilchi says and what his scribe writes, which means the travelogue reflects the scribe's comments and ideas. Vanzan, "Mīrzā Abu'l-Ḥasan Khan Šīrāzī," 356.
62 Fatemi, "Music, Festivity, and Gender in Iran."
63 Willem Floor, *A Social History of Sexual Relations in Iran* (Washington, DC: Mage Publishers, 2008), 235–52; Jaʿfar Shahri, *Tehran-i Qadim [Old Tehran]* (Tehran: Intisharat-i Muʿin, 1371 [1992]), 1: 28–9.

From the king of Iran to the dervish wanderer, Haj Sayyah, Iranian travelers obsessively recorded the shows and plays that they saw in Europe, even recording the names of the singers.[64] On June 21, 1873, Nasser al-Din Shah writes: "They had sent expressly to Paris and had called from thence Patti, who is one of the renowned songstresses of Firangistan."[65] Similar to the parties and formal ceremonies, travelers were mostly attracted to the beauty of the women: "O my God! Paradise is exactly this place. If someone asks if the nymphs are real, [I will say] yes they are, I swear to God, I saw them with my own eyes. First, I could not believe they were human."[66] ʿAbd al-Samad Mirza Salur describes an opera in Russia. Unable to comprehend the broader social underpinnings that enabled women to be present in the public realm and work in the entertainment industry, the travelers' descriptions objectified women largely based on their appearances and sexual appeal.

The most important spatial setting where Iranian travelers came across European women was in their ordinary daily lives. Whether while visiting parks, going to the opera and playhouses, visiting factories, shopping in stores, or simply moving around the city in carriages, Iranian travelers recorded whenever they saw a European woman. Sometimes this acquaintance was very brief. This is particularly the case for the king and Qajar princes, who were accompanied in urban spaces by their hosts and did not have the chance to delve into the daily lives of passers-by. They could only observe the presence of ordinary women, without having any close conversation. For example, in Frankfurt, Nasser al-Din Shah observes, possibly from the hotel, that in the "mornings the wives of villagers bring in on carts fruit, vegetables, and the like, to sell; and form a market for these commodities opposite our quarters around the church. After a time, when all are sold off, they go away."[67] Moreover, the presence of women and

[64] For some examples, see: Nasser al-Din Shah, *Safarnamih*, 24, 41, 81, 95, 124, 127, 159, 163, 200, 211, 242; Reza Ghuli Mirza, *Safarnamih*, 410, 430; Shirazi, *Hiyratnamih*, 216, 228, 240, 331, 333; Garmrudi, *Safarnamih-yi Mirza Fattah Khan*, 787, 827, 829; ʿIzz al-Dulih, "Safarnamih-yi Shahzadih," 188–9, 242; Mahallati, *Safarnamih-yi Haj Sayyah*, 88, 131, 162, 199, 271, 291; Talib Khab, *Masir-i Talibi*, 313.
[65] Nasser al-Din Shah, *The Diary of H.M.*, 158.
[66] ʿIzz al-Dulih, "Safarnamih-yi Shahzadih," 188–9.
[67] Nasser al-Din Shah, *The Diary of H.M.*, 109.

men in public spaces together was another source of interest for the travelers. There are many instances in which the travelers mention that men and women are walking hand in hand or kissing publicly. In the case of the formal ceremonies and parties, similarly, there are detailed descriptions of the dances and how men and women choose each other as their dance partners.[68]

From private parties to public spaces, from opera houses to factories, and from queens and wealthy ladies to workers and prostitutes, there is a common point between all the patriarchal gazes upon and descriptions of European women by Iranian travelers: They objectified women. The public presence of women was just another aspect of the numerous beauties of a European city. European cities were charming because of their buildings, gaslights, paving, bridges, trees, streets, restaurants, and also their women. For the travelers, women were mere objects. It is not surprising that the king of Iran counts the beauties of Jardin Mabille, a garden in Paris, in these words:

> The garden is lighted up with lamps innumerable; there are beautiful avenues, basins of water, places like natural hills with cascades or waterfalls; and in the middle of the garden a pavilion where an orchestra performs. It also has coffee-shops and handsome apartments well lighted with lamps. Beautiful women of every description frequent this place, which is a curiosity in its way.[69]

A pleasant public space contains pretty women in the same fashion that it contains pretty lamps, avenues, pavilions, trees and flowers, cafés, and so forth. These male Iranian travelers were unable to step out of their patriarchal discourse; they projected the same discourse over the European landscape by objectifying half of society.

The only exception in this regard is Haj Sayyah, who, thanks to the lack of affiliation to the royal family, was free to experience various aspects of European society and talk with common people. He sees the broader social context that allows women to be relatively more active

[68] For some examples, see: Nasser al-Din Shah, *Safarnamih*, 159, 203; ʿAlavi Shirazi, *Dalil al-Sufara*, 78, 96, 110, 152–3; Reza Ghuli Mirza, *Safarnamih*, 360, 323, 394; Shirazi, *Hiyratnamih*, 76, 83, 162, 240, 315, 330; Garmrudi, *Safarnamih-yi Mirza Fattah Khan*, 787, 807; Mahallati, *Safarnamih-yi Haj Sayyah*, 131, 157, 253, 271, 291; Talib Khab, *Masir-i Talibi*, 231, 272, 310, 322.

[69] Nasser al-Din Shah, *The Diary of H.M.*, 272–3.

members of society and to live freer lives in comparison to their Iranian counterparts. Traveling on a train to Lucerne, he was accompanied by a young woman for several stations. The young woman lived by herself on a small income as a teacher in Zurich. Haj Sayyah records his feelings: "Again I thought of the people in my country and felt sad. In Europe a girl was safe and secure and lived and traveled freely, unlike the poor women of my country."[70] The relative freedom of women in European cities was in stark contrast to Iranian cities, which pushed Haj Sayyah to such a generalization.[71] Despite gender inequality in European societies, in comparison to Iran, European women enjoyed more freedom and were privileged to access more social rights.

Power and the City

European cities displayed impressive spectacles of power to Iranian travelers, particularly the king and the Qajar elites. They provided spatial representations of power. For the king of Iran, European cities were prepared as magnificent stages. His trajectories inside the cities were carefully planned through wide streets and squares, with crowds shouting and waving their hands along his path, and with fireworks and gaslights shining during the nights. These well-organized spectacles and welcoming ceremonies were completely different from the Qajar court's spatial strategies in Tehran. In the latter case the crowd had to leave the city and welcome the monarch at the city gates in a chaotic manner. Chapter 4 will provide a detailed examination of welcoming ceremonies in the Qajar court and how these ceremonies transformed as the result of the acquaintance of the Qajar elites with European models.

Saint Petersburg was the first European capital that Nasser al-Din Shah visited during his trip. He describes his first official reception in a European capital in these words:

[70] Mahallati, *An Iranian in Nineteenth Century Europe*, 182.

[71] However, this conclusion does not imply that there was gender equality in nineteenth-century Europe. There was vast social discrimination against women at that time. For more information on the gender inequality in nineteenth-century Europe, see: Bonnie G. Smith, *Ladies of the Leisure Class: The Bourgeoises of Northern France in the Nineteenth Century* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981); Elizabeth Wilson, *The Sphinx in the City: Urban Life, the Control of Disorder, and Women* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991).

Both sides of the road, the balconies, and the roofs, were full of men and women, who shouted hurrahs. Incessantly did we and the Emperor bow to the people. For a while we drove on, until at length, passing beneath an arch and a lofty gateway we entered the square in front of the Winter Palace. In this square there is a very tall and stout column of stone, a monolith, bearing on its summit a statue in metal of the Emperor Alexander I.[72]

There are certain spatial elements in this account: (1) a long, wide, and straight street, the name of which he mentions earlier, Newsky; (2) the presence of a well-organized crowd throughout his trajectory on either side of the street, in the balconies, and on the sidewalks; (3) an arch and a "lofty gateway"; (4) the palace square, or Dvortsovaya; (5) a stout column with the metal statue of Emperor Alexander I; and (6) the winter palace.

One can find similar stages all over Nasser al-Din Shah's travelogue. In Berlin, Paris, London, and many other European cities, he experienced the same landscape. Here and there he reflects on his wonders and shares the emotions produced through these spectacles. In the entry of July 5, 1873, when he was leaving Britain for Paris, Nasser al-Din Shah writes: "Large crowds were present, showing great regret. It was evident that the people of England were all sorry and grieved in their hearts at our departure."[73] Whether propaganda for the usage of his travelogue inside Iran,[74] or a genuine reflection of his thoughts, one point is evident: the preparation of urban spaces for the reception of the Iranian monarch provided him with a new spatial knowledge. Nasser al-Din Shah found out that the cities could be arranged for the reception of royal and political guests. Being trapped in the labyrinthine fabric of his capital, with narrow and winding passages, he realized that cities could be constructed through a top-down process rather than a gradual organic growth. He learned that the cities could provide stages to spatially manifest the power relationship between the state and society. In this relationship, urban spaces dictate a particular order and orchestrate the scene to emphasize the centrality of the royal power.

Such an understanding is clearly manifested in Nasser al-Din Shah's 1873 account of his visit to Paris: "The streets of Paris,—thus straight,

[72] Nasser al-Din Shah, *The Diary of H.M.*, 42–3.
[73] Nasser al-Din Shah, *The Diary of H.M.*, 215.
[74] Sohrabi, *Taken for Wonder*.

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broad, and level, together with the avenues in which trees have been planted so regularly and tastefully, were all planned and laid out on the instructions and under the supervision of M. Haussman [*sic*]."[75] As another example, Haj Sayyah describes Saint Petersburg's streets as engineer-designed streets,[76] or, in the same city, Ilchi describes how the harmony of the streets was the result of a strict top-down regulation of all the new and old construction: "Anyone who wants to build a house in the city [...] takes the plans to the king [...] if the design is not against the general order of the city, he gets the construction permits, otherwise he has to change the plans."[77]

Moreover, the travelers occasionally mention the ongoing maintenance and cleaning of spaces by certain urban institutions. For example, Reza Ghuli Mirza and Haj Sayyah mention how all the streets were cleaned and watered daily to prevent any dirt and dust.[78] Ilchi describes the continuous process of cleaning and maintenance in Saint Petersburg, where streets, paving, trees, and all the elements of the city were repaired and kept working properly.[79] Mirza Abu Talib Khan mentions that people should repair the façades of their buildings every two or three years to maintain London's new and clean appearance.[80] And finally, Mirza Fattah Khan mentions the annual income of Paris obtained through taxation and how this money was spent for the maintenance and cleaning of the city.[81] There is a common point between these accounts: The state can be responsible for the wellbeing of cities. It needs to regulate various aspects of construction, growth, and the development of urban spaces. After the 1870s expansion of Tehran, the state implemented this new understanding through enforcing various guidelines for the city. These guidelines and the state's attempts to regulate the city played a crucial role in the future transformation of Tehran.

While European states arranged their capitals as magnificent spectacles for Nasser al-Din Shah, Iranian ambassadors had the chance

75 Nasser al-Din Shah, *The Diary of H.M.*, 250.
76 Mahallati, *An Iranian in Nineteenth Century Europe*, 327.
77 ʿAlavi Shirazi, *Dalil al-Sufara*, 144.
78 Reza Ghuli Mirza, *Safarnamih*, 344; Mahallati, *An Iranian in Nineteenth Century Europe*.
79 ʿIzz al-Dulih, "Safarnamih-yi Shahzadih," 142.
80 Talib Khab, *Masir-i Talibi*, 184.
81 Garmrudi, *Safarnamih-yi Mirza Fattah Khan*, 806.

to visit royal buildings. They could stand at the epicenters of cities' spatial arrangements, looking from a balcony over long distances with carefully designed streets, buildings, trees, and gaslights pointing toward them. One of these occasions appears in Mirza Fattah Khan's travel account of when he was invited to a formal reception in King Louis Philippe's palace, probably Tuileries Palace, in Paris. After the meal, he accompanied the king to the balcony on the upper level. Mirza Fattah Khan takes three pages to describe the scene he witnessed from the balcony. He calls the view "one of the rare wonders of the era,"[82] and he provides every detail of the trees, flowers, streets, and squares in the garden as well as the people, benches, fountains, statues, and the Arc de Triomphe du Carrousel, which holds reliefs of Napoleon's wars and victories. After providing a detailed account of the scenery, he adds: "the biggest virtue is that if one stands in the middle of the King's room and looks outside, he will see the garden's street and the city square and the streets outside the complex."[83] These wonder-like sentences perfectly describe the experience of a new perspective developed by the Iranian ambassador. He experienced the power of the state over the rearrangement of Paris and how such rearrangements provided the state with the spatial manifestation of its power.

Fast-forwarding thirty years, circa the summer of 1867, one can find another account of Paris, this time in Haj Sayyah's travelogue.[84] Haj Sayyah, as an ordinary person, stands at the other end of this spectrum, wherein he was the subject of the spectacles and experienced the spatial power while wandering through European streets on his own. In contrast to Mirza Fattah Khan, who stood at the center of power and witnessed people's presence in the spatial order, Haj Sayyah experienced the Parisian spatial arrangements as an ordinary person. He describes the preparation of Paris for the reception of the Ottoman Sultan:

[82] Garmrudi, *Safarnamih-yi Mirza Fattah Khan*, 802.

[83] Garmrudi, *Safarnamih-yi Mirza Fattah Khan*, 803.

[84] Haj Sayyah's travelogue lacks the exact dating of events. The dates can be approximated via occasional clues in the text. In Paris, Haj Sayyah points to two events: first, the International Exposition in Paris, and second, Sultan Abdul-Aziz's (the Ottoman Sultan) presence in Paris. These two events narrow the dates to the summer of 1867 and more precisely to the last days of June 1867.

All the streets were cleanly swept and sprinkled with water. The city was decorated [and they had built special decorative gates for the reverence of the Sultan][85] [...] The streets were so crowded that it was difficult to walk, although they were about sixty to seventy paces wide [...] Policemen were on guard at every intersection, preventing accidents [...] Suddenly the shouts of "Long live the Sultan" were heard [...] Men, women, and children were on the roofs of the houses and by the windows, watching [...] The Sultan looked to the right and left and answered the greetings of the people with a wave of his hands. People were happy and remarked, "The Sultan is gracious and tactful." Men took off their hats in respect as the carriage of the Sultan went by [...] Turkish music [and song] was heard from most of the houses [as if they were obliged to play].[86]

Here, the spectacle is similar to Nasser al-Din Shah's description of Saint Petersburg. There are common spatial elements in both of them. While the king and ambassadors experienced these spectacles from the position of power, Haj Sayyah delved into them and experienced them from the point of view of an ordinary person. However, the significant point is that Iranian travelers, from the king to the dervish, were parts of these spectacles. It is inaccurate to separate them from these spatial arrangements and consider them as mere observers. They were part of the performances and practices that created the new spatial order.

As a result, from Nasser al-Din Shah – sitting in a carriage with European kings and emperors and waving his hand to the people on the side of the street – to Haj Sayyah – standing on the side of the streets amid the masses receiving the kings and emperors – Iranian travelers developed a new spatial consciousness. They learned that the city has functions beyond the daily lives of its people. Cities can be prepared as grand stages where the plays of power and space keep people amused and legitimize the rule of the state. Monarchs and rulers can appear in these public stages; they do not need to hide behind their palace walls as sacred unattainable figures. They can arrange the whole city and its urban spaces to manifest their power and presence.

[85] Not in the English translation, added from the Persian text: Mahallati, *Safarnamih-yi Haj Sayyah*, 156–7.

[86] Mahallati, *An Iranian in Nineteenth Century Europe*, 124. The sentences in brackets are not included in the English translation of the travelogue; I added them from the Persian text: Mahallati, *Safarnamih-yi Haj Sayyah*, 156–7.

In short, Iranian travelers discovered a new spatial strategy that regulates the relationship between the state and society. In this strategy, the state arranges the spatiality of the city and orchestrates its public presence to consolidate its power. As the next two chapters will demonstrate, this novel understanding was clearly manifested in the 1870s expansion of Tehran and the transformation of the spatial strategies of the state.

New Functions, a New Temporality

In European cities, Iranian travelers found a new function for cities: city as the landscape of leisure and entertainment. There can be public organizations and spaces to fill people's spare time. During the daytime, zoos, aquariums, museums, botanical gardens, and parks amused the travelers. From Nasser al-Din Shah to Haj Sayyah, they were deeply amused by these places. Reza Ghuli Mirza takes ten pages to describe all of the animals in London Zoo.[87] Nasser al-Din Shah visited zoos in almost every city he went to. He provides detailed accounts of animals, how they were distinct from Iranian species, and their differences and similarities with what he had previously studied in zoology books.[88] Similarly, there are detailed accounts of major European museums: London's British Museum and Madam Tussauds, the Louvre Museum in Paris, and Saint Petersburg's State Hermitage Museum are just a few examples.[89]

European institutions of entertainment were fundamentally different from their nineteenth-century Iranian counterparts. As Chapter 1 discussed, coffeehouses, *zūrkhānih*s, *takīyyih*s, and bathhouses accommodated the bulk of the social interactions in Iranian cities. However,

[87] Reza Ghuli Mirza, *Safarnamih*, 373–83.
[88] Nasser al-Din Shah, *Safarnamih*, 51, 65, 96, 156–9.
[89] For some examples, see: Nasser al-Din Shah, *Safarnamih*, 24, 26, 28, 39, 48, 50–1, 55, 58, 80–1, 95–6, 100, 127, 133, 151, 153, 159, 161, 199, 200; ʿAlavi Shirazi, *Dalil al-Sufara*, 87, 206; Reza Ghuli Mirza, *Safarnamih*, 359, 360–1, 393, 400, 409–10, 428–9; Shirazi, *Hiyratnamih*, 142, 146–7, 173, 178, 216, 228, 257–8, 260, 284, 296, 302, 330, 333; Garmrudi, *Safarnamih-yi Mirza Fattah Khan*, 787, 827, 829; ʿIzz al-Dulih, "Safarnamih-yi Shahzadih," 188, 191, 198–9, 202, 204, 205, 212, 216, 218, 223, 229; Mahallati, *Safarnamih-yi Haj Sayyah*, 117, 122, 162–3, 161–2, 199, 202, 260, 291; Talib Khab, *Masir-i Talibi*, 76, 159, 188, 208, 313.

unlike their European counterparts they were highly colored with communal identities and masculinity. While access to European theaters, zoos, museums, and so forth was, more or less, unrestricted for the public – considering the public as the entire population – Iranian spaces of entertainment and conviviality were highly confined to the social identity and gender of their users.

As a result, Iranian travelers were free to visit various spaces of entertainment in Europe. They could construct their time to have fun without any restrictions. It is no surprise that travelers occasionally generalized their experiences, claiming that "*Farangistan* [Europe] is such a huge *ʿīshratgāh* [amusement park]"[90] where "each person is relaxing and never thinking of the possibility of grief in his life."[91] Clearly, this is a generalization and, as the next section discusses, Iranian travelers had an incomplete image of Europe. Behind their idealized images recorded in their travelogues, there were the harsh lives of the working classes.

The analysis of the representations of nightlife reveals a new insight into Iranian travelers' wonder toward European cities. They encountered a new spatiality that was not only stretched in its physical dimensions with wide, straight, and long streets, but was stretched in its temporal dimension as well. Thanks to gaslights – and later electricity – European cities were bright and lively even in the dark hours. This great wonder that inspired the Iranian travelers had two different sources: the illumination of urban spaces and the nightlife.

A great deal of space in the travelogues is devoted to the use of gas and electric lights in urban spaces. Travelers provide detailed descriptions of how the gaslights worked;[92] they distinguish between decorative lights and streetlights and explain their differences.[93] They were fascinated by the huge chandeliers in the theaters, opera houses, and indoor shopping malls, such as the one in the Galleria Vittorio Emanuele in Milan[94] or the Palais-Royal in Paris.[95] Haj Sayyah describes

[90] ʿIzz al-Dulih, "Safarnamih-yi Shahzadih," 208.
[91] Reza Ghuli Mirza, *Safarnamih*, 409.
[92] Reza Ghuli Mirza, *Safarnamih*, 328. Reza Ghuli Mirza describes how the gas is produced from the burning of coal in certain plants and is transferred through pipes to gaslights.
[93] Talib Khab, *Masir-i Talibi*, 185, 218.
[94] Mahallati, *An Iranian in Nineteenth Century Europe*, 98.
[95] Garmrudi, *Safarnamih-yi Mirza Fattah Khan*, 808.

a big N and three lines drawn out with lamps in Paris, which stood for Napoleon III.[96] These words of ʿAbd al-Samad Mirza ʿIzz al-Dulih elegantly summarize this common wonder of the travelers: "Insomuch that there are gaslights burning in every street, it seems that night does not know this city [Paris] at all and sun never abandons the merry and virtue of this city by hiding itself at the sunset."[97] The fascination toward gas and electric lights would soon manifest in the 1870s expansion of Tehran. One of the state's main projects was to install gaslights in all the main streets of the new city. The state attempted to reconstruct the image of the night-less European city through this undertaking.

If the travelers were the observers of the gas and electric lights in European cities, they also joined the citizens in their nightlife. Most nights, Iranian travelers, particularly the king and those who were traveling as princes or ambassadors, went to operas, concerts, ballets, theaters, circuses, and so forth. They joined the crowd in cheering, having fun, enjoying the live performances, playing the role of spectator, and getting lost amid hundreds or thousands of people.[98] It is not a surprise that they recorded these experiences in great detail, such as Haj Sayyah writing seven pages explaining every trick of a magician in Paris,[99] Reza Ghuli Mirza writing six pages describing every scene of a theater in London,[100] Nasser al-Din Shah, who enjoyed recognizing a play, recording the name of Don Quixote and Sancho,[101] and Mirza Abu Talib Khan, who went further and recorded the architectural features of a theater building, including the architectural terms, and a sketch of the floor plan.[102]

In contrast to the Qajar princes and the king, who mostly described the indoor nightlife of the theaters and the like, travelers like Haj Sayyah and Mirza Abu Talib Khan were free to explore the outdoor spaces of the urban nightlife. Haj Sayyah was particularly fascinated by Paris during the night. Moving from one café and restaurant to

[96] Mahallati, *An Iranian in Nineteenth Century Europe*, 124.
[97] ʿIzz al-Dulih, "Safarnamih-yi Shahzadih," 210.
[98] See footnote 89.
[99] Haj Sayyay, *Safarnamih*, 180–7.
[100] Reza Ghuli Mirza, *Safarnamih*, 363–69.
[101] Nasser al-Din Shah, *Safarnamih*, 39.
[102] Mirza Abu Talib, *Masir-i Talibi*, 75. The English translation does not contain the sketch.

another, observing people playing music in the streets or in the cafés and restaurants, joining others in a garden to see a play or some magician's tricks, getting a carriage and passing through urban nightlife, Haj Sayyah built an exceptional experience that he describes in these words:

> Whatever I saw that night I had never seen elsewhere. All the city looked like jewelry […] There were music and singing in coffee shops and theaters. They were all full, with no place to sit […] The trees were festooned with green lights. Musicians played, and young people and children danced […] After one hour fireworks began […] In all Paris I did not see anyone with dirty clothes […] Anyway that night ended and made me more mature, seeing men attain such a degree of perfection […] I could not sleep. I was thrilled to be in Paris.[103]

By reading between the lines of Haj Sayyah's descriptions and examining Iranian travelers' wonder-filled sentences, an important point emerges that is beyond a mere fascination toward entertainment, gaslights, and urban nightlife. It is the fascination toward the public life of people in a shared spatiality. Iranian travelers experienced a particular sociality of European cities that was represented spatially in the forms of public entertainment. In contrast to the communal practices of Iranian urban society, which were small-scale gatherings in interior spaces, in Europe travelers witnessed the spatial manifestations of collective amusement. Back home, as the next chapter will discuss, there were few state-sponsored ceremonies that could gather the masses together for a collective activity. The main two were the *qurbān* camel sacrifice rituals and the royal *taʿzīyih*s in *Takīyyih Duwlat*. However, even those collective activities were further divided by communal identities and factional strife. Despite people's collective presence in a shared space, they were still able to reproduce their communal ties. In contrast, in London and Paris Iranians could get out and join the crowd. They were able to get lost amid the crowd, become a person like others, and enjoy various types of public entertainment without the constant need to redefine their social identity.

Soon after the 1870s expansion of Tehran, the state and Qajar elites attempted to introduce European-style forms of entertainment to the new city. Lacking the social context, these early attempts were doomed

[103] Haj Sayyah, *An Iranian in Nineteenth Century Europe*, 125–6.

to failure. However, as Chapter 5 will show, half a century later and via the development of the modern middle class in Iranian cities, European types of entertainment and public life became an ever-present aspect of Iranian cities, particularly Tehran. By the mid-twentieth century, no one remembered the wonders of the king of Iran or the poor dervish toward these, by now, taken-for-granted activities.

Silences

Coding the text of the travelogues based on their common themes resulted in what has been reviewed to this point. However, the overarching silences in the texts provide additional insight into the common understanding of European cities by Iranian travelers. Two points in Haj Sayyah's final quotation from the previous section help to articulate this point: Paris as a piece of jewelry and Paris as a city without any dirty people.

Iranian travelers mostly saw just one side of European cities. They saw the wealth, order, cleanliness, and health without realizing that beneath the surface of this paradise the poor and harsh lives of the working classes existed, which is depicted in novels and books such as Charles Dickens's *Oliver Twist* and *A Tale of Two Cities* or Friedrich Engels's *The Condition of the Working Class in England*. This incomplete realization of the social lives of European cities pushed the travelers to the extreme wherein they equated Europe with paradise: "The sides of the Rhine River are the paradise of *farangistan*, and *farangistan* is the paradise of the world with its gardens, buildings, palaces, and pavilions";[104] "Honestly, London is the most beautiful city on the planet […] In all the aspects of urbanism, such as architecture, streets, gardens, churches, factories, schools, theaters, and the like, it is much better than Paris, which in its turn it is the best city of *Farangistan*."[105] Although Naghmeh Sohrabi[106] argues that sometimes the wonder in the language and exaggerations in the descriptions were part of the literary genre of nineteenth-century travelogues, the deep silence on the downsides of European social life is still a notion that deserves more attention.

104 ʿIzz al-Dulih, "Safarnamih-yi Shahzadih," 193.
105 Garmrudi, *Safarnamih-yi Mirza Fattah Khan*, 822.
106 Sohrabi, *Taken for Wonder*.

Then again, there is not consistency among all the travelogues in this regard. Haj Sayyah and Mirza Abu Talib Khan, as independent travelers, provide the readers with a more realistic view of European societies. They had the chance to see both affluent and impoverished neighborhoods and the poor, beggars, and workers more than the other travelers did. This is more apparent in the case of Haj Sayyah as he visited a greater number of European countries. Particularly, during his journeys in Italy and Russia, he suffered hardship. The lack of safety and the presence of thieves, prostitutes, beggars, and poor children in towns and cities are abundant amid his accounts. He was robbed twice and lost almost all of his belongings. Similarly, Mirza Abu Talib Khan witnesses the poverty of Irish peasants and writes:

> The poverty of the peasants, or common people, in this country, is such, that the peasants of India are rich when compared to them [...] they never wear a shoe [...] I was informed, that many of these people never taste meat during their lives, but subsist entirely upon potatoes; and that, in the farm houses, the goats, pigs, dogs, men, women, and children, lie all together. Whilst on our journey, the boys frequently ran for miles with the coach, in hopes of obtaining a piece of bread.[107]

While there are a few instances of descriptions of poverty and dire living conditions in the independent travelers' accounts, the accounts of the Qajar king, princes, and ambassadors are relatively silent in this regard. They were escorted everywhere and their trajectories were planned carefully inside the cities. Even when they had limited independence, they merely visited upscale parts of cities on their own. Sometimes they were able to see workers and the poor, but their observations were from a distance, seeing people standing on the sides of the streets with poor faces and clothing, and no more elaboration was recorded. For example, in Liverpool, Nasser al-Din Shah observes: "In proportion to the inhabitants of London, many more poor people were noticed in these parts, on whose countenances were visibly stamped the signs that they obtained a living with difficulty."[108] Consequently, European cities are largely depicted unrealistically in these travelogues and they are mostly illustrated as paradises without any pain, poverty, danger, or violence.

[107] Talib Khan, *Travels of Mirza Abu Talib*, 106–7.
[108] Nasser al-Din Shah, *The Diary of H.M.*, 177–8.

Through the examination of the 1870s expansion of Tehran, the next chapter will illustrate how the idealization of European cities, their public lives, and spaces manifested physically in the city. For the first time in the history of Iranian urbanism, a new vocabulary of urban design was incorporated for the new city. European-style streets and boulevards with gaslights, tramways, and stores constituted the spatial structure of the new city. During the next eight decades after the expansion of Tehran, the new city developed a novel sociality different from the traditional social life of Iranian cities. In comparison to mere spatial manifestation of European urbanism, it took Tehran much longer to foster an alternative social life. By the mid-twentieth century, the new spatial regime of knowledge became the dominant spatial discourse in Iranian urbanism, dictating the spatiality of cities, their social lives, and their spaces. Various socio-spatial relationships of Iranian cities underwent massive transformations, and Tehran and other cities began a new trajectory that defined their future in the years to come.

There is another silent area in travelogues. Travelers occasionally use comparisons with Iran to describe different aspects of European societies, landscapes, climates, and so forth. By drawing on the similarities and differences between common cases in Europe and Iran, they summarize paragraphs in just a few sentences.[109] Travelers even compare the two universes on more critical topics, such as political issues and women, especially the latter, which is their favorite topic.[110] While comparisons are abundant in all the travelogues, they are largely silent when they reach cities and urban spaces. In other words, there are not significant comparisons between Iranian cities and urban spaces and their European counterparts. There are a few comparisons on the architecture of buildings, especially the interior arrangements of spaces, but on a larger scale there is relative silence.

[109] For some examples, see: Nasser al-Din Shah, *The Diary of H.M.*, 113, 279; ʿIzz al-Dulih, "Safarnamih-yi Shahzadih," 216; Nasser al-Din Shah, *Safarnamih*, 47, 116, 167, 222, 232; ʿAlavi Shirazi, *Dalil al-Sufara*, 71, 73, 143; Reza Ghuli Mirza, *Safarnamih*, 449; Shirazi, *Hiyratnamih*, 81, 240, 256, 280, 304–5, 325, 326; Garmrudi, *Safarnamih-yi Mirza Fattah Khan*, 773, 817; ʿIzz al-Dulih, "Safarnamih-yi Shahzadih," 192; Mahallati, *Safarnamih-yi Haj Sayyah*, 121, 147, 171, 178, 197, 215, 258, 291, 298.

[110] ʿAlavi Shirazi, *Dalil al-Sufara*, 148; Shirazi, *Hiyratnamih*, 105, 163, 180, 315; Garmrudi, *Safarnamih-yi Mirza Fattah Khan*, 754, 755; Mahallati, *Safarnamih-yi Haj Sayyah*, 85, 244–5.

One may claim that since cities and urban spaces are large-scale entities, we should not expect any comparison in this regard. In response, the travelers are not completely silent in comparing the cities and their spaces. On the contrary, there are many instances in which they compare European cities to each other. This is particularly the case with London and Paris, as if these two cities are the origins that the virtue of other European cities should be compared to.[111] However, there is no significant cross-continental comparison between Iran and Europe in this regard.[112]

The only exception is Mirza Abu Talib Khan's travelogue. Unlike the others, he depends greatly on the similar urban spaces in India to describe European urban spaces: "Of the admirable inventions of British are square and park […] Park is similar to Hindi's *ramna* […] but square is an equivalent to Hindi's *cauka*, but India's *cauka* belongs to the market, and this one is different, there are houses or high class stores around it, and its middle is for walking."[113] As this example shows, Mirza Abu Talib Khan uses urban spaces in Indian cities as examples to introduce British urban spaces properly.

Why did Iranian travelers not use the same method as Mirza Abu Talib Khan does? Or, on the contrary, why is the same silence not present in Mirza Abu Talib Khan's travelogue? It is not possible to provide a definite answer to these questions. One possibility is that the great difference between Iranian cities and their European counterparts made them belong to two different universes, which demanded

[111] For a comparison of European cities with each other, see: Nasser al-Din Shah, *Safarnamih*, 28, 47, 211, 249; ʿAlavi Shirazi, *Dalil al-Sufara*, 72, 80, 133, 146; Shirazi, *Hiyratnamih*, 123, 192, 276, 293; Garmrudi, *Safarnamih-yi Mirza Fattah Khan*, 793, 806–7, 822; ʿIzz al-Dulih, "Safarnamih-yi Shahzadih," 197–9, 210, 222, 232; Mahallati, *Safarnamih-yi Haj Sayyah*, 137–8, 159, 259, 284, 315, 467, 502, 525.

[112] The only case of comparison between Iranian urban spaces to their counterparts in another country is a very short sentence in ʿAbd al-Samad Mirza Salur's travelogue. However, in this case he compares Istanbul's streets to Tehran's, which resembled each other to some extent: "After the lunch we went to Istanbul visiting Hagia Sophia. The streets were so dirty and bad, similar to Tehran." In this case, the spatial contexts of the two cities resemble each other; Mirza Salur does not experience Istanbul as an alien landscape that is deeply different from Tehran. ʿIzz al-Dulih, "Safarnamih-yi Shahzadih," 234.

[113] Talib Khab, *Masir-i Talibi*, 185. The Hindi words are not available in the English translation.

two different languages and two different forms of spatial consciousness to comprehend and describe. Iranian urban life and spaces were so different from their European counterparts that it made it hard to draw cross-continental connections between them. However, the case of India was different. The colonial presence and practices in India had generated spaces based on European, or more specifically British, spatial consciousness. As a result, Mirza Abu Talib Khan could trace similarities between Calcutta in India, London, and even Cape Town in South Africa.[114]

As the next chapter argues, the disjunction between European and Iranian spatial forms is clearly manifested in the 1870s expansion of Tehran. The state constructed its desired European image on the north side of the old town, completely detached from it; the two forms could not merge over each other. They had two different characters and they stood side by side, respecting each other. However, after the construction of the new city a dialog gradually developed between the two cores. In the 1920s and 1930s this dialog further transformed into a monologue. The new city and the new regime of knowledge superimposed its spatiality and sociality over the old one. The respectful disjunction between the two universes transformed into a fully-fledged power relationship with destructive consequences.

Conclusion

European cities were like mirrors in which Iranian travelers could see what was absent in their cities back home. The travelers pointed out and documented the elements that they could not find in Iranian cities. However, it is critical to avoid creating sets of binary oppositions. At this point, this chapter does not intend to establish binary oppositions between European and Iranian cities or European urban spaces and their counterparts in Iran. Binary oppositions are value-laden. They define one element as the origin and the other as subordinate. Mentioning differences between public and private spaces, the presence of women in public spaces, public life, nightlife, and so on does not necessarily mean that the two universes were opposing entities; it does not mean that they were standing on different sides of a spectrum.

[114] Talib Khan, *Travels of Mirza Abu Talib*, 79; Talib Khab, *Masir-i Talibi*, 33.

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Actually, there is no spectrum at all. The spectrum view easily traps the analysis in the modernist discourse of space in which there is a single path, called modernism, and a single destination, called European or Western cities.[115] This chapter argues that the two universes were two different manifestations of human civilizations, which formed for thousands of years in relative isolation and that, from a certain point in time, interconnections between them started to emerge. They were simply different rather than opposites.

It would be naive to think that the spatial consciousness of Iranian society changed because of the travelogues or because of any other means of knowledge transformation. However, it is more accurate to say that Iranians, or at least the elites and the Qajar court, generated an alternative spatial knowledge to the one they had lived and experienced in Iran. Generating new knowledge does not mean that society became alienated from its long-lived spaces. For Iranians, the new European spatiality[116] was an independent entity, different from the traditional Iranian one. As the next chapter will show, these two modes of spatiality could not be merged at that time; they were just two different universes that could be juxtaposed to each other. In other words, at this point, we cannot construct a power relation between the two forms of knowledge. These two were so separate and different that it would be inaccurate to claim and generalize with certainty that Iranian society preferred European spaces over their own familiar ones. However, from the moment that, during the 1870s expansion of Tehran, new neighborhoods were constructed based on the novel spatial knowledge, the trajectory of events changed. When the new consciousness was physically implemented, it came to be in a direct dialog with the old one.

[115] Doreen Massey, *For Space* (Los Angeles: Sage, 2005), 66–9.

[116] It is essential to recall that the European spatiality which fascinated Iranians was relatively new and in the process of becoming. The history of the urban forms of major European cities – London, Paris, Berlin, Rome, and many others – shows their massive transformations during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Prior to that, many European cities were based on their medieval networks of streets and squares. For more information on the history of European cities, see: A. E. J. Morris, *History of Urban Form: Before the Industrial Revolution*, 3rd ed. (London: Routledge, 2013); Leonardo Benevolo, *The History of the City*, trans. Geoffrey Culverwell (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1980).

Finally, as Chapter 4 will illustrate, the conformity of the 1870s expansion of Tehran with the main principles of the new spatial knowledge shows that spatial meanings can be incubated in the collective consciousness of a society, or in a section of a society, for a long time before they are physically manifested. The relational theories of space introduce a dynamic framework for the analysis of spaces. In these theories, spatial meanings are outcomes of the constant interrelations and negotiations between various social trajectories. Social space is a social product and it should be analyzed through its sociality. As a result, it is not possible to attach a fixed meaning to a place. The meanings are in a constant process of changing; they exist and coexist together, and they negotiate to produce new spatial meanings. Through this research, I argue that, even prior to the physical production of spaces, social trajectories can negotiate their desired spatial meanings. In the case of Tehran and Iranian urban society, spaces began their social lives many years before their physical production; they were in the process of becoming decades before the expansion of Tehran.

The next three chapters will discuss the impact of the production of new spatial knowledge on the spatiality and sociality of Tehran. After its initial physical manifestation through the 1870s expansion of Tehran, this spatial knowledge gradually changed into a dominant socio-spatial discourse. What follows will examine the impact of this discourse on the quadruple spatial relationships in Tehran.

4 The Qajar Court and the City
Spatial Strategies of the State in the Nineteenth Century

Tram-lines are observed running down some of the principal thoroughfares […] shops are seen with glass windows and European titles. Street lamp-posts built for gas, but accommodating dubious oil-lamps, reflect an air of questioning civilization. Avenues, bordered with footpaths and planted with trees, recall faint memories of Europe […] We ride along broad, straight streets that conduct into immense squares and are fringed by the porticoes of considerable mansions.[1]

Written in 1889, these sentences belong to George Curzon, the correspondent of *The Times*. They do not describe a European or colonial city; the subject of this description is Tehran, or better to say the northern neighborhood of the city after its 1870s expansion. This expansion provided the city with new urban spaces that had no precedent in Iranian cities. Curzon eloquently describes this contrast, mentioning that "we are in a city which was born and nurtured in the East, but is beginning to clothe itself at a West-End tailor's. European Teheran has certainly become, or is becoming […] it is being Europeanised upon Asiatic lines."[2] Edward G. Browne, a British orientalist who visited Tehran in 1888, provides more or less the same description of the new city and adds that the new neighborhood accommodates "almost all the Europeans and many of the more opulent and influential Persians."[3]

These accounts are in stark contrast to the general picture of social life and spaces of Tehran before its 1870s expansion, as depicted in Chapter 1. The late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century accounts of the city depict a modern and Europeanized neighborhood in the north of the old city, with wide and long cobblestone streets and

[1] George N. Curzon, *Persia and the Persian Question*, vol. 1 (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1892), 306.
[2] Curzon, *Persia and the Persian Question*, 1: 306.
[3] Edward G. Browne, *A Year Amongst the Persians* (London: Adam and Charles Black, 1893), 92.

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spacious squares, gaslights, and horse tramways. These spaces were the reproductions of mostly the physical qualities of European cities that had fascinated Iranian travelers since the late eighteenth century. This particular neighborhood housed the affluent citizens and European residents of the city. Unlike the old city, where the communal sphere had the dominant role in the production of small-scale communal spaces, new Tehran was the product of economic relations and political supremacy through the discourse of modernity.

As this chapter will discuss, the 1870s expansion of Tehran was a vehicle for the spatial commodification of vast sections of the new city. Through this expansion, the Qajar court managed to produce the new spatiality as a lucrative commodity. The commodification of the city accompanied an unprecedented socio-spatial bureaucratization. A combination of several factors – from preventing outbreaks of diseases to organizing a novel relationship between the state and society – helped the state to stretch its control and dominance over the spatiality of the city. In its initial steps, these early attempts were the manifestations of a fundamental shift in the relationship between the state, society, and the city. As Chapter 5 will illustrate, this relationship stabilized in the first half of the twentieth century. It will demonstrate how spatial control became a powerful tool for the state and the modern middle class to transform and modernize traditional urban society.

To use Lefebvre's concept of abstract spaces, Tehran went through a process of spatial abstraction particularly after its 1870s expansion. Abstract or conceived spaces in Lefebvre's works stand in contrast to lived spaces or spaces of representation, the subject of the first chapter. Lefebvre's spatial abstraction closely relates to Marx's notion of alienation. Similar to the separation of producer from the means of production and the transformation of the use value into the exchange value, spatial abstraction leads to "the evisceration of symbolic significance" of lived spaces and the transformation of spaces of representation to conceived spaces.[4]

In this view, abstract does not imply a mental quality. It is a social, economic, political, and spatial reality.[5] Two major processes produce

[4] Japhy Wilson, "'The Devastating Conquest of the Lived by the Conceived': The Concept of Abstract Space in the Work of Henri Lefebvre," *Space and Culture* 16, no. 3 (2013): 366.

[5] Andy Merrifield, *Henri Lefebvre: A Critical Introduction* (New York: Routledge, 2006), 111.

abstract spaces: the commodification and bureaucratization of spaces.[6] Spatial commodification transforms the use value of spaces into the exchange value. Space is produced as a sort of commodity. In this process, architecture and urban planning and design have a significant impact. Through the fragmentation of space into lots and parcels, space can be bought and sold. Spatial commodification closely relates to the reorganization of spaces to serve as the state's mode of production. In this process, the state "plans and organizes society 'rationally,' with the help of knowledge and technology."[7]

The bureaucratization process tends to provide a homogeneous representation of space. Abstract space "is instrumental to the state's erasure of preexisting differences"[8] in favor of spatial and social homogeneity. In this process abstract space is a political product in which the state, or other forms of hegemonic power, controls and defines socio-spatial relations in favor of a dominant discourse. In the words of Lefebvre, "the aim is to make it [space] appear homogeneous, the same throughout, organized according to a rationality of the identical and the repetitive that allows the state to introduce its presence, control, and surveillance in the most isolated corners."[9] Abstract space – or perhaps more accurately, state space – ignores the diversity and fragmentation of lived reality. It is a tool for social control and domination. Lefebvre introduces the concept of "the illusion of transparency" to describe the deceptive nature of abstract spaces.[10] In this process, space loses its symbolic meanings that are made through the everyday lives of ordinary people; it is reduced to an abstract construct. Abstract space is the realm of hegemonic power, which attempts to provide a simple and clarified conception of space and social life; it provides a "communality of use." As Lefebvre puts it, "such and such a place is supposed to be trouble-free, a quiet area where people go peacefully to have a good time, and so forth."[11] Once

[6] Derek Gregory, *Geographical Imaginations* (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1994), 401; Wilson, "The Devastating Conquest of the Lived," 368–9.
[7] Henri Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith (Malden: Blackwell, 1991), 23. Also quoted in: Wilson, "The Devastating Conquest of the Lived," 369. Also see: Henri Lefebvre, "Space and the State," in *State/Space: A Reader*, ed. Neil Brenner et al. (Malden: Blackwell), 85.
[8] Wilson, "The Devastating Conquest of the Lived," 370.
[9] Lefebvre, "Space and the State," 86.
[10] Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, 27.
[11] Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, 56.

again, there is a direct relationship between conceived spaces and the architecture and urban planning professions, which attempt to provide lucid and coherent representations of space. By representing social space as homogeneous, empty, quantitative, and geometrical, spatial planning erases contradictions and imposes an imaginary coherence that functions "to reduce reality in the interests of power."[12]

This chapter examines the processes of the commodification and bureaucratization of Tehran, particularly before and after its 1870s expansion. It demonstrates how this expansion followed delicate economic objectives, and how the Qajar court had pursued this commodification process through its spatial policies long before the actual expansion of Tehran. Afterwards, the chapter focuses on the bureaucratization process and argues that, from the first half of the nineteenth century, the state had already generated spatial strategies to prevent cholera outbreaks in the city. These strategies can be regarded as the first attempts of the Qajar court toward a vast spatial bureaucratization in Tehran. The chapter moves to the examination of the spatial strategies of the state for the legitimation of its power, showing how the expansion of Tehran helped the state to stretch its spatial control and domination beyond the confines of the royal compound. It continues with the study of the social life and spaces of the new neighborhood at the end of the nineteenth century and finds that the Qajar elites produced semi-private spaces modeled after European social spaces. Finally, the chapter concludes with the investigation of the spatial strategies of the state and the impact of the two processes of commodification and bureaucratization on Tehran. It demonstrates how these processes resulted in the formation of socio-spatial dichotomies in the city.

Spatial Commodification and the 1870s Expansion of Tehran

The studies that investigate the history of urban development in Tehran during the Nasser al-Din Shah era largely examine the morphological aspects of the major expansion of the city in the 1870s.[13] These

[12] Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, 367. Also quoted in: Wilson, "The Devastating Conquest of the Lived," 370.

[13] Sayyid Mohsen Habibi, *Az Shar ta Shahr: Tahlili Tarikhi az Mafhum-i Shahr va Sima-yi Kalbudi-yi An: Tafakkur va Taʾssur [From the Shar to the City:*

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studies ignore the larger social and political contexts that brewed this spatial transformation. In contrast, this book examines the expansion of Tehran from a broader perspective and argues that it aligned closely with the spatial vocabulary that Iranian elites acquired through their acquaintance with European cities. Nasser al-Din Shah and high-ranking officials in the Qajar court were the primary receivers of this new spatial knowledge and, at the same time, they were the main force behind its physical embodiment.[14] This new spatial understanding provided the instrument for conducting the expansion of Tehran. The European vocabulary of urban planning and design served the state in the commodification process of vast sections of the new city. In addition to the novel spatial knowledge, the Qajar court's spatial policies prior to the expansion of the city left an undeniable impact on the future transformation of Tehran. These ostensibly trivial interventions, which are mostly ignored in the literature examining the transformation of the city, paved the road for its final expansion in the early 1870s.

On April 15, 1852, the official newspaper of the court, *Vaqayiʿ Itifaqiyyih*, published an announcement:

Since the population of the city has grown bigger, and people are in dire need of accommodation, the king has issued an order and gave his consent

Historical Analysis of the Concept of the City and its Morphology] (Tehran: University of Tehran Press, 1384 [2005]); Husayn Karimiyan, *Tehran dar Guzashtih va Hal [Tehran in Past and Present]* (Tehran: Intisharat-i Danishgah-i Milli, 2535 [1976]); Mahvash Alemi, "The 1891 Map of Tehran: Two Cities, Two Cores, Two Cultures," *Journal of the Islamic Environmental Design Research Centre* 1 (1985): 74–84; Shahab Katouzian, "Tehran, Capital City: 1786–1997. The Re-invention of a Metropolis," *Journal of the Islamic Environmental Design Research Centre* 1 (1985): 34–45; Ali Madanipour. *Tehran: The Making of a Metropolis* (Chichester: Wiley, 1998).

[14] It is important to note that this process had already begun long before Nasser al-Din Shah's reign. One of the earlier examples belongs to the Fath ʿAli Shah era, wherein he intended to build a new city, Sulimaniyyih, miles away from the capital by the Karaj River. William Ouseley mentions that "the king, having consulted Abul Hassan Khan's [Mirza Abul Hassan Khan Shirazi – Ilchi] description of London, had ordered that the streets should be wide, the meidáns or squares ample and numerous, with buildings of a uniform height and appearance, on the plan of our English metropolis." However, the latter project was never constructed and it took several decades until the Qajar court had the chance to produce its desired spatiality. William Ouseley, *Travels in Various Countries of the East; More Particularly Persia* (London: Rodwell and Martin, 1823), 3: 374.

to the construction of new houses [outside the city], between Muhammadiyyih and Shah ʿAbd al-ʿAzim Gates, particularly for impoverished people who cannot afford the high prices inside the ramparts. From the moment the King issued his order, around two hundred families have planned and built their houses and stores in that district.[15]

There are delicate points in this announcement that show how the court's supposedly philanthropic decision created the foundation for the future socio-spatial configuration of the city. The king's order permitted people to build new houses only in the southern section of the city. Why were they directed to the south and not to the other lands beyond the ramparts?

Before its expansion, nineteenth-century Tehran was surrounded by farms and gardens. Outside the ramparts, particularly in the north and west, there were royal gardens that belonged to the king and high-ranking officials.[16] In contrast, on the south there were worthless lands used mostly for extracting clay and baking bricks.[17] The contrast between the south side and the other sections was the outcome of the geographical location of the city. Located on slopes, Tehran's main water sources flowed from the northern mountains toward the city. By means of subterranean aqueducts called *qanāt*s, water was brought to the city from the foot of the mountains and was distributed among the neighborhoods via narrow open gutters in the middle of the streets.[18] As a result, those who lived in the northern section of the city received cleaner water.[19] The court received fresh water

[15] *Vaqayiʿ Itifaqiyyih*, Jumada t-Tania 24, 1268 [April 15, 1852].
[16] Alemi, "The 1891 Map of Tehran," 76–7; Donald N. Wilber, *Persian Gardens and Garden Pavilions*, 2nd ed. (Washington, DC: Dumbarton Oaks, 1979).
[17] Jennifer M. Scarce, "The Role of Architecture in the Creation of Tehran," in *Téhéran Capitale Bicentenaire*, ed. C. Adle and B. Hourcade (Paris: Institute Français de Recherche en Iran: 1992), 83. The 1891 map of Tehran, *Naqshih-yi Shahr-i Dar al-Khalafih-yi Nasseri-yi Tehran*, clearly shows the contrast between the southern section and the other parts of the city. Although this map was surveyed after the 1870s expansion, the new lands inside the city wall were still in their pre-expansion condition, with gardens on the north and abandoned worthless lands on the south.
[18] Jakob Eduard Polak, *Persien. Das Land und seine Bewohner. Ethnographische Schilderungen [Persia. The Country and Its Inhabitants. Ethnographic Descriptions]* (Leipzig: Brockhaus, 1865), 77.
[19] Mina Marefat, "Building to Power: Architecture of Tehran 1921–1941" (PhD diss., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1988), 61.

from dedicated *qanāt*s. When in 1865 the court constructed a new *qanāt* with a remarkable amount of water for the royal compound, the king ordered the distribution of water among the neighborhoods only after filling all the creeks and pools in the royal compound and watering the royal gardens.[20] Similarly, when in 1871 water from the Karaj River was brought to Tehran from thirty miles west of the city, it was distributed among the neighborhoods only after watering all the northern royal gardens.[21]

Under these conditions, it made sense that the court would try to save the valuable northern lands by accommodating the impoverished people in the south; it protected the lands by providing the maximum distance between them and the poor people. Moreover, there was no planning for the new construction in the south and people were free to build on their own. The court did not utilize its powerful tool – knowledge of urban planning and design – for organizing the new southern settlement. As a result, in 1853, just a year after the king's authorization, the southern area was flooded, which destroyed houses, stores, and some communal buildings such as bathhouses.[22] A similar incident occurred in 1867, which resulted in the destruction of 247 houses in the southern city. The analysis of the flood revealed that the destruction occurred because people had blocked part of the ditch around the city with their unplanned construction.[23]

The court's decision to accommodate poor people on the southern lands was one of the first instances wherein a given spatial configuration was the outcome of people's economic status rather than communal relations, meaning that economic interests, rather than communal bonds, produced the spatiality of the city beyond the southern ramparts of Tehran. Moreover, through this strategy, the court managed to protect its valuable gardens to the north. These gardens were lucrative properties and the court could easily divide them into pieces and sell them as residential land at great prices. This process had already begun inside the city as early as 1856, when the court divided and sold a garden.[24]

[20] *Duwlat-i ʿIliyyih*, Rajab 18, 1282 [December 7, 1865].
[21] *Duwlat-i ʿIliyyih*, Dhu l-Hijja 11, 1287 [March 4, 1871].
[22] *Vaqayiʿ Itifaqiyyih*, Shaʿban 17, 1269 [May 26, 1853].
[23] *Duwlat-i ʿIliyyih*, Safar 3, 1284 [June 6, 1867].
[24] *Vaqayiʿ Itifaqiyyih*, Rabiʿath-Thani 24, 1272 [January 3, 1856].

As these instances show, economic incentives played a significant role in the formation of future Tehran. As early as the 1850s and 1860s, the court's measures were laying the groundwork for the main principles of the future expansion of the city. It is no surprise that when the king ordered the expansion in December 1867, he decided to stretch the city limits 1,800 *zarʿs*[25] (around 1.9 km) to the north and only 1,000 *zarʿs* (~1 km) in other directions.[26] In this way, most of the royal gardens were included in the new urban limits and the court provided a great economic resource for the years to come.[27]

The main expansion of Tehran began in 1867. On December 8, after an official ceremony on the northern outskirts of the old city, Nasser al-Din Shah officially launched the project that would permanently change Tehran in the years to come.[28] The destruction of the old ramparts, filling the old ditch, building the new ramparts and ditch, and the construction of new streets and squares were costly undertakings, which could be a great burden for the bankrupt court with its empty treasury. However, a national disaster helped the court to save on the expenses of the expansion. The main years of construction, 1869 to 1871, coincided with a severe drought and famine, which impacted vast areas of the country. For two of those years, 1869 and 1870, winter precipitation was negligible and the farmlands failed to yield enough crops.[29] The impact of the famine was catastrophic. Around 1.5 million people died throughout the country, which was 20–25 percent of the total population.[30] The famine caused people to flee from smaller towns and villages to the capital and northern parts of the country.[31]

By January 22, 1872, 4,384 refugees were gathered in the capital. Most of the refugees were accommodated outside the city gates: 1,700

[25] *Zarʿ* was a Persian unit of measurement equal to 104 centimeters or 41 inches.

[26] Shaʿban 29, 1284 [December 26, 1867].

[27] Mahvash Alemi shares the same view: Alemi, "The 1891 Map of Tehran," 76.

[28] The official newspaper of the court has a great report on the day of the inauguration of the project, see: *Dawlat-i ʿIliyyih*, Shaʿban 29, 1284 [December 26, 1867].

[29] Shoko Okazaki, "The Great Persian Famine of 1870–71," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London* 49, no. 1 (1986): 183. Also see: Xavier de Planhol, "Famines in Persia," *Encyclopedia Iranica* (December 15, 1999), www.iranicaonline.org/articles/famines (accessed August 24, 2015).

[30] Okazaki, "The Great Persian Famine of 1870–71," 185.

[31] Okazaki, "The Great Persian Famine of 1870–71," 184.

people by the southern gate, 1,200 people by the western gate, 1,200 people by the eastern gate, 98 people in the city hospital, and 286 people in the Armenian neighborhood, south of the city.[32] Once again, similar to the 1850s, the court protected its valuable northern lands by creating a buffer zone between the undesired people – the poor and refugees – and the new neighborhood. However, the court used the same people to build the new rampart, dig the ditch, and construct the streets. James Bassett, visiting the country during the famine years, mentions that "[t]he famishing were employed to construct roads, and to repair the moat about the city."[33] George Curzon goes one step further and argues that "[a] good deal of the money sent out from England by the Persian Famine Relief Fund in 1871 was spent in the hire of labour for the excavation of the new ditch [...] and for the erection of the lofty sloping rampart beyond."[34] The great famine provided an opportunity for the Qajar court to hire cheap labor and to pay workers with the money they received from a third party.

After this massive expansion, the area of the city within the ramparts quadrupled from three square kilometers (1.15 square miles) to twelve square kilometers (4.6 square miles). Based on the measurements of the map, the city expanded on average 1,250 meters (4,100 ft) to the north, 550 meters (1,800 ft) to the east, 750 meters (2,450 ft) to the south, and 900 meters (2,950 ft) to the west.[35] As was mentioned before, the northern expansion was much larger in order to embrace the royal gardens and lands. The western section saw the second largest expansion, since the western lands belonged to the king or the high-ranking people of the court. However, the southern and eastern sides received lesser expansions. Since the early 1850s the south had been populated by impoverished people and, beyond that, it contained worthless brick burners and clay extraction lands. The east side contained the farmland of mostly ordinary people.

As is clear from the dimensions and directions of the urban development that occurred, the court had clear economic incentives to

[32] *Iran*, Dhu al-Qaʿda 11, 1288 [January 22, 1872].

[33] James Bassett, *Persia the Land of Imams: A Narrative of Travel and Residence 1871–1885* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1886), 145.

[34] Curzon, *Persia and the Persian Question*, 1: 305.

[35] The measurements are based on the 1891 map of Tehran: ʿAbd al-Ghaffar, "Naqshih-yi Dar al-Khalafih-yi Nasseri-yi Tehran," [ca. 1891], Sazman-I Jughrafiya-yi Artish, Tehran.

undergo such an ambitious project. Given that the court was in a critical economic condition,[36] the new expansion was a valuable opportunity to make up a portion of its annual deficit. Even the nomination of the representatives who administered this project points to systematic land speculation by the court. Nasser al-Din Shah appointed Mustufi al-Mamalik to conduct the project.[37] He was one of the largest landowners of the capital, and he and his brother-in-law, Mirza ʿIsa Vazir, accomplished a tremendous project.[38] In the years to come, the court divided the royal gardens and lands of the new northern neighborhood, Duwlat, into smaller parcels and sold them to affluent people in the city.

This process can be easily followed through the occasional announcements that appeared in the official newspapers of the court. The best example in this regard is Lalihzar garden, one of the old royal gardens from the Fath ʿAli Shah era.[39] As a royal recreational garden, Lalihzar began its transformation before the expansion of the city. First, it became a semi-public zoo in the mid-1860s.[40] After the expansion, it became part of the northern neighborhood. By the end of 1888, the garden had already lost land to new north–south streets, one built on its western side and one passing through the center, splitting the garden in two.[41] A few months later the new western street, now called

[36] See Chapter 2.

[37] *Dawlat-i ʿIliyyih*, Shaʿban 29, 1284 [December 26, 1867].

[38] John D. Gurney, "The Transformation of Tehran in the Later Nineteenth Century," in *Téhéran Capitale Bicentenaire*, ed. C. Adle and B. Hourcade (Paris: Institute Français de Recherche en Iran: 1992), 68.

[39] For the history of Lalihzar in its earlier times and its uses, see: Nassir Najmi, *Iran-i Qadim va Tehran-i Ghadim [The Old Iran and the Old Tehran]* (Tehran: Intisharat-i Janzadih, 1362 [1984]), 334–6; Sayyid Mohsen Habibi and Zahra Ahari, Lalihzar ʿArsih-yi Tafarruj az Bagh ta Khiyaban: Shiklgiri-yi Khiyaban bih Sabk-i Urupaʾi dar Durih-yi Nasseri [Lalihzar as an Outing Stage, from Garden to Street: Formation of Street based on European Models in the Nasseri Era], *Hunar-ha-yi Ziba*, 34 (1387 [2008]): 6–7.

[40] *Dawlat-i ʿIliyyih*, Muharram 13, 1282 [June 8, 1865].

[41] *Iran*, Rabiʿ ath-Thani 25, 1306 [December 29, 1888]. In his book of memoirs, Mehdi Ghuli Hidayat mentions that the eastern street, Saʿdi, was constructed through the garden, cutting it into two halves. The Eastern half, which was a zoo before, was sold and constructed much earlier than the western half. The western half still existed when the 1891 map of Tehran was surveyed. It is important to note that the survey of the map took several years and, by the time it was published in 1891, the western section of the garden had been sold and built on. Hidayat mentions that the king sold Lalihzar for 90,000 tumans.

Lalihzar after the garden, was illuminated by gaslights at night,[42] and in less than a year it was connected to the newly built network of horse tramways. In February 1890, the newspaper announced that the court divided and sold the garden[43] and new buildings were emerging around the street.[44] The recipe was simple and clear: a garden outside the city ramparts changed into a valuable asset after the 1870s expansion. By connecting the garden to the new network of European-style streets, illuminating the street with gaslights, and bringing the horse tramway to it, the court managed to increase the value of its land and made it ready for the market.

Existing records make it possible to estimate the court's revenue from selling Lalihzar garden. Hidayat claims that Nasser al-Din Shah sold the garden for 90,000 tumans.[45] Based on Browne's account, in 1888 every four tumans was twenty-four shillings,[46] which means that one tuman was equal to six shillings, or seventy-two pence. Regarding these figures, in 1890, Nasser al-Din Shah gained £64,800 by selling just the western half of Lalihzar garden. Using the British National Archive online currency converter tool, this amount was equaled to £5,316,795 in 2017.[47]

It is no surprise that the court also claimed most of the lands in the new Duwlat neighborhood. On August 20, 1877, the court prohibited people from selling or buying the lands in a significant section of the

Most probably, he refers to the remaining western half: Mehdi Ghuli Hidayat, *Khatirat va Khatarat: Gushih-ʾi az Tarikh-i Shish Padishah va Gushih-ʾi az Durih-yi Zindigani-yi Man [Memoires and Dangers: The History of Six Monarchs and My Life]* (Tehran: Zavvar, 1344 [1965]), 5.

[42] *Iran*, Jumada l-Ula 16, 1306 [January 19, 1889].

[43] Probably the remaining western section.

[44] *Iran*, Jumada t-Tania 20, 1307 [February 11, 1890].

[45] Hidayat, *Khatirat va Khatarat*, 5.

[46] Browne, *A Year Amongst the Persians*, 92.

[47] There are other websites that calculate historical currency conversions. However, the most reliable source is from the British National Archive, which unfortunately does not convert up to the present time: "Currency converter," *The National Archives*, www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/currency/results.asp#mid (accessed April 6, 2020). The other website that provides a more detailed calculation is *MeasuringWorth.com*, which gives an estimate of between £7,010,000.00 and £94,500,000.00, based on different economic factors: "Five Ways to Compute the Relative Value of a UK Pound Amount, 1270 to Present," *MeasuringWorth*, www.measuringworth.com/ukcompare (accessed April 6, 2020).

Figure 4.1 Landownership after the 1870s expansion of Tehran.

neighborhood.[48] The area of this section was around 750,000 square meters (185 acres), which is more than fifteen times larger than the western half of Lalihzar garden, sold in 1890. Besides the claimed section and the royal gardens, the title of *Arāẓī-yi Khāliṣih*, Royal Lands, is recorded over many parcels on the 1891 map of Tehran. The rest of the lands belonged to the people close to the court, such as Mustufi al-Mamalik and his brother-in-law, Mirza ʿIsa Vazir. Figure 4.1 demonstrates the distribution of the lands claimed by the court and other high-ranking officials beyond the limits of the old city after the 1870s expansion of Tehran.

[48] *Iran*, Shaʿban 10, 1294 [August 20, 1877].

The utilization of a new vocabulary of urban planning and design assisted the court in conducting this massive urban development and its accompanying land speculation. This vocabulary is similar to the spatial knowledge that Iranians, particularly the elites, had produced earlier through their firsthand observations of European cities. Analogous to the findings from the travelogues analysis, the urban development of Tehran was deeply focused on implementing certain physical aspects. As Afshin Marashi puts it, "among the first project of reform were those advocating *physical* transformation […] Reform and modernization in the colonial and semicolonial world, it seems, reflected an obsession with appearance."[49] Moreover, the presence of Europeans in Tehran, particularly those who were teaching in the Dar al-Funun College, had a significant impact on the plan of the new city and the design of its new ramparts. As an example, General Buhler, the French military instructor at the Dar al-Funun College, designed the new ramparts based on Vauban's defense system of seventeenth-century French and Italian towns.[50]

The main spatial structure of the new northern neighborhood, Duwlat, consisted of several long and wide streets starting from a central square, Tupkhanih. These streets were paved, mostly equipped with gaslights, and planted with straight lines of trees on both sides. Six of these streets began from Tupkhanih Square at the north of the royal compound, stretching in four directions.[51] In 1881, the first gaslight plant opened in the city and the court equipped the main streets with gaslights.[52] In 1889, these streets and the main streets around the old city were equipped with horse tramway lines, the first public transportation system within the city.[53]

Within just a few years, the Qajar court succeeded in the production of a new physical urban landscape. An article in the official newspaper perfectly demonstrates the state's obsession with the new

[49] Afshin Marashi, *Nationalizing Iran: Culture, Power, and the State, 1870–1940* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2008), 21.
[50] Gurney, "The Transformation of Tehran," 53, 64.
[51] For more information on the physical and social dimensions of the new streets, see: Karimiyan, *Tehran dar Guzashtih va Hal;* Alemi, "The 1891 Map of Tehran"; Habibi, *Az Shar ta Shahr*; Marashi, *Nationalizing Iran*; Madanipour, *Tehran*.
[52] *Iran*, Shaʿban 10, 1298 [July 7, 1881].
[53] *Iran*, Shawwal 13, 1306 [June 13, 1889].

development. The article begins with the description of old Tehran, before the expansion, as a "bad and filthy" land, which was occasionally struck with "cholera and plague." However, after the expansion, "its prosperity, the cleanliness of its streets, and the public opinion have progressed on an hourly basis."[54] The most interesting part of the article is where it describes the new streets. In the description of Ilkhani Street it claims:

It is a very straight and long street. Its width is between fifteen to twenty *zar*ʿs [fifteen to twenty meters or fifty to sixty-five feet] and its length is around 2,500 *zar*ʿs [2,600 meters or 1.6 miles]. Trees are planted on both sides of the street, it is paved with stones, the sides of the creeks are decorated with carved stones, it is illuminated by lamps and lanterns during the nights, and it is surrounded by gardens and majestic buildings […] and there is Ilakhani garden, a royal garden with its street wall made of columns and fences so that it is visible to the pedestrians in the street.[55]

There are similar descriptions for most of the new streets of the city. As with European urban spaces, the straightness of the streets, their length, width, paving, gaslights, and the surrounding buildings and gardens were the focus of attention. For a culture that used to hide its private spaces behind thick and bare walls, it was a fundamental change to surround the new garden with fences, allowing people to see inside the garden. Figure 4.2 shows Tehran after its expansion, and its major streets and squares.

For the first time, the major expansion of an Iranian city was based on European-like spaces.[56] Instead of the typical organic growth, the court planned the future development of the northern section of the city. The new neighborhood was produced as a commodity. Urban

[54] *Iran*, Rabiʿ ath-Thani 9, 1294 [April 22, 1877].
[55] *Iran*, Rabiʿ ath-Thani 9, 1294 [April 22, 1877].
[56] Before this expansion, the intercontinental relationships between Iran and Europe produced new spatial manifestations in the country, particularly in Tehran. The Qajar elites built new palaces with European architecture. For more information on nineteenth-century projects under the influence of the European architectural styles, see: Amir Bani Masʿud, *Miʿmari-yi Muʿasir-i Iran: Dar Takapu-yi Biyn-i Sunnat va Mudirnitih [Iran's Contemporary Architecture: In Struggle between Tradition and Modernity]*, 2nd ed. (Tehran, Nashr-i Hunar-i Miʿmari, 1390 [2011]), 82–97; Jennifer M. Scarce, "The Royal Palaces of the Qajar Dynasty: A Survey," in *Qajar Iran: Political, Social, and Cultural Change, 1800–1925*, ed. Edmund Bosworth and Carole Hillenbrand (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1983), 329–51.

Figure 4.2 The 1870s expansion of Tehran based on an 1891 map of Tehran.[57]

planning and design based on this novel spatial vocabulary provided an essential instrument for this commodification and transformed worthless lands outside the city ramparts to lucrative assets ready to be sold on the market. Instead of the old established dominant communal discourse, from this point forward economic interests became the main force in the production of spaces. Similar to the northern city, the impoverished southern neighborhood formed as the byproduct of the same economically driven attitude toward urban development. In order to commodify the northern neighborhoods, the court had to create a buffer zone between the impoverished people and refugees and its valuable lands. As a result, it accommodated the impoverished people far from the future Duwlat neighborhood.

These accounts clearly demonstrate the process of spatial abstraction. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the commodification of spaces is

[57] ʿAbd al-Ghaffar, "Naqshih-yi Dar al-Khalafih-yi Nasseri-yi Tehran."

one of the main processes that produce abstract spaces. In the case of Tehran, this process was not limited to the final expansion of the city in the 1870s. It can be traced through various decisions of the court with socio-spatial implications as early as the 1850s, such as the accommodation of impoverished and poor people, the construction of new aqueducts, and the directions and dimensions of the final expansion. Using Lefebvre's terminology, through this process the spatiality of the new northern neighborhood of Tehran, as well as the impoverished south, was not the product of the lived reality of social spaces. These neighborhoods were not spaces of representation. In contrast, they were conceived through the process of spatial planning and commodification.[58]

Cholera Outbreaks and Spatial Bureaucratization

The second process of spatial abstraction, besides commodification, is the bureaucratization of spaces. Bureaucratization extends the presence and control of the state into various aspects of social life and spaces. In the case of Iranian cities, the ultimate manifestation of this spatial bureaucratization at the urban level developed after the Constitutional Revolution and through the passage of the Municipality Act[59] of 1907.[60] However, as this section demonstrates, this process had been incubating for at least half a century prior to its ultimate manifestation.

[58] However, it is essential to note that the economic incentives were not the only reason behind the expansion of the city. Due to the increase in the population of Tehran, there was no empty land in the old city and all of its gardens had been changed into residential areas. Moreover, the southern outskirts of the city were already populated by the early 1850s. The residential areas outside the ramparts were not immune to occasional floods coming down from the mountains. As a result, the expansion of the city embraced the southern sections and protected them against floods. Moreover, the new ramparts enabled the court to increase its revenue through the taxation of goods entering the city. For the population of Tehran, see: Sirus Sʿadvandiyan and Mansureh Ettehadieh, *Amar-i Dar al-Khalafih-yi Tehran: Asnadi az Tarikh-i Ijtimaʿi-yi Tehran dar ʿAsr-i Qajar [Statistics from Tehran the Capital: Documents from Social History of Tehran in the Qajar Era]* (Tehran: Nashr-i Tarikh-i Iran, 1368 [1990]), 341–50. John D. Gurney examines different aspects of this project in detail – see: Gurney, "The Transformation of Tehran," 51–71.

[59] Qanūn-i Baladīyyih.

[60] Habibi, *Az Shar ta Shahr*, 162; Islamic Parliament Research Center, "Qanun-i Baladīyyih [Municipality Law]," http://rc.majlis.ir/fa/law/show/90099 (accessed December 22, 2015).

From the mid-nineteenth century a new discourse gradually developed in Iranian cities, particularly in Tehran, that obliged the state to adopt certain responsibilities toward the wellbeing of its citizens. This new discourse was a reaction to multiple episodes of cholera epidemics in Iran, which had severe impacts on the urban population in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The Qajar court felt the urgency of the top-down regulation of the city for the prevention of cholera outbreaks. As a result, the new discourse provided the court with unprecedented spatial power and responsibilities. This was one of the first occasions that the court practiced vast top-down management of urban spaces. This initial experience later manifested in the grand expansion of the city and the state's sponsorship of urban design and development at the northern section of Tehran.

The Qajar monarchy experienced episodes of epidemics throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The 1904 epidemic is one of the best-studied cases of the late Qajar era.[61] Brucell estimates that the death toll of the disease in Tehran alone was around 13,000 people.[62] Twelve years earlier, in the summer of 1892, another cholera epidemic resulted in more than 20,000 deaths in the city, as ʿIyn al-Saltanih suggests.[63] One of the earliest cases of the disease during the Nasser al-Din Shah era was the 1853 epidemic. The entries of the *Vaqayiʿ Itifaqiyyih* newspaper help to reconstruct the dimensions of this episode. Starting on April 18, 1853,[64] the epidemic daily killed around 70 people up to May 19.[65] This reached 130 people before the end of the month and finally fell to 40 people by June 2.[66] It was not until August 5 that the city returned to its normal condition.[67]

[61] R. M. Burrell, "The 1904 Epidemic of Cholera in Persia: Some Aspects of Qājār Society," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 51, no. 2 (1988): 258–70.

[62] Burrell, "The 1904 Epidemic of Cholera," 270.

[63] Qahraman Mirza ʿIyn al-Saltanih, *Ruznamih-yi Khatirat-i ʿIyn al-Saltanih [ʿIyn al-Saltanih Memoir]*, ed. Masʿud Salur and Iraj Afshar (Tehran: Asatir, 1376 [1997]), 1: 486.

[64] The June 2, 1853 issue mentions that the first case of cholera had been recorded 46 days earlier, which makes it April 18, 1853. *Vaqayiʿ Itifaqiyyih*, Shaʿban 24, 1269 [June 2, 1853].

[65] *Vaqayiʿ Itifaqiyyih*, Shaʿban 10, 1269 [May 19, 1853].

[66] *Vaqayiʿ Itifaqiyyih*, Shaʿban 24, 1269 [June 2, 1853].

[67] *Vaqayiʿ Itifaqiyyih*, Dhu al-Qaʿda 5, 1269 [August 10, 1853]. The newspaper mentions that the king returned to the city on August 5 since there were no new cases of cholera.

Although the disease came back a few months later, the second time it did not last very long and had disappeared by the start of the cold season.[68] Using the numbers from newspaper entries, a rough estimate shows that at least 4,000 people died during this epidemic. With a total population of 120,000 people, the casualty rate was at least 3.3 percent of the total population of the city. Before the Nasser al-Din Shah era and during the reign of his father, Muhammad Shah, a cholera outbreak in the summer of 1846 killed 12,000 people of the 30,000 summer residents of the city.[69]

Besides the initial fatalities, the impact of the cholera epidemics on urban society was immense as it was usually followed by famine and drastic increases in the prices of basic goods.[70] People's first reaction was to flee from the city to nearby villages – in the case of Tehran, to the northern villages of Shimiranat,[71] which "served only to scatter the disease still wider."[72] The king was the first one to leave the capital and the last one to return.[73]

During these episodes, the presence of Europeans in the country and the measures they took during the outbreaks[74] helped to generate new knowledge regarding the poor hygiene conditions and accumulation

[68] *Vaqayiʿ Itifaqiyyih*, Safar 8, 1270 [November 10, 1853].

[69] Cyril Elgood, *A Medical History of Persia and the Eastern Caliphate: From the Earliest Times until the Year A.D. 1932* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1951), 496–7.

[70] Burrell, "The 1904 Epidemic of Cholera," 259, 263, 270; ʿIyn al-Saltanih, *Ruznamih-yi Khatirat-i ʿIyn al-Saltanih*, 1: 484.

[71] *Vaqayiʿ Itifaqiyyih*, Shaʿban 17, 1269 [May 26, 1853].

[72] Burrell, "The 1904 Epidemic of Cholera," 263.

[73] In 1846, Muhammad Shah departed to a remote mountain village, 20 miles from Tehran. Even there, his camp was not immune and he lost a son, a daughter, and two wives. Elgood, *A Medical History of Persia*, 496–7. In 1853 Nasser al-Din Shah went to Shimiranat, Sultaniyyih, and Lar and came back when there were no more cholera cases. *Vaqayiʿ Itifaqiyyih*, Shaʿban 10, 1369 [May 19, 1853]; Dhu al-Qaʿda 5, 1269 [August 10, 1853]; Muharram 2, 1270 [October 5, 1853]. In 1892 he went to Shahristanak and isolated himself, permitting nobody to enter the area without spending time in quarantine. ʿIyn al-Saltanih, *Ruznamih-yi Khatirat-i ʿIyn al-Saltanih*, 1: 485. In 1904, Muzaffar al-Din Shah panicked, first deciding to escape to Russia, but finally locked himself in his palace in Niyavaran, away from the outside world for two months. Burrell, "The 1904 Epidemic of Cholera," 265.

[74] For the impact of the Europeans' presence and the measures they took during the epidemic episodes, see Burrell, "The 1904 Epidemic of Cholera"; Elgood, *A Medical History of Persia*.

of garbage in the city as the main sources of the outbreaks. During the 1853 epidemic, *Vaqayiʿ Itifaqiyyih* wrote:

> The physicians of the world have researched on two points about the disease [cholera]. First, this disease happens more in big populations […] and wherever there are more filth and infection, it is proved that the number of the casualties rises […] In some cities of Farangistan [Europe] where cholera had become epidemic, the council of physicians suggested three points to people. First, people should pour lime in the toilets. Second, they should whitewash the walls of the houses with lime […] and finally they should not overeat.[75]

Similarly, Jakob Eduard Polak, the Austrian physician who was the modern medicine instructor in the Dar al-Funun College of Tehran in the 1850s, mentions in his travelogue that the filth of the city was one of the leading causes exacerbating the severity of cholera epidemics. Since there was no responsible organ for garbage removal in Tehran, the streets and empty lands were full of filth, and stray dogs played the main role in cleaning the city.[76]

Out of the turmoil, a new discourse grew that gave power to the state to intervene in urban spaces for people's health. Two years before the 1853 epidemic, *Vaqayiʿ Itifaqiyyih* wrote that "since all the physicians of the world have realized that the main cause of the diseases is the filth of the streets, the governor of the city [*kalāntar*] is trying his best to keep the streets clean."[77] It was a few months after the 1853 outbreak that the same discourse was reiterated, this time with a distinct agenda:

> Since the streets of Tehran are too narrow and filthy, probably the infection of the streets caused the infection of the air and resulted in the epidemics. Consequently, the government has decided that first, the streets that are too narrow should be widened, wherever it is possible, second the garbage from the streets should be collected, and the streets should be paved to remain clean.[78]

There are several points in this announcement that deserve attention. First, the narrowness of the streets, besides the filth, is related to the

[75] *Vaqayiʿ Itifaqiyyih*, Shaʿban 10, 1269 [May 19, 1853].
[76] Polak, *Persien*, 80.
[77] *Vaqayiʿ Itifaqiyyih*, Rajab 7, 1267 [May 8, 1851].
[78] *Vaqayiʿ Itifaqiyyih*, Jumada l-Ula 25, 1270 [February 23, 1854].

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cholera outbreaks. Similarly, having proper paving would cause fewer outbreaks. More importantly, the government is responsible for the intervention in urban spaces to prevent the disease and to preserve people's health by widening, paving, and cleaning the streets.

This could be seen as a decisive shift in the relationship between the state and the city. This new discourse gave power to the state to interfere in the city; however, it took more than half a century to adopt its final form as an independent organ, the municipality, that would govern the city. The bankrupt Qajar state did not have the necessary power or funding to make fundamental changes in the urban fabric. As a result, year after year, the state reiterated its promises without implementing real changes.[79] The royal compound was the only exception in this regard. Nasser al-Din Shah spent extravagantly to rearrange the royal compound with new streets, paving, gaslights, new palaces, and the like.[80]

Beginning in 1865, unable to make significant changes during the preceding fourteen years, the state attempted to transfer the responsibility for the cleaning and maintenance of the streets to the citizens. Chiragh Ali Khan Siraj al-Mulk, the head of a new office called *Iḥtisābīyyih*,[81] was ordered to "oblige the citizens to transfer the garbage in front of their houses to the outside of the city [...] and wash and sweep [*āb va jārū*] in front of their houses daily."[82] Again, it does not seem that the state had much success in this regard, since on December 19, 1869, Nasser al-Din Shah appointed a new head, Amin al-Huzur, for the office of *Iḥtisābīyyih* and defined his duties in terms of ten specific tasks.[83] Still, the main concern was hygiene issues; eight of the ten tasks dealt with this, such as: transferring piles of garbage, repairing the aqueducts, changing the water in the reservoirs, building public laundries, forbidding the burying of dead bodies in the city, and

[79] *Vaqayiʿ Itifaqiyyih*, Shawwal 29, 1275 [June 1, 1859]; *Duwlat-i ʿIliyyih*, Dhu l-Hijja 29, 1281 [May 25, 1865]; Shawwal 3, 1286 [January 6, 1870].

[80] For the changes in the royal compound, see: Yahya Zukaʾ, *Tarikhchih-yi Sakhtiman-ha-yi Arg-i Saltanati-yi Tehran va Rahnama-yi Kakh-i Gulistan [The History of the Buildings in the Royal Citadel of Tehran and the Gulistan Palace Guide]* (Tehran: Anjuman-i Asar-i Melli, 1349 [1970]).

[81] *Iḥtisābiyyih* was an early version of a municipality, which was established during Nasser al-Din Shah's reign. Its main concern was the cleanliness of the city.

[82] *Duwlat-i ʿIliyyih*, Dhu l-Hijja 28, 1281 [May 25, 1865].

[83] *Duwlat-i ʿIliyyih*, Shawwal 3, 1286 [January 6, 1870].

so forth. Four tasks aimed to engage residents in the maintenance of the city by urging them to transfer their garbage, clean and pave the streets, and the like. Two tasks dealt with the transportation in the city. Finally, there was a new concern toward the physical appearance of the city; part of the tenth task obliged people to build new buildings with an appropriate appearance.[84] Simple and rudimentary, one can find the origins of a new desire to shape the city toward an ideal image, which would grow as a fully developed discourse in the years to come during the 1870s expansion of Tehran.

The fight with disease outbreaks was not the only factor that extended the domain and control of the state over the spatiality of the city. The second significant factor in this regard was the desire of the Qajar court to establish a new relationship with society in order to legitimize its power. Since the sixteenth century, Iranian monarchies, particularly the Safavids, developed and sponsored particular religious ceremonies to bridge the gap between the state and society and to demonstrate themselves as the ardent protectors of people's religiosity.[85] The Qajar court adopted and developed most of these rituals. However, after the 1870s expansion of Tehran, a major shift occurred in the spatial strategies of the state. In order to discuss this shift, I will first review the old, established strategies and then demonstrate the shift that occurred toward the end of the nineteenth century. This major spatial shift in the relationship between the state and society helped the Qajar court to advance its spatial bureaucratization.

Spatial Strategies of the Qajar Court before the Expansion of Tehran

In the segmented context of the nineteenth-century urban society of Tehran, the court was the only force that could transcend the communal boundaries and generate collective public life. By sponsoring various public and religious ceremonies, the court could associate with the discourse of religiosity and portray itself as the primary protector and sponsor of religion. As a result, these ceremonies were the basis for the legitimation of the court's power. The court "meticulously performed

[84] *Duwlat-i ʿIliyyih*, Shawwal 3, 1286 [January 6, 1870].

[85] Babak Rahimi, *Theater State and the Formation of Early Modern Public Sphere in Iran* (Leiden: Brill, 2012).

religious rites, financed holy shrines, patronized state-appointed imam jomʿehs and shaykh al-islams, girded the Safavid sword – the Shiʿi symbol – sat on the Peacock Throne," and many other similar strategies to legitimize its power; however, as Abrahamian claims, they "failed to obtain divine sanctity,"[86] and the main religious authorities did not observe the Qajar court as the legitimate ruler of the country.[87]

By sponsoring various religious ceremonies, the Qajar court had established a fragile relationship with society and had created quasi-public life and quasi-public spaces in Tehran. However, a close examination of these ceremonies and their spaces reveals that the court had to observe the politics of the communal sphere. Moreover, in these ceremonies, although people of various communities of the city gathered for a shared event in a shared space, they could reproduce their communal boundaries and avoid merging with the other communities. The communities were able to reproduce their micro-spaces in these state-sponsored ceremonies and the public participating in these ceremonies was far from homogeneous. As a result, despite people's presence in a shared space, I use *quasi-public* to refer to these spaces and events. In this section, I examine the main court-sponsored public ceremonies before the expansion of Tehran. This examination is essential to demonstrate the transformation of these ceremonies and their spatiality after the expansion of the city.

The Court-Sponsored Muharram Ceremony

Traditionally, the Muharram ceremonies in *Takīyyih Duwlat* were the primary venue where the citizens could meet the king from a distance in a prearranged spatial setting. In *Takīyyih Duwlat* the king and communities could mourn the martyrs of *Karbalā* together. It was the state's *takīyyih*, held annually as the symbol of the king's Shiʿi passion and his support of religious ceremonies, but more importantly established his power and served political goals. From the Fath ʿAli Shah

[86] Ervand Abrahamian, *Iran between Two Revolutions* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), 40.

[87] For more information on the relationship between the state and religious authorities, see: Mongol Bayat, *Iran's First Revolution: Shīʿism and the Constitutional Revolution of 1905–1909* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991); Hamid Algar, *Religion and State in Iran 1785–1906: The Role of the Ulama in the Qajar Period* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969).

era to the Nasser al-Din Shah era, Arg Square, located in the royal compound, was the traditional site for holding the court-sponsored Muharram ceremonies for the Qajar monarchs.

Takīyyih Duwlat is the most studied *takīyyih* from nineteenth-century Tehran. Generally, scholars[88] of the field conflate *Takīyyih Duwlat* with the huge circular building located in the royal compound, which was built in the 1870s by the order of Nasser al-Din Shah. However, through a detailed examination of the official newspapers of the Qajar court, the accounts of the European travelers, and historic maps of Tehran, this section demonstrates that the circular *Takīyyih Duwlat* was just one of various spatial representations of the practice. *Takīyyih Duwlat* was a well-established socio-political concept, practiced by the Qajar court for decades prior to the construction of the circular building. Moreover, the circular buildings followed the same physical characteristics that are recognizable in the prior manifestations of the

[88] Farrokh Gaffary, "Les Lieux de Spectacle a Tehran," in *Téhéran Capitale Bicentenaire*, ed. C. Adle and B. Hourcade (Paris: Institute Français de Recherche en Iran: 1992), 144–8; Willem Floor, *The History of Theater in Iran* (Washington, DC: Mage Publishers, 2005), 140–5; Enayatullah Shahidi and Ali Bulookbashi, *Pazhuhishi dar Taʿzīyih va Taʿzīyihkhani: Az Aghaz ta Payan-i Durih-yi Qajar dar Tehran [Taʿzīyih and Taʿzīyihkhani in Tehran: A Research on Shiʿa Indigenous Drama of Taʿzīyeh from the Beginning to the End of Qajar Era]* (Tehran: Daftar-i Pazhuhish-ha-yi Farhangi, 1380 [2001]), 182–4; Samuel R. Peterson, "The Taʿzīyih and Related Arts," in *Taʿzīyih: Ritual and Drama in Iran*, ed. Peter J. Chelkowski (New York: New York University Press, 1979), 68–74; Marashi, *Nationalizing Iran,* 39–48; Kamran Scot Aghaie, *The Martyrs of Karbala: Shiʿi Symbols and Rituals in Modern Iran* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2004), 22; Negar Mottahedeh, *Representing the Unpresentable: Historical Images of National Reform from the Qajars to the Islamic Republic of Iran* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2008), 66; Hasan Ali Purmand and Seyed Habib Allah Lizgi, "Takiyyih Duwlat," *Kitab-i Mah-i Hunar*, 124 (1387 [2009]): 4–12; Jamshid Malekpour, *The Islamic Drama* (London: Frank Cass, 2004), 1; Babak Rahimi, "Takkiyeh Dowlat: The Qajar Theater State," in *Performing the Iranian State: Visual Culture and Representations of Iranian Identity*, ed. Staci Gem Scheiwiller (London: Anthem Press, 2013), 63–7. One of the few exceptions in this regard is Jean Calmard's essay on Muharram ceremonies and diplomacy. He distinguishes between different forms of *Takīyyih Duwlat* in different eras. Similarly, Floor talks about the previous forms of *Takīyyih Duwlat* before the construction of the gigantic circular building: Jean Calmard, "Muharram Ceremonies and Diplomacy (a Preliminary Study)," in *Qajar Iran: Political, Social, and Cultural Change, 1800–1925*, ed. Edmund Bosworth and Carole Hillenbrand (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1983), 213–28; Floor, *The History of Theater in Iran*, 139–40.

concept. Finally, the construction of the circular *Takīyyih Duwlat* was not a radical change from the past and only transformed the size of the ceremonies. In contrast, as the rest of the chapter argues, the radical shift in the state's spatial strategies occurred after the 1870s expansion of Tehran. Through the spatial abstraction of the new neighborhood, the Qajar court developed new spaces and ceremonies for presenting the royal power and seeking socio-political legitimation.

The available data on *Takīyyih Duwlat* is much greater than that of any other *takīyyih* in Tehran. The best documents for the investigation of the subject are the official newspapers of the Qajar court: *Vaqayiʿ Itifaqiyyih*, *Duwlat-i ʿIliyyih*, and *Iran*. These newspapers provide accounts of the court's Muharram ceremonies from 1851 on. Analysis of the newspapers shows that *Takīyyih Duwlat*, as a socio-political concept rather than a building, followed the physical presence of the Qajar monarchs. Consequently, whenever the monarchs changed their location, *Takīyyih Duwlat* followed them.

Chapter 1 discussed the particular seasonal rhythm of the displacement of Tehran's population in the hot and cold seasons. The same climatic rhythm is discernible in the movement of the Qajar monarchs away from the city during the hot season and back whenever it was cooler.[89] Consequently, the physical location of *Takīyyih Duwlat* as the court's *takīyyih* followed the same seasonal rhythm. The first year that the *Vaqayiʿ Itifaqiyyih* newspaper recorded the accounts of Muharram was 1851, the third year of Nasser al-Din Shah's reign.[90] The next year, 1852, the newspaper did not use the term *Takīyyih Duwlat*. However, there is an account of a *takīyyih* in Arg Square where mourning processions, *dastihs*, from different neighborhoods of the city gathered in the presence of the king on the tenth day of Muharram,[91] *ʿĀshūrā*.[92] This was one of the primary functions of

[89] For the details of Nasser al-Din Shah's travels during the hot season, see: Dustʿali Khan Muʿir al-Mamalik, *Yaddasht-ha-ʾi az Zindigani-yi Khususi-yi Nasser al-Din Shah [Notes from Nasser al-Din Shah's Private Life]* (Tehran: Nashr-i Tarikh-i Iran, 1361 [1982]).

[90] There is a short entry about an accident in *Takīyyih Duwlat* caused by a storm in that year. *Vaqayiʿ Itifaqiyyih*, Muharram 11, 1268 [November 6, 1851].

[91] The tenth day of Muharram, *ʿĀshūrā*, is the most important day of the mourning month. It was the day that the war between Husayn and Yazid ended and Husayn was killed.

[92] *Vaqayiʿ Itifaqiyyih*, Muharram 14, 1269 [October 28, 1852].

Takīyyih Duwlat, as a platform for gathering the communities' representatives, *dastihs*, on the tenth day of the mourning month. The king was present in *Takīyyih Duwlat* on that day, and each community had the chance to perform in his presence. Abdollah Mostofi provides a great account of these ceremonies and shows how the communal identity structured the performance of mourning processions at the state-sponsored *Takīyyih Duwlat*. Based on his account, various *dastih*s from the city's neighborhoods entered the stage and performed their mourning activities one by one. The members of each *dastih* belonged to the same community and dressed uniformly to emphasize their communal bond.[93] As this account shows, the most important social gathering of the city, which could unite the segments of society into a more coherent public, was structured through the same communal discourse that had produced the entire urban landscape.

The ceremonies on the tenth day in *Takīyyih Duwlat* consisted of the most important episode of *taʿzīyih* performances, Husayn's murder. The accounts of the exact ceremony are available from the early nineteenth century, during Fath ʿAli Shah's reign. On January 25, 1812,[94] William Ouseley, a British orientalist and member of the British diplomatic crew in Tehran, attended the Muharram ceremonies in Arg Square. In his travelogue he describes the ceremony, *dastih*s, *taʿzīyih* performances, place of the *takīyyih*, and the king's presence in great detail.[95] J. M. Tancoigne witnessed the same ceremonies in Arg Square during Fath ʿAli Shah's reign. He provides valuable descriptions of all the rituals; however, unlike Ouseley, he did not receive an invitation to the ceremonies on the tenth day of Muharram.[96]

From 1851 to 1855, Nasser al-Din Shah was in Tehran. During these five years the month of Muharram moved in the calendar from

[93] Witnessing the ceremonies of *Takīyyih Duwlat* during his childhood, he remembers two of the mourning processions that impressed him the most: Brujerdi people (a city in the west from the *Luri* ethnicity), and "the stone-beaters of Kashan" (referring to a profession and a city in central Iran at the same time): Abdollah Mostofi, *From Agha Mohammad Khan to Naser ed-Din Shah (1794–1896)*, vol. 1 of *The Administrative and Social History of the Qajar Period [The Story of My Life]*, trans. Nayer Mostofi Glenn (Costa Mesa: Mazda Publishers, 1997), 167.

[94] Muharram 10, 1227HJ.

[95] Ouseley, *Travels in Various Countries*, 3: 165–71.

[96] M. Tancoigne, *A Narrative of a Journey into Persia* (London: W. Shackell, 1820), 198–200.

Figure 4.3 The sign of *takīyyih* in Arg Square from the Muhammad Shah era.

November in 1851 to September in 1855. In each year, the court held the same ritual with the performance of the *dastih*s in front of the king on the tenth day. However, *Vaqayiʿ Itifaqiyyih* mentions two *takīyyih*s in the court, one in Arg Square, a temporary tent erected annually for the ceremonies, and the other in the form of a building inside the royal compound. In 1854 and 1855 both *takīyyih*s are mentioned as *Takīyyih Duwlat*: *Takīyyih Duwlatī-yi Arg*, and *Takīyyih Duwlatī-yi Miydān-i Arg*.[97] On Berezin's map from the Muhammad Shah era there is a sign for a *takīyyih* in Arg Square that refers to *Takīyyih Duwlatī-yi Miydān-i Arg*. Similarly, Kriziz's map shows the place of *Takīyyih Duwlatī-yi Arg* inside the royal compound and records the term *Takīyyih Duwlat* on the map, as seen in Figures 4.3 and 4.4.

From 1856 to 1868, however, Nasser al-Din Shah was not in Tehran for Muharram ceremonies. For thirteen years he left Tehran before the heat and returned when Muharram was over and the weather had cooled. For ten Muharram months during this period he used two new *takīyyih* buildings in Niyavaran and Saltanatabad, at the foot of the mountain range, north of Tehran. In 1859 Muharram happened

[97] *Vaqayiʿ Itifaqiyyih*, Muharram 12, 1271 [October 5, 1854] and Muharram 7, 1272 [September 19, 1855].

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
Figure 4.4 The old *Takīyyih Duwlat* in the royal compound of Tehran.

during the king's long trip to Azarbayjan, west of Iran. The time of the ceremonies coincided with his stay at Sultaniyyih. Consequently, *Takīyyih Duwlat* was held in a big tent there: "they had pitched a huge tent in Chaman-i Sultaniyyih for Imam Husayn's taʿzīyih and, similar to previous years, they performed the taʿzīyih under the tent, which was Takīyyih Duwlat indeed."[98] Finally, on the remaining two occasions, the court delayed its Muharram ceremonies, holding them after the king's return from his trips.

As these accounts show, *Takīyyih Duwlat* was not in the central city for thirteen consecutive years. Moreover, from 1851 to 1869, *Takīyyih Duwlat* adopted five different formats: a tent in Arg Square, a building in the royal compound, Niyavaran *Takīyyih*, Saltanatabad *Takīyyih*, and a tent in Sultaniyyih. The only common element between these locations and architectural formats was the physical presence of Nasser al-Din Shah. *Takīyyih Duwlat* was a socio-political concept that "allowed the shah to affirm and acknowledge his attachment to Shiʿism without the intermediacy of the olama [clerics]. It was a conscious effort to demonstrate the link between king and people."[99]

[98] *Vaqayiʿ Itifaqiyyih*, Muharram 18, 1276 [August 17, 1859].
[99] Floor, *The History of Theater*, 151.

The Qajar elites could ensure "religious and political legitimacy" through Muharram ceremony patronage.[100] Moreover, *Takīyyih Duwlat* was a venue for certain sections of society, *Tujār* (merchants) and *Ashrāf* (royal people), to reaffirm their bond with the court by assuming a portion of the expenses and donating the objects needed for *takīyyih bastan*.[101]

As a result, *Takīyyih Duwlat* was a space for the socio-political practices of the court. Based on Ouseley's travelogue this practice originated years before the Nasseri era. Certain elements were necessary to form *Takīyyih Duwlat*: the king's presence, a relatively big space in the royal compound or assigned by the court as the place of the *takīyyih*, the performance of *taʿzīyih*, holding mourning rituals of the communities' representatives in the form of *dastih*s, and the presence of people.

As a result, *Takīyyih Duwlat* should not be limited to the gigantic circular structure built in the 1870s. For years, Arg Square provided space for this practice. Based on Ouseley's and Tancoigne's travelogues, *Takīyyih Duwlat* existed during Fath ʿAli Shah's reign; Berezin's map (Figure 4.3) shows a *takīyyih* in Arg Square during Muhammad Shah's reign; and finally, *Vaqayiʿ Itifaqiyyih* newspaper provides the accounts of the Arg Square *Takīyyih Duwlat* in the early years of Nasser al-Din Shah's reign. It is important to note that Berezin's map records the place of *Takīyyih Duwlat* in Arg Square. It shows that the notion of *Takīyyih Duwlat* did not necessarily demand a physical structure. It was the locus of the coming together of social and political relations in the specific year that Berezin surveyed the map. This coming together had priority over the permanency of the architectural form. The same point can be realized through the text of the *Vaqayiʿ Itifaqiyyih* newspaper when it talks about *Takīyyih Duwlat* in Chaman-i Sultaniyyih, mentioning that, "similar to previous years, they performed the taʿzīyih under the tent, which was Takīyyih Duwlat indeed."[102] Pay attention to the stress that the author of the text puts on *Takīyyih Duwlat:* "which was Takīyyih Duwlat indeed" or "fi al-vaqiʿ Takīyyih Duwlat

[100] Kamran Aghaie, "Religious Rituals, Social Identities and Political Relationships in Tehran under Qajar Rule, 1850s–1920s," in *Religion and Society in Qajar Iran*, ed. Robert Gleave (London: Routledge Curzon, 2005), 376; Aghaie, *The Martyrs of Karbala*, 15–29.

[101] *Duwlat-i ʿIliyyih*, Rabiʿ al-Awwal 1, 1278 [September 6, 1861]; Aghaie, *The Martyrs of Karbala*, 26–7.

[102] *Vaqayiʿ Itifaqiyyih*, Muharram 18, 1276 [August 17, 1859].

bud." Through the text of the newspaper, the state assured people that the court had adhered to its annual responsibility by holding the state-sponsored ceremonies, similar to the previous years.

Takīyyih Duwlat returned to Tehran in 1869. A few years after its return, the state built a new circular building, the one that many have regarded as the sole *Takīyyih Duwlat*. Was there the same seasonal transfer, following the movement of the king, after the construction of the new *Takīyyih Duwlat*? Or, on the contrary, as Mottahedeh argues, had *Takīyyih Duwlat* found a permanent royal home and architectural representation since then?[103] I will return to this topic later in this chapter.

As this examination demonstrates, prior to the expansion of Tehran and the incorporation of European vocabulary of architecture and urban design in the configuration of the city, the Iranian state had particular spatial strategies for establishing a relationship with society and legitimizing royal power. However, the spatiality of this relationship did not have priority over the practice. The Qajar court did not necessarily depend on using urban spaces. The royal compound could accommodate the court-sponsored Muharram ceremonies whenever the monarch was present in Tehran. At other times, the court could take the rituals wherever the monarch was and designate another space for holding them. In other words, the court was independent of the city in holding its ceremonies. It could take the rituals in the royal compound or hold it in an alternative space outside the city. The same characteristics are recognizable in the other court-sponsored ceremonies of the time.

Other Court-Sponsored Religious Ceremonies in Pre-1870s Tehran

While Muharram ceremonies were based on grief and sorrow, there were other religious ceremonies – *ʿiyd*s – with a more convivial atmosphere. *ʿIyd-i fitr*,[104] *ghadīr*,[105] *qurbān*, and Prophet Muhammad's

[103] Mottahedeh, *Representing the Unpresentable*, 68.

[104] ʿIyd-i Fitr marks the end of the fasting month, Ramadan. It is a holiday in both the Shiʿi and Sunni communities.

[105] ʿIyd-i Ghadīr is the celebration of ʿAli's appointment, the first Shiʿi Imam, as the successor of the Prophet. This holiday is only respected in Shiʿi communities.

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birthday were the traditional festive ceremonies that the court sponsored.

The camel sacrifice ceremony of *qurbān* day was the second court-sponsored annual religious ceremony that gathered large numbers of people in nineteenth-century Tehran. *Qurbān* day is the last day of the Haj season, when Muslims kill an animal as the symbol of Abraham's act of sacrificing his son. Accounts of European travelers from the Safavid era show that the *qurbān* camel sacrifice became one of the main annual ceremonies sponsored by the court: "a camel was elaborately decorated with flowers, mirrors, henna, and fine fabrics several days prior to the day of sacrifice. It was then paraded through the streets of the city accompanied by minstrels, dancers, and acrobats."[106] As Babak Rahimi demonstrates, this ceremony goes back to the reign of Shah ʿAbbas I. It was aimed to form "a ritual space that essentially overlaps with the political sphere."[107] On the day of the ceremony, the sacrifice ritual happened in an open field outside of the city. In a special ceremony, the king's representative would slaughter the camel and cut and divide the carcass among the representatives of the guilds and neighborhoods of the city.[108]

Accounts of European travelers,[109] Iranian memoirs,[110] and official newspapers[111] show that the main principles of the ceremony had remained unchanged since the Safavid era, with the decoration of the camel prior to the main day, the role of the court in assigning a representative, moving the camel around the city in various neighborhoods, and dividing the carcass among the guilds after the slaughter.

[106] Richard W. Bulliet et al., "Camel," in *Encyclopedia* Iranica (December 15, 1990), www.iranicaonline.org/articles/camel-sotor#pt5 (accessed June 16, 2015). Also see Babak Rahimi's valuable article on camel sacrifice ceremonies during the Safavid era: Babak Rahimi, "The Rebound Theater State: The Politics of the Safavid Camel Sacrifice Rituals, 1598–1695 C.E.," *Iranian Studies* 37, no. 3 (2004): 451–78.

[107] Rahimi, "The Rebound Theater State," 452.

[108] For detailed descriptions of the ceremony, see: Bulliet et al. "Camel"; Husayn Lisan, "Qurbani az Ruzigar-i Kuhan ta Imruz 2 [Sacrifice from the Ancient to Contemporary Era 2]," *Hunar va Mardum*, 167 (1355 [1976]): 60–70.

[109] Ernest Orsolle, *Le Caucase et la Perse* (Paris: Librairie Plon, 1885), 271–3; Eugène Aubin, *La Perse d'aujoud'hui – Iran: Mésopotamie* (Paris: Libraire Armand Colin, 1908) 146–8.

[110] Muʿir al-Mamalik, *Yaddasht-ha-ʾi az Zindigani-yi Khususi*, 61–2.

[111] *Vaqayiʿ Itifaqiyyih*, Dhu l-Hijja 15, 1268 [September 30, 1852]; Dhu l-Hijja 11, 1269 [September 15, 1853].

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In Qajar Tehran before its 1870s expansion, an empty plot of land in front of Nigaristan Palace, outside the city ramparts, was the location of the camel sacrifice ceremony.[112] However, unlike *Takīyyih Duwlat*, this ceremony took place every year, regardless of climatic conditions. Moreover, the presence or absence of the Qajar monarchs had no impact on the ceremony. In fact, the Qajar "monarchs did not like to take part in the ceremony. Instead, they would assign the task to a prince as their agent."[113] Although the court sponsored the ceremony, the rituals would happen with or without the king.

Although the *qurbān* ceremony was sponsored by the state for the entire city, similar to the Muharram ceremonies, communal identity was the pivotal element in structuring the ceremony. The camel had to pass through various neighborhoods of the city prior to its sacrifice. After the act of sacrifice, its carcass had to be divided among the guild representatives.[114] During the Qajar period, as Rahimi mentions, it seems that the guilds played a primary role in holding these ceremonies.[115]

In contrast to the camel sacrifice of the *qurbān* festival that took place outside of Tehran, the court celebrated other convivial religious ceremonies inside the royal compound. These ceremonies depended entirely on the court and the physical presence of the king in the city; similar to the *Takīyyih Duwlat*, the court would cancel the ceremonies if the king was absent from the city.

From 1852, the *Vaqayiʿ Itifaqiyyih* newspaper records court-sponsored ceremonies that took place on religious holidays.[116] The procedure was almost the same for every holiday. First, there was a *Salām-i ʿAm* – literally meaning public greeting – in the court, where

[112] After the expansion of the city in the 1870s, this land became part of the main city. However, the sacrifice site did not change until the Constitutional Revolution, when that space became the parliament square. Zahra Ahari, "Shahr, Jashn, Khatirih: Taʾamuli dar Nisbat-i Fazaha va Jashnha-yi Shahri dar Duran Safaviyan va Qajariyan [City, Ceremony, Collective Memory: A Study on the Relation of Ceremonies and Urban Spaces in Safavid and Qajar Eras]," *Hunar-ha-yi Ziba* 3, no. 47 (1390 [2012]): 5–16.

[113] Bulliet, "Camel." Also see: Rahimi, "The Rebound Theater State," 476–7.

[114] Eugène Aubin, who visited the ceremony in 1907, mentions the guilds that received main parts of the carcass. Aubin, *La Perse d'aujoud'hui*, 147.

[115] Rahimi, "The Rebound Theater State," 476.

[116] *Vaqayiʿ Itifaqiyyih*, Dhu l-Hijja 15 and 22, 1268 [September 30 and October 7, 1852].

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princes, government officials, ministers, high-ranking military officers, foreign country ambassadors, high-ranking guild members, and the like were invited to meet the king in person. The ceremony was highly orchestrated, and each person had a specific place to stand, with every action prearranged.[117] After the *Salām*, Nasser al-Din Shah met the ordinary people in Arg Square. The king would enter the second floor of a building called *ʿImārat-i Sar Darb*,[118] where he could overlook the square and the crowd. The meeting was usually accompanied by music performances and other forms of entertainment.[119]

Nasser al-Din Shah and his successor, Muzaffar al-Din Shah, added several new religious holidays to the official calendar. In the context of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, promoting the dominant religious discourse seemed to be the only feasible way to consolidate the legitimation of the court's power. As a result, Nasser al-Din Shah added three new religious holidays: Imam ʿAli,[120] Imam Mahdi,[121] and Imam Hussein's birthdays.[122] Moreover, during this era Munir al-Saltanih, one of the king's wives, began to have court-sponsored ceremonies for the wives of high-ranking people in the city on Fatimah's, the Prophet's daughter's, birthday.[123] Similar to his father, Muzaffar al-Din Shah added three new religious holidays: Imam Hassan's birthday, Imam Reza's birthday, and a holiday commemorating the Prophet Muhammad's first revelation.[124] It is important to note that all of these new holidays were festive; it was as if the court attempted to balance the long Muharram and Safar mourning months with the festive atmosphere of the new holidays. Prior to 1865, when Arg Square was remodeled, these holidays had the same procedure as the *Salām-i ʿAm* followed by the king's public attendance in Arg Square.

117 For the detailed descriptions of Nowruz Salāms, see: Muʿir al-Mamalik, *Yaddasht-ha-ʾi az Zindigani-yi Khususi*, 54–8; Mostofi, *From Agha Mohammad Khan*, 1: 201–3.

118 For more information on Arg Square and ʿImārat-i Sar Darb, see: Zukaʾ, *Tarikhchih-yi Sakhtiman-ha-yi Arg-i Saltanati*, 25–40.

119 *Vaqayiʿ Itifaqiyyih*, Rabiʿ al-Awwal 25, 1269 [January 6, 1853]; Jumada t-Tania 13, 1269 [March 24, 1853].

120 *Vaqayiʿ Itifaqiyyih*, Rajab 15, 1270 [April 13, 1854].

121 *Vaqayiʿ Itifaqiyyih*, Shaʿban 18, 1272 [April 24, 1856]; Shaʿban 13, 1273 [April 8, 1857].

122 *Iran-i Sultani*, Shaʿban 6, 1311 [February 13, 1894].

123 Muʿir al-Mamalik, *Yaddasht-ha-ʾi az Zindigani-yi Khususi*, 62.

124 *Iran-i Sultani*, Shaʿban 27, 1321 [November 17, 1903].

Court-Sponsored Non-religious Ceremonies

Besides religious ceremonies, the court sponsored three secular ceremonies as well. *Nowruz*, or New Year Day, was the most elaborate ceremony of the court after Muharram. Moreover, it was the only ceremony that was not based on the lunar calendar and was held on the first day of spring, March 21, each year. The ceremony consisted of three parts: (1) a *Salām* for the exact moment of the vernal equinox, called *Salām-i Tahvīl*; (2) *Salām-i ʿAm*, similar to those of the other ceremonies; and (3) ceremonies in Arg Square for the ordinary people. The second secular ceremony, Nasser al-Din Shah's birthday, was held from 1852 onward, with two stages of the *Salām* and succeeding gatherings of the common people in Arg Square.[125]

As with the other ceremonies previously discussed, such as Muharram and *qurbān*, the ceremonies in Arg Square were not immune to social fragmentation. As an example, in November 1857, Nasser al-Din Shah assigned a crown prince. The court arranged four nights of festivities in Arg Square to celebrate the event. The *Vaqayiʿ Itifaqiyyih* newspaper mentions that the court divided the area of the square into eight sections, each for a different neighborhood. The *Kadkhudā*s of the neighborhoods were responsible for the decoration and carpeting of the ground in their section.[126] Similar to the *qurbān* sacrifice ceremony and Muharram mourning in *Takīyyih Duwlat*, people's gatherings in Arg Square were conducted through the communal discourse. Social segments of the city reproduced their communal identities and formed their micro-spaces in the larger sites of ceremonies.

The last occasion on which the court could establish a direct relationship with society was the ceremonies for the monarchs' returns to the city. Due to the annual displacement of the Qajar monarchs and their travels to cooler locations during the hot summer days, there was at least one annual occasion for celebrating their return to the city, held on the day of their arrival. This annual event had its own social and spatial politics with the participation of various groups and communities. Qajar-era newspapers provide a valuable window for studying these ceremonies.

[125] *Vaqayiʿ Itifaqiyyih*, Safar 13, 1269 [November 26, 1852].
[126] *Vaqayiʿ Itifaqiyyih*, Rabiʿ al-Awwal 24, 1274 [November 12, 1857].

On October 2, 1851, the *Vaqayiʿ Itifaqiyyih* newspaper describes the preparations for Nasser al-Din Shah's entrance to the city:

> First, one hundred people from nobles and astronomers with their special hats and shawls, three hundred people from *haji*s and famous figures with candy bowls and plates [*Kāsih va Durī Nabāt*], three hundred guild members and merchants, all the military forces with their uniforms, the neighborhood officials and representatives, and high-ranking people of the city and government will get out of the city for welcoming. Second, semi-nude athletes of *zūrkhānih*s with their athletic equipment, and Armenians, Jews, and Zoroastrians with their holy books and especial clothes will join them as well. Third, one hundred sheep and two pairs of cows will be sacrificed in front of the king's steps and divided among ordinary people. Fourth, 1,200 candy glasses [*Shīshih-yi Nabāt*], and three hundred candy bowls and plates will be broken in front of the king's horse. Finally, whatever is necessary for a joyful ceremony should be performed on the day.[127]

The following week, the newspaper mentions that all the ceremonies were performed as they had been planned and, after the ceremonies, the king entered the city from Shah ʿAbd al-ʿAzim Gate and went to the royal compound via the old bazaar.[128] Similarly, on August 10, 1853, Nasser al-Din Shah returned to the city after months of absence due to the summer and a cholera outbreak. The *Vaqayiʿ Itifaqiyyih* newspaper mentions that people, merchants, *kadkhudā*s of the neighborhoods, shopkeepers, and military personnel went out of the city and crowded by the entrance gate. They sacrificed animals to welcome their king into the city. Similar to 1851, there was a chaotic and crowded scene outside the city gate. However, after explaining the event in detail, the newspaper briefly added: "The king entered the city from the Dulab gate and went to the royal compound."[129]

There are two important points to be made regarding these accounts. First, the arrangement of the welcoming ceremony was entirely based on the communal identity of participants. Guild members, religious authorities, neighborhood representatives, and the like formed the main body of the welcoming crowd. They wore their special clothes to distinguish themselves from the others. Once again, the politics of

[127] *Vaqayiʿ Itifaqiyyih*, Dhu l-Hijja 6, 1267 [October 2, 1851]. The translation is not word by word.
[128] *Vaqayiʿ Itifaqiyyih*, Dhu l-Hijja 13, 1267 [October 9, 1851].
[129] *Vaqayiʿ Itifaqiyyih*, Dhu al-Qaʿda 5, 1269 [August 10, 1853].

social segmentation dominated the relationship between the court and society; the state had to observe these politics and live up to social norms. Second, the spatial contexts for these welcoming ceremonies were outside the city. Tehran did not have the necessary streets and squares to line the crowd on either side. These accounts illustrate chaotic scenes at entrance gates to the city, where people broke candy bowls and sacrificed beasts to welcome their monarch. These were in stark contrast to Nasser al-Din Shah's experiences in European cities during his 1873 trip, where large crowds of people cheered alongside his trajectories and welcomed his presence.

The examination of various religious and non-religious court-sponsored ceremonies in pre-expansion Tehran demonstrates common themes between them and their spatiality. First, most of these ceremonies, except the *qurbān* camel sacrifice, had a seasonal characteristic. In the cases of *Takīyyih Duwlat*, convivial religious ceremonies, and the king's birthdays, they were highly dependent on the physical presence of the Qajar monarchs in the city. During their absences in the hot summer months there was no ceremony in Tehran and, on many occasions, the court held the ceremonies at the monarchs' summer residences.[130] The public manifestation of the state–society relationship completely depended on the king's physical presence. The king was the state, and without the king there was no need for the court-sponsored ceremonies.

Second, the spatiality of these ceremonies did not depend on the city. None of these ceremonies had a permanent spatial setting inside the city. The sites of the welcoming ceremonies and the *qurbān* camel sacrifice were beyond the city walls. The court-sponsored Muharram ceremonies, the public gatherings for convivial religious ceremonies, the king's birthday ceremonies, and the *Nowruz Salām*s all happened in Arg Square in the royal compound. The royal compound was detached from the entire city by its separate rampart and ditch. Its spatiality was beyond the reach of ordinary people. The state could cut the flow of people to Arg Square whenever it desired. As a result, there was almost no overlap between the spatiality of the daily lives of

[130] Different entries of *Vaqayiʿ Itifaqiyyih* and *Duwlat-i ʿIliyyih* show the lack of the public ceremonies during the hot seasons. For some examples, see: *Vaqayiʿ Itifaqiyyih*, Shawwal 5, 1270 [July 1, 1854]; Dhu l-Hijja 20, 1270 [September 13, 1854]; *Duwlat-i ʿIliyyih*, Safar 10, 1278 [August 17, 1861].

ordinary people and "state spaces" in pre-expansion Tehran; abstract spaces and lived spaces were largely detached from one another. The state's spatiality of power and domination was limited to the royal compound and the state was not able to produce its required spatiality in the city.

Third, even the existing abstract spaces in the royal compound and beyond the city walls and the court-sponsored ceremonies were not able to transcend the lived reality of social life and produce a homogeneous public. As I mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the main goal of abstract spaces is to produce homogeneity. However, the public, gathering at the court's ceremonies, was far from homogeneous. Communities could reproduce their micro-spaces inside larger state spaces. Even the state had to observe the politics of communal life and arrange its ceremonies in a way that respected the diverse communal landscape of the city. This is an important point which demonstrates that the Qajar court was unable to produce its desired socio-political homogeneity. It had to satisfy various communities by designating micro, communal spaces in larger conceived spaces. The lived reality and people's spaces of representation were more powerful than the conceived spaces of the state. The state's attempts for spatial abstraction and the production of quasi-public spaces were rudimentary and incomplete.

Spatial Strategies of the Qajar Court after the Expansion of the City

In 1865, Nasser al-Din Shah commanded the rearrangement of Arg Square, changing it into a garden-like space with a large pool of water in the middle.[131] Consequently, the court lost its sole stage for gathering huge crowds for its ceremonies.[132] However, this loss was soon

[131] *Duwlat-i ʿIliyyih*, Jumada t-Tania 12, 1282 [November 2, 1865]; Zukaʾ, *Tarikhchih-yi Sakhtiman-ha-yi Arg-i Saltanati*, 25–40.

[132] During this period, there are accounts of Nasser al-Din Shah's presence in the Arg Square after different occasions of *Salām-i ʿAm* and enjoying entertainments in the square. However, none of these accounts mention a public presence in the Square. See: *Duwlat-i ʿIliyyih*, Rajab 18, 1282 [December 7, 1865]; Dhu al-Qaʿda 25, 1282 [April 11, 1866]; Mostofi, *From Agha Mohammad Khan*, 1: 203; Muʿir al-Mamalik, *Yaddasht-ha-ʾi az Zindigani-yi Khususi*, 59.

compensated for after the expansion of the city. The expansion commenced a new era for the relationship between the state and society and changed the balance of spatial abstraction and lived reality of social spaces in favor of the former. Through the expansion of the city, a delicate shift occurred in the spatiality of the state's public ceremonies. Afshin Marashi provides a valuable analysis of this shift. In his book, *Nationalizing Iran*, he argues that the second half of the Nasseri era was a transitional period for the legitimation of the state. Being acquainted with the new models of legitimation practiced in the European nation-states, the Qajar court attempted to implement these models in the Iranian context. The urban transformation of Tehran provided essential spaces for mass state-sponsored ceremonies, which could engage people in great numbers. However, this era remained "largely a transitional" period in this regard, and it was the Pahlavi state (1925–79) that succeeded in the nationalization projects and the implementation of new models of legitimation.[133] Marashi and Babak Rahimi[134] identify the new building of *Takīyyih Duwlat* as the "singular" exception wherein the state could partially implement the new "style of legitimation rituals" during the Qajar era.[135] In contrast, I suggest that the new *Takīyyih Duwlat* was still within the continuation of the older practice. Instead, I examine other spatial strategies of the state as attempts of the Qajar court to implement a new relationship with society.

The New Takīyyih Duwlat *and State-Sponsored Muharram Ceremonies*

Before presenting the central discussion on the spatial strategies of the court in this era, I examine the condition of the new building of *Takīyyih Duwlat* after the expansion of Tehran. Earlier in this chapter, I discussed the seasonal character of *Takīyyih Duwlat* and originated the existence of this concept as early as Fath ʿAli Shah's reign. As mentioned, *Takīyyih Duwlat* returned to Tehran in 1869, when the Muharram mourning month had moved around the calendar, passed through the summer, and re-entered the cooler days of the spring. For five years after its return to Tehran, the state held its Muharram

133 Marashi, *Nationalizing Iran*, 11–39.
134 Rahimi, "Takkiyeh Dowlat," 63–7.
135 Marashi, *Nationalizing Iran*, 39.

ceremonies inside the old *Takīyyih Duwlat* in the royal compound. Since Arg Square was redesigned into a garden, the state could not follow the old practice of pitching a tent in the square for Muharram ceremonies.

In 1874, accounts of the new *Takīyyih Duwlat* appeared in state newspapers for the first time. On February 18, just before the start of the mourning month, the *Iran* newspaper mentioned that, after three years, the construction of the new building was finally complete. However, the text does not reveal whether the state used the building that year, particularly due to the severe winter[136] and concerns about the stability of the wooden arches of the dome.[137] As a result, 1875 should be considered as the first year that *Takīyyih Duwlat* was completely moved to its new location.

It is important to note that the transfer of *Takīyyih Duwlat* to the new location was still a continuation of the old practice. In other words, nothing was changed by this spatial transformation, except the size of the state-sponsored mourning ceremonies and the population it served; it was more pompous after the move. As *Iran* newspaper mentions in the first year of the opening of the building, "in this year [the *Takīyyih*] is held with greater glory [...] and this year's condition is much better than the previous years."[138] As a result, the new *Takīyyih Duwlat* was not a break from the old traditions, but a new method of legitimation rituals for the state.[139] The state had been following the same practice for years, but by this time it was more iconic.

Scholars usually study the circular *Takīyyih Duwlat* as its only manifestation, without noting its previous formats and alternative spatial manifestations. This misunderstanding can be the result of the iconic structure of the building, which is sometimes compared to the Royal Albert Hall in London.[140] While the comparison is legitimate regarding the architectural shape of the building, this narrow approach has

[136] *Iran*, Dhu l-Hijja 29, 1290 [February 18, 1874].
[137] *Iran*, Muharram 2, 1292 [February 9, 1875].
[138] *Iran*, Muharram 2, 1292 [February 9, 1875].
[139] Rahimi, "Takkiyeh Dowlat," 63–7; Marashi, *Nationalizing Iran,* 39.
[140] One of the earliest accounts of such a comparison belongs to Ernest Orsolle. Visiting Tehran in 1882, only seven years after the opening of the new building, he claims that the architect of *Takīyyih Duwlat* designed the building after the Royal Albert Hall in London. George Curzon in *Persia and the Persian Question* reiterates the same argument stating that Nasser al-Din Shah,

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caused a fundamental misrepresentation of the building: examining *Takīyyih Duwlat* as a permanent theater building rather than a temporary socio-political space, and as the king's marvelous idea of following modernization projects and incorporating European models for Iranian practices.[141] In contrast, I suggest that the giant circular *Takīyyih Duwlat* was just one of its manifestations and it was built as a continuation of the old tradition of state-sponsored Muharram ceremonies.

Even the interior architectural arrangement of the building was based on the main architectural necessities of a *takīyyih* building, with a central stage, people gathering around the stage, and arches or *tāqnamā*s surrounding the space and providing special sitting places for the royals. In the new *Takīyyih Duwlat* the king had his own specific room on a higher level, located above the ordinary people.[142] Through the

being so impressed with Albert Hall in London, ordered it to be reproduced, and that is the reason why *Takīyyih Duwlat* was built with a circular form. Since then, this argument has been repeated by different scholars. Orsolle, *Le Caucase et la Perse*, 251; Curzon, *Persia and Persian Question*, 1: 328. Calmard, Motahedeh, Peterson, Purmand, and Lizgi believe that *Takīyyih Duwlat* was constructed after the Royal Albert Hall in London; Babak Rahimi argues that it was more after the Parisian Opera House; and Benjamin compares it to the amphitheater of Verona. Jean Calmard, "Le Patronage des Ta'ziyeh: Elément pour une Etude Globale," in *Taʿzīyih: Ritual and Drama in Iran*, ed. Peter J. Chelkowski (New York: New York University Press, 1979), 125; Mottahedeh, *Representing the Unpresentable*, 66–7; Purmand and Lizgi, "Takiyyih Duwlat," 9; Peterson, "The Taʿziyih and Related Arts," 69–70; Rahimi, "Takkiyeh Dowlat," 63; Samuel Greene Wheeler Benjamin, *Persia and the Persians* (London: John Murray, 1887), 382.

[141] It is important to note that, although the dates clearly prove that the circular *Takīyyih Duwlat* was under construction prior to the king's first trip to Europe, I do not completely reject the possibility of a foreign origin of impression on the design of the structure through the transfer of pictorial documents from Europe to Iran. Particularly, as Rahimi argues, the circularity of the building and stage was not the continuation of the traditional rectangular spaces and performance stages. However, a probable impression from a foreign source does not have any impact on the main argument. *Takīyyih Duwlat* should not be analyzed through the architectural discourse. The socio-political function had priority over its architectural manifestations, and this socio-political concept had been under practice for decades prior to the construction of the circular building. The circular *Takīyyih Duwlat* was the continuation of this old established practice and an upgrade in its size. Rahimi, "Takkiyeh Dowlat," 63–7.

[142] For more information on the architecture and details of *Takīyyih Dawlat* building, see: Zukaʾ, *Tarikhchih-yi Sakhtiman-ha-yi Arg-i Saltanati*, 283–315.

analysis of the interior arrangement of the circular *Takīyyih Duwlat*, Babak Rahimi argues that the designation of an elevated royal box for the king situated him at the center of royal power and that the co-presence of the king and audience in a shared space "served as an enunciation of kingship authority in the performance of the ceremonial presence of the king among the denizens of the city."[143] While this conclusion is absolutely legitimate, my point of departure is that, unlike Rahimi and Marashi, I do not see this practice as a novel phenomenon in the Qajar court. The same concept is discernible in the traditional form of *Takīyyih Duwlat* as a tent in Arg Square, where Fath ʿAli Shah was observing the royal *taʿzīyih* ceremonies from the second floor of a building called *ʿImārat-i Sar Darb*,[144] the main gate to the royal compound.[145] Similarly, Lady Sheil's description of a royal *takīyyih* – probably the old *Takīyyih Duwlat* in the royal compound – suggests that, in 1849, the king had his separate, elevated box for watching the performances: "The Shah's box was at the top, facing the performers."[146]

Finally, as Mostofi's accounts show, the new *Takīyyih Duwlat* maintained its role as the main stage for the performances of various communities' representatives in the presence of the king.[147] Although there is no doubt that the size of the crowds was smaller and the ceremonies were not as glorious as the later ones, the tent form of *Takīyyih Duwlat* in Arg Square and the old *Takīyyih Duwlat* in the royal compound had the same socio-political function as the circular building. Similarly, they were stages for the performance of various communities of the city in front of the king and people. They provided opportunities for the merchants and elites to support the ceremonies and reaffirm their ties with the state. In other words, they were the stages for the legitimation of the royal authority.

In 1889, when Muharram reached the hot summer days once again, the king and *Takīyyih Duwlat* left the city together. The construction

[145] James Morier, *A Journey through Persia, Armenia, and Asia Minor, to Constantinople, in the years of 1808 and 1809* (Philadelphia: M. Carry, and Wells and Lilly, 1816), 199.

[144] For more information on Arg Square and ʿImārat-i Sar Darb, see: Zukaʾ, *Tarikhchih-yi Sakhtiman-ha-yi Arg-i Saltanati*, 25–40.

[146] Lady Sheil, *Glimpses of Life and Manners in Persia* (London: John Murray, 1856), 127.

[143] Rahimi, "Takkiyeh Dowlat," 65.

[147] Mostofi, *From Agha Mohammad Khan*, 1: 167.

of the huge costly building did not guarantee a fixed location for *Takīyyih Duwlat*. The reason is clear: *Takīyyih Duwlat* never was a fixed architectural entity. It was a fluid socio-political concept that could adopt different formats. It mostly demanded the physical presence of the Qajar monarchs for its full manifestation. In their absence, the gigantic structure was almost useless. Similarly, it did not have any use during the non-mourning months. George Curzon, visiting the empty building, wonders: "I entered and looked around. The building was entirely empty, save for some chained beasts, a curious use to which to put so consecrated a structure."[148] As a result, the new building was just an update in the size and glory of the *Takīyyih*.

As these accounts demonstrate, the new building was not a deviation from old practices; it cannot be interpreted as the new spatial strategy of the state. The novel spatial relationship between the state and society should be examined in the new northern neighborhood of Tehran after the 1870s expansion. It was the new network of streets and squares, mostly in the northern neighborhood and around the royal compound, that created the essential platforms for the state's spatial strategies. While in the previous era the court–public relationship – besides *Takīyyih Duwlat* – was limited to occasional gatherings in Arg Square and outside the city, the new urban spaces elevated this relationship to a new level.

The Transformation of the Spatial Relationship between the State and Society

The expansion of Tehran provided new ceremonial spaces for the court. As mentioned earlier, this expansion produced a network of European-style streets and squares in the new northern neighborhood. In addition to the new neighborhood, the court remodeled the eastern street of the royal compound, Nasseriyyih, and the northern street between the royal compound and Tupkhanih Square, Bab al-Humayun. After the expansion, these streets provided the necessary platforms for public gatherings during the court-sponsored convivial ceremonies. On these streets, the court could entertain people with fireworks, decorative lights, and live music.

[148] Curzon, *Persia and the Persian Question*, 1: 327.

As early as 1871, Bab al-Humayun Street, north of the royal compound and south of Tupkhanih Square, transformed into a ceremonial space during the holidays.[149] A valuable account of the court-sponsored ceremonies in new streets is available in Carla Serena's travelogue. Witnessing the 1878 New Year ceremonies in Bab al-Humayun Street, she describes the fireworks, clowns, music groups, and other entertainers, and the big crowd gathered in the street.[150] On another occasion she mentions that

> [from the street, I could see] the Shah looked over the street and all the ceremonies from behind the windows of his apartment, accompanied by his wives wrapped in dark veils like ghosts […] The appearance of the street, dazzling for the people in it, should be magical for the king. From his place, he sees the *Dowleh* gate, with its floors and galleries resplendent in colorful lights which extend to the front of the palace with garlands of lights varying in color and form, as they burst under the spark of fireworks.[151]

This scene is very similar to Nasser al-Din Shah's visit to Milan, described in Chapter 3. Standing in the royal palace, he had witnessed the central square crowded with people and the church colored with different lights. The king reconstructed this European image in Tehran. The court reproduced spaces, ceremonies, and, more importantly, the monarch's position as the sovereign observer of his people.

Soon, the state used other spaces for its public gatherings, such as Nasseriyyih Street east of the royal compound, Tupkhanih Square, and the old Sabzih Miydān. The court even went a step further and built a new plaza on Nasseriyyih Street, in front of Shams al-ʿImarih gate, for its public events.[152] The location of this plaza made it possible for Nasser al-Din Shah to watch the fireworks from the upper levels of the Shams al-ʿImarih building.

[149] *Iran*, Shaʿban 17, 1288 [November 1, 1871].

[150] Carla Serena, *Hommes et Choses en Perse* (Paris: Charpentier, 1883), 240–1.

[151] Serena, *Hommes et Choses en Perse*, 243.

[152] Iran, Rajab 16, 1306 [March 19, 1889]. Nasseriyyih Street, with its new plaza, and Bab al-Humayun Street were the main centers of the public ceremonies. In addition to these spaces, the court occasionally used Tupkhanih Square and Sabzih Miydan. In a few instances, the old-style public gatherings in Arg Square, with the king visiting the public from the second floor, were even revived. The best resource for studying these gatherings, which is incorporated in this research, is various issues of *Iran* newspaper.

There is a subtle difference between Arg Square and the new streets and squares in regard to holding public ceremonies. New spaces were always open to the public, while Arg Square was within the royal compound; the state could cut the flow of the crowd into the square anytime it wished. In other words, if in the previous era it was the crowd that needed to be transferred into the state's realm to take part in the court-sponsored ceremonies, now it was the court that brought its ceremonies beyond the confines of the royal compound. The spatial outreach of the state stretched after the expansion of the city and the remodeling of the streets around the royal compound. The Qajar court was no longer constrained to the royal compound. It sought new space and transformed those spaces into spectacles for presenting the royal authority. Spatial abstraction began to stretch throughout the city after the 1870s expansion of Tehran.

Nasser al-Din Shah's birthday was the most extravagant festivity of the court's calendar after the expansion. Starting in 1872, the king's birthday became the main public festival of the city:[153] the fireworks for this event were larger, the decorative lights were greater, and the locations of the gatherings were many. Besides the increased quality, a delicate duality appeared. On January 12, 1881, the official newspaper of the court described the eve of the king's birthday in these words:

> On the eve of the holiday, the prime minister, accompanied by the war, commerce, and the city ministers, the head of the police department, and some other nobles of the city, went to the bazaars and caravansaries to see the people's lights and congratulate merchants, shopkeepers, and ordinary people for the King's birthday.[154]

Almost every year on the eve of the king's birthday, a group of high-ranking officials would check the old city to inspect people's so-called voluntary participation in the ceremonies. On no other holiday did they act the same way.

While the state was responsible for the decoration of the new streets and squares, it began to extend its control toward the social spaces of the old city. The people of the bazaar had to express their loyalty to the monarchy through their voluntary participation in the king's

[153] *Iran*, Safar 10, 1289 [April 19, 1872].
[154] *Iran*, Safar 11, 1298 [January 12, 1881].

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birthday and the decoration of their social spaces. While in the past era the state had to observe the politics of the communal sphere in its ceremonies, now society had to meet the state's requirements by changing its social spaces.

Besides the state's regulations for preventing outbreaks, this is one of the first instances in which the state attempted to mark its spatial presence in spaces that belonged to people's daily social lives. Spatial bureaucratization began to transform social spaces into abstract spaces. This process, as Chapter 5 demonstrates, became more complex and powerful after the Constitutional Revolution, particularly during Reza Shah's reign.

However, similar to the case of *Takīyyih Duwlat*, the court-sponsored festivities largely remained dependent on the king's physical presence in the city. If the king was on a trip or away from the city during the summer, there was no ceremony on the holidays. Although the Qajar court attempted to implement new forms of legitimation, as Marashi argues, "ceremonial activity in late Qajar Iran remained grounded largely in the premodern conception of political authority."[155] The new spatial strategies were a transitional mode between the ancient form of the state–society relationship and a modern form that would develop later, during the Pahlavi era.

New Urban Spaces and the Transformation of Welcoming Ceremonies

Alongside the transformation of convivial ceremonies after the expansion of Tehran, the welcoming ceremonies for the king's annual return to the city underwent fundamental transformations. In contrast to the chaotic welcoming ceremonies of the pre-expansion era, the scene was very different after the expansion. For example, when on December 17, 1875, Nasser al-Din Shah returned to the city, there were perfectly arranged lines of military forces, officials, government employees, physicians, and so forth on both sides of the streets. The king's trajectory inside the city was precisely arranged. Four music groups were located at strategic points to perform for the king's passage. From the city gate to Miydān-i Mashq – Military Square – sixty cannons were arranged to fire continuously while the king passed. One thousand

[155] Marashi, *Nationalizing Iran*, 38–9.

horsemen stood at the beginning section of his trajectory, from the city gate to the first square on his way.[156]

After the expansion of the city, the court held almost the same detailed welcoming ceremony for the king's return each year. Sometimes it contained even more features. For example, from 1881, the Italian head of the new police department,[157] Conte de Monte Forte, ordered the erection of temporary triumphal arches and wooden columns holding flower pots to decorate the king's trajectory in the city.[158] The first time that Conte de Monte Forte erected the arches and columns, the court's newspaper authenticated this act by referring to Europe, declaring that "it is common in *Farangistan*," or European countries.[159] This is an important point, which shows how effective the cross-continental relationships were in the production of spaces and practices in a non-colonial context. A Frenchman, with the help of the other European and Iranian instructors of the Dar al-Funun College, planned the expansion of the city, the new European-style streets which held the welcoming ceremonies for the Iranian king, and an Italian officer arranged the details of the ceremonies.

Figure 4.5 compares the king's trajectories inside the city before and after the expansion. The map on the left is based on the 1858 map of Tehran. Different instances of Nasser al-Din Shah's entrance to the city and his possible trajectories from the city gates to the royal

156 *Iran*, Dhu al-Qaʿda 18, 1292 [December 17, 1875].

157 The new police department was opened in 1879. It was established by an Italian officer to modernize the police force of the city. He was hired in the second trip of Nasser al-Din Shah to Europe. In recent years, the National Archive of Iran published the daily police reports in two volumes. Ahmad Karimi-Hakkak, "Censorship," *Encyclopedia Iranica* (December 15, 1990), www.iranicaonline.org/articles/censorship-sansur-in-persia (accessed August 26, 2015); Ensiya Shaykh Rezaei and Shahla Azari, *Guzarish-ha-yi Nazmmiyyih az Mahallat-i Tehran [Police (Nazmiya) Reports of Tehran Districts]*, 2 vols (Tehran: Intisharat-i Sazman-i Asnad-i Milli-yi Iran, 1377 [1998]). For the announcement of the establishment of the new police department in the official newspaper, see: *Iran*, Rabiʿ ath-Thani 12, 1296 [April 5, 1879].

158 *Iran*, Rajab 29, 1298 [January 27, 1881] and Dhu al-Qaʿda 29, 1298 [October 24, 1881]. In his memoir, Abdollah Mostofi describes Nasser al-Din Shah's return to Tehran after his third European trip. He mentions the triumphal arches and other details of the welcoming ceremony: Mostofi, *From Agha Mohammad Khan to Naser ed-Din Shah*, 1: 270.

159 *Iran*, Rajab 29, 1298 [January 27, 1881].

Figure 4.5 The ceremonial spaces and king's trajectories in the city before and after the expansion of Tehran.

compound are highlighted.[160] The map on the right is based on the 1891 map of Tehran, and it highlights the king's trajectory after the expansion of the city. As the comparison between the maps shows, after the expansion, Nasser al-Din Shah did not pass through the narrow alleys of the old city on his way to the royal compound. All the welcoming ceremonies were limited to the new streets and squares, and the old city was left out. In contrast, in the pre-expansion era, there was a balance in the king's choices for the entrance gates; he used all the gates except the western Qazvin Gate. A couple of times, Nasser al-Din Shah even returned to the city via the southern Muhammadiyyih gate, near where he had permitted the impoverished people to build their houses. Moreover, the chaotic scenes outside the city gates in the pre-expansion era changed into precisely arranged ceremonies with various details inside the city.

The expansion of Tehran provided the Qajar court with an opportunity to enlarge its spatial authority beyond the confines of the royal compound. Two important shifts occurred in the spatial strategies of the state and its relationship with society. First, while in the previous era the spatiality of the city had no role in providing the desired spectacles for the presentation of royal power and the state had to hold its ceremonies outside the city or inside the royal compound, after the expansion the streets and squares of the northern neighborhood and the remodeled streets around the royal compound became the main stages for the state. Tehran (re)produced through the process of abstraction; the state produced its spaces beyond the confines of the royal compound. The state even began to cast its authority over the traditional social spaces of the old city – Tehran grand bazaar – and forced people to decorate the bazaar on the king's birthday.

Second, the politics of the communal sphere became less involved in the new state-sponsored ceremonies and their related spatiality. After the expansion, the welcoming ceremonies became similar to European models, with prearranged rows of officials, military forces, and people as bystanders alongside the streets. The decoration of the streets and

[160] In most cases, the newspaper does not record the exact trajectory of the king inside the city; the text only mentions the entrance gates. I highlighted the shortest possible paths from the gates to the royal compound. These paths match the main *guzars* or alleys of the old city, which makes it more probable that they were used by the king.

squares, illuminations, fireworks, live music, and other forms of public entertainment during the convivial ceremonies addressed the society as a whole. There is no trace of communal relations in the arrangements of these ceremonies. In other words, the state took a significant step toward the production of homogeneity in its public ceremonies. It was able to hold its ceremonies regardless of communal politics.

The northern neighborhood of Tehran was produced through the state's desire for land speculation and the establishment of a novel relationship between the state and society. In other words, the two processes of spatial commodification and bureaucratization played a significant role in the formation of the Duwlat neighborhood. Does this fact mean that the new neighborhood was devoid of lived reality? Did urban society leave its mark on the spatiality of the new city? What was the role of ordinary people's daily lives in the production of social spaces in the new city? These are the questions that the next section addresses. Chapters 5 and 6 return to these questions and demonstrate how urban society reproduced the Duwlat neighborhood as a lived reality. The contest between abstract and lived spaces continued to shape and reshape the old and new cities decades after the expansion of Tehran.

Early Attempts for the Production of European-Style Social Spaces

Gradually after the formation of the new neighborhood, new commercial spaces centered around the streets, particularly the northern streets of Lalihzar and ʿAlaʾ al-Duwlih. European-style shops "with glass windows and European titles"[161] opened, which in the words of Alemi turned the streets into "the elegant commercial center of the city."[162] Moreover, by 1888 two hotels, similar to European hotels, opened on ʿAlaʾ al-Duwlih Street.[163]

The accumulation of new commercial spaces was partly due to the demographic composition of the Duwlat neighborhood. Most of the

[161] Curzon, *Persia and the Persian Question*, 1: 306.
[162] Alemi, "The 1891 Map of Tehran," 82. For more information on the history of Lalihzar Avenues and its transformation, see: Habibi and Ahari, "Lalihzar ʿArsih-yi Tafarruj az Bagh ta Khiyaban."
[163] Browne, *A Year Amongst the Persians*, 92.

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European embassies were gathered in the new neighborhood, particularly around ʿAlaʾ al-Duwlih Street, sometimes known as Boulevard des Ambassadeurs.[164] Besides the diplomatic crew, most of the Europeans living in Tehran gathered in this neighborhood.[165] It is hard to estimate the exact number of Europeans in the city at this time. The only nineteenth-century survey that totaled their number is from 1852, before the expansion of the city, which counted 130 Europeans in Tehran. In 1888, Browne mentioned that the "European colony in Teharán is considerable."[166] A year later, Curzon estimated that around 500 Europeans were living in the city.[167] Besides the Europeans, the main population of the Duwlat neighborhood consisted of the affluent Iranians who were more inclined toward the European lifestyle.[168]

The more or less homogeneous population of the Duwlat neighborhood produced private and semi-private spaces that were modeled after European social spaces, but worked just for a small group of the elites and some Europeans in the capital. There were two parks, a museum, a theater, a gallery, and even a place for holding concerts.[169] However, these spaces were not open to the public. In 1885–6, the first theater opened in the Dar al-Funun College and continued to operate for five years. Molière's plays were the first and most popular plays that were brought to the stage. However, this place was not open to ordinary people. It had a door to the interior of the royal compound and the plays were mostly performed for the king and the elites.[170] Floor argues that none of the performances in this era were public. They "were aimed at a limited target group, which included the officials of

[164] Curzon, *Persia and the Persian Question*, 1: 310; Browne, *A Year Amongst the Persians*, 91–2; Ella C. Sykes, *Persia and Its People* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1910), 48–9.

[165] Edward Browne describes different Europeans who were in Tehran but were not part of the diplomatic crews: Browne, *A Year Amongst the Persians*, 85, 92.

[166] Browne, *A Year Amongst the Persians*, 85.

[167] Curzon, *Persia and the Persian Question*, 1: 334.

[168] Browne, *A Year Amongst the Persians*, 92.

[169] Not necessarily a designed and built concert hall.

[170] Jamshid Malekpour, *Adabiiyat-i Namayishi dar Iran [Drama in Iran]*, vol. 1 (Tehran: Intisharat-i Tus, 1385 [2006]), 306–9. Floor dates the first performance of modern theater in Tehran to the late 1870s and argues that the first theater group was established by young Armenians in Tehran: Floor, *The History of Theater in Iran*, 214–17.

Figure 4.6 Private parks with English landscape design in Tehran.

the royal court and other members of the Iranian elite, as well as the leading members of the European and the Armenian community."[171]

Similarly, the first museum of the city was nothing but a section of the royal compound for the exhibition of royal jewelry, some antique objects, and European states' gifts to the king. The museum was closed to ordinary people; only people of the court and some European guests were allowed to visit it.[172] Even the official newspaper did not introduce it as a place for the public, instead mentioning that "the term museum is adopted from French, meaning a place for holding valuable and weird objects."[173] Toward the end of his reign, Nasser al-Din Shah ordered the construction of a new building in the royal compound, naming it *ʿImarat-i Galiri*, or the Gallery Building. They gathered old and new Iranian and European paintings, hanging them in the new building. Once more, this building was open only to the elites.[174]

The most interesting case in this regard was the construction of two new gardens by two of the nobles close to the court. Located in the Duwlat neighborhood, these gardens, shown in Figure 4.6, were

[171] Floor, *The History of Theater in Iran*, 217.

[172] Francis Bradley Birt's and George Curzon's travelogues contain detailed descriptions of the royal museum: F. B. Bradley-Birt, *Persia: Through Persia from the Gulf to the Caspian* (Boston: J. B. Millet Company, 1910), 301–2. Curzon, *Persia and the Persian Question*, 1: 314–17.

[173] *Iran*, Rabiʿ ath-Thani 9, 1294 [April 22, 1877].

[174] Zukaʾ, *Tarikhchih-yi Sakhtiman-ha-yi Arg-i Saltanati*, 322; Karimiyan, *Tehran dar Guzashtih va Hal*, 251.

designed based on the principles of English landscape design,[175] and they are recorded as parks on the 1891 map of Tehran. They were imitations of English parks, but in the Iranian context they were deprived of their main element: the public.

Finally, the most successful attempt of the court and elites to produce European social spaces at a (semi-)private level was concert-like gatherings, which were held beginning on January 10, 1872. Two years earlier, the royal music group, or *Anjuman-i Musikan*, was established under the tutelage of the French music instructor of Dar al-Funun College, Alfred Jean Baptiste Lemaire. The official newspaper of the court writes: "In a city like Tehran where the *farangi* people do not have any relatives [the concert hall] is a place for them to gather and socialize during the long and cold winter nights."[176] Again, these gatherings were just for the Europeans and a few Iranian elites. Even the text of the announcement emphasizes the semi-public status of these gatherings by excluding the larger public, ordinary Iranian people, and associating solely Europeans with these gatherings.

The museum, gallery, theater, concert hall, and parks were the manifestations of the fascination of the minority in power with an alternative lifestyle. They were the translations of appearances. Devoid of sociality, they were physical caricatures of an occidental dream depicted on an "oriental" canvas. The forms were imitated, but the souls remained undiscovered. The production of genuine European-style social spaces demanded more time for full realization. This transitional era created hybrid spatial meanings and practices. These meanings had been incubated in the collective imagination of Iranian society – at least in that of the elite minority – since Mirza Abu Talib Khan's era. This new spatial knowledge, which Iranians began to produce as early as the late eighteenth century, was only partial. Through the expansion of the city, this partial knowledge came into existence. Partial knowledge produced partial spaces; inherently social spaces came into existence without the presence of ordinary people.

The majority of the ordinary people did not have previous experience of these spaces. This fact can be seen in the opposition of clerics to the theater and, simultaneously, the lack of public support for

[175] Alemi, "The 1891 Map of Tehran," 79.
[176] *Iran*, Dhu al-Qaʿda 15, 1288 [January 26, 1872].

it, which resulted in its closure only five years after its opening.[177] Similarly, Ernest Orsolle, who visited Iran in 1882, mentions that after the return of the king from Europe, Nasser al-Din Shah permitted the opening of new cafés and restaurants in Tehran that were similar to those in Europe. However, despite the royal patronage, they went bankrupt, and only one remained open, which was not a place for respectable Europeans and was frequented by officers, Armenians, and pleasure-seeking Persians.[178] A city with hundreds of traditional coffeehouses could ultimately only support one café-restaurant. This contrast was the spatial manifestation of the contrast between the desires of Iranian society and those of the elites, with the latter seeking new spaces modeled after those of Europe.

However, the desire for the European lifestyle and social spaces gradually grew to become a dominant discourse in the first half of the twentieth century. In the period between the two World Wars, as Chapter 5 will demonstrate, the formation of the modern middle class and its close ties with the Pahlavi state resulted in the production of new social spaces in the northern neighborhoods of Tehran.

Spatial Abstraction and the Formation of Dualities in Tehran

This chapter examined the two processes of spatial commodification and bureaucratization in Tehran, before and after its 1870s expansion. It examined the transformation of the relationships between the state and the city and the state and society as mediated through the city. These social, political, and spatial transformations initiated the formation of spatial dichotomies in Tehran. These dichotomies, as Chapter 5 will suggest, later became a powerful discourse with vast social and spatial ramifications.

In 1877, the thirtieth anniversary of Nasser al-Din Shah's reign, the *Iran* newspaper writes: "[People] started the festivities on Saturday, twentieth of Dhu l-Hijja. From the night of twenty-first, they decorated and lighted up all the bazaars, alley ways, Governmental Streets, state buildings, and some of the houses."[179] There is an interesting

177 Malekpour, *Adabiiyat-i Namayishi dar Iran*, 309.
178 Orsolle, *Le Caucase et la Perse*, 222.
179 *Iran*, Dhu l-Hijja 28, 1293 [January 14, 1877].

phrase in this short piece that would become the dominant term for the description of new streets and squares of the city after the expansion of Tehran: *Khīyābān-ha-yi Duwlati*, Governmental Streets,[180] was the phrase that the state adopted to refer to the new network of streets and squares.[181] There are older instances of the usage of the term *Duwlati*, governmental, in phrases such as *Takīyyih-yi Duwlati* (*Takīyyih Duwlat*), *Arg-i Duwlati* (royal compound), *ʾArażī-yi Duwlati* (royal lands), and the like. However, this was the first time that the state used the term for urban spaces. In the other cases the court was the actual owner, but here new streets and squares belonged to people as *sharīʿ-i ʿām*, or public streets.

If ownership was not the distinguishing factor, what was the difference between the governmental and non-governmental streets of the city? The state took responsibility for the new city. The planning, construction, paving, maintenance, planting, and illumination of new streets were parts of the state's duties. The court's fascination with appearance worked in the favor of the new neighborhood. After the construction, the state was responsible for maintaining the appearance of the new city. In contrast, the old city was left outside the circle of the state's duties; the state held the people accountable for its labyrinthine network of alleys.

As an example of this, in June 1880, Nasser al-Din Shah appointed a new head of the office of *Iḥtisābīyyih*, the municipality-like department established in the mid-1860s. Under the king's official command, there is a bold contrast between new and old neighborhoods, which parallels the difference between *Khīyābān-ha-yi Duwlati* and non-governmental streets. Based on the king's command, people living in the old city were obliged to pave the alleys in front of their houses[182]

[180] Ironically, this matches Lefebvre's phrase of state spaces.

[181] Some examples are Lalihzar, ʿAlaʾ al-Duwlih, Marizkhanih, Chiragh Gaz, Nizamiyyih, and Nasseriyyih Streets and Tupkhanih, Nigaristan, and Shams al-ʿImarih Squares. For other instances of the usage of *Khīyābān-ha-yi Duwlati* in the official newspaper of the court, see: *Iran*, Safar 11, 1298 [January 12, 1881]; Shaʿban 10, 1298 [July 7, 1881]; Shawwal 12, 1303 [July 15, 1886]; Jumada l-Ula 17, 1304 [February 11, 1887]; Shawwal 25, 1304 [July 18, 1887]; Jumada l-Ula 17, 1305 [January 31, 1888]; Jumada l-Ula 16, 1306 [January 19, 1889]; Safar 27, 1307 [October 23, 1889]; Rabiʿ al-Awwal 11, 1307 [November 5, 1889]; Rabiʿ ath-Thani 21, 1307 [December 15, 1889]; Dhu l-Hijja 15, 1311 [June 19, 1894].

[182] *Iran*, Rajab 5, 1297 [June 14, 1880].

and keep them clean and dust-free by sprinkling water and sweeping them regularly.[183] In contrast, the newspaper repeatedly announced that the agents of *Iḥtisābīyyih* took good care of the "Governmental Streets and Squares" by cleaning them regularly, repairing any damage quickly, and planting new trees alongside them.[184] In 1887, when the court had equipped all the "Governmental Streets" of the city with gaslights, the government obliged people to put lights in the alleys by their entrance doors and light them during the night.[185] The state took responsibility for illumination in the new city and assigned the same responsibility to the people in the old city.

The term *Khīyābān-ha-yi Duwlati* requires a second component, something like *Khīyābān-ha-yi Millati* or the people's streets. Although the second term was never used, this duality was evident in the practices of the Qajar court. The court appropriated the *Khīyābān-ha-yi Duwlati* for holding official ceremonies, introducing new land uses, accommodating the Europeans and elites, and so forth, while *Khīyābān-ha-yi Millati* were the continuation of the old way of life. The latter belonged to the old city, to various communities of the city. As a result, the communities were responsible for their maintenance. The only role of the state in this regard was to remind people of their duties, to oblige people to adhere to them, and to punish them for failures. As a result, it is not hard to decipher these sentences from the *Iran* newspaper, when it talks pompously about the expansion of Tehran: "Some of the most important constructions are the long streets with trees planted on their side. [These streets] have no similarity to old alleys that were narrow, crooked, filthy, and stinky, where a horse could hardly pass through them."[186] The difference between the governmental and non-governmental was the difference between old and new, the East and the West, modern and obsolete, and communal and governmental.

It is important to note that the existence of this duality implies the general expansion of spatial abstraction in Tehran. In both the old and new cities, the process of spatial bureaucratization was at work. While in the case of the new city the state looked after urban spaces directly,

[183] *Iran*, Rajab 19, 1297 [June 28, 1880].
[184] *Iran*, Shawwal 12, 1303 [July 15, 1886], Jumada l-Ula 17, 1304 [February 11, 1887], and Jumada l-Ula 17, 1305 [January 31, 1888].
[185] *Iran*, Shawwal 25, 1304 [July 17, 1887].
[186] *Iran*, Rabiʿ ath-Thani 9, 1294 [April 22, 1877].

in the old city it obliged people to follow its guidelines. The inherent duality of this bureaucratization was manifested spatially and divided the city into two different spatial poles.

The duality of the old and new cities had another aspect too. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, from the 1850s onward, the spatial strategies of the state created impoverished neighborhoods in the south beyond the city ramparts. For the first time, the distribution of the population was solely based on people's economic status. Similarly, the policies of the state during the 1871–2 famine exacerbated the situation, meaning that the state housed the poor and starving people away from the northern section of the city. Meanwhile, the expansion of Tehran provided a lucrative opportunity for the state to sell the northern lands at high prices. It is not hard to guess who the main customers of the northern lands were. The city became polarized between the wealthy north and impoverished south. Wealthy people living in the old neighborhoods of the city, gradually filtered into the northern neighborhood.

Interestingly, this process matches the formation of the new wealthy class in the country, the propertied middle class discussed in Chapter 2. As national wealth accumulated gradually in the hands of the wholesale merchants and landlords, and society started to transform its traditional communal structure to a new class-based one, the northern neighborhood of Tehran provided the spatial manifestation of this social transformation.

Unfortunately, essential demographic data to illustrate this trend is not available. The best available data in this regard is the 1932 survey of Tehran. The state conducted this survey just before the final destruction of the city's ramparts. It is an important document because, by 1932, the northern neighborhood was completely formed and integrated into urban life and the city within the walls was fully developed. This survey divides Tehran into ten districts, nine of them inside the city ramparts and one outside of the city. From the nine districts inside the walls, District One corresponds with the royal compound. District Two (Duwlat) and Three (Hassanabad) are the two northern neighborhoods of Tehran, where the state had sold its lands to wealthy families. District Four (Sangilaj), Eight (Bazaar), and Nine (Ūdlājān) almost match the main neighborhoods of the old city.

The 1932 survey of Tehran does not include household income levels to illustrate the distribution of the population based on the

Figure 4.7 The average number of livable rooms in each house.

economic status of the citizens. However, two other factors can be used to reproduce the distribution of wealth in the city. The first factor is the average number of livable rooms, or *Yurd*s,[187] in each house in the nine demographic districts of Tehran, as seen in Figure 4.7. As the map shows, the two northern neighborhoods contain houses with greater numbers of livable rooms. It can be inferred from this that the houses in the northern neighborhoods were bigger. However, the main difference between the north and the rest of the city becomes evident when this map is combined with the map in Figure 4.8, which shows the average number of people living in each room (the second factor). In the northern houses the number of livable rooms is equal to or even more than the number of residents in the houses. In other words, on average, each person has at least one room for himself. However, two or more people shared a room in the neighborhoods of the old city, as well as in the southern neighborhood of Muhammadiyyih (District Six).

[187] The survey counted the rooms that at least one person could sleep in during the night. Calling this unit of measurement *Yurd*, they omitted spaces such as restrooms, kitchens, and water storages, or *ābanbār*s. Baladiyyih Tehran, *Sarshumari-yi Nofus-i Shahr-i Tehran: Dar Sanavat-i 1262 va 1270 va 1301 va 1311 [The Survey of Tehran Population in the Years 1262 and 1270 and 1301 and 1311]* (Tehran: Matbaʿih-yi Majlis, 1312 [1933]), 38.

Figure 4.8 The average number of people living in each room.[188]

What do these maps indicate? In 1932, while the houses in the northern neighborhoods were bigger, fewer people lived in them. In other words, the residents of the north, on average, had better economic conditions than the other parts of the city. The worst conditions of all the neighborhoods were those of District Six, Muhammadiyyih, the most southern neighborhood of the city. Here, the houses were the smallest and most crowded, with the fewest rooms to live in.

It is interesting to note how a trivial decision in the 1850s morphed into an enormous urban problem eighty years later. Nasser al-Din Shah took the first step toward the production of the new spatial structure of Tehran by accommodating poor people in the south. The Qajar court's spatial strategies accompanied by the structural transformations of society and changes in the distribution of wealth between people created a polarized city divided between wealthy and poor.

The two processes of commodification and bureaucratization reproduced Tehran and transformed its socio-spatial configuration. By the early 1930s, this reconfiguration had established completely new spatial patterns based on people's economic status. However, this is just the tip of the iceberg. As the two final chapters will discuss, Tehran's social, cultural, and political landscape transformed as well, and each

[188] I produced the maps in Figures 4.7 and 4.8 based on the data from *Sarshumari-yi Nofus-i Shahr-i Tehran*.

transformation was accompanied by its spatial manifestations, which reshaped and reproduced Tehran in the decades to come.

Conclusion

In the second half of the nineteenth century, particularly after the 1870s expansion, Tehran went through a major process of spatial abstraction. In the long term, this process changed the balance between the lived and conceived spaces of Tehran in favor of the latter and helped the state to expand its socio-spatial domination and control.

The spatial abstraction of Tehran consisted of two closely interrelated processes: commodification and bureaucratization. Through the former process, the state managed to transform vast sections of the new city into lucrative commodities. By utilizing the European vocabulary of urban design and planning, the Qajar court divided northern lands of the city into smaller parcels and sold them one by one. Moreover, beginning in the mid-nineteenth century, the court accommodated impoverished people and refugees far from its northern lands and created a buffer zone to preserve the value of these lands. This process resulted in the reconfiguration of Tehran based on the economic status of people rather than their communal bonds.

The process of spatial bureaucratization was more complex. First, beginning in the mid-nineteenth century, facing various episodes of cholera outbreaks, the Qajar court gradually adopted the responsibility for spatial bureaucratization for disease prevention. These early attempts were largely conducted through the court's acquaintance with European countries and the measures they took in the face of large-scale epidemics.

The second aspect of spatial bureaucratization manifested in the spatial strategies of the court toward the development of new ceremonies for the legitimation of royal power. Modeled after European nation-states, these new models initiated the transformation of urban spaces into spectacles of power. While the traditional forms of the state–society relationship were largely based on the spatiality of the royal compound and some spaces beyond the city ramparts, after the expansion of Tehran, the major streets around the royal compound and in the new city transformed into stages for court-sponsored ceremonies.

Moreover, the court began to oblige ordinary people to meet the state's requirements by decorating the spaces of their daily lives on

particular occasions, such as the king's birthday. While in the case of previous state-sponsored ceremonies the state had to design its rituals based on the politics of the communal sphere and people were able to reproduce their communal micro-spaces in the larger space of the ceremonies, after the expansion of Tehran and the adoption of new spatial strategies by the state, the people had to follow the state's guidelines and transform their social spaces to meet the state's requirements. In other words, while in the previous era lived spaces and day-to-day social relations could impose their attributes on state spaces and ceremonies, after the expansion of Tehran and the development of the new models, this balance turned in favor of the state. Spatial bureaucratization extended throughout the city and began to turn lived spaces into abstract spaces.

The spatial abstraction of Tehran gradually reified the spatial knowledge that Iranians had incubated for decades. The expansion of Tehran based on European spatial forms, the commodification of the city, and the spatial bureaucratization mostly based on European models resulted in the development of a spatial discourse. This discourse developed spatial dichotomies in the city and transformed Tehran into new and old, north and south, European and Iranian, and modern and traditional. This discourse had great political, economic, and cultural ramifications.

The next chapter continues the examination of the impact of this discourse on Tehran after the Constitutional Revolution. Although the city went through the process of spatial abstraction after its 1870s expansion, Chapters 5 and 6 will demonstrate that society reclaimed its role in the social production of social spaces and produced novel forms of social life and spaces in the new city. However, the latter process was largely influenced by the spatial discourse mentioned above.

5 *The Interwar Period and Middle-Class Urbanism*

In Chapter 4 I examined the state's spatial policies from the mid-nineteenth century and demonstrated how the state's interventions in Tehran resulted in an unprecedented process of spatial abstraction. Conducted and developed under the influence of new spatial knowledge, this process tilted the balance of lived and abstract spaces toward the latter. The Qajar court stretched its control over the spatiality of the city and expanded the city based on the European vocabulary of urban design.

In this chapter, I investigate the post-Qajar era and demonstrate that, after the establishment of the Pahlavi state in the 1920s, the process of spatial abstraction reached new heights. In the late 1920s and throughout the 1930s, the Pahlavi state, particularly in the main cities of the country, undertook a massive project of social reform with widespread spatial ramifications. The centralization of power was the state's key for the implementation of these reforms. In Tehran, the municipality became the central state's executive organ. The spatial strategies of the municipality resulted in the further decline of the communal sphere and the consolidation of the state's domination over people's daily lives and spaces.

The codification of space was the state's main method for accomplishing social reforms, modernization, and Westernization. By designing and imposing detailed guidelines for various communal spaces of the old city, the state disturbed the old established forms of communal life. Similar to Foucault's concept of the carceral archipelago,[1] the Pahlavi state succeeded in imposing strict social control and discipline over urban populations through spatial guidelines. Spatial codification was an effective strategy for the subjection[2] of the urban population.

[1] Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of Prison*, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage Books, 1995).
[2] Michel Foucault, "The Subject and Power," *Critical Inquiry* 8, no. 4 (1982): 777–95.

The state's spatial codes, similar to Jeremy Bentham's Panopticon,[3] stretched the state's omnipresent control to every corner of the communal sphere. The Pahlavi state transformed the lived spaces of the old city into representations of space and means of social control.[4]

However, the Pahlavi state was not alone in implementing these reforms. Sections of Iranian urban society actively pursued the modernization of the country and demanded vast social reforms. The modern middle class, developed in Iranian cities after the Constitutional Revolution, became an active part of social reform in the 1920s and 1930s and was at the forefront of this modernization. The advocates of modernity actively played a significant role in the further abstraction of the traditional social spaces of Iranian cities. They joined the Pahlavi state in the negative framing of the traditional lifestyle by producing spatial stigmas.

Alongside illustrating this general process of spatial abstraction, this chapter narrates the stories of the production of new forms of social life that were modeled after Western social spaces. Theaters, cinemas, cafés, restaurants, sports clubs, and hotels became the gathering places of the modern middle class. These spaces provided them with social markers to claim their distinct position in regard to the rest of society. The spatiality of the city transformed into a symbolic capital in this era.

Different from but convertible to economic capital, symbolic capital can be seen as a type of social credit and as "the collection of luxury goods attesting the taste and distinction of their owner."[5] Through the examination of the domains of art and culture, Pierre Bourdieu develops the concept of symbolic capital and demonstrates how the incorporation of symbolic capital into the realm of social life can provide a marker for the social status of certain classes and a tool for expressing their distinction from the other social groups.

[3] Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, 200–3.

[4] Although this Foucauldian point of view portrays an inescapable reality, Lefebvre's notion of abstract space is far from homogeneous and dominant. Chapter 6 will return to the subject and demonstrate how, despite the domination of a fixed social discourse over Iranian society and the spatiality of Tehran, the lived reality of social life transformed the spatiality of the new city into counter-spaces of resistance against the state.

[5] Pierre Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, trans. Richard Nice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 197.

Symbolic capital is not necessarily restricted to the domains of art and culture and can develop a powerful spatial aspect.[6] As this chapter demonstrates, the development of the northern neighborhoods of Tehran based on a new vocabulary of urban design and architecture provided a vehicle for the advocates of modernity to practice a novel way of life and produce unprecedented social spaces in Iranian cities. Modeled after European social spaces, the new theaters, cinemas, cafés, restaurants, hotels, and sport clubs became social markers for the advocates of modernity to claim a distinct social position in regard to the rest of society.

Through these investigations, I found that the dichotomy of new and old spaces resulted in a discourse that generated a power relationship between the modern middle class and traditional strata of society. The advocates of modernity, backed by the state, utilized this discourse to depict their lifestyle as modern, progressive, European, secular, healthy, scientific, and happy, and to portray the traditional and religious ways of life as backward, obsolete, unhealthy, unhappy, and ignorant. They saw themselves as the eligible bright future of the country and portrayed the others as the dark past that needed to be reformed. Accompanied by structural social changes, this discourse resulted in the decline of the communal sphere, communal spaces, and the neighborhoods of the old city.

I argue that the socio-spatial manifestation of this discourse was the outcome of its incubation for more than a century in Iranian society. Its traces are recognizable in the wonders of Iranian travelers when they visited European cities in the first half of the nineteenth century, in Nasser al-Din Shah's descriptions of *farang* in his travelogue, in the 1870s expansion of Tehran, in the thoughts and actions of the intelligentsia during the constitutional era, and in the formation of the Pahlavi state. The passage of time had enhanced the inherent power relationship of this discourse. If the nineteenth-century travelogues were devoid of spatial comparison between Iran and Europe, and the state conducted the 1870s expansion of Tehran with respect to the communal sphere and the old city, in contrast, by the 1930s the power relationship between the Westernized modern middle class and the traditional sections of society had reached its climax. This power

[6] David Harvey develops the spatial aspect of symbolic capital and shows "that the symbolic capital of the built environment attracts general flows of financial

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relationship bore dire socio-spatial outcomes, particularly for the latter group.

The chapter continues with a brief overview of the post-constitutional era to the 1941 abdication of Reza Shah from power. After that, I will discuss the formation of the modern middle and urban working classes and the decline of the communal sphere. This will be followed by a focus on the spatial strategies of the state and their impacts on the old and new social groups and their social spaces. Moreover, I examine the spatial practices of the modern middle class. I demonstrate that in contrast to the general process of spatial abstraction, this class successfully produced novel forms of social life and spaces in Tehran. The chapter ends with the discussion of the socio-spatial discourse that resulted in the transformation of Tehran and its urban society during the 1920s and 1930s.

The Post-Constitutional Era: An Overview

On February 21, 1921, hours before the sunrise, thousands of military forces from the Russian-trained Cossack Brigade marched into Tehran and performed a bloodless coup under the commandership of forty-two-year-old Colonel Reza Khan.[7] Reza Khan expressed that the

capital." There is a rich literature in urban studies based on the notion of symbolic capital and its role in the commodification of urban spaces. Sharon Zukin, "David Harvey on Cities," in *David Harvey: A Critical* Reader, ed. Noel Castree and Derek Gregory (Malden: Blackwell, 2006), 117. For more works on the topic, see: David Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992); David Harvey, *Paris, Capital of Modernity* (New York: Routledge, 2003); David Harvey, *Rebel Cities: From the Right to the City to the Urban Revolution* (London: Verso, 2012); Don Mitchell, *The Right to the City: Social Justice and the Fight for Public Space* (New York: Guilford Press, 2003); Sharon Zukin, *The Cultures of Cities* (Malden: Blackwell, 1995); Sharon Zukin, *Naked City: The Death and Life of Authentic Urban Places* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); Sharon Zukin, *Loft Living: Culture and Capital in Urban Change* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982).

[7] For more discussion on Reza Khan's rise to power and the role of Britain in this process, see: Shareen Blair Brysac, "A Very British Coup: How Reza Shah Won and Lost His Throne," *World Policy Journal* 24, no. 2 (2007): 90–103; Homa Katouzian, *State and Society in Iran: The Eclipse of the Qajars and the Emergence of the Pahlavis* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2000), 214–41; Gavin R. G. Hambly, "The Pahlavī Autocracy: Riżā Shāh," in *The Cambridge History of Iran: From Nadir Shah to the Islamic Republic*, ed. Peter Avery

coup was aimed to save the Qajar monarchy and bring back peace to the chaotic condition of the country. However, within a few years, he climbed the ladder of power, and on December 12, 1925, the Parliament elected Reza Khan as the new king of the country. The Pahlavi dynasty replaced the Qajar, and Reza Khan became Reza Shah. The young democracy was replaced by a new era of autocracy.[8]

During the two decades after the 1921 coup until Reza Shah's abdication from power in 1941 as the result of the British and the Soviet invasion of the country during World War II, Iranian society and cities experienced dramatic transformations. The Pahlavi state brought many reforms to fruition. One of the key factors in Reza Shah's success in implementing long-anticipated reforms was his control over military forces.[9]

Most of the reforms and changes of this era can be examined through four main frameworks: nationalism, secularism,

et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 7: 219–20; Michael P. Zirinsky, "The Rise of Reza Khan," in *A Century of Revolution: Social Movements in Iran*, vol. 2 of *Social Movements, Protest, and* Contention, ed. John Foran (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994), 53–6.

[8] There is a general agreement among scholars of the contemporary history of Iran that depicts Reza Shah's rise to power as the result of the chaos after the Constitutional Revolution. In recent years, however, the dominance of the narrative that depicts the chaotic condition and futility of the years between the Constitutional Revolution and the 1921 coup has been questioned. The full examination of these views is beyond the scope of this chapter. For more discussion on the topic, see: Ervand Abrahamian, *Iran between Two Revolutions* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), 116–18; Homa Katouzian, "Riza Shah's Political Legitimacy and Social Base,1921–1941," in *The Making of Modern Iran: State and Society under Riza Shah, 1921–1941*, ed. Stephanie Cronin (London: Routledge Curzon, 2003), 15–37; Hambly, "The Pahlavī Autocracy," 213–18; M. Reza Ghods, "Iranian Nationalism and Reza Shah," *Middle Eastern Studies* 27, no. 1 (1991): 35–45; Amin Banani, *The Modernization of Iran 1921–1941* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961), 30–8; Katouzian, *State and Society in Iran*. For alternative views, see: Stephanie Cronin, *Soldiers, Shahs and Subalterns in Iran: Opposition, Protest and Revolt, 1921–1941* (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 6; Afshin Marashi, *Nationalizing Iran: Culture, Power, and the State, 1870–1940* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2008), 53.

[9] For more information on the army during Reza Shah's reign, see: Banani, *The Modernization of Iran*, 52–8; Hambly, "The Pahlavī Autocracy," 221–2; Stephanie Cronin, "Riza Shah and the Paradoxes of Military Modernization in Iran, 1921–1941," in *The Making of Modern Iran: State and Society under Riza Shah, 1921–1941*, ed. Stephanie Cronin (London: Routledge Curzon, 2003), 38–66.

modernization, and centralization. The nation-building project was the outcome of a long process that had begun in the mid-nineteenth century. This project utilized the pre-Islamic era as the basis for the construction of a modern national identity. By implementing national education, mandating particular dress codes for men and women, holding commemorative ceremonies, and building commemorative monuments, the Pahlavi state managed to construct a new national identity.[10]

At the same time, the state followed various policies to secularize society and curtail the ʿ*ulamā*'s power. The new national education that was implemented brought an end to the ʿ*ulamā*'s dominance in the education system. By establishing a new secular judiciary system, the religious judicial courts declined and they lost their authority as the main venues for conducting people's judicial needs. By forcing women to unveil in public, developing women's education,[11] banning

[10] For the history of nation building and national identity in Iran, see: Marashi, *Nationalizing Iran*; Firoozeh Kashani-Sabet, *Frontier Fictions: Shaping the Iranian Nation, 1804–1946* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999); Ghods, "Iranian Nationalism and Reza Shah"; Houchang E. Chehabi, "Staging the Emperor's New Clothes: Dress Codes and Nation-Building under Reza Shah," *Iranian Studies* 26, no. 3–4 (1993): 209–29; Talinn Grigor, *Building Iran: Modernism, Architecture, and National Heritage under the Pahlavi Monarchs* (New York: Periscope Publishing, 2009); Muhamad Tavakoli-Taraghi, "Historiography and Crafting Iranian National Identity," in *Iran in the 20th Century: Historiography and Political Culture*, ed. Touraj Atabaki (London: I.B. Tauris, 2009), 5–21; Touraj Atabaki, "Agency and Subjectivity in Iranian National Historiography," in *Iran in the 20th Century: Historiography and Political Culture*, ed. Touraj Atabaki (London: I.B. Tauris, 2009), 69–92; Afshin Marashi, "The Nation's Poet: Ferdowsi and the Iranian National Imagination," in *Iran in the 20th Century: Historiography and Political Culture*, ed. Touraj Atabaki (London: I.B. Tauris, 2009), 93–111.

[11] There is a rich literature on women's condition during the First Pahlavi era; see: Camron Michael Amin, *The Making of the Modern Iranian Woman: Gender, State Policy, and Popular Culture, 1865–1946* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2002), 48–188; Jasamin Rostam-Kolayi, "Expanding Agendas for the 'New' Iranian Woman: Family Law, Work, and Unveiling," in *The Making of Modern Iran: State and Society under Riza Shah, 1921–1941*, ed. Stephanie Cronin (London: Routledge Curzon, 2003), 164–89; Shireen Mahdavi, "Riza Shah Pahlavi and Women: A Re-evolution," in *The Making of Modern Iran: State and Society under Riza Shah, 1921–1941*, ed. Stephanie Cronin (London: Routledge Curzon, 2003), 190–202; Houchang E. Chehabi, "The Banning of the Veil and its Consequences," in *The Making of Modern Iran: State and Society*

traditional hats and clothes, changing the religious and charitable endowment of properties and limiting the clerics' authority on the matter, prohibiting religious ceremonies of Muharram and *qurbān*, and even imprisoning and murdering some of the high-ranking *ʿulamā*, the Pahlavi state constrained the powerful religious strata and promoted secular values.[12]

Reza Shah's reign witnessed an unprecedented wave of modernization. Many long-anticipated projects, such as the national railway system, came to fruition during this era. Iran's transportation and communication systems underwent a rapid transformation; the total length of the country's roads, paved and unpaved, increased from 8,500 km (5,300 miles) in 1927 to 24,000 km (15,000 miles) in 1938. The state undertook the 1,394 km (870 mile) trans-Iranian railway, connecting the Persian Gulf in the south to the Caspian Sea in the north, financed by an additional import tax on sugar and tea. In the 1930s, a German company began regular flights between Iranian

under Riza Shah, 1921–1941, ed. Stephanie Cronin (London: Routledge Curzon, 2003), 203–21; Parvin Paidar, *Women and the Political Process in Twentieth-Century Iran* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 78–117; Hamideh Sedghi, *Women and Politics in Iran: Veiling, Unveiling, and Reveiling* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 61–90; Firoozeh Kashani-Sabet, "Patriotic Womanhood: The Culture of Feminism in Modern Iran, 1900–1941," *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 32, no. 1 (2005): 29–46.

[12] For more information on the relationship between the Pahlavi state and the *ʿulamā* and secularization of Iranian society, see: Hamid Algar, "Religious Forces in Twentieth Century Iran," in *The Cambridge History of Iran: From Nadir Shah to the Islamic Republic*, ed. Peter Avery et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 7: 732–64; Hambly, "The Pahlavī Autocracy," 232–4; Banani, *The Modernization of Iran*, 72–3; Cronin, *Soldiers, Shahs and Subalterns in Iran*, 31–8; Katja Föllmer, "Religious Aspects in Communication Process in Early Pahlavi Iran," in *Culture and Cultural Politics under Reza Shah: The Pahlavi State, New Bourgeoisie and the Creation of a Modern Society in Iran*, ed. Bianca Devos and Christoph Werner (Abingdon: Routledge, 2014), 288–318; Mehrzad Boroujerdi, "Triumphs and Travails of Authoritarian Modernization in Iran," in *The Making of Modern Iran: State and Society under Riza Shah, 1921–1941*, ed. Stephanie Cronin (London: Routledge Curzon, 2003), 152–61. For an alternative view on how the First Pahlavi's policies unintentionally resulted in uniting *ʿulamā*, see: Arang Keshavarzian, "Turban or Hat, Seminarian or Soldier: State Building and Clergy Building in Reza Shah's Iran," *Journal of Church and State* 45, no. 1 (2003): 81–112.

cities, and the national telephone system was in operation by 1935. Similarly, the state initiated many new industries during this era; textile and oil industries developed rapidly, the state established several sugar refineries throughout the country, the production of cement started in this period, and many other small-scale industries flourished.[13]

Finally, centralization can be considered the hallmark of the Pahlavi era. In contrast to the Qajar court, which was unable to implement its power beyond the capital, Reza Shah managed to reach throughout the country. The new army and the government bureaucracy, which Abrahamian calls the pillars of Reza Shah's regime,[14] were the key factors in the creation of a capable central government. Reza Shah's tribal policies weakened a continuing threat to the central government.[15] By establishing a national bank, centralizing and reforming the methods of tax collection, establishing state monopolies on the import and export of certain goods, centralizing the education and judiciary systems, and closing down the oppositional parties and newspapers, the Pahlavi state managed to become the sole economic, political, financial, industrial, and military force by the early 1940s, before Reza Shah's abdication.

[13] Charles Issawi, ed., *The Economic History of Iran 1800–1914* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971), 374–9; Bannani, *The Modernization of Iran*, 132–43; Hambly, "The Pahlavī Autocracy," 229–30; K. S. Maclachlan, "Economic Development, 1921–1979," in *The Cambridge History of Iran: From Nadir Shah to the Islamic Republic*, ed. Peter Avery et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 7: 608–12; Ronald Ferrier, "The Iranian Oil Industry," in *The Cambridge History of Iran: From Nadir Shah to the Islamic Republic*, ed. Peter Avery et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 7: 639–57.

[14] Abrahamian, *Iran between Two Revolutions*, 135.

[15] For the state's tribal policies and their impacts, see: Stephanie Cronin, *Tribal Politics in Iran: Rural Conflict and the New State, 1921–1941* (London: Routledge, 2007); Kaveh Bayat, "Riza Shah and the Tribes: An Overview," in *The Making of Modern Iran: State and Society under Riza Shah, 1921–1941*, ed. Stephanie Cronin (London: Routledge Curzon, 2003), 224–30; Richard Tapper, "The Case of the Shahsevan," in *The Making of Modern Iran: State and Society under Riza Shah, 1921–1941*, ed. Stephanie Cronin (London: Routledge Curzon, 2003), 231–52; Stephanie Cronin, "Riza Shah and the Disintegration of Bakhtiyari Power in Iran, 1921–1934," in *The Making of Modern Iran: State and Society under Riza Shah, 1921–1941*, ed. Stephanie Cronin (London: Routledge Curzon, 2003), 253–81; Hambly, "The Pahlavī Autocracy," 226–9.

New Urban Classes and the Decline of the Communal Sphere

Alongside these changes, Iranian urban society and the communal sphere underwent dramatic transformations. In the words of Gavin R. G. Hambly:

> Between 1921 and 1941, the social structure of Iran changed dramatically, with new occupations, new jobs and the migration of workers to new locations eroding long-established patterns of living. Most striking of all was the phenomenon of rapid urbanization, as the surplus population of the villages began to move to the cities, responding to rumours of opportunities for an improved way of life. Tehran, in particular, saw the beginnings of that phenomenal growth which became virtually unmanageable by the 1970s.[16]

Tehran's population in 1922, a year after Reza Shah's military coup, was around 210,000 people.[17] This number reached 310,000 in just ten years without any change in the city boundaries.[18] However, most of this growth happened in the second half of Reza Shah's reign, when he had succeeded in suppressing various rebellions around the country and begun his structural reforms. In 1941, just before his abdication, the population of Tehran had passed 540,000 people, and the city had grown considerably.[19] Fifteen years later, the first national census of November 1956 counted more than 1.5 million people in the city.[20]

This rapid urban growth, accompanied by state-sponsored projects and reforms, disturbed the old social structures. Social segmentation and the communal sphere gradually lost their central position for structuring urban society. In one example, the old, established guild system lost its control over the bazaars, crafts, and trades, which resulted in the weakening of the bazaar organization. Newly

[16] Hambly, "The Pahlavī Autocracy," 231.

[17] Baladiyyih Tehran, *Sarshumari-yi Nufus-i Shahr-i Tehran: Dar Sanavat-i 1262 va 1270 va 1301 va 1311 [The Survey of Tehran Population in the Years 1262 and 1270 and 1301 and 1311]* (Tehran: Matbaʿih-yi Majlis, 1312 [1933]), 16.

[18] Baladiyyih Tehran, *Sarshumari-yi Nufus-i Shahr-i Tehran*, 39.

[19] Eckart Ehlers and Willem Floor, "Urban Change in Iran, 1920–1941," *Iranian Studies* 26, no. 3–4 (1993): 262.

[20] Ministry of Interior, *National and Province Statistics of the First Census of Iran: November 1956*, vol. 1(August 1961), 473. For a comparison between the population of the cities in 1930 and 1941, see: Ehlers and Floor, "Urban Change in Iran," 262.

established municipalities began to regulate various guilds. For example, the municipality of Tehran issued separate *niẓāmnāmih*s,[21] or guidelines, for each guild, which discredited *Kadkhudā*s[22] as the heads of the guilds and recognized the municipality's Office of Food Control, *ʾIdārih-yi Arzāq*, as the authority for handling the internal disputes of the guilds and their relationship to the outer world.[23] Moreover, by abolishing guild taxes, the state took away the sole internal regulating force that had provided a power structure in guilds for centuries. In the words of Abrahamian, "the elimination of the guild tax was a kiss of death designed to sap the control of the craft and trade masters over their apprentices, artisans, journeymen, and wage earners."[24] Through these systematic changes, the state annihilated one of the oldest and

[21] *Niẓāmnāmih*s are a less-studied aspect of the Pahlavi era. During the two decades of Reza Shah's reign, the municipality of Tehran issued several *niẓāmnāmih*s to regulate different aspects of public life and improve the sanitary conditions of the city. These *niẓāmnāmih*s were designed separately for different stores, particularly food product stores, and were aimed to regulate all of the various aspects of their work. *Niẓāmnāmih*s were effective instruments for expanding the presence and influence of the central state into various aspects of social life. For the regulations of the fruit sellers, confectionaries, groceries, *kalih pazī*s (lamb head kitchens), and *kabābī*s (kebab kitchens), see: *Majalih-yi Baladiyyih [Baladiyyih Magazine]* 1, no. 5 (Dhu al-Qaʿda 3, 1339 [July 9, 1921]): 9–10. For the regulations of the *salmānī*s (hair salons), see: *Majalih-yi Baladiyyih [Baladiyyih Magazine]* 1, no. 8 (Dhu al-Qaʿda 24, 1339 [July 30, 1921]): 16. For the regulations of the bathhouses see: *Majalih-yi Baladiyyih [Baladiyyih Magazine]* 9, no. 3 (Aban 1309 [November 1930]): 91–3. For the regulations of the public garages, see: *Majalih-yi Baladiyyih [Baladiyyih Magazine]* 11, no. 6 (Farvardin 1314 [March 1935]): 184. For the regulations of all the traditional kitchens, see: Iʿlan az Taraf-i Baladiyyih-yi Tehran [Announcement from Municipality of Tehran], *Ittilaʿat*, Mihr 26, 1307 [October 18, 1928]. For the regulations of the bakeries, see: Iʿlan az Taraf-i Baladiyyih-yi Tehran [Announcement from Municipality of Tehran], *Ittilaʿat*, Aban 8, 1307 [October 30, 1928]. For the regulations of the bakeries and butchers, see: Iʿlan az Taraf-i Baladiyyih-yi Tehran [Announcement from Municipality of Tehran], *Ittilaʿat*, Murdad 23, 1309 [August 15, 1930]. For the regulations of the cafés and coffeehouses, see: Tarz-i Bana-yi Kafih [Guideline for Building a Café], *Ittilaʿat*, Mihr 3, 1307 [September 25, 1928].

[22] See Chapter 1.

[23] The first article of these guidelines says: "Handling all the internal disputes and defining the confines of the guilds are the duties of the Department of Food Control of the municipality." For some examples of these guidelines, see: *Majalih-yi Baladiyyih [Baladiyyih Magazine]* 4, no. 13 (Bahman 1304 [February 1926]): 1–6. Various issues of this magazine are available at the University of Tehran, Central Library, Department of Periodicals.

[24] Abrahamian, *Iran between Two Revolutions*, 151–2.

most powerful forms of segmentation and communal affiliation in Iranian urban society. Due to the elimination of the bonding forces that had held professional communities together for centuries, retail stores and workshops proliferated independently inside and outside the bazaar. Ashraf and Banuazizi explain: "In Tehran, for example, the number of persons in such occupations increased from 12,000 in [...] 1928 to 250,000 in [...] 1976."[25] The formerly established power structures that had enabled commercial interactions in Iranian cities for centuries lost their power over their members.

Similarly, as mentioned before, the religious groups lost their central position in society; clerics lost their authority over the judiciary and education systems as well as the religious endowment of properties. Big merchants were gradually replaced by "new industrial entrepreneurs and traders, contractors, consulting engineers, financiers, and bankers."[26] More broadly, the state's policies and interventions accompanied by the transformations of Iranian society led to the decline of the communal sphere. The communal sphere, as the main social force structuring Iranian urban society during the nineteenth century, lost its centrality to conduct social relations in cities. It lost its semi-autonomy against the central state, and the Pahlavi state succeeded in its subjugation.

Alongside this general story of decline, after the Constitutional Revolution, particularly in the Reza Shah period, two major classes developed in Iranian cities. First, due to the proliferation of new industries, an urban working class formed in Iranian cities. By 1937–8, 6 percent of 14.9 million Iranian citizens were employed in the industrial sector.[27] Despite its small size, the concentration of these new industries in the main cities of the country meant that most of the working class lived in these cities. Abrahamian estimates that there were 64,000 workers employed in sixty-two "modern manufacturing plants and numerous handicraft workshops" of Tehran.[28]

[25] Ahmad Ashraf and Ali Banuazizi, "Class System VI: Classes in the Pahlavi Period," in *Encyclopedia Iranica* (December 15, 1992), www.iranicaonline.org/articles/class-system-vi (accessed December 15, 2015).

[26] Ashraf and Banuazizi, "Class System VI"

[27] Boroujerdi, "Triumphs and Travails of Authoritarian Modernisation," 155. For a comprehensive discussion of the size of the working class and the number of industrial plants, see: Ashraf and Banuazizi, "Class System VI."

[28] Abrahamian, *Iran between Two Revolutions*, 147.

In contrast to the old crafts, new industries, particularly those established by the state, were a source of employment for all the sections of society; the communal backgrounds of the workers were not necessarily as significant a factor for their employment as they had been. Based on Abrahamian's estimate, the first generation of industrial workers had diverse rural backgrounds: "According to the first national census taken in 1956, 14% of the migrants in Tehran were from neighboring villages, 23% from Azerbaijan, 19% from Gilan, 10% from Mazandaran, 10% from Kermanshah, 9% from Isfahan, 6% from Khurasan, 4% from Khuzistan, and 2% from Fars."[29] Unlike the old guild structure of the traditional industries and the priority of the communal ties over economic status in hiring, the new industries effectively formed a class-based social structure. Members of the new urban working class could be identified based on their common economic interests rather than their communal identity. As Chapter 6 will discuss, this class-based identity played a significant role in the transformation of political public spaces in Tehran.

In the context of this chapter, however, it is the second urban class that had a significant impact on the transformation of Tehran, its social life, and its spaces. In Iranian studies literature there are different terms for this class, such as professional-bureaucratic intelligentsia,[30] new middle class,[31] intelligentsia,[32] modern middle class,[33] and *ruwshanfikran* or intellectuals.[34] In this book, I use the term modern middle class, which stands in contrast to the propertied middle class of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries or, as I will refer to it, the traditional middle class.

[29] Abrahamian, *Iran between Two Revolutions*, 147.
[30] James Alban Bill, *The Politics of Iran: Groups, Classes, and Modernization* (Columbus: Charles E. Merril Publishing, 1972), 56.
[31] Husayn Adib, *Tabaqih-yi Mutivasit-i Jadid dar Iran [The New Middle Class in Iran]* (Tehran: Intisharat-i Jamiʿih, 1358 [1979]); Ashraf and Banuazizi, "Class System VI."
[32] Abrahamian, *Iran between Two Revolutions*, 145.
[33] Bianca Devos, "Engineering a Modern Society? Adoptions of New Technologies in Early Pahlavi Iran," in *Culture and Cultural Politics under Reza Shah: The Pahlavi State, New Bourgeoisie and the Creation of a Modern Society in Iran*, ed. Bianca Devos and Christoph Werner (Abingdon: Routledge, 2014), 266–87; Banani, *The Modernization of Iran*, 29–30.
[34] Jalal Al-i Ahmad, *Dar Khidmat va Khiyanat-i Ruwshanfikran [On Service and Betrayal of Ruwshanfikran]*, 2 vols. (Tehran: Intisharat-i Kharazmi, 1357 [1978]).

It is important to note that, due to the novelty of this class in Iran, there are various definitions for it. For example, Banani traces members of the modern middle class back to various social backgrounds, from sons of affluent strata in the Qajar era to a few sons of peasants, and from the sons of the clergy to the sons of minor officials: "In Iranian society these young men formed the professional class – journalists, doctors, lawyers, teachers, army officers, and government officials."[35] Adib defines technicians, white-collar workers, and teachers as the core of the modern middle class.[36] Ashraf and Banuazizi count "independent professionals, civil servants, military personnel, white-collar employees and technicians in private enterprises, and the intelligentsia" as the members of this class. Finally, Al-i Ahmad claims that the modern middle class, *ruwshanfikran* in his terminology, was composed of five different groups: (1) writers, artists, poets, and professional experts; (2) professors, critics, judges, lawyers, and white-collar workers; (3) physicians, engineers, and researchers; (4) teachers and clerks; and (5) journalists, TV and radio hosts, and publishers.[37]

The examination of various definitions of the modern middle class suggests two possible approaches for its delineation: through its socio-economic status and based on its social values. Each of these markers has points of overlap and divergence with the traditional strata of society, and the clear demarcation between the modern middle class and the rest of urban society can be misleading.

The central bureaucracy of the Pahlavi state, the modern professional market, and the new national education system contributed to the formation and development of the modern middle class as a socio-economic marker. During the interwar period, the state grew from a weak and small circle of courtiers to a capable central government, forming ten ministries with 90,000 full-time personnel.[38] Moreover, the military forces had thousands of personnel. By combining different military forces in Iran and replacing foreign officers with Iranians, Reza Khan made an army of 40,000. Throughout his reign, the army was the biggest consumer of the national budget; it was continuously

[35] Banani, *The Modernization of Iran*, 29.
[36] Adib, *Tabaqih-yi Mutivasit-i Jadid dar Iran*, 94–6.
[37] Al-i Ahmad, *Dar Khidmat va Khiyanat-i Ruwshanfikran*, 81–7.
[38] Abrahamian, *Iran between Two Revolutions*, 136–7.

modernized by purchasing military equipment and, by the time of his abdication in 1941, it had grown to 400,000 men.[39]

As a result, the state became the biggest employer in the country. The 1922 municipality census counted 6,369 government employees in Tehran; in 1932 there were 12,105 employees in both military and nonmilitary sections. In 1932, the number of employees plus their family members was 40,838, which suggests that governmental employment had a direct impact on more than 13 percent of the total population of the city.[40]

Besides the state, as Schayegh argues, the growing market for the modern professions, such as medicine, law, teaching, engineering, and architecture, played a great role in the development of the modern middle class.[41] Al-i Ahmad uses this professional background to estimate the size of the modern middle class in 1956. Based on his detailed calculations using the 1956 national census, the modern middle class nationally consisted of 450,000 people in that year.[42]

Moreover, the development of the national education system played a significant role in the consolidation of the modern middle class. The new education system trained the manpower for the state's bureaucracy, industries, and commercial enterprises.[43] It was a crucial element in the nation-building project of the state.[44] The education

[39] For more information on the army during the First Pahlavi era, see: Banani, *The Modernization of Iran*, 52–8; Hambly, "The Pahlavī Autocracy," 221–2; Cronin, "Riza Shah and the Paradoxes of Military Modernization," 38–66.

[40] Baladiyyih Tehran, *Sarshumari-yi Nufus-i Shahr-i Tehran*, 23, 126. Using the Baladiyyih documents, Ashraf and Banuazizi count 24,000 government employees in Tehran, which is two times more than the data I extracted. This is likely due to the usage of a misleading table on page 132 of the source document. The table on this page contains the numbers of government employees divided into three different categories based on their employment status. Each category is further divided into six or eight subcategories based on gender and age group. However, the table provides the total number of men and women employees in different groups in each employment status category in the middle of table. If someone adds the number of this table to calculate the number of government employees, they will come up with a total that is two times more than the real number. Ashraf and Banuazizi, "Class System VI"; Baladiyyih Tehran, *Sarshumari-yi Nufus-i Shahr-i Tehran*, 132.

[41] Cyrus Schayegh, *Who Is Knowledgeable Is Strong: Modern Iranian Society, 1900–1950* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009), 5.

[42] Al-i Ahmad, *Dar Khidmat va Khiyanat-i Ruwshanfikran*, 121–6.

[43] Ashraf and Banuazizi, "Class System VI."

[44] Marashi, *Nationalizing Iran*, 86–109.

reforms were extensive.[45] Although the basis of these reforms had been initiated by the establishment of a few modern primary schools in the late nineteenth century and, more importantly, the 1910 passage of the *Fundamental Law of Education* by Parliament, the main national reforms occurred after the 1921 coup and the establishment of the Pahlavi monarchy.[46]

The 1935 yearbook of the Ministry of Education provides a reliable source for illustrating this progress.[47] Between 1925 and 1935, the budget of the Ministry of Education increased 7.5 times, from 7.7 to 58 million rials,[48] and reached 84 million in 1940.[49] Although Matthee argues that, in comparison to the military budget, the increase in the educational budget was negligible,[50] in a historical perspective the contrast between the Pahlavi's and Qajar's education policies is still astonishing. The number of schools, both the old-fashioned schools (*maktab*s) and new schools, increased from 612 in 1922–3 to 5,339 in 1934–5.[51] During the same period, the number of students rose from 55,131 to 255,673;[52] by the time of Reza Shah's abdication from power this number had reached 366,095, of which only 51,922 students were in *maktab*s.[53] However, due to the state's anti-religious

[45] There is a rich literature on the education reforms during the Pahlavi era: Rudi Matthee, "Transforming Dangerous Nomads into Useful Artisans, Technicians, Agriculturalists: Education in the Riza Shah Period," in *The Making of Modern Iran: State and Society under Riza Shah, 1921–1941*, ed. Stephanie Cronin (London: Routledge Curzon, 2003), 128–51; David Menashri, *Education and the Making of Modern Iran* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992), 87–154; Marashi, *Nationalizing Iran*, 86–109; Banani, *The Modernization of Iran*, 85–111.

[46] Sayyed ʿAli Al-i Dawud, "Education IX: Primary Schools," in *Encyclopedia Iranica* (December 15, 1997), www.iranicaonline.org/articles/education-ix-primary-schools (accessed December 16, 2015).

[47] Vizarat-i Maʿarif ʾUqaf va Sanayiʿ Mustazrafih, *Salnamih va ʾIhsaʾiyyih 1312–1313 va 1313–1314 [Yearbook and Statistics 1933–1934 and 1934–1935]*, 2 vols (Tehran: ʾIdarih-yi Kul-i ʾIntibaʿat, 1315 [1936]). This yearbook is accessible in National Library and Archives of Iran.

[48] Vizarat-i Maʿarif ʾUqaf va Sanayiʿ Mustazrafih, *Salnamih va ʾIhsaʾiyyih*, 2: 87.

[49] Matthee, "Transforming Dangerous Nomads," 146.

[50] Matthee, "Transforming Dangerous Nomads," 146.

[51] Vizarat-i Maʿarif ʾUqaf va Sanayiʿ Mustazrafih, *Salnamih va ʾIhsaʾiyyih*, 2: 81.

[52] Vizarat-i Maʿarif ʾUqaf va Sanayiʿ Mustazrafih, *Salnamih va ʾIhsaʾiyyih*, 2: 82.

[53] Menashri, *Education and the Making of Modern Iran*, 102.

policies and its attempts to curtail the clerics' power, the number of theology students dropped dramatically from 4,879 in 1924–5 to 784 in 1941–2.[54]

Women's education witnessed an impressive expansion during this era as well. The number of female graduates from the modern primary schools increased from three in 1922, in comparison to forty-four male graduates for the same year, to 2,253, in comparison to 6,631 males, in 1935.[55] The first group of forty girls graduated from the modern high schools in 1928, fourteen years after the first male graduates. This number reached 211 girls in 1935, in comparison to 537 boys.[56]

Finally, in 1935, by combining various institutes of higher education, particularly the old Dar al-Funun college of 1851, the state established the first modern university in Iran, the University of Tehran.[57] The university soon changed into an engine of economic development, secularization, and nation-building. Moreover, the Pahlavi state needed the graduates of the university to implement its modernization projects.[58] Although six years after its foundation Reza Shah had to step down from power, the university gradually grew to become an important factor in the development of the modern middle class. The total number of students at the University of Tehran, despite the establishment of additional university options in the city, grew from 1,034 in 1934–5 to 2,023 in 1940–1, and reached 18,183 in 1976–7.[59]

The Pahlavi state's bureaucracy, the modern professions, and the new education system were not continuations of their Qajar counterparts. They were detached from the politics of segmented society;

[54] Menashri, *Education and the Making of Modern Iran*, 102.

[55] Vizarat-i Maʿarif ʾUqaf va Sanayiʿ Mustazrafih, *Salnamih va ʾIhsaʾiyyih*, 2: 84.

[56] Vizarat-i Maʿarif ʾUqaf va Sanayiʿ Mustazrafih, *Salnamih va ʾIhsaʾiyyih*, 2: 85. For the numbers of male and female students in different years between 1922 and 1942, see: Menashri, *Education and the Making of Modern Iran*, 110. Also see: Matthee, "Transforming Dangerous Nomads," 133–4.

[57] For more information on the establishment of the University of Tehran and its early years, see: Christl Catanzaro, "Policy or Puzzle? The Foundation of the University of Tehran between Ideal Conception and Pragmatic Realization," in *Culture and Cultural Politics under Reza Shah: The Pahlavi State, New Bourgeoisie and the Creation of a Modern Society in Iran*, ed. Bianca Devos and Christoph Werner (Abingdon: Routledge, 2014), 37–54. Matthee, "Transforming Dangerous Nomads," 134–5; Banani, *The Modernization of Iran*, 85–111; Menashri, *Education and the Making of Modern Iran*, 143–54.

[58] Catanzaro, "Policy or Puzzle?" 44.

[59] Menashri, *Education and the Making of Modern Iran*, 151, 213.

they were centers for the amalgamation of people under the rubric of nationalism; they were employers beyond any communal identity. Although by the end of the Reza Shah period the size of the modern middle class was relatively small in comparison to the entire population, these changes signaled the beginning of the decline of the old social structures.[60] Moreover, as this chapter examines, the concentration of the modern middle class in the cities had monumental sociospatial ramifications.

Regarding the social values of the modern middle class, these differed from the traditional strata of society in two significant ways. First, the modern middle class distinguished itself from the rest of society by including women in the public realm. The state's social reforms had a great impact in this regard. The Pahlavi state commenced a top-down project to integrate women into public life. By increasing women's education and employment opportunities, as well as introducing compulsory unveiling, the state attempted to redefine the image of modern Iranian women.[61] The modern Iranian woman image in this case was defined "against the ignorance and moral confusion of the traditional woman" and "her progressive qualities were derived from successfully adapting Euro-American culture to an Iranian context."[62] In the words of Paidar, the formation of a link between gender equality and national progress helped women to achieve some social rights in this era.[63]

Although these steps were elementary, in the long-term they had a crucial impact on Iranian urban society. The most significant shift was the transformation of a gendered quality of public life and spaces. New definitions of women in society, beyond daughters, mothers, and

[60] Ashraf and Banuazizi, "Class System VI"; Baladiyyih Tehran, *Sarshumari-yi Nufus-i Shahr-i Tehran*, 23, 126; Al-i Ahmad, *Dar Khidmat va Khiyanat-i Ruwshanfikran*, 121–6. Abrahamian, *Iran between Two Revolutions*, 136–7; Marashi, *Nationalizing Iran*, 86–109; Matthee, "Transforming Dangerous Nomads"; Menashri, *Education and the Making of Modern Iran*, 87–154; Catanzaro, "Policy or Puzzle?"; Banani, *The Modernization of Iran*, 85–111; Al-i Dawud, "Education IX: Primary Schools."

[61] Badr ol-Moluk Bamdad, *From Darkness into Light: Women's Emancipation in Iran*, trans. F. R. C. Bagley (Hicksville: Exposition Press, 1977), 91–104; Sedghi, *Women and Politics in Iran*, 67–76; Paidar, *Women and the Political Process*, 103–17; Amin, *The Making of the Modern Iranian Woman*, 48.

[62] Amin, *The Making of the Modern Iranian Woman*, 48.

[63] Paidar, *Women and the Political Process*, 103.

sisters, became possible during the Pahlavi era. Although Amin demonstrates that alongside this social transformation "the very meaning of male guardianship had been expanded" as well, by this time women could become students, teachers, coworkers, and classmates, and the modern middle class was at the center of this social change.[64]

Second, the modern middle class assimilated willingly into the culture of modernity through an active pursuit of modern reforms in the West. It is possible to trace this desire to long before the Constitutional Revolution, as early as the Fath ʿAli Shah (1797–1834) era. However, the Constitutional Revolution and the establishment of the Pahlavi state provided a new momentum for the pursuit of this desire and mobilized certain sections of Iranian society and the state. The modern middle class actively followed and promoted a new lifestyle, different from the traditional one. In the words of Bianca Devos, "[t]hese middle-class Iranians were not just passively modernized through state-enforced reforms, they themselves acted as pioneers promoting a progressive way of life, primarily by adopting a modern Western lifestyle."[65] Ahmad Ashraf suggests that this class turned away from Iranian and religious culture to enjoy "the fruits of modernization and Westernization."[66] Multiple motives behind the modern middle class's adoption of Western culture can be identified, such as their sense of the backwardness of the country, interest in improving Iranian society, and adoption of a Western lifestyle as a marker of their social status.[67]

These characteristics have pushed some scholars to use terms such as intelligentsia or *ruwshanfikr* to identify what is referred to herein as the modern middle class. For example, Abrahamian examines this class as the expansion of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries' intelligentsia, claiming that the reforms caused the intelligentsia to transform "from a stratum into a social class."[68] Al-i Ahmad's *ruwshanfikr* group is based on the same notion. He uses the term *ruwshanfikr* to refer to the intelligentsias of the constitutional era.[69]

[64] Amin, *The Making of the Modern Iranian Woman*, 188.
[65] Devos, "Engineering a Modern Society?" 270.
[66] Ahmad Ashraf, "The Roots of Emerging Dual Class Structure in Nineteenth-Century Iran," *Iranian Studies* 14, no. 1–2 (1981): 24.
[67] Devos and Werner, "Introduction," 5.
[68] Abrahamian, *Iran between Two Revolutions*, 145–6.
[69] Al-i Ahmad, *Dar Khidmat va Khiyanat-i Ruwshanfikran*, 21.

In contrast, I intentionally avoid combining the modern middle class with the earlier intelligentsia groups. While I do not deny the connections and continuities between the two, I prefer to highlight their different social origins by using distinguishing terms. The nineteenth and early twentieth centuries' intelligentsias were the individuals who had produced an independent understanding of the West, mostly by visiting European countries. However, the modern middle class was formed through the transformation of Iranian urban society and the state's top-down social reforms. The members of this class did not necessarily have any direct and independent experience of the West.

In any case, both groups were inclined toward the West and the Western lifestyle. In describing the characteristics of a *ruwshanfir*, Al-i Ahmad calls him *farangī maāb*, depicted as:

> A person who wears Western clothes, hats, and shoes. If it happens, he drinks alcoholic beverages. He sits on chairs. He shaves. He wears a tie. He eats using a spoon and a fork. He uses *farangī* words [...] He goes to cinemas. He goes out to dance.[70]

In Al-i Ahmad's view, being *farangī maāb* is the first and the most important characteristic of a *ruwshanfikr*. Similarly, James Alban Bill believes that many members of the intelligentsia became "obsessed with Western ideas and culture."[71] This inclination toward the West and the active promotion of their lifestyle were the key characteristics of the modern middle class.

As such, there was an alignment between the Pahlavi state's reforms and the demands of particular sections of Iranian society, particularly the modern middle class, for modernization and progress. More than any other social group, the modern middle class constituted the state's growing bureaucracy; it played an active role in the modernization project of the state. Through an analysis of the newspaper articles of the era, Devos claims that: "Most of the middle-class modernists widely supported the state's ambitious reform agenda. They believed a strong centralized state to be of utmost importance for it to succeed."[72] The members of the modern middle class "considered their

[70] Al-i Ahmad, *Dar Khidmat va Khiyanat-i Ruwshanfikran*, 44.
[71] Bill, *The Politics of Iran*, 61.
[72] Devos, "Engineering a Modern Society?" 272.

own material interests and aspirations tied to the monarch's program of modernization and secularization."[73] This class played a great role in the substitution of secular nationalism for religious fanaticism. Without their support, the Pahlavi state could not implement many of its reforms.[74]

These social transformations led to the formation of, in the words of Ahmad Ashraf, a "dual class structure" in Iranian cities.[75] On the one hand, there were the traditional sections of society with all their communal interactions and religious gatherings and, on the other hand, there was the alliance between the state and certain sections of urban society, particularly the modern middle class, based on the shared desire for the pursuit of modernity and reforms. In this era, a social gap developed between the two sections:

> The rift between these two principal strata intensified in the process of modernization in the interwar period [...] These developments have led to the formation of an increasing cultural alienation of the ruling elite and the new middle classes from the religious stratum and the masses of bazaaris, rural migrants, workers, peasants, and tribesman.[76]

Under these conditions, the close bond between the state and the modern middle class resulted in the consolidation of this class and further transformation of the social life and spaces of Iranian cities, particularly Tehran.

Although these accounts portray a dichotomous social structure and the further examination of social spaces in Tehran demonstrates the spatial manifestation of this dichotomy, it is important to note that this dichotomization did not necessarily result in the complete separation of social groups. There were definitely many people in the traditional sections of urban society who actively pursued alternative ways of life. Similarly, the alliance between the modern middle class and the state does not mean that there was no point of convergence. As Chapter 6 demonstrates, the dictatorial attitude of the Pahlavi state generated discontent among various social groups, as well as within the modern middle class.

[73] Ashraf and Banuazizi, "Class System VI."
[74] Banani, *The Modernization of Iran*, 24.
[75] Ashraf, "The Roots of Emerging Dual Class."
[76] Ashraf, "The Roots of Emerging Dual Class," 25.

In the next section, I continue by examining the transformation of Tehran in the interwar period. The institutional organ for the implementation of the state's policies in the capital was the municipality of Tehran. As a result, I will first illustrate the bigger picture of the transformation of the city and the role of the municipality in this regard. Afterwards, I examine the spatial practices of the modern middle class and the production of new forms of social life and spaces in Tehran. As I demonstrate, the spatial rise of the modern middle class coincided with the decline of communal life and traditional social spaces. The state's policies played a decisive role in the spatial consolidation of the former and the demise of the latter.

Tehran's Municipality and Spatial Bureaucratization

As Chapter 4 examined, beginning in the mid-nineteenth century, particularly after the 1870s expansion of Tehran, the city went through the process of spatial abstraction. The state's attempts to prevent outbreaks of diseases, the spatial commodification of the new city, the spatial bureaucratization, and the implementation of new strategies for the legitimation of the royal authority resulted in the development of a novel relationship between the state, the city, and society. The process of spatial abstraction, particularly the spatial bureaucratization of Tehran, reached new heights after the Constitutional Revolution and during Reza Shah's reign.[77] The transformation of Tehran in this era was in line with the state's national policies. The four principles of the Reza Shah era – nationalism, secularism, centralization, and modernization – brought drastic physical and social changes to the city. By the time of Reza Shah's abdication in 1941, Tehran was unrecognizable from what it had been in 1921.

[77] This chapter mostly focuses on the spatial strategies of the state for further bureaucratization of Tehran through the empowerment of the municipality and social control through spatial regulations. The Pahlavi state to some extent altered the spatial strategies of the Qajar era for the legitimation of its power. On the one hand, through the discourse of nationalism, the state sponsored the construction of national monuments throughout the country. These projects did not have any precedent in the previous eras. There is a rich literature on the Pahlavi state's sponsorship of national monuments. On the other hand, through holding carnivals and military parades on certain national holidays, such as the anniversary of Reza Shah's coup and his birthday, the

Two different factors assisted the state in the vast spatial bureaucratization in Tehran: the mechanism of legislation and the centralization of power in certain urban institutions. First, the Pahlavi state used the legislative power of the Parliament as a means of knowledge production, and the production of knowledge helped the state to consolidate its control over the city. One of the first and most important laws in this regard was the *Mandatory Real Estate Registration Act*. Discussed and passed by the Parliament in early 1928, this act obliged all property owners to register their properties in the state's offices.[78] While this act had specific impacts at the national level through recording all the agricultural lands, at the urban level it led to the official documentation of land parcels in the cities. To register one's property, the

state developed new ceremonies and incorporated the spatiality of cities for its legitimation. Despite their minor differences with their Qajar counterparts, such as holding carnivals in the city, these latter ceremonies were more or less the continuations of the Qajar-era ceremonies. For works on the state's sponsoring of national monuments, see: Talinn Grigor, "The King's White Walls: Modernism and Bourgeois Architecture," in *Culture and Cultural Politics under Reza Shah: The Pahlavi State, New Bourgeoisie and the Creation of a Modern Society in Iran*, ed. Bianca Devos and Christoph Werner (Abingdon: Routledge, 2014), 95–118; Grigor, *Building Iran*; Marashi, *Nationalizing Iran*, 110–32. For some examples of the new ceremonies, such as military parades and carnivals, see: Yik Ruz-i ba Shukuh-dar Miydan-i Jalaliyyih [A Glorious Day-In Jalalliyyih Square], *Ittilaʿat*, Isfand 4, 1310 [February 25, 1932]; Kudihta-yi Sivum-i Hut-Miydan-i Jalaliyyih [The February 21st Coup – Jalaliyyih Square], *Ittilaʿat*, Isfand 4, 1311 [February 23, 1933]; Miydan-i Jalaliyyih- Ruz-i Sivum-i Isfand [Jalalliyyih Square – February 21st], *Ittilaʿat*, Isfand 4, 1313 [February 23, 1935]; Jashn-i karnaval [Carnival Festivity], *Ittilaʿat*, Isfand 20, 1311 [March 11, 1933]; Karvan-i Shadi ya Karnaval Tehran-Karnaval Isfahan [Happiness Caravan or Tehran's Carnival – Isfahan's Carnival], *Ittilaʿat*, Isfand 28, 1311 [March 19, 1933]; Ruz-i Jashn-i Milad-i Aʿlahazrat Humayuni [The Birthday Festivals of His Majesty], *Ittilaʿat*, Isfand 29, 1311 [March 20, 1933]; Karvan-i Shadi: Buzurgtarin Jashn-i Milli [The Happiness Caravan: The Biggest National Festival], *Ittilaʿat*, Isfand 20, 1312 [March 11, 1934]; Karvan-i Shadi: Khat-i Siyr-i Karvan dar Du Ruz [The Happiness Caravan: The Caravan's Trajectories in Two Days], *Ittilaʿat*, Isfand 22, 1312 [March 13, 1934]; Karvan-i Shadi [The Happiness Caravan], *Ittilaʿat*, Isfand 28, 1312 [March 19, 1934].

[78] Layihih-yi Sabt-i Asnad va Amlak-i Ijbari [The Mandatory Real Estate Registration Law], *Ittilaʿat*, Bahman 5, 1306 [January 26, 1928]. For the complete text of the law and all its changes through time, see: Islamic Parliament Research Center, "Qanun-i Sabt-i Asnad va Amlak [Real Estate Registration Law]," http://rc.majlis.ir/fa/law/show/92284 (accessed December 22, 2015).

owner had to record the legal boundaries of the property by surveying it. This process solidified property lines and legally defined their boundaries, which had a great impact on the cities, particularly on their old fabrics.

In the old neighborhoods, built out of mud and clay, the buildings could not last long and were prone to repeated destruction and change over time. As a result, the property lines and the morphology of the city were in a constant process of gradual transformation. A comparison between the 1858 and 1891 maps of Tehran reveals some of these gradual changes, as seen in Figure 5.1. However, surveying and registering property lines prevented the further transformation of the city without the state's supervision and control. Through this law, the state managed to establish its control over every single parcel of land in the city and in the country.

Two other major pieces of legislation followed the process of the registration of properties. First, in 1930, the state passed the *Residential Properties Taxation Act*.[79] While the registration act had recorded all the owners, boundaries, and locations of properties, this act provided a sustainable source of revenue for municipalities. The second was the 1933 *Act for the Construction and Development of the Streets*.[80] This act legalized municipalities' interventions in the old cities, destruction of old neighborhoods, and construction of new streets. It urged the municipalities to draw maps of the new streets and define the exact area of each property that had to be demolished to build these streets. The resulting maps were the basis for compensating the owners.[81] However, long before the passage of this act, the

[79] ʿAvariz-i Khanih-ha-yi Maskuni, *Ittilaʿat*, Shahrivar 20, 1309 [September 12, 1930] and Azar 10, 1309 [December 2, 1930].

[80] *Majalih-yi Baladiyyih [Baladiyyih Magazine]* 10, no. 11–12 (Farvardin 1313 [March 1934]): 557–61; Islamic Parliament Research Center, "Qanun Rajiʿ bih Ihdas va Tusiʿih-yi Maʿabir va Khiyaban-ha [The Law for the Construction and Development of the Streets]," http://rc.majlis.ir/fa/law/show/92834 (accessed December 22, 2015).

[81] Although the municipalities were obliged to pay the owner the value of the demolished houses, it seems that they were not totally fair in all cases. The data on the practices of the municipalities is scarce; however, there are a few examples amid the articles of the newspapers that prove the unjust procedures of street building and compensation. For example, a year after the construction of a new street in the city of Kerman, the owners of the destroyed houses lived in tents in front of their old properties without receiving the money that would allow them

Figure 5.1 Gradual transformation of the old city over time.

Figure 5.2 Widening map of Chiraghbarq Street, starting from Tupkhanih Square.[82]

municipalities had already begun this procedure. In other words, the act codified the existing practices rather than mandating a new one. Figures 5.2 and 5.3 provide some examples of these maps in Tehran. The maps record the owner of each property and the boundaries of the new streets that pass through them.

to buy a new place: Qanun-i Baladiyyih-ha, *Ittilaʿat*, Urdibihisht 23, 1309 [May 13, 1930]. Similarly, through the examinations of people's grievance letters to the Parliament, a recent study shows that the street-building construction did not happen smoothly or without protest: Suhiyla Safari et al., "Iʿtirazat-i Mardum Bih Nusazi-yi Shahri dar Duwrih-yi Pahlavi-yi Aval [People's Protests against Urban Renewal in the First Pahlavi Era]," *Tahghighat-i Tarikh-i Ijtimaʿi* 4, no. 1 (spring and summer 1393 [2014]): 29–60.

[82] *Majalih-yi Baladiyyih [Baladiyyih Magazine]* 6, no. 4 (Bahman 1306 [February 1928]): 24ff.

Figure 5.3 Widening map of Istanbul Street, from its intersection at Lalihzar.[83]

The construction of new streets and squares transformed Tehran's old neighborhoods dramatically. The Pahlavi state demolished the spatial structure of these neighborhoods. For centuries, the old neighborhoods of Tehran had gradually formed based on various factors, such as climatic and environmental necessities, the politics of the communal sphere, the distribution of water in the city, the location of the communal spaces of each neighborhood, and so forth. During the 1870s expansion of Tehran, the Qajar court was unable to alter the spatial configuration of these neighborhoods and had to respect the old city.

In contrast, by undertaking a massive project of constructing new streets and squares, both in the old and new cities, the Pahlavi state transformed the physicality of Tehran dramatically. The municipality of Tehran widened the streets of the northern city from the Nasseri expansion and built new squares at their cross sections. In the old city, the municipality destroyed buildings and constructed new straight and wide streets by cutting through the old neighborhoods. Through these projects, the state superimposed a new spatial pattern on the old fabric, which was in stark contrast to its former labyrinthine network of narrow alleys. Moreover, by constructing buildings with uniform façades and extroverted architecture alongside the new streets and squares and incorporating pre-Islamic motifs in the façades of the governmental buildings – as the architectural manifestations of the state's nation-building project – the state provided a new physical appearance

[83] *Majalih-yi Baladiyyih [Baladiyyih Magazine]* 6, no. 5 (Isfand 1306 [March 1928]): 22ff.

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for the city.[84] The municipality also wiped out a vast section of the *Sangilaj* neighborhood for the stock exchange building. This project was never finished and, years later, the municipality transformed the empty land into a public park. Similarly, the destruction of many of the Qajar palaces inside and outside of the royal compound provided open space for new governmental buildings and ministries. In 1933, the state tore down the city ramparts without replacing them; the last barrier against Tehran's limitless expansion was wiped out, and the city began to grow in four directions.

At the same time, new industries began to emerge around the city, mainly on the southern side. Similarly, the state built Tehran's massive railway station and its facilities in the south of the city. In contrast, the northern lands of the city accommodated new urban facilities of the modern world, such as the University of Tehran, the National Garden (*Bāgh-i Millī*), the National Bank, the National Museum, and a new hospital. Moreover, long avenues connected Tehran to the northern mountainous region. These streets provided the spatial structure for the expansion of the city to the north in the decades to come.[85] Figure 5.4 illustrates the outcome of the state's interventions in Tehran three years after Reza Shah's abdication.

[84] For more information on architecture in the First Pahlavi era, see: Grigor, "The King's White Walls"; Grigor, *Building Iran*; Amir Bani Masʿud, *Miʿmari-yi Muʿasir-i Iran: Dar Takapu-yi Biyn-i Sunnat va Mudirnitih [Iran's Contemporary Architecture: In Struggle between Tradition and Modernity]*, 2nd ed. (Tehran: Nashr-i Hunar-i Miʿmari, 1390 [2011]), 190–263; Mina Marefat, "Building to Power: Architecture of Tehran 1921–1941" (PhD diss., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1988), 68–248; Mustafa Kiyani, *Miʿmari-yi Duwrih-yi Pahlavi-yi Aval: Digarguni-yi Andishih-ha, Piydayish va Shiklgiri-yi Miʿmari-yi Duwrih-yi Bistsalih-yi Muʿasir-i Iran, 1299–1320 [Architecture in the First Pahlavi Era: Transformation of Thoughts, Formation of Architecture in the Twenty Years Period of Contemporary Iran, 1921–1941]* (Tehran: Muʾasisih-yi Mutaliʿat-i Tarikh-i Muʿasir-i Iran, 1386 [2008]).

[85] For more information on the transformation of Tehran during the First Pahlavi era, see: Eckart Ehlers, "Cities IV. Modern Urbanization and Modernization in Persia," in *Encyclopedia Iranica* (December 15, 1991), www.iranicaonline.org/articles/cities-iv (accessed December 21, 2015); Ehlers and Floor, "Urban Change in Iran"; Sayyid Mohsen Habibi, "Réza Chah et le Développement de Téhéran (1925–1941)," in *Téhéran Capitale Bicentenaire*, ed. C. Adle and B. Hourcade (Paris: Institute Français de Recherche en Iran: 1992), 199–206; Sayyid Mohsen Habibi, *Az Shar ta Shahr: Tahlili Tarikhi az Mafhum-i Shahr va Sima-yi Kalbudi-yi An: Tafakkur va Taʾssur [From the Shar to the City: Historical Analysis of the Concept of the City and Its Morphology]* (Tehran: University of Tehran Press, 1384 [2005]), 149–85; Husayn Karimiyan, *Tehran dar Guzashtih*

Figure 5.4 The 1944 map of Tehran (the scale at top-left corner has been added).[86]

The second factor that helped the state in conducting an unprecedented spatial bureaucratization in Tehran was the empowerment of municipalities. The existence of these governmental, urban institutions had become possible after the Constitutional Revolution by the passage of the June 2, 1907 *Baladiyyih Act*.[87] The act, which was revised and passed again in 1927, gave a broad range of responsibilities to municipalities,

va Hal [Tehran in Past and Present] (Tehran: Intisharat-i Danishgah-i Milli, 2535 [1976]), 285–324; Ali Madanipour, *Tehran: The Making of a Metropolis* (Chichester: Wiley, 1998), 36–40; Marefat, "Building to Power," 73–109. For the fate of the buildings in the royal compound, see: Yahya Zuka', *Tarikhchih-yi Sakhtiman-ha-yi Arg-i Saltanati-yi Tehran va Rahnama-yi Kakh-i Gulistan [The History of the Buildings in the Royal Citadel of Tehran and the Gulistan Palace Guide]* (Tehran: Anjuman-i Asar-i Melli, 1349 [1970]).

[86] Muhammad Reza Ghafari, "Naqshih-yi Rahnama-yi Tehran va Atraf-i An," [ca. 1944], Tehran Map Collection, American Geographical Society Library, University of Wisconsin Milwaukee, Milwaukee.

[87] Islamic Parliament Research Center, "Qanun-i Baladīyyih". Also see: *Majalih-yi Baladiyyih [Baladiyyih Magazine]* 1, no. 4 (Shawwal 25, 1339 [July

from improving public health to regulating prices and from performing cultural reforms to constructing new streets and squares.[88] The municipalities thus turned into the most efficient instruments for the state's socio-spatial reforms in the cities, particularly in Tehran.

The municipalities managed to unify various power structures in Iranian cities. They abolished neighborhoods' semi-autonomy by overruling their self-organization and *Kadkhudā*s' roles as the heads of the neighborhoods. In Tehran, the municipality divided the city into eleven districts, each with its own internal organization and hierarchy of responsibilities and duties.[89] Similarly, as mentioned earlier, the municipality replaced the old guild system and made all the guilds accountable to the Office of Food Control. In addition, the municipality of Tehran took over responsibility for water distribution in the city. Through this process, it established oversight over all the *mīrāb*s, water distributers, in Tehran. To accomplish this task, the municipality began to rent all the subterranean aqueducts, or *qanāt*s, from their owners. At the same time, it forbade the owners to rent the *qanāt*s to anybody else. Through these policies, the municipality acquired a monopoly over the city's water resources.[90] Moreover, the municipality replaced various governmental offices of the Qajar era that were responsible for different aspects of urban life, such as *Iḥtisābīyyih* and *Tanẓīf*.[91]

For several years after the 1921 coup, the main concerns of the municipality were the continuations of the Qajar era's urban problems, such as the need to improve public health, regulate water

2, 1921]): 8–12; vol. 1, no. 5 (Dhu al-Qaʿda 3, 1339 [July 9, 1921]): 9–10; vol. 1, no. 5 (Dhu al-Qaʿda 3, 1339 [July 9, 1921]): 9–10; vol. 1, no. 6 (Dhu al-Qaʿda 10, 1339 [July 16, 1921]): 7–8; vol. 1, no. 7 (Dhu al-Qaʿda 17, 1339 [July 23, 1921]): 6; vol. 1, no. 8 (Dhu al-Qaʿda 24, 1339 [July 30, 1921]): 4–5.

[88] For the complete text of the 1927 law, see: Qanun-i Baladi [Municipality Law], *Ittilaʿat*, Isfand 1, 1305 [February 21, 1927]; Isfand 6, 1305 [February 26, 1927]; Isfand 10, 1305 [March 2, 1927]; Isfand 19, 1305 [March 11, 1927]; Isfand 22, 1305 [March 14, 1927]; Isfand 24, 1305 [March 16, 1927].

[89] *Majalih-yi Baladiyyih [Baladiyyih Magazine]* 6, no. 1 (Aban 1306 [October 1927]): 11.

[90] Iʿlan [Announcement], *Ittilaʿat*, Isfand 29, 1305 [March 21, 1927]. Also, for the municipality's water guidelines see: Iʿlan [Announcement], *Ittilaʿat*, Khurdad 9, 1313 [May 30, 1934].

[91] These offices were responsible for managing various aspects of the city in the Qajar era. For more information, see Chapter 4.

distribution in the city, prevent food and water shortages, and control prices. These issues were the state's primary justification for the consolidation of its spatial control and further bureaucratization of the city. During these years, fighting disease outbreaks and the microbial contamination of drinking water absorbed the bulk of the budget and energy of the municipality. This concern is clearly reflected in *Baladiyyih* magazine, the official periodical of the municipality: "Between all the problems of the urban life, public health is the most important one. While all the other social matters have their own opponents and proponents, it is only on this issue that everyone agrees."[92] As a result, one of the significant measures of the municipality was the establishment of the Office of Health and Public Affairs, or *ʾIdārih-yi Ṣiḥīyyih va Muʿāvinat-i ʿUmūmī*. This office had the power to interfere in various aspects of urban life in order to improve public health and prevent the outbreak of diseases. It supervised, regulated, and controlled all the businesses that dealt with food provision. In cases such as epidemics, it even had the legal authority to enter private residences and disinfect people's clothing and furniture. The construction of hospitals, asylums, new bathhouses, clinics, and the like were some of the other duties of this sector.[93]

In this era, the municipality issued dozens of *niẓāmnāmih*s, or guidelines, to regulate different aspects of public life and improve the sanitary conditions of the city. These *niẓāmnāmih*s were designed separately for different stores, particularly food product stores, and aimed to regulate all the various aspects of their business.[94] The municipality even went as far as linking all construction in the city to public health and demanded that people receive approval from the municipality's

[92] *Majalih-yi Baladiyyih [Baladiyyih Magazine]* 1, no. 9 (Dhu l-Hijja 1, 1339 [August 6, 1921]): 1.

[93] For a complete list of the duties of this office, see: *Majalih-yi Baladiyyih [Baladiyyih Magazine]* 1, no. 9 (Dhu l-Hijja 1, 1339 [August 6, 1921]): 5–7; *Majalih-yi Baladiyyih [Baladiyyih Magazine]* 3, no. 4 (Jumada l-Ula 28, 1343 [December 25, 1924]): 9–13.

[94] For the regulation of the fruit sellers, confectionaries, groceries, *kalih pazī*s (a kind of food), and *kabābī*s (selling kebabs), see: *Majalih-yi Baladiyyih [Baladiyyih Magazine]* 1, no. 5 (Dhu al-Qaʿda 3, 1339 [July 9, 1921]): 9–10. For the regulations of *salmānī*s (hair salons), see: *Majalih-yi Baladiyyih [Baladiyyih Magazine]* 1, no. 8 (Dhu al-Qaʿda 24, 1339 [July 30, 1921]): 16. For the regulation of bathhouses, see: *Majalih-yi Baladiyyih [Baladiyyih*

Office of Construction, or *Idārih-yi Sākhtimān*, before beginning any building operations.[95] Moreover, as mentioned earlier, by abolishing the old guild system and issuing separate *niẓāmnāmih*s for each guild, the municipality managed to control all the commercial interactions in Tehran as well as control prices and prevent food shortages.

During the 1920s, the municipality of Tehran succeeded in subjugating various sources of power in the city. This process enabled the state to stretch its dominance and control over the spatiality of the city. Similar to the national government, the centralization of power was the state's primary method for pushing ahead its reform programs in the cities. While this process had begun during the Qajar era and the reign of Nasser al-Din Shah, the Pahlavi state consolidated its spatial presence by abolishing various communal power structures that could challenge its authority. The central state substituted the segmented urban power structure, which resulted in further abstraction of the city. This process was a serious blow to the vitality of the communal sphere; it disabled communities and prevented them from regulating their internal affairs and relationships with the outer world. The state gained absolute dominance over the spatiality of the city.

However, this is not the end of the story. Toward the end of the 1920s and throughout the 1930s, the municipality's priorities shifted toward social matters. Instead of approaching the city through the discourse of public health, in this era the main concern of the state was concentrated on social reforms and the transformation of people's traditional lifestyles. In an article in *Municipality* magazine from 1928, it describes its own responsibilities in these words:

Magazine] 9, no. 3 (Aban 1309 [November 1930]): 91–3. For regulations of the public garages, see: *Majalih-yi Baladiyyih [Baladiyyih Magazine]* 11, no. 6 (Farvardin 1314 [March 1935]): 184. For the regulation of all the traditional kitchens, see: Iʿlan az Taraf-i Baladiyyih-yi Tehran [Announcement from Municipality of Tehran], *Ittilaʿat*, Mihr 26, 1307 [October 18, 1928]. For the regulation of the bakeries, see: Iʿlan az Taraf-i Baladiyyih-yi Tehran [Announcement from Municipality of Tehran], *Ittilaʿat*, Aban 8, 1307 [October 30, 1928]. For the regulation of the bakeries and butchers, see: Iʿlan az Taraf-i Baladiyyih-yi Tehran [Announcement from Municipality of Tehran], *Ittilaʿat*, Murdad 23, 1309 [August 15, 1930].

[95] *Majalih-yi Baladiyyih [Baladiyyih Magazine]* 1, no. 7 (Dhu al-Qaʿda 17, 1339 [July 23, 1921]): 5. Later, in 1933, the municipality issued a separate guideline for new construction. For this guideline, see: *Majalih-yi Baladiyyih [Baladiyyih Magazine]* 10, no. 6 (Farvardin 1312 [March 1933]): 323–8.

The public health, food provision, city's beautification, illumination, and cleaning, and the most important of all, disciplining citizens' morality and preventing their harmful habits are some of the thousands of duties of the municipality. To sum up, from the birth to the death of a person, he has to deal with the municipality, and the organization is his guardian.[96]

The state mobilized its most powerful instrument in the cities, the municipalities, toward the implementation of social reforms. However, these top-down reforms were amplified by bottom-up social demands of a particular section of Iranian society for the production of novel forms of social life and spaces. The rest of this chapter demonstrates how the advocates of modernity, particularly the modern middle class, developed novel forms of social life and spaces in Tehran and transformed the relationship between the city and society. At the same time, the bond between this group and the Pahlavi state resulted in the systematic transformation of people's traditional lifestyles and communal spaces.

The Simultaneous Processes of Social Production and Abstraction of Social Spaces

From the mid-nineteenth century, Tehran went through a long-term process of abstraction. With the exception of the Constitutional Revolution and the production of political public spaces, during this era, the spatial domination of the state grew gradually but constantly. Beginning in the Nasser al-Din Shah era, the state managed to stretch its control and presence in various aspects of social life and spaces of the city. Bureaucratization and commodification based on European models helped the state in its spatial domination. In this view, the Pahlavi state and its spatial strategies were the continuations of the process that had already begun in the nineteenth century.

However, the constant process of spatial abstraction does not mean that Iranian urban society ceased to produce new social spaces. In contrast, as the rest of this chapter demonstrates, after the Constitutional Revolution and particularly in the interwar period, the advocates of modernity, especially the modern middle class, produced

[96] *Majalih-yi Baladiyyih [Baladiyyih Magazine]* 6, no. 5 (Isfand 1306 [March 1928]): 34–6.

novel forms of social life and spaces in Tehran. Unlike the traditional social spaces of Iranian cities, examined in the first chapter, these novel spaces were modeled after their European counterparts. Cafés, restaurants, hotels, cinemas, theaters, and sport clubs proliferated in the northern neighborhoods of the city. These spaces accommodated new forms of social interactions and became the markers for the distinction of the modern middle class. This class produced its spatiality and used it as symbolic capital to define its superior position in society and distinguish itself from the traditional strata.

At the same time, the advocates of modernity joined the state in the systematic process of the transformation of the traditional forms of social life and spaces. By imposing strict guidelines, *niẓāmnāmih*s, the state regulated and altered the long-established socio-spatial configuration of these spaces. In their periodicals, the modern middle class portrayed these traditional forms of social life and spaces as filthy, unhealthy, and obsolete. They produced negative spatial stigmas for these portrayals. The line between the spatial strategies of the state and spatial practices of the modern middle class were blurred in this era. There was a significant overlap between the two in confronting traditional social spaces. The members of the modern middle class assisted the state in its systematic abstraction of traditional social spaces.

The Demise of Coffeehouses and Rise of Cafés

The traditional coffeehouses and kitchens[97] of the old city of Tehran underwent major socio-spatial transformations in this era. The municipalities' *niẓāmnāmih*s targeted these spaces and transformed them dramatically. On September 25, 1928, the municipality of Tehran issued its first *niẓāmnāmih* for cafés and coffeehouses. It consisted of twenty-five rules organized into four sections: construction, opening, products, and range of services.[98] The primary goal of this *niẓāmnāmih* and many other similar ones was the regulation of the safety and health aspects of various enterprises. For example, the cafés and coffeehouses *niẓāmnāmih* obliged the owners to regulate the wastewater of their store and install exhausts for fumes, forbid clay

[97] *Kabābī*s, *ṭabākhī*s, *ḥalīmpazī*s, and *dīzīpazī*s.
[98] For the complete text of this *niẓāmnāmih*, see: Tarz-i Bana-yi Kafih [Guideline for Building a Café], *Ittilaʿat*, Mihr 3, 1307 [September 25, 1928].

cups, regulate the consumption of hookahs, and many other similar measures.[99] However, a close reading of the *niẓāmnāmih*s shows that, besides enhancing the public health, they were the state's means to implement subtle socio-spatial transformations to redefine the traditional social functions of their targeted spaces.

The very first line of this *niẓāmnāmih* states that "cafés and coffeehouses are the same." By placing cafés and coffeehouses under the same category, the state was able to regulate them in the same way. As Chapter 1 discussed, coffeehouses were lively centers of communal life with their well-established social interactions. In contrast, cafés mostly belonged to the modern middle class and were patterned after their European counterparts. The state's regulation thus resulted in the social transformation of the former and the growing prevalence of the latter. Article three of the first section of this *niẓāmnāmih* forbade coffeehouses from drawing pictures on their walls and ceilings; article five forbade them from building sitting platforms around their interior space; article six obliged them to separate the food, tea, and coffee preparation area from the serving space; article one of the second section obliged them to have tables and chairs instead of platforms; and article seven of the fourth section prohibited *naqqālī*, or storytelling, and similar communal activities in coffeehouses.

These regulations went far beyond a public health discourse. The spatial bureaucratization through this *niẓāmnāmih* did not merely align with hygienic issues. By targeting one of the most vibrant traditional social spaces, the state was able to disturb the reciprocal relationship between social interactions and social spaces. By forbidding the drawings, the storytellers were unable to use them to perform their acts, since drawings were an inseparable part of *naqqālī*. The rearrangement of the seats of interior space affected the communal atmosphere of coffeehouses. Instead of sitting on platforms around the interior space, watching the performance, and participating in the collective act taking place in the middle, now people had to sit at separate tables. Moreover, these laws directly forbade all the communal activities in coffeehouses, particularly *naqqālī*.[100] Finally, by separating the

[99] Tarz-i Bana-yi Kafih [Guideline for Building a Café], *Ittilaʿat*, Mihr 3, 1307 [September 25, 1928].

[100] It is usually assumed that the development of other forms of public entertainment and the introduction of gramophones, radio, and later TV sets into

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food preparation and serving areas, the laws disregarded the central role of the owner of the coffeehouse, the *qahvihkhānihchī*. As prominent public figures in their neighborhoods and communities, the owners played a significant role in all the communal activities inside their enterprises and, at the same time, they could control the food preparation and serving processes. But these regulations forced them to move behind the walls of the kitchen, effectively detaching them from their communities.

The same socio-spatial regulations affected traditional kitchens. Similar to coffeehouses, the *niẓāmnāmih* for traditional kitchens primarily focused on various health and safety aspects.[101] However, amid these health and safety regulations, the state altered some socio-spatial aspects of traditional kitchens as well. The municipality's regulations obliged them to separate their food preparation from their serving

*qahvihkhānih*s resulted in the demise of *naqqālī*. ʿAli Al-i Dawud argues that "[a]fter the introduction of radio broadcasting in Persia in 1319 Š./1940 the character of coffeehouses began to change. Customers were more interested in hearing news of the world, particularly World War II, than in listening to stories or poems, with the result that reciters soon began to disappear." ʿAli Bulookbashi gives the same argument and believes that the new forms of public entertainment replaced traditional communal activities. However, Kumiko Yamamoto briefly points to the role of the state in the decline of *naqqāllī*: "In the late 1920s *naqqâl*s were accused of instigating members of guild organizations (whose members formed the main part of their audiences) to rioting and were forbidden to perform in coffeehouses." Ali Al-i Dawud, "Coffeehouse," in *Encyclopedia Iranica* (December 15, 1992), www.iranicaonline.org/articles/coffeehouse-qahva-kana-a-shop-and-meeting-place-where-coffee-is-prepared-and-served (accessed June 16, 2015); Ali Bulookbashi, *Qahvih and Qahvihkhanihnishini dar Iran [Iranian Coffeehouses: Traditions of Meeting and Passing Time at the Coffeehouses]* (Tehran: Daftar-i Pazhuhish-ha-yi Farhangi, 1393 [2014]), 115–16; Kumiko Yamamoto, "Naqqāli: Professional Iranian Storytelling," in *A History of Persian Literature*, vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yarshater (London: I.B. Tauris, 2010), 246. Moreover, the ban of *naqqālī* in the coffeehouses of Tehran and possibly other big cities does not mean that the practice suddenly disappeared across the entire country. Unfortunately, I could not find any data about the strictness of the implementation of these regulations in Tehran. Regarding other policies of the state during this era, it is probable that the state followed its regulations strictly. However, *naqqālī* did not disappear and in many small towns and villages it continued to live on for many years.

[101] Iʿlan az Taraf-i Baladiyyih-yi Tehran [Announcement from Municipality of Tehran], *Ittilaʿat*, Mihr 7, 1307 [September 29, 1928]; *Ittilaʿat* [Announcement from Municipality of Tehran], *Ittilaʿat*, Mihr 26, 1307 [October 18, 1928].

area; otherwise, they would be shut down.[102] Similar to coffeehouses, platforms were forbidden, they were obliged to have tables and chairs, they had to separate interior space from the streets by installing store windows, and they had to wipe out all the drawings on the ceilings and walls. The laws even forbade customers from eating with their hands and obliged them to use utensils.[103]

A painting from the early 1840s provides an image of traditional kitchens in the Tehran bazaar, as shown in Figure 5.5. Painted by Eugène Flandin on his trip to Iran, this painting shows how the location of the platform in the front of the shop was necessary for its social functions. It was a stage for the preparation of food; at the same time, the food was served on the same platforms to the customers. More importantly, it brought all people together. The owner of the kitchen and the customers were at the same platform; serving and being served were combined. This platform was a vibrant social stage for casual conversation and the spread of news.

This image helps to imagine how separating the kitchen and serving place, installing windows and doors for the shop, and using chairs and tables instead of platforms transformed the customary socio-spatial relations. While the health and safety aspects of these regulations are indisputable, it is important to note how subtle architectural transformations had profound social impacts. The resulting spaces did not fit the traditional social interactions of Iranian urban society; they were alien spaces in the old city.

Through these spatial transformations, the Pahlavi state disturbed the spatial arrangements that could enhance communal interactions between the members of the traditional strata of society. The state's regulations targeted coffeehouses and kitchens and their internal practices. As a result, the Pahlavi state managed to control and transform them by disturbing and altering the socio-spatial configuration of these enterprises. The desire for the modernization and Westernization of the country and society necessitated the transformation and control of traditional social spaces. *Niẓāmnāmih*s provided the state

[102] Iʿlan az Taraf-i Baladiyyih-yi Tehran [Announcement from Municipality of Tehran], *Ittilaʿat*, Mihr 7, 1307 [September 29, 1928].

[103] Iʿlan az Taraf-i Baladiyyih-yi Tehran [Announcement from Municipality of Tehran], *Ittilaʿat*, Mihr 26, 1307 [October 18, 1928].

Figure 5.5 A traditional kitchen in Tehran bazaar by Eugène Flandin.[104]

with the instrument to extend its control over the most intimate social spaces of the city.

In contrast to the fate of these spaces, the Reza Shah era witnessed the proliferation of European-style cafés, restaurants, and hotels in Tehran. Alongside the development of the modern middle class, these spaces increased and spread in the northern neighborhoods of the city. Cafés, restaurants, and hotels became the gathering places of the people who desired to practice an alternative lifestyle, which was modern, mixed-sex, non-traditional, and European. Articles of *Ittilaʿat* newspaper, as the main venue that reflects the social views of the modern middle class, clearly demonstrate how this class equated progress and the modernization of society with the proliferation of European-style social spaces. In this view, a modern city and society had to have cafés, restaurants, and hotels: "Hotels are one of the principles of civilization and one of the requirements and necessities of every city."[105]

[104] This picture is in the public domain and is free to use without restriction. It is accessible through the New York Public Library website: General Research Division, the New York Public Library, "Tourneur de Caliouns; Cuisine de Bazar," New York Public Library Digital Collections, http://digitalcollections.nypl.org/items/510d47e2-9066-a3d9-e040-e00a18064a99 (accessed January 4, 2016).

[105] Mihmankhanih [Hotel], *Ittilaʿat*, Shahrivar 24, 1307 [September 15, 1928].

Another article from October 25, 1931 asks whether people have changed as the result of the state's modernization. The article encourages people to go to theaters, cinemas, cafés, and concerts to become modern:

> People who are trying to change, not only have changed their appearances but also have changed their identity and adopted the modern principles of social life from a few years ago; they are eager to learn [about the modern world]. Now that they have to go to theaters, cinemas, cafés, and concerts, they want to know which moral principles they should adopt and which [flaws] they should abandon.[106]

The modern middle class advocated new forms of social life and social spaces as venues for the modernization and Westernization of society. Participation in the social life of these spaces was understood as the mechanism by which the culture of modernity could be assimilated. These spaces transformed into social markers for the distinction of the advocates of modernity and their way of life from the rest of society and the traditional and religious lifestyles.

It is no surprise that these enterprises mostly had non-Iranian titles, such as Grand,[107] Paris,[108] Victoria,[109] Renaissance,[110] Luxe,[111] Imperial,[112] and Continental[113] Hotels. Similarly, there were Continental,[114] Vuka,[115] Imperial,[116] Mikado,[117] Modern,[118] Lausanne,[119] Luna Park,[120] Lotto,[121] and Bristol[122] Cafés or Café-Restaurants. Some of the cafés went as far as advertising in Persian and French at the same

[106] Mardum Haman Mardumand ya ʿAvaz Shudihand? [Are People the Same or Have They Changed?], *Ittilaʿat*, Aban 2, 1310 [October 25, 1931]
[107] *Ittilaʿat*, Aban 17, 1305 [December 9, 1926].
[108] *Ittilaʿat*, Khurdad 10, 1306 [June 1, 1927].
[109] *Ittilaʿat*, Urdibihisht 17, 1308 [May 7, 1929].
[110] *Ittilaʿat*, Khurdad 13, 1308 [June 3, 1929].
[111] *Ittilaʿat*, Mihr 28, 1308 [October 20, 1929].
[112] *Ittilaʿat*, Azar 7, 1310 [November 29, 1931].
[113] *Ittilaʿat*, Shahrivar 23, 1311 [September 14, 1932].
[114] *Ittilaʿat*, Aban 5, 1308 [October 27, 1929].
[115] *Ittilaʿat*, Tir 5, 1309 [June 27, 1930].
[116] *Ittilaʿat*, Aza 1, 1309 [November 23, 1930].
[117] *Ittilaʿat*, Mihr 12, 1310 [October 5, 1931].
[118] *Ittilaʿat*, Azar 4, 1310 [November 26, 1931].
[119] *Ittilaʿat*, Azar 6, 1310 [November 28, 1931].
[120] *Ittilaʿat*, Urdibihisht 12, 1311 [May 2, 1932].
[121] *Ittilaʿat*, Murdad 31, 1311 [August 22, 1932].
[122] *Ittilaʿat*, Shahrivar 5, 1311 [August 27, 1932].

Figure 5.6 Café advertisement in the *Ittilaʿat* newspaper.[123]

Figure 5.7 Café advertisement in the *Ittilaʿat* newspaper.[124]

time, as seen in Figures 5.6 and 5.7, and in their advertisements they highlighted their Western features:

Important Announcement. Imperial Hotel and Restaurant in Lalihzar Street next to Didihban Mayak Cinema inaugurated on Monday night, Azar 3, 1309 [November 25, 1930], based on the best European-style. For the reception of respectable gentlemen, there are various options such as soirée, evening tea, American bar, lunch, and dinner. The orchestra for the evening tea plays from four to six pm and for the soirée from eight pm to two hours after midnight.[125]

The advertisements in the *Ittilaʿat* newspaper show that new forms of social life developed around these spaces, such as garden parties, masquerades, public parties for the New Year, dancing nights, concerts, theaters, film screenings, and the like.[126] These forms of social

[123] *Ittilaʿat*, Khurdad 24, 1310 [June 15, 1931].

[124] *Ittilaʿat*, Shahrivar 7, 1310 [August 30, 1931].

[125] Ittilaʿ-i Muhim [Important Announcement], *Ittilaʿat*, Azar 1, 1309 [November 23, 1930].

[126] For a few examples, see: Namayish-i ʿAli-yi Huzn va Nishat [A Perfect Play of Grief and Happiness], *Ittilaʿat*, Aban 17, 1305 [December 9, 1926]; Balmaskih-yi ba Shukuh [Glorious Masquerade], *Ittilaʿat*, Diy 9, 1306 [December 31, 1927]; Kunsirt-i Maʿrufi [Maʿrufi Concert], *Ittilaʿat*, Behman

life were relatively new in Iranian cities. If, in the late Nasseri era, the European-style social gatherings were limited to a small section of courtiers and a few Europeans in Tehran, in this era the modern middle class eagerly advocated this new lifestyle.

The desire for alternative forms of social life, mostly pursued by the modern middle class, produced spaces that were in stark contrast to the traditional strata's social spaces. The contrast between these spaces is traceable in the literature of both sections of society. On the one hand, the traditional strata used particular terms to humiliate those who practiced the modern way of life and people with European appearances, such as *fukulī*, *mustafrang*, *ghirtī*, *farangīmaāb*, and the like.[127] On the other hand, the modern middle class used negative stigmas to ridicule the traditional forms of social life and spaces in their periodicals. For example, the *Ittilaʿat* newspaper wrote about the unhealthy conditions in coffeehouses and claimed that the customers of these places were either low-income workers or opium addicts.[128] In a series of comic articles in *Tehran-i Musavar* magazine, the author depicted a countryman, *dihātī*,[129] who came to Tehran and was impressed by its progress. Unable to recognize the city anymore, he talked about its

16, 1306 [February 6, 1928]; Namayish-i Elahih-yi Jashn-i Gol-ha [The Play of the Goddess of the Flowers' Festivity], *Ittilaʿat*, Bahman 24, 1306 [February 14, 1928]; Klub-i Shiydan Shid [Shiydan Shid Club], *Ittilaʿat*, Bahman 26, 1306 [February 16, 1928]; Bih Eftikhar-i Ilgha-i Kapitulasiyun [In Honor of the Abolition of the Capitulations], *Ittilaʿat*, Khurdad 1, 1307 [May 22, 1928]; Klub-i Kiyvan [Kiyvan Club], *Ittilaʿat*, Khurdad 6, 1307 [May 27, 1928]; Kunsir-i Urupai [European Concert], *Ittilaʿat*, Bahman 4, 1307 [January 24, 1929]; Tajdid-i Uprit-i ʿAli-yi Huri [Repetition of the Grand Opera of Huri], *Ittilaʿat*, Farvardin 29, 1308 [April 20, 1929]; Shabnishini [Soiree], *Ittilaʿat*, Urdibihisht 17, 1308 [May 7, 1929]; Kafih Musical va Maghazih-yi Qanadi (Voka) [Musical Café and Confectionery (Voka)] *Ittilaʿat*, Shahrivar 10, 1309 [September 2, 1930]. Similarly, Hamid Naficy mentions that some modern cafés and hotels, and even traditional coffeehouses, in Tehran began sessions of film exhibition in this era. Hamid Naficy, *A Social History of Iranian Cinema: The Artisanal Era, 1897–1941*, vol. 1 (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2011), 128–9.

[127] These terms loosely translate as Westernized; however, they bear an implicit humiliation. Al-i Ahmad, *Dar Khidmat va Khiyanat-i Ruwshanfikran*, 43–4.

[128] 3-Ijtimaʿat [3- Social Gathering], *Ittilaʿat*, Diy 12, 1307 [January 2, 1929].

[129] This word is sometimes used as a derogatory term to humiliate people who do not know much about the city.

different marvels. On one occasion, the poor countryman entered a modern café and described it in these words:

> Wow! What is this place?! It is not a coffeehouse! Definitely, it is not a coffeehouse! If it is a coffeehouse, why there is no painting of Rustam, Suhrab, and Giv on the walls!?[130] If it is a coffeehouse, why does it not have a storyteller? […] If it is a coffeehouse, what are these chairs and table?! If it is a coffeehouse, why does it have a gramophone?! […] Maybe it is the house of *farangī*s! O my God! I seek refuge in You. I am about to go crazy.[131]

The distribution of modern spaces follows the same social pattern of old and new described in the previous chapter. The modern social spaces of Tehran were mostly located in the new northern neighborhoods of the city. The 1932 census of Tehran counted fifty-five cafés in the city, forty-three of which were in the two northern neighborhoods, Hasanabad and Duwlat. A 1914 travel guide to Tehran mentions only three hotels in the city, Hotel de Paris, Hotel de France, and Hotel de L'Europe, all on the northern street of ʿAlaʾ al-Duwlih, later Firduwsi Street.[132] In 1932, this number had reached fifty-four hotels and inns, thirty-three of which were in Hasanabad and Duwlat, and sixteen in the Ūdlājān neighborhood.[133] Finally, the census counted thirty-three restaurants, nineteen of them in the northern neighborhoods. There were no cafés and hotels in the two main southern neighborhoods of Muhammadiyyih and Bazaar, and there were only two restaurants in the latter.[134] Figure 5.8 shows the distribution of hotels and inns of the city based on the 1949 guidebook of Tehran. Once again, the two neighborhoods of Duwlat and Hasanabad accommodate the majority of these enterprises. The south and north, old and new, traditional and modern, and Iranian and European dichotomies had formed distinct spatial representations in the city.

[130] The heroes of epic stories of *Shahnamih* whose paintings were part of *qahvihkhānih*s so the *naqqāl*s were able to use them to tell their stories.

[131] *Tehran Musavar*, 2 (Azar 23, 1308 [December 14, 1929]): 15. Various issues of this magazine are available at the University of Tehran, Central Library, Department of Periodicals.

[132] Karl Baedeker, *Russia with Teheran, Port Arthur, and Peking: Handbook for Travellers* (Leipzig: Karl Baedeker Publisher, 1914), 501.

[133] The Udlajan neighborhood was the only neighborhood in the old city that hosted some of the state's early construction before the Nasseri expansion of Tehran. Nasseriyyih Street and Square were the first examples of European-style spaces in Tehran before the main Qajar expansion. See Chapter 4.

[134] Baladiyyih Tehran, *Sarshumari-yi Nufus-i Shahr-i Tehran*, 30, 33.

Figure 5.8 The distribution of modern social spaces in Tehran in 1949.[135]

Although the state pursued the alteration and abstraction of the traditional forms of social life and spaces, the production of cafés, restaurants, and hotels can be regarded as a counter-process against the hegemony of the state and the general abstraction of the city. However, these spaces were not immune to the state's strict regulations. The authoritative and bureaucratic state soon passed new *niẓāmnāmih*s for these growing enterprises. The September 25, 1928 cafés and

[135] Shahrbani-ye Kol-e Keshvar, *Rahnama-ye shahr-e Tehran [Tehran City Guide]* (Tehran: Da'ereh-ye Joghrafiya'-ye Setad-e Artesh, 1328 [1949]).

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coffeehouses *niẓāmnāmih* was aimed to regulate cafés too.[136] The *niẓāmnāmih* for restaurants was published less than a month later.[137] Beginning in November 1930, the municipality began to grade cafés, restaurants, and hotels to define their specific taxes, which were based on those grades.[138] Ultimately, the most effective law was proposed in 1933, this time by the Interior and Justice Ministries. Titled the *Public Places Guidelines*, or *Niẓāmnāmih-yi Amākin-i ʿUmūmī*, this law set unified regulations for all the public places of the cities, including cafés, restaurants, and hotels. Consisting of fifty-eight sections, this law regulated every single aspect of these public enterprises.[139]

From Takīyyehs *and Religious Performances to Cinemas and Theaters*

The second half of Reza Shah's reign witnessed the restriction of many religious public ceremonies, including the prohibition of Muharram mourning rituals, *taʿzīyih* performances, and mourning processions. There was a transitional period from the formation of the Pahlavi state to the ban of the religious rituals. The announcements in *Ittilaʿat* newspaper prove that the municipality of Tehran sponsored the Muharram ceremonies up to 1933. A short article from June 1, 1931 shows that, in that year, the mourning ceremonies were held in *Takīyyih Duwlat* in the royal compound, and even Reza Shah visited *Takīyyih Duwlat* twice, on Muharram 9 and 10.[140] This was the last time that the newspaper mentioned the Muharram ceremonies in *Takīyyih Duwlat*. In the next two years there were very short announcements about mourning ceremonies at the municipality building. However, there is no talk of *Takīyyih Duwlat* and

[136] Tarz-i Bana-yi Kafih [Guideline for Building a Café], *Ittilaʿat*, Mihr 3, 1307 [September 25, 1928].

[137] Iʿlan az Taraf-i Baladiyyih-yi Tehran [Announcement from Municipality of Tehran], *Ittilaʿat*, Mihr 26, 1307 [October 18, 1928].

[138] Dar Baladiyyih-yi Tehran [In Municipality of Tehran], *Ittilaʿat*, Aban 19, 1309 [November 11, 1930].

[139] Nizamnamih-yi Amakin-i ʿUmumi [Public Places Guidelines], *Ittilaʿat*, Bahman 11, 1312 [January 31, 1933]; Nizamnamih-yi Amakin-i ʿUmumi [Public Places Guidelines], *Ittilaʿat*, Bahman 12, 1312 [February 1, 1933].

[140] Dar Takiyyih Duwlat [In Takiyyih Duwlat], *Ittilaʿat*, Khurdad 10, 1310 [June 1, 1931].

taʿzīyih performances in these years.[141] After 1933 there is no sign of the state-sponsored Muharram ceremonies. As a result, Shahidi's and Floor's estimates that 1932 or 1933 were the possible years of the official ban of Muharram rituals seem to be correct.[142]

There are several possible reasons for this prohibition. Peter J. Chelkowski believes that the incompatibility of these rituals with the state's modernization programs and the fear of the transformation of the rituals into political demonstrations were the main reasons for their ban.[143] Aghaie sees the ban as the state's method of eliminating possible political opponents.[144] Beizaʿi and again Aghaie argue that the state's ban of the ceremonies was to create a more civilized image of Iranian society in the international arena, since some of these ceremonies could be judged as violent and backward by foreigners.[145]

The articles of *Ittilaʿat* newspaper provide clues regarding the animosity of the advocates of modern reforms toward the religious rituals. The authors of these articles, mostly members of the modern middle class, depict mourning ceremonies as dark rituals against public virtue,[146] contrary to public health, and an element of the humiliation of Iranians in front of Europeans.[147]

Muharram rituals were not the only religious ceremonies that were prohibited under Reza Shah's rule. The *qurbān* camel sacrifice suffered

141 Tazakur az Taraf-i Baladiyyih-yi Tehran [Notification from Municipality of Tehran], *Ittilaʿat*, Urdibihisht 22, 1311 [May 12, 1932]; Ijra-yi Marasim-i Sugvari [Performing the Mourning Ceremonies], *Ittilaʿat*, Urdibihisht 6, 1312 [April 26, 1933].

142 Enayatullah Shahidi and Ali Bulookbashi, *Pazhuhishi dar Taʿzīyih va Taʿzīyihkhani: Az Aghaz ta Payan-i Durih-yi Qajar dar Tehran [Taʿzīyih and Taʿzīyihkhani in Tehran: A Research on Shiʿa Indigenous Drama of Taʿzīyeh from the Beginning to the End of Qajar Era]* (Tehran: Daftar-i Pazhuhish-ha-yi Farhangi, 1380 [2001]), 149; Willem Floor, *The History of Theater in Iran* (Washington, DC: Mage Publishers, 2005), 197–8.

143 Peter J. Chelkowski, "Dasta," in *Encyclopedia Iranica* (December 15, 1994), www.iranicaonline.org/articles/dasta (accessed January 6, 2016).

144 Kamran Scot Aghaie, *The Martyrs of Karbala: Shiʿi Symbols and Rituals in Modern Iran* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2004), 51.

145 Bahram Beizaʿi, *Namayish dar Iran [A Study on Iranian Theater]*, 3rd ed. (Tehran: Rushangaran va Mutaliʿat-i Zanan, 1380 [2001]), 150; Aghaie, *The Martyrs of Karbala*, 52. For a comprehensive account of Muharram rituals under the Pahlavi state, see: Aghaie, *The Martyrs of Karbala*, 47–86.

146 Majalis-i Sugvari [Mourning Ceremonies], *Ittilaʿat*, Tir 4, 1314 [June 26, 1935].

147 ʿAzadari [Mourning], *Ittilaʿat*, Khurdad 10, 1310 [June 1, 1931].

a similar fate; in 1935, the state abolished the ceremony. Two articles announcing the ban in *Ittilaʿat* newspaper provide valuable insight into the public framing of the ban. On the one hand, the articles mention that the camel sacrifice ceremony was against the real essence of Islam and that it was a shame for all Muslims. On the other hand, the articles connect the ceremony to the dark ages of Iran, claiming that it was not compatible with a modern and progressive nation.[148] Moreover, the articles of *Ittilaʿat* newspaper introduce Ramadan fasting month as the month of "silence, boredom, lethargy, and inaction."[149] Once again, negative stigmas provided a powerful instrument for portraying the traditional forms of social life.

Whatever the reasons behind the restrictions of religious ceremonies, these bans had profound spatial impacts. By abolishing or altering social life, traditional social spaces began to disintegrate and disappear from the cities. Tehran's *takīyyih*s, as the lively centers of the old neighborhoods, disappeared one by one in the years to come. In 1946, the state demolished the gigantic circular *Takīyyih Duwlat* in the royal compound to provide open space for the bazaar branch of the National Bank.[150] In losing their communal spaces, the traditional forms of social life lost their reproductive capacity.[151]

However, similar to the previous case of coffeehouses and cafés, a parallel social process produced new social spaces based on the sociality and spatiality of European countries. As such, cinemas and theaters offered an alternative to the abolished religious performances. Beginning in the constitutional era, the intelligentsia had already begun to popularize cinema and theater when the Pahlavi state consolidated.

[148] Shutur-i Qurbani [The Sacrificed Camel], *Ittilaʿat*, Isfand 21, 1313 [March 12, 1935]; ʿIyd-i Qurban [Qurban Holiday], *Ittilaʿat*, Isfand 23, 1313 [March 14, 1935].

[149] Mah-i Ramizan [Ramadan Month], *Ittilaʿat*, Bahman 1, 1309 [January 21, 1931].

[150] Zukaʾ, *Tarikhchih-yi Sakhtiman-ha-yi Arg-i Saltanati*, 310.

[151] It is important to note that the traditional and religious sections of Iranian society challenged the state clampdown on religion on several occasions, and this period witnessed various instances of protest and *bast* in holy shrines and mosques around the country. However, the Pahlavi state suppressed these instances violently and did not allow them to become large-scale protests. One of the best examples in this regard is the 1935 army massacre of the protesters in Imam Reza Shrine in Mashhad. Chapter 6 will return to this point in more detail.

The constitutional era helped to transfer theatrical performances from the small circle of the Qajar courtiers to the broader public.[152]

However, this process accelerated during the Reza Shah era. The growth of the modern middle class and the social demands for alternative forms of collective life were decisive factors in the proliferation of cinemas and theaters. Gradually, the number of these spaces increased in Tehran. In 1925 there was only one cinema in the entire city. This number reached seven in 1929,[153] fifteen in 1933,[154] and thirty-six – twenty-eight cinemas and eight theaters – in 1949.[155]

Moreover, the cinemas became more affordable for all sections of society. An article in *Ittilaʿat* newspaper on August 19, 1929, criticized the prices of the tickets and complained that the poor and ordinary people could not afford them. In 1932 the municipality began to define the ticket prices for each cinema separately.[156] With the increase in the number of cinemas, the municipality graded them into three levels and issued a separate cinema *niẓāmnāmih*. The cinema *niẓāmnāmih* defined the maximum price of the tickets for each grade: ten rials for the first grade, five rials for the second grade, and three rials for the third grade.[157]

Through these measures, cinemas and theaters became an inseparable part of people's social lives, particularly for the modern middle

[152] For the history of theater during the constitutional era, see: Floor, *The History of Theater in Iran*, 222–39; Jamshid Malekpour, *Adabiiyat-i Namayishi dar Iran [Drama in Iran]*, vol. 2 (Tehran, Intisharat-i Tus, 2006).

[153] Sinima [Cinema], *Ittilaʿat*, Murdad 27, 1308 [August 19, 1929].

[154] Baladiyyih Tehran, *Sarshumari-yi Nufus-i Shahr-i Tehran*, 33. This number seems to represent all the places that were used for the public showing of movies in the city and not necessarily the saloons specifically built as cinemas. In this era, hotels and even cafés were often used to play movies for the public. Another document counts seven cinema saloons and four theaters in 1936. The latter seems to count just the cinema and theater saloons and ignores other places. Vizarat-i Maʿarif ʾUqaf va Sanayiʿ Mustazrafih, *Salnamih va ʾIhsaʾiyyih*, 2: 148.

[155] Shahrbani-yi Kul-i Kishvar, *Rahnama-yi Shahr-i Tehran [Tehran City Guide]* (Tehran: Daʾirih-yi Jughrafiyaʾi-yi Sitad-i Artish, 1328 [1949]), 75–6. I came across this city guide in the University of Tehran Central Library, Department of Documents and Theses.

[156] Iʿlan az Taraf-i Baladiyyih-yi Tehran [Announcement from Municipality of Tehran], *Ittilaʿat*, Isfand 12, 1310 [March 3, 1932].

[157] Nizamnamih-yi Sinima-ha [Cinema's Regulations] *Ittilaʿat*, Diy 8, 1314 [December 30, 1935]; *Majalih-yi Baladiyyih [Baladiyyih Magazine]* 11, no. 8–9 (Bahman 1314 [February 1936]): 293–303.

class. The articles of *Ittilaʿat* newspaper show how this class regarded cinemas and theaters as efficient instruments for social reform. They regard the cinemas as a "necessity of life," an instrument for "enhancement of morality," and a means of "enlightenment."[158] Cinemas and theaters were the bridges connecting the modern middle class to the modern European world.

Hamid Naficy claims that the rise of the modern middle class contributed to the popularization of the cinema. In this process, advertisement was a key factor: "newspaper ads, flyers, posters, billboards, and sometimes spectacles involving ballyhoo, barkers, musicians, and planes" helped to create a culture of social life around cinemas and theaters in Iranian cities, as can be seen in Figure 5.9.[159] By the second half of Reza Shah's reign, articles in *Ittilaʿat* newspaper depict crowded cinemas, long lines in the streets, and the popularity of cinemas and theaters.[160] The document that most accurately confirms this popularity is the municipality's census of the annual ticket sales in 1931–2[161] and 1932–3.[162] Based on this census, in 1931–2, 136,074 theater tickets and 1,032,973 cinema tickets were sold in Tehran. The next year the sale of theater tickets reached 217,732 and cinema tickets decreased to 927,986. These figures show that, on average, in 1931–2 each person in the city went to cinemas or theaters five times, and in 1932–3 the number was still high at four times.[163] As a result,

[158] Sinima [Cinema], *Ittilaʿat*, Murdad 27, 1308 [August 19, 1929]; *Ittilaʿat*, Aban 6, 1308 [October 28, 1929]; *Tehran Musavar* 3–4 (Diy 21, 1308 [January 11, 1930]): 12–13; Tiʾatr-i Liyli va Majnun [Liyli va Majnun Theater], *Ittilaʿat*, Azar 15, 1309 [December 7, 1930]; Tiʾatr va Sinima dar Iran [Theater and Cinema in Iran], *Ittilaʿat*, Azar 17, 1309 [December 9, 1930]; Tiʾatr va Sinima [Theater and Cinema], *Ittilaʿat*, Diy 21, 1309 [January 11, 1931].

[159] Naficy, *A Social History of Iranian Cinema*, 1: 203–8.

[160] For some examples, see: Tiʾatr va Sinima [Theater and Cinema], *Ittilaʿat*, Azar 26, 1307 [December 17, 1928]; Ilahih, *Ittilaʿat*, Bahman 8, 1308 [January 28, 1930]; Tiʾatr-i Liyli va Majnun [Liyli va Majnun Theater], *Ittilaʿat*, Azar 15, 1309 [December 7, 1930]; Tiʾatr va Sinima dar Iran [Theater and Cinema in Iran], *Ittilaʿat*, Azar 17, 1309 [December 9, 1930]; Tiʾatr va Sinima [Theater and Cinema], *Ittilaʿat*, Diy 21, 1309 [January 11, 1931].

[161] 1310 HJ.

[162] 1311 HJ.

[163] *Majalih-yi Baladiyyih [Baladiyyih Magazine]* 10, no. 11–12 (Farvardin 1313 [March 1934]): 576ff.

Figure 5.9 A movie advertisement in *Ittilaʿat* newspaper. The bottom text of the advertisement reads: "The *Scarlet Dove* has flown from America and will nest in Mayak cinema in the near future."[164]

[164] *Ittilaʿat* newspaper, Diy 15, 1308 [January 5, 1930].

Figure 5.10 An advertisement in *Ittilaʿat* newspaper announcing: "Concert for women! On Saturday, there will be a glorious concert for women by a skillful British artist and some other famous artists in the Iranian Youth Club."[165]

by the early 1930s a lively social life had formed around cinemas and theaters of Tehran. Five cinema and theater attendances per capita in a year shows that the desire for alternative forms of social life was not limited to the modern middle class, and various sections of urban society enjoyed the social life of cinemas and theaters.

Another significant transformation was the presence of women in the cinemas and theaters. At first, the cinema and theater halls were men-only spaces with occasional women-only showing times. Figure 5.10 shows an advertisement in *Ittilaʿat* newspaper for a women-only concert, announcing: "Concert for women! On Saturday, there will be a glorious concert for women by a skillful British artist and some other famous artists in the Iranian Youth Club."[166] Naficy mentions that Alinaqi Vaziri, a reformist musician, opened the first women's cinema in April 1928.[167] After the destruction of this cinema in a fire, the modern middle class reformists pursued the establishment of mixed-gender cinemas. One of the early articles that asked for women's presence in cinemas and theaters appeared on January 2, 1929 in *Ittilaʿat* newspaper.[168] Soon women were allowed into the saloons. Similar to the *takīyyih*s, men and women were separated on two different sides. However, beginning in March 1936 men and women could sit together.[169]

The distribution of the cinemas and theaters in the city follows the same pattern as the cafés, restaurants, and hotels. They were mostly

[165] *Ittilaʿat*, Urdibihist 20, 1306 [May 11, 1927].
[166] *Ittilaʿat*, Urdibihist 20, 1306 [May 11, 1927].
[167] Naficy, *A Social History of Iranian Cinema*, 1: 263–4.
[168] 3-Ijtimaʿat [3-Social Gathering], *Ittilaʿat*, Diy 12, 1307 [January 2, 1929].
[169] Farrokh Gaffary, "Les Lieux de Spectacle a Tehran," in *Téhéran Capitale Bicentenaire*, ed. C. Adle and B. Hourcade (Paris: Institute Français de Recherche en Iran, 1992), 151. For more information on women's presence in cinemas, see: Naficy, *A Social History of Iranian Cinema*, 1: 263–70.

concentrated in the northern city, away from the old neighborhoods. Notably, Lalihzar Street became the cultural center accommodating most of the city's cinemas and theaters. In 1949, five out of eight theaters and nine out of twenty-eight cinemas in Tehran were located on Lalihzar Street. The rest of the theaters and cinemas of the city were mostly gathered in the same neighborhood, such as on Shah Street.[170] Figure 5.8 provides a map of the distribution of these enterprises based on a 1949 guidebook of Tehran. As the map demonstrates, there is a concentration of cinemas and theaters on Lalihzar and Shah Streets.

From Zūrkhānih*s to Sport Clubs*

The traditional gymnasiums of Iranian cities faced a similar fate as coffeehouses, kitchens, *takīyyih*s, and the other venues of traditional social life. The decline of *zūrkhānih*s had already begun after the Constitutional Revolution, long before the advent of the Pahlavi regime, when royal patronage ceased to support them. However, a major blow to the wellbeing of this institution occurred during Reza Shah's reign. By the establishment and consolidation of the Pahlavi state, the ban of religious ceremonies, the founding of the municipalities and police forces in the cities, and the eradication of semi-independent neighborhoods and their administration, the *zūrkhānih* communities lost their primary connection to the broader urban society. They lost their role as the protectors of their neighborhoods after the establishment of police forces. By the ban of Muharram ceremonies, the social strata most closely associated with the institution of the *zūrkhānih* lost one of their main communal activities. Finally, coffeehouses as their main gathering places outside gymnasiums underwent fundamental socio-spatial transformations.[171]

[170] Shahrbani-yi Kul-i Kishvar, *Rahnama-yi Shahr-i Tehran*, 75–6.

[171] For the decline of the *zūrkhānih*s after the Constitutional Revolution, particularly during the Pahlavi era, see: Houchang E. Chehabi, "Zur-Ḵāna," in *Encyclopedia Iranica* (August 15, 2006), www.iranicaonline.org/articles/zur-kana (accessed June 19, 2015); Lloyd Ridgeon, "The Zūrkhāna between Tradition and Change," *Iran: Journal of the British Institute of Persian Studies* 45 (2007): 249. Toward the end of Reza Shah's reign and during the reign of his son, the traditional sport, *varzish-i bāstānī*, had a relative revival because of the connection of this sport to the nationalist discourse and "for the nationwide millenary celebration of Ferdowsi's birth in the summer of 1934": Chehabi, "Zur-Ḵāna."

In the interwar period, the negative framing of the *zūrkhānih*s by the advocates of social reforms accelerated their decline. An example from *Ittilaʿat* newspaper on October 18, 1928 perfectly summarizes this framing. The article mentions three main drawbacks of *zūrkhānih*s that made them inefficient for the modern way of life. First, although *zūrkhānih* sports strengthen some muscles, they do not contribute to the enhancement of the general condition of the body. Second, *zūrkhānih* exercises are not based on modern scientific design and can cause deformation of certain body parts. Finally, *zūrkhānih*s do not have proper ventilation, and exercising in their unhealthy air can cause harm.[172] Chehabi mentions four main themes that the modern middle class used to stigmatize *zūrkhānih*s, mostly in the periodicals published by the members of this class: the moral corruption of their members, *zūrkhānih*s as centers for ruffians and urban thugs, their incompatible exercises with the modern way of life, and unhealthy air conditions.[173] Moreover, Cyrus Schayegh recognizes a class discourse in this stigmatization:

> The modern middle class thought that the corruption of "old" sport in the unhygienic *zūrkhānah*s had been caused by human factors. After all, these institutions were frequented mostly by the urban lower classes and by some members of the traditional urban middle class, ignorant of modern science and hostile to disciplined sport and human interaction.[174]

As a result, the same social discourse that resulted in the decline of coffeehouses, traditional kitchens, and religious performances in Iranian cities was at work against the *zūrkhānih*s. Establishing spatial stigmas was one of the reformists' methods to distinguish their lifestyle from the traditional forms of social life.

In contrast to the general decline of *zūrkhānih*s and their stigmatizations, a second process was at work to popularize modern European sports in society, particularly among the modern middle class. Schayegh's study shows how the modern middle class adopted modern sports as a socio-cultural marker to distinguish itself from the traditional strata of society. This incentive "propelled sport into the field of state policy and made it a part of the government's attempt to

[172] Islahat-i ʾijtimaʿi [Social Reforms], *Ittilaʿat*, Mihr 26, 1307 [October 18, 1928].

[173] Chehabi, "Zur-Ḵāna."

[174] Cyrus Schayegh, "Sport, Health, and the Iranian Middle Class in the 1920s and 1930s," *Iranian Studies*, 35, no. 4, Sports and Games (2002): 367.

create a healthy and productive nation."[175] Through this process, the modern middle class tied modern sport to a discourse that exemplified it as a means of production of healthy and fit individuals, a means of enhancement of the mental and moral condition of people and society, and an instrument for the nation-building project of the state.[176]

One of the first steps by the Pahlavi state to promote modern European sports was the passage of the *Law for Compulsory Daily Physical Education in the New Public Schools*, *Qanun-i Varzish-i Ijbari dar Madaris-i Jadidih*.[177] The resulting curriculum for the physical education in schools completely ignored the "*zūrkhānih*-type exercises"[178] and adopted a Swedish calisthenics system for boys' and girls' physical education.[179] In 1934, the Office of Physical Education was opened in the Ministry of Education to arrange soccer teams in the schools and hold interschool competitions. Later that year, "a number of Iranian statesmen and educators founded the National Association for Physical Education," and an American, Thomas R. Gibson, was invited to establish and organize sport clubs and events in the country.[180] A year later, *Ittilaʿat* newspaper translated and published Gibson's speech at Alburz College of Tehran, in which he enumerated his achievements during his first year of work: establishing forty-seven sport clubs in the country, increasing the annual sport budget from 10,000 to 25,000 *tuman*s, establishing mandatory physical education hours for primary and high schools – one hour per day and two hours per week, respectively – arranging a specific curriculum for children, educating special trainers for physical education hours in schools, and expanding physical education among girls and women.[181]

175 Schayegh, "Sport, Health, and the Iranian Middle Class," 344.
176 Schayegh, "Sport, Health, and the Iranian Middle Class," 347–69.
177 Islamic Parliament Research Center, "Qanun-i Varzish-i Ijbari dar Madaris-i Jadidih [Compulsory Daily Physical Education in the New Public Schools law]," http://rc.majlis.ir/fa/law/show/91337 (accessed January 8, 2016).
178 Chehabi, "Zur-Ḵāna."
179 Houchang E. Chehabi, "The Politics of Football in Iran," *Soccer and Society* 7, no. 2–3 (2006): 236. For the history of the introduction of modern physical education in Iran, see: Houchang E. Chehabi, "Mir Mehdi Varzandeh and the Introduction of Modern Physical Education in Iran," in *Culture and Cultural Politics under Reza Shah: The Pahlavi State, New Bourgeoisie and the Creation of a Modern Society in Iran*, ed. Bianca Devos and Christoph Werner (Abingdon: Routledge, 2014), 55–72.
180 Chehabi, "The Politics of Football in Iran," 239.
181 Tarbiyat Badani dar Iran [Physical Education in Iran], *Ittilaʿat*, Azar 11, 1314 [December 3, 1935].

برندگان مسابقه دو

روز جمعه ۹۶ نفر در مسابقه دو شرکت نموده بودند و برندگان این مسابقه بیشتر شاگردان مدرسه افسری امنیه بودند بقرار ذیل :

در زمین امجدیه ـ جشن کانون ورزش طهران

در ورزشگاه نمره ۱ (امجدیه)

جشن کانون ورزش ایران

Figure 5.11 News of sports events on the first page of *Ittilaʿat* newspaper.[182]

The popularity of modern sports, particularly soccer, grew gradually but constantly throughout the Pahlavi era. Chehabi's study of the popularization of soccer shows how state policies and social demand transformed it from an unknown phenomenon into the most popular sport in the country in just a few decades.[183] The modern middle class's newspapers had a great role in the popularization of modern sports. After the establishment of the National Association for Physical Education, *Ittilaʿat* newspaper frequently devoted several columns to reflecting various sporting events in the country. Many times, sports news made its way to the first page of the newspaper, as seen in Figure 5.11.[184]

182 From left to right, *Ittilaʿat*, Khurdad 11, 29, 31, 1315 [June 1, 19, 21, 1936].

183 Chehabi, "The Politics of Football in Iran."

184 For some early examples from the newspaper, see the first page of these days: *Ittilaʿat*, Khurdad 11, 29, 31, 1315 [June 1, 19, 21, 1936]. For some articles on Iran's modern sports movement in *Ittilaʿat* newspaper, see: Musabiqih-yi Futbal [Soccer Match], *Ittilaʿat*, Farvardin 20, 1312 [April 9, 1933]; Nihzat-i Varzish dar Iran [Sport Movement in Iran], *Ittilaʿat*, Isfand 21, 1312 [March 12, 1934]; Dar Midan-i Varzish: Iftitah-i Musabiqih-ha-yi Varzishi [In the Sport Field: Inauguration of Sport Matches], *Ittilaʿat*, Diy 15, 1313 [January 5, 1935]; Varzish [Sport], *Ittilaʿat*, Bahman 30, 1313 [February 19, 1935]; *Ittilaʿat*, Diy 15, 1313 [January 5, 1935]; Junbish va Nihzat-i Varzish dar Iran [Sport Movement in Iran], *Ittilaʿat*, Murdad 12, 1314 [August 4, 1935]; Musabiqih-ha-yi Varzishi [Sport Matches], *Ittilaʿat*, Azar 4, 1314 [November 26, 1935]; Tarbiyat Badani dar Iran [Physical Education in Iran], *Ittilaʿat*, Azar 11, 1314 [December 3, 1935]; Nihzat-i Varzish dar Iran [Sport Movement in Iran], *Ittilaʿat*, Khurdad 3, 1315 [May 24, 1936].

The spatial distribution of modern sports fields and *zūrkhānih*s in Tehran follows the same pattern of other modern and traditional spaces. In 1932 there were eighteen *zūrkhānih*s in Tehran. Only three of them were located in the new northern neighborhoods of the city, and none of them were in the Duwlat neighborhood. Eleven *zūrkhānih*s were located solely in the Bazaar and Ūdlājān neighborhoods, the main neighborhoods of the old city.[185] In contrast, in 1949 there were nineteen sports clubs, seven swimming pools, and seven sports fields in Tehran, mostly in the northern neighborhoods of the city or far north in Shemiranat.[186] Figure 5.8 provides the location of sport clubs, fields, and swimming pools of Tehran based on a 1949 guidebook of the city. As the map demonstrates, similar to other modern social spaces, they were mostly concentrated in the northern neighborhoods of Duwlat and Hasanabad, particularly on Firduwsi Street.

The Modern Middle Class and the Consolidation of the Spatial Discourse

A twofold process transformed Tehran – its sociality and spatiality – after the Constitutional Revolution. This process resulted in the decline of the traditional forms of social life and spaces; in contrast, it consolidated the discourse of modernity spatially and produced alternative forms of social life and spaces in the city. This process had ardent social and political supporters.

The advocates of modern reforms, particularly the modern middle class, initially supported Reza Shah's dictatorship since they saw him as the only way toward peace and the modernization of the country.[187] In the words of Banani:

> An increasing number of younger intellectuals substituted nationalism for religious fanaticism. The changes that Reza Shah Pahlavi was able to bring about in so short a time in social, political, and economic conditions of Iran were accomplished with the support of this group.[188]

[185] Baladiyyih Tehran, *Sarshumari-yi Nufus-i Shahr-i Tehran*, 33.
[186] Shahrbani-yi Kul-i Kishvar, *Rahnama-yi Shahr-i Tehran*, 34–6.
[187] Banani, *The Modernization of Iran*, 24; Abrahamian, *Iran between Two Revolutions*, 120, 152–4; Katouzian, "Riza Shah's Political Legitimacy," 22.
[188] Banani, *The Modernization of Iran*, 24.

In return, this class found the opportunity to produce its desired social image; they filled the positions in the new administration apparatus of the state and played a significant role in its modernization projects.[189]

These reforms had significant spatial manifestations. As detailed above, the Pahlavi state regulated coffeehouses and traditional kitchens in favor of new European-style cafés, restaurants, and hotels. The state's ban on religious ceremonies was accompanied by the proliferation of cinemas and theaters in Iranian cities. Modern sports clubs and fields overshadowed *zūrkhānih*s and their social practices.[190]

From a larger view, the state-sponsored spatial abstraction of traditional social spaces, the production of novel forms of social life and spaces in the northern neighborhoods of Tehran, the decline of traditional forms, and the struggle between the old and the new, can all be interpreted through the framework of the spatial discourse that had developed decades earlier. This discourse is traceable in the text of Iranian travelogues to Europe. Although in that case the analysis of the texts of travelogues reveals no power relationship between Iranian and European cities, the travelogues provide the manifestations of the beginning of the process that led to the vast spatial transformations of the 1930s. There is an invisible line connecting Nasser al-Din Shah's wonders in London and Paris, the 1870s expansion of Tehran, the post-revolution intelligentsia, the production of novel social spaces, and the Pahlavi state's top-down spatial interventions. This line is the spatial discourse incubated for more than 100 years until its full emergence in the 1930s.

In this discourse, the West, particularly Western Europe and the United States, became a model for the advocates of reforms, particularly the modern middle class. They studied Paris, London, Berlin,

[189] Devos, "Engineering a Modern Society?" 270.

[190] There were other similar cases that I do not discuss to prevent further prolongation. For example, in this era, the bathhouses lost their internal socio-spatial structures. Mostly for hygiene reasons, the municipality's bathhouses *niẓāmnāmih* encouraged all the traditional bathhouses to abandon their old system of pools of water and divide their internal space into separate cabins and install showers. As a result, all the social practices that were formed around the stages of bathing were affected. Moreover, by developing architectural techniques and the construction of houses with bathrooms, traditional bathhouses lost their monopoly as the sole spaces for taking baths. For bathhouses *niẓāmnāmih*, see: *Majalih-yi Baladiyyih [Baladiyyih Magazine]* 9, no. 3 (Aban 1309 [November 1930]): 91–3.

New York, and other major Western cities to compare them to Tehran. They searched for infrastructure, cinemas, theaters, parks, streets and squares, buildings, transportation systems, and many other features of these cities as models for the transformation of their own cities. They constructed an image of the West and reproduced their city after that desired image.[191]

In their view, cinemas, theaters, modern sport clubs, hotels, cafés, restaurants, and other Western social spaces and practices were the cure for the obsolete, backward, and traditional sections of society. Social reforms were equal to watching plays, going to cinemas, attending garden parties and masquerades, spending time in cafés, and playing soccer. These practices and their related spaces were means to reform traditional Iranian society. In their periodicals, the modern middle class observed their right to continuously educate the other sections of society on how to behave like a modern person and how to act in the new social spaces of the city.[192]

[191] Lulihkishi va Khiyabansazi [Piping and Street Counstruction], *Ittilaʿat*, Murdad 11, 1309 [August 2, 1930]; Bazar-ha-yi Mahali [Local Bazaars], *Ittilaʿat*, Murdad 13, 1309 [August 4, 1930]; Miydani ki Azuqih-yi Paris ra Midahad [A Square that Provides Paris's Food Supplies], *Ittilaʿat*, Murdad 15, 1309 [August 6, 1930]; Shar-i Landan [London City], *Ittilaʿat*, Murdad 20, 1309 [August 11, 1930]; Anjuman-ha-yi Baladi [City Councils], *Ittilaʿat*, Shahrivar 2, 1309 [August 24, 1930]; Utubusrani [Bus Service], *Ittilaʿat*, Shahrivar 6, 1309 [August 28, 1930]; Yik Shab dar Hotil Impirial [A Night in Imperial Hotel], *Ittilaʿat*, Azar 26, 1309 [December 17, 1930]; Zindigi-yi Imruz-i Ma [Our Life These Days], *Ittilaʿat*, Aban 4, 1311 [October 26, 1932]; Jashn [Festival], *Ittilaʿat*, Isfand 14, 1313 [March 3, 1935]; *Majalih-yi Baladiyyih [Baladiyyih Magazine]* 3, no. 3 (Jumada l-Ula 4, 1343 [December 1, 1924]): 1–2; *Majalih-yi Baladiyyih [Baladiyyih Magazine]* 3, no. 5 (Rajab 10, 1343 [February 4, 1925]): 2–3, 9–10; *Majalih-yi Baladiyyih [Baladiyyih Magazine]* 4, no. 10 (Aban 1304 [November 1925]): 9; *Majalih-yi Baladiyyih [Baladiyyih Magazine]* 4, no. 14 (Isfand 1304 [March 1926]): 2–5; *Majalih-yi Baladiyyih [Baladiyyih Magazine]* 9, no. 4 (Azar 1309 [December 1930]): 123–5; *Majalih-yi Baladiyyih [Baladiyyih Magazine]* 9, no. 7–8 (Isfand 1309, Farvardin 1310 [March and April 1932]): 206; *Majalih-yi Baladiyyih [Baladiyyih Magazine]* 10, no. 1 (Isfand 1310 [March 1932]): 24–5; *Majalih-yi Baladiyyih [Baladiyyih Magazine]* 11, no. 6 (Farvardin 1314 [March 1935]): 159–61.

[192] Tiʾatr va Sinima [Theater and Cinema], *Ittilaʿat*, Azar 26, 1307 [December 17, 1928]; 3-Ijtimaʿat [3-Social Gathering], *Ittilaʿat*, Diy 12, 1307 [January 2, 1929]; ʾijtimaʿat [Social Gathering], *Ittilaʿat*, Diy 17, 1307 [January 5, 1929]; Yik Shab dar Hotil Impirial [A Night in Imperial Hotel], *Ittilaʿat*, Azar 26, 1309 [December 17, 1930]; Jumʿih ya Taʿtil-i ʿUmumi [Friday or Public Holiday], *Ittilaʿat*, Isfand 12, 1309 [March 4, 1931]; Risturan-i Baladiyyih

Consequently, this discourse produced a power relationship between the advocates of modernity, particularly the modern middle class, and the rest of society. In this relationship, as discussed earlier, the former defined its lifestyle in terms such as modern, progressive, European, secular, healthy, scientific, and happy. In contrast, the modern middle class repeatedly utilized spatial stigmas for the negative portrayal of the traditional ways of life and depicted the latter as backward, obsolete, traditional, religious, unhealthy, unhappy, and ignorant. These dichotomies can be traced in various pictorial and textual documents of the era, as demonstrated in Figures 5.12–5.14.[193]

[Municipality's Restaurant], *Ittilaʿat*, Mihr 12, 1310 [October 5, 1931]; Mardum Haman Mardumand ya ʿAvaz Shudihand? [Are People the Same or Have They Changed?], *Ittilaʿat*, Aban 2, 1310 [October 25, 1931]; Raʿayat-i Huquq-i ijtimaʿ [Observance of the Community Rights], *Ittilaʿat*, Aban 3, 1310 [October 26, 1931]; ʿUbur va Murur dar Khiyaban-ha [Commuting in the Streets], *Ittilaʿat*, Aban 4, 1310 [October 27, 1931]; Az Qahirih ta Tehran [From Cairo to Tehran], *Ittilaʿat*, Tir 16, 1311 [July 7, 1932]; Aya Tarz-i Fikr-i Ma ʿAvaz Shudih Ast? [Has Our Way of Thinking Changed?], *Ittilaʿat*, Murdad 3, 1311 [July 25, 1932]; Zindigi-yi Imruz-i Ma [Our Life These Days], *Ittilaʿat*, Aban 4, 1311 [October 26, 1932]; Girani-i Qiymat-i Tafrih [The High Price of Recreation], *Ittilaʿat*, Aban 10, 1311 [November 1, 1932]; Shadi va Nishat-i ʿUmumi [Public Happiness and Exhilaration], *Ittilaʿat*, Isfand 22, 1311 [March 13, 1933]; Jashn [Festival], *Ittilaʿat*, Mihr 12, 1313 [October 4, 1934]; *Majalih-yi Baladiyyih [Baladiyyih Magazine]* 3, no. 5 (Rajab 10, 1343 [February 4, 1925]): 2–3, 9–10; *Majalih-yi Baladiyyih [Baladiyyih Magazine]* 9, no. 4 (Azar 1309 [December 1930]): 126–7; Yik Shab dar Hotil Impirial [A Night in Imperial Hotel], *Ittilaʿat*, Azar 26, 1309 [December 17, 1930]; Risturan-i Baladiyyih [Municipality's Restaurant], *Ittilaʿat*, Mihr 12, 1310 [October 5, 1931].

[193] ʾijtimaʿat [Social Gathering], *Ittilaʿat*, Diy 15, 1307 [January 5, 1929]; Saʿy va ʿAmal-i Baladiyyih [Municipalities' Efforts], *Ittilaʿat*, Tir 17, 1308 [July 8, 1929]; Sakhtiman-ha-yi Gili [Mud Buildings], *Ittilaʿat*, Bahman 26, 1309 [February 15, 1931]; Mardum Haman Mardumand ya ʿAvaz Shudihand? [Are People the Same or They Have Changed?], *Ittilaʿat*, Aban 2, 1310 [October 25, 1931]; ʿUbur va Murur dar Khiyaban-ha [Commuting in the Streets], *Ittilaʿat*, Aban 4, 1310 [October 27, 1931]; Akharin Baqaya-yi Vagun [The Last Remnants of Tramway], *Ittilaʿat*, Farvardin 22, 1311 [April 11, 1932]; Girani-i Qiymat-i Tafrih [The High Price of Recreation], *Ittilaʿat*, Aban 10, 1311 [November 1, 1932]; Shadi va Nishat-i ʿUmumi [Public Happiness and Exhilaration], *Ittilaʿat*, Isfand 22, 1311 [March 13, 1933]; Jashn [Festival], *Ittilaʿat*, Mihr 12, 1313 [October 4, 1934]; *Majalih-yi Baladiyyih [Baladiyyih Magazine]* 1, no. 2 (Shawwal 9, 1339 [July 16, 1921]): 3; *Majalih-yi Baladiyyih [Baladiyyih Magazine]* 3, no. 5 (Rajab 10, 1343 [February 4, 1925]): 2–3, 9–10; *Majalih-yi Baladiyyih [Baladiyyih Magazine]* 6, no. 4 (Bahman 1306 [February 1928]): 9; *Majalih-yi Baladiyyih [Baladiyyih Magazine]* 11, no. 1 (Khurdad 1313 [May 1934]): 34–6.

Figure 5.12 A juxtaposition of two places of food consumption in old and new Tehran. On the left a *kabābī* from the Qajar era and on the right a modern café, Café Pars, on Lalihzar Street.[194]

Figure 5.13 On the left, the state-sponsored hat; on the right, various hats from the Qajar era, which belonged to various communities of the city.[195]

These dichotomies went far beyond social groups and ways of life. They reproduced Tehran and provided new definitions for its sociality and spatiality. The two types of social spaces and the two poles

[194] *Majalih-yi Baladiyyih* 10, no. 11–12 (Farvardin 1313 [March 1934]): 532ff.
[195] *Majalih-yi Baladiyyih* 10, no. 9–10 (Azar 1312 [November 1933]): 442–5.

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Figure 5.14 The logo of *Tehran Musavar* magazine. It consisted of different social groups in the city. The contrast between modern and traditional middle classes is clear in this picture.[196]

of the city, north and south, were redefined through the same spatial discourse, as can be seen in Figure 5.8. The unhygienic, traditional, religious, ignorant south, with its *takīyyih*s, coffeehouses, and *zūrkhānih*s, stood in contrast to the modern, Western, clean, and enlightened north, with its cafés, cinemas, theaters, sports fields, and the like. In their view, the European-style social spaces were the markers that defined the modern middle class's social status. The spatiality of the city transformed into symbolic capital and served as a marker of being modern and progressive. This symbolic capital helped the advocates of modernity to distinguish themselves from the rest of society and define their position as the designated social and cultural inheritors of Iran's future. Once exotic and fairytale-like spaces and lifestyles transformed into a new norm for Iranian urban society. This process had been incubating for more than a century before its full manifestation. This gradual shift transformed the contours of taken-for-granted spatiality for Iranian urban society and the state.

Both the state and society should be considered as the receivers and promoters of this discourse. It would be misleading to draw a line and separate the state and society, assuming the former as the main agent of the production of the discourse and the latter as its primary receiver. In my view, there is no difference between Nasser al-Din Shah's and Haj Sayyah's wonders. The Pahlavi state's and the modern middle class's desires for modernization and Westernization originate from the same source.

[196] *Tehran Musavar* 15, no. 77 (1323 [1944]): 1.

As a result, throughout the interwar period, Tehran witnessed systematic top-down and bottom-up socio-spatial transformations. It was systematic and top-down because the state had a fixed and efficient plan and the required instruments for its implementation. The legislative power of the state and municipality, which were manifested in the numerous *niẓāmnāmih*s and laws, were the keys to the top-down, systematic transformation of social life and spaces. The concurrent bottom-up processes originated with a section of society, the modern middle class, that had a substantial role in its embodiment. Through their periodicals the modern middle class played a part in framing the south and north, old and new, progressive and obsolete, and many other dichotomies of the era.

Conclusion

In the interwar period, Tehran, the state, and society trod the same path. As a political, economic, and, more importantly, social product, Tehran formed and transformed alongside the spatial strategies of the state as well as the changes in ordinary people's social relations and interactions. Although the state-sponsored commodification and bureaucratization processes were powerful forces in shaping the city, Tehran was not a mere product of the spatial strategies of the state. People's daily lives and practices constantly and incrementally formed and transformed the spatial and social contours of the city. While, beginning in the second half of the nineteenth century, the state-sponsored projects transformed the city's appearance via short-term projects, the real changes occurred in longer spans of time and should be investigated beyond the mere physicality of the city. The Qajar state naively assumed that it could recreate European spatiality through the expansion of Tehran. This expansion did not, in fact, bring fundamental social changes; it produced containers devoid of meaningful social life. It took at least half a century before Iranian society reproduced those spaces and attached new meanings to them.

The examination of the transformations of Tehran since the nineteenth century may suggest that the state succeeded in the absolute abstraction of the city, its social life, and social spaces. Undoubtedly, during this period the spatial balance between the state and society tilted in favor of the former, but by no means did this change of balance imply the complete abstraction of the city. The story of Tehran

is far from the Foucauldian notion of the carceral archipelago.[197] In fact, the omnipresent state and its abstract spaces were not homogeneous and dominant. Tehran, similar to other big cities, is the outcome of the constant struggle between lived and conceived spaces. This struggle shapes and reshapes the city; it produces and transforms the daily landscape of people's lives. At times, the spatial abstraction may find a momentum and push back the lived reality of the city; however, abstract spaces, as the next chapter discusses, bear an inherent contradiction, which will lead to the production of counter-spaces or differential spaces.

[197] Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*.

6 *The Age of Social Movements*
The Transformation of Political Public Space

On May 11, 1945, the Tudih Party (the Communist Party of Iran) held a massive parade in Tehran for the commemoration of the end of World War II. Describing the parade, *Zafar* newspaper, one of the periodicals close to the party, recorded: "In Sipah [Tupkhanih] Square, people climbed up Reza Shah's Statue, cheering for their brothers and sisters [...] This is the same statue that, in the past, people could not even approach it and, eventually, it will be erased alongside the other signs of Reza Shah's regime [...]."[1] The next year, on May 1, 1946, during the May Day parade when the Tudih Party's Student Organization entered the square, one of the students shouted: "Comrades! We are so pleased to march in front of this symbol of dictatorship and this enemy of Iranian workers and murderer of liberals (pointing to Reza Shah's Statue) and, hopefully, we will replace it with the statue of the liberals and supporters of workers' rights."[2] As early as September 1941 there was strong support for the removal of Reza Shah's statues from the main squares of Tehran.[3] This desire took around twelve years to be temporarily satisfied.

On August 16, 1953, tens of thousands of people from different walks of life gathered in Baharistan Square as a reaction to an unsuccessful coup by the military forces loyal to Muhammad Reza Shah, Reza Shah's successor. Students, university professors, people of the bazaar, shopkeepers, workers, and other groups gathered to hear speeches from leading political figures. Despite the scorching summer heat, the meeting continued for more than two hours and was

[1] Tazahur-i Buzurg-i Millat-i Iran bih Munasibat-i Piruzi [The Massive Protest of Iranian Nation for the Commemoration of the Victory], *Iran-i Ma*, Urdibihisht 23, 1324 [May 13, 1945].

[2] Kargaran-i Jahan Mutahid Shavid [Get United the Workers of the Universe], *Zafar*, Urdibihisht 15, 1325 [May 5, 1946].

[3] Jaryanat-i Ruz [Events of the Day], *Dad*, Shahrivar 3, 1323 [August 25, 1944].

followed by a people's march in the main streets of northern Tehran that continued until midnight. The next morning, people returned to drag down Reza Shah's and Muhammad Reza Shah's statues in Baharistan and Tupkhanih Squares, as well as the other parts of the city. Despite the resistance of military forces, the growing crowd succeeded in pushing back and dragging down the statues. Figure 6.1, from the photo archive of *Ittilaʿat* newspaper, shows the moment of the toppling of Reza Shah's statue in Tupkhanih Square. *Bakhtar-i Imruz* newspaper provides a detailed report of the incidents that describes how the clashes between people and military forces resulted in the victory of the former and the destruction of the statues. The text of the newspaper creates a dichotomy between the protesting crowd and the military forces, calling the former unknown young soldiers.[4]

In these accounts, there is a clear tension between the opposing political forces and groups over establishing their authority on the main public spaces of Tehran. On one hand, Reza Shah's and Muhammad Reza Shah's statues, at the centers of the largest and most important squares of the city, represented the hegemony of the state, the court in this case; these signs epitomized the power of the court over public spaces of Tehran. As long as they were present, the royal family could claim its spatial dominance. On the other hand, people attacked these signs to (re)claim public spaces. The dragging down of these statues was a symbolic act to declare the end of the state's spatial control. The fights in Baharistan Square between "the unknown young soldiers" protesting against the monarchy and the military forces loyal to the kingdom closely matches the struggle between the abstract and lived spaces of the city. In the 1940s and the early 1950s, Baharistan Square became the political ground for the ultimate encounters of these opposing forces.

Public space is a medium for representation. For people and sociopolitical forces, particularly the marginalized ones who have no share of the formal venues of power, the occupation of public spaces is essential to claim the spatiality of the city and produce a physical and spatial representation. This is the ultimate and the most vital role of public space. Through this process, spaces of representation diverge from abstract spaces or representations of space.

[4] For details of the day, see: *Bakhtar-i Imruz*, Murdad 26, 1332 [August 17, 1953].

Figure 6.1 Dragging down Reza Shah's statue in Tupkhanih Square on August 18, 1953.[5]

The notion of abstract space and its capacity for the subjection of people and social control may imply a Foucauldian quality, suggesting that there is no escape from the power relationships embedded in abstract spaces.[6] However, despite its imposed homogeneity, transparency, commonality of use, and domination, abstract space contains inherent contradictions. Lefebvre summarizes them as the contradictions between quantity and quality, production and consumption, homogeneity and fragmented multiplicity, and exchange value and

[5] Kudita-yi 28 Murdad 1332 [The August 19, 1953 Coup], *Ittilaʿat Historical Photo Archive*, photo source: 47010019D 4-2-2006H 9-15-56, photo number: 47010019.

[6] Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of Prison*, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage Books, 1995); Michel Foucault, "The Subject and Power," *Critical Inquiry* 8, no. 4 (1982): 777–95.

use value.[7] He calls them contradictions of space and acknowledges them as the spatial manifestations of social contradictions.[8] It is only in space that these contradictions express the conflict between the social and political forces and, as a result, they become contradictions of space.[9]

The contradictions of space provide a differential capacity for spaces. Lefebvre distinguishes between two groups of differences: minimal or reduced differences and maximal or produced ones. The first group is produced within the dominant system and bears no threat to the established order, while the latter directly challenges the system and escapes its dominance.[10] People's everyday lives are a rich source for the production of maximal differences.[11] Although through spatial abstraction the state strives to annihilate maximal differences and transform them into minimal and reduced ones, the day-to-day spatial practices of ordinary people provide a rich terrain "where minimally differential aspirations clash with other realities of daily life and may lead to claims for *maximal* difference."[12] The production of lived spaces – spaces of representation – is the opportunity to develop "counter-projects" against the state-sponsored alienation and abstraction through the primacy of use value over exchange value and the primacy of quality over quantity. These spaces challenge the hegemony

[7] Henri Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith (Malden: Blackwell, 1991), 352–6; Japhy Wilson, "'The Devastating Conquest of the Lived by the Conceived': The Concept of Abstract Space in the Work of Henri Lefebvre," *Space and Culture* 16, no. 3 (2013): 369–72; Rob Shields, *Lefebvre, Love and Struggle: Spatial Dialectics* (London: Routledge, 2005), 178–80.

[8] Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, 358.

[9] Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, 365.

[10] Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, 372; Wilson, "The Devastating Conquest of the Lived," 372; Stefan Kipfer, "How Lefebvre Urbanized Gramsci: Hegemony, Everyday Life, and Difference," in *Space, Difference, Everyday Life: Reading Henri Lefebvre*, ed. Kanishka Goonewardena et al. (New York: Routledge, 2008), 202–4; Stefan Kipfer et al., "Globalizing Lefebvre?"in *Space, Difference, Everyday Life: Reading Henri Lefebvre*, ed. Kanishka Goonewardena et al. (New York: Routledge, 2008), 292–3.

[11] Kipfer, "How Lefebvre Urbanized Gramsci," 203.

[12] Kipfer, "How Lefebvre Urbanized Gramsci," 203. The same concept is the central notion in Michel de Certeau's *The Practice of Everyday Life*: Michel de Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life*, trans. Steven Rendall (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984).

of the system by transferring abstract spaces into differential spaces or counter-spaces.[13]

Differential spaces are the spaces that provide an opportunity to be other. They undermine the homogeneity of abstract spaces by accentuating differences.[14] As a result, there is a close affinity between the notion of the right to the city and the right to difference. The latter is, as Kipfer mentions, "simply the flipside of asserting the right to the city."[15] The right to the city and the appropriation of urban space by social groups provide the opportunity for the manifestation of differences and for the representation of otherness. It challenges the hegemonic definition of space and social life by producing counter-spaces amid abstract spatiality, in the words of Henri Lefebvre:

> When a community fights the construction of urban motorways or housing developments, when it demands "amenities" or empty spaces for play and encounter, we can see how a counter-space can insert itself into spatial reality: against the Eye and the Gaze, against quantity and homogeneity, against power and the arrogance of power, against the endless expansion of the "private" and of industrial profitability; and against specialized spaces and a narrow localization of function.[16]

Regarding this Lefebvrian framework, the political struggles of the 1940s and the early 1950s in Tehran pose significant questions that this chapter seeks to examine. After decades of spatial abstraction and the (re)production and development of the city through abstract spaces, how did the people of Tehran transform state spaces into a political arena to contest the hegemony of the state? What was the relationship between spaces of daily life, produced in the Reza Shah era, and the new spaces of protest in Tehran? Why did people choose the new streets and squares of the city for protesting against the monarchy? Why did they not take *bast* in the mosques of the old city as they did in the constitutional era?

[13] Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, 381; Edward W. Soja, *Thirdspace: Journeys to Los Angeles and Other Real-and-Imagined Places* (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1996), 68.

[14] Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, 52.

[15] Kipfer, "How Lefebvre Urbanized Gramsci," 204. Also see: Andy Merrifield, *Henri Lefebvre: A Critical Introduction* (New York: Routledge, 2006), 113–14; Don Mitchell, *The Right to the City: Social Justice and the Fight for Public Space* (New York: Guilford Press, 2003).

[16] Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, 381–2.

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In the twelve-year period from Reza Shah's forced abdication in September 1941 to the military coup of August 1953 against Muhammad Mossadegh's government by forces loyal to Muhammad Reza Shah, a process of spatial democratization occurred in Tehran and major cities of the country. In this process, urban society redefined the role of public spaces as spaces of representation; people transformed the well-established abstract spaces of the Reza Shah era into lively political spectacles for social movements. The two decades of Reza Shah's iron-fist rule over the country, particularly after the mid-1920s, did not guarantee the full abstraction of public spaces. In contrast, it provided fertile ground for the rejuvenation of political struggles after the collapse of his regime.

The spatiality of these popular political movements was fundamentally different from that of the constitutional era. Unlike the constitutional era, when the main sacred spaces transformed into active political spaces, between 1941 and 1953 political struggles mostly moved to the main streets and squares of northern Tehran. As this chapter argues, the spatial discourse that had already transformed various spatial practices of Iranian society and the state yielded its ultimate fruit through the transformation of the spatiality of political discontents or, better to say, political public spaces.

To analyze this spatial shift, this chapter scrutinizes political groups and forces of this era and their political gatherings, protests, demonstrations, and parades in public spaces of Tehran. This examination suggests a dynamic political scene that cannot be dichotomized into the conventional binary opposition of people against the state, as was examined during the constitutional era. Both notions of the state and people were multifaceted and hard to demarcate straightforwardly. Unlike the constitutional era, people's role in the political scene should be mostly analyzed based on their affiliation to the formal political parties. Two main political parties of this era, which initiated the majority of protests and parades, were the Tudih and National Front Parties. Tudih or the Communist Party was the most active political force of the country in the first half of this era. After its initial suppression in 1946 and the formation of the National Front Party in 1949, the Tudih Party lost its unrivaled political role to the National Front Party. Although it regained some of its power after Mossadegh's premiership, between 1949 and 1953, the National Front Party should be regarded as the most dominant political force of the country, particularly in Tehran.

Besides these two parties, Qavam al-Saltanih's Democrat Party was a significant political force for a short period between 1945 and 1947, which, mostly in 1946, managed to hold large-scale political gatherings. During the twelve-year period between 1941 and 1953, two other social groups were significant players in the political arena: the university and high school students and the traditional and religious strata of society. These groups were active both independently and in association with the major political parties, particularly the National Front and the Tudih.

In this era, similar to the popular political forces, the notion of the state was multifaceted. On one hand, there was the royal family and the court. Although Muhammad Reza Shah did not have the authoritarian power of his father, he was an influential player who had the support of the army and was the subject of people's protests in many instances. On the other hand, there were various prime ministers who gained power after they received the majority in the Parliament and chose their cabinets. The governments of the twelve-year era had wavering relationships with the public and the court. In many instances, the major political forces, particularly the Tudih Party, challenged various governments by holding large-scale protests. On other occasions, such as the premiership of Mossadegh, the majority of political groups and major social forces, except the Tudih Party, united in support of the government, yet both the government and his supporters were at odds with the court and Muhammad Reza Shah.

In this highly colorful political tapestry, one element connects all the political parties, social forces, and centers of power: the fight over the spatiality of the city, or better to say, the struggle over the public spaces of Tehran. During the twelve-year era there was a constant struggle between people, the state, political parties, the court, and various social groups over claiming the public spaces of the city. The most successful groups were those who could gather masses in the streets and squares of Tehran, fill up the largest squares of the city with tens of thousands of people, and hold parades that could extend for multiple kilometers through the streets of the city. Through these tactics, political forces were able to brag about their popularity and negotiate their share from formal venues of power. The spatiality of the city was a medium to express the power of these forces and to demonstrate their social basis to their adversaries; Tehran's public spaces manifested their full capacity in nurturing people's and groups' representations.

Besides the physicality of the city, the textual world was an important arena for representing socio-political forces. As the continuation of the tradition that had already been established during the constitutional era, the twelve-year period witnessed the flourishing of newspapers throughout the country, particularly in Tehran. Every social group and political party had its own newspaper, sometimes multiple newspapers at the same time. Although some governments of the era curbed the power of the press by imposing martial laws and closing down their opponents' newspapers, in comparison to the Reza Shah era and the years after the 1953 coup, there was a distinct atmosphere of free speech in Tehran and other major cities of Iran.

The mutual reading of the textual and physical worlds suggests a great affinity between the two realms. First, the political parties and groups used their newspapers to invite people to participate in their meetings and protests. Second, the city provided these groups with the perfect platform to represent themselves and express their popular power. Third, the textual world provided them with a second chance to amplify the impact of their political rallies and extend their voices to a larger audience. In the days and weeks after political rallies, the sponsoring groups would provide detailed descriptions of their gatherings and reprinted the articles in favor of their movements from other newspapers. Through this, they were able to form a network of supporters in the textual world based on the events of the physical one. In other words, the textual world worked as a propellant for the political gatherings, protests, and parades in the city. However, after their occurrence, it was the spatiality of the city that provided the material for newspapers. Through this interconnection, the political parties and groups of this era were highly successful in harvesting public support for their objectives.

On the other side of the spectrum, the rival groups used their newspapers to downplay the success of their opponents' political gatherings by remaining silent or deflecting the realities of the physical world. On some occasions, competing newspapers mentioned their rivals' political meetings, but omitted the titles of the groups by simply mentioning "people" as the protesting groups. On other occasions, they dedicated just a tiny section of the least popular page of the newspaper to briefly reflect the political gatherings of their adversaries. Moreover, there were times that they provided full reports of the events, but with a vivid demonizing strategy. They depicted the political gatherings as chaotic

riots in which shops were looted, public properties were destroyed, and innocent people were injured or killed. Finally, the most common strategy was absolute silence and ignoring the gatherings of their rival groups. Through these methods, the struggles over the spatiality of the city and fights over the spaces of representation were transferred into the textual realm. In short, the textual and physical worlds were the mediums to form public opinion.

This is a highly Habermasian notion of the public sphere. Particularly, as this chapter demonstrates, the political struggles of this era had a deep class-based character. Urban classes, particularly the modern middle class and urban working class, were the main agents of these struggles. The majority of the political parties can be analyzed based on the class structure of society. As a result, there is a fundamental difference between the public sphere in the twelve-year period between 1941 and 1953 and the formation of the public sphere through the coming together of various communal spheres during the constitutional era. As the chapter argues, the public sphere and political public spaces transformed alongside each other.

I continue the chapter with a brief review of the major events of the era. Afterwards, I travel back to the early years of Reza Shah's rule to introduce the main instances of social movements before the solidification of his power. This flashback helps to provide a comparative framework to construct the storyline of this chapter. Adopting a chronological view, the main part of the chapter deals with the instances of political struggles between 1941 and 1953.

Iran between 1941 and 1953: A Brief Overview

In August 1941, during World War II, the Red Army from the north and the British Army from the south invaded Iran to open a supply route to stop the Germans' progress toward the East. Iran's national railway system was crucial to their victory over the Nazis and helped them to transfer supplies from the Persian Gulf to the borders of the Soviet Union in the north. Unwilling to cooperate with the Allies, Reza Shah had rejected their requests to use Iranian territory during the war. His uncooperativeness led to the invasion by the Allies and brought an abrupt end to his rule. Reza Shah stepped down in favor of his son, Muhammad Reza Shah, and left the country shortly thereafter. Twelve years of relative and fragile freedom and democracy began.

Iran was under occupation until 1946. During those years, the shortage of food, particularly bread, and high inflation due to the Allies' invasion were major problems across the country. Moreover, separatist movements emerged in the western and northwestern Kurdish- and Turkish-speaking sections of the country.[17]

In comparison to the Reza Shah era, the political scene became highly diverse and unstable. Between 1941 and 1953, the government witnessed seventeen premierships and thirty-one cabinets. On average, each premiership lasted eight months and each cabinet only five months. Three primary sources of power continuously competed for their dominance over the political scene: the court, the Parliament, and the executive branch (the premier and the cabinet).[18]

The highlight of the era was the Oil Industry Nationalization Movement. This movement was a reaction to the oil concessions of 1901 and 1933 and Britain's control over the southern oil resources of the country. The 1901 concession guaranteed a sixty-year monopoly over these resources to the British contractor, D'Arcy, in return for a royalty of 16 percent of the profits. In 1932, Reza Shah canceled the concession, but he was forced to sign another nearly identical one-sided contract within a year.[19] However, in the late 1940s and the

[17] For an overview of the Allies' invasion and the troubled years after that, see: F. Eshraghi, "Anglo-Soviet Occupation of Iran in August 1941," *Middle Eastern Studies* 20, no. 1 (1984): 27–52; Ronald W. Ferrier, "Anglo-Iranian Relations III. Pahlavi Period," in *Encyclopaedia Iranica* (August 5, 2011), www.iranicaonline.org/articles/anglo-iranian-relations-iii (accessed September 1, 2020); Richard A. Stewart, *Sunrise at Abadan: The British and Soviet Invasion of Iran, 1941* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1988); Jami, *Guzashtih Chiragh-i Rah-i Ayandih Ast: Tarikh-i Iran dar Fasilih-yi Du Kudita 1299–1332 [The Past is the Light for the Future Path: The History of Iran between the Two Coups 1921–1953]* (Tehran: Intisharat-i Quqnus, 1362 [1983]); Baqir ʿAqili, *Ruzshumar-i Tarikh-i Iran: Az Mashrutih ta Inghilab [Chronicle of the History of Iran: From the Constitutional Era to the Revolution]*, vol. 1 (Tehran: Nashr-i Guftar, 1990), 249–351; Hassan Iʿzam Qudsi, *Kitab-i Khatirat-i Man ya Rushan Shodan-i Tarikh-i Sad Salih [The Book of My Memories or Demystifying One Hundred Years of History]*, vol. 2 (Tehran: Chapkhanih-yi Hiydari, 1342 [1963]), 393–817.

[18] For the political condition of Iran in this era, see: Ervand Abrahamian, *Iran between Two Revolutions* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), 169–280; Fakhreddin Azimi, *Iran: The Crises of Democracy* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2009).

[19] For the history of the oil industry in Iran, see: Ronald W. Ferrier, "The Iranian Oil Industry," in *The Cambridge History of Iran: From Nadir Shah to the Islamic Republic*, ed. Peter Avery et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University

early 1950s, the Oil Industry Nationalization Movement became a momentous campaign to end the control of foreign powers over the oil resources of Iran. Under the leadership of the popular Parliament deputy, Muhammad Mossadegh, the movement gained broad social support from various sections of society. In March 1951 the movement reached its climax with the passage of the Oil Industry Nationalization Bill in the Parliament. Shortly after, Mossadegh became the prime minister and managed to hold the position for more than two years.

The nationalization of the oil industry brought Iran and Britain into conflict. Britain evacuated its entire oil industry crew from Iran, boycotted Iranian oil in the international markets, demanded other countries not buy Iranian oil, imposed economic sanctions against the country, prevented the United States from giving financial loans to Mossadegh's government, filed complaints against Iran with the United Nations and the International Court of Justice, and caused destabilization inside the country by provoking tribal communities against the central government and distributing weapons among them. In response, Mossadegh's government shifted to an oil-less economy, succeeded in breaking the boycott by selling oil to Italy and Japan, managed to control inflation, won the cases in the international courts, created national unity against Britain, expelled all British diplomats, and closed down the British embassy and consulates in Iran.[20]

Press, 2007), 7: 639–57; Mostafa Elm, *Oil, Power, and Principle: Iran's Oil Nationalization and Its Aftermaths* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1992), 1–43.

[20] For the Oil Nationalization Movement and its aftermath, see: Mary Ann Heiss, *Empire and Nationhood: The United States, Great Britain, and Iranian Oil, 1950–1954* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997); Ronald W. Ferrier, "The Anglo-Iranian Oil Dispute: A Triangular Relationship," in *Musaddiq, Iranian Nationalism, and Oil*, ed. James A. Bill and W. M. Roger Louis (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1988), 164–99; Homa Katouzian, "Oil Boycott and the Political Economy: Musaddiq and the Strategy of Non-Oil Economics," in *Musaddiq, Iranian Nationalism, and Oil*, ed. James A. Bill and W. M. Roger Louis (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1988), 203–227; W. M. Roger Louis, "Musaddiq and the Dilemmas of British Imperialism," in *Musaddiq, Iranian Nationalism, and Oil*, ed. James A. Bill and W. M. Roger Louis (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1988), 228–60; Richard Cottam, "Nationalism in Twentieth-Century Iran and Dr. Muhammad Musaddiq," in *Musaddiq, Iranian Nationalism, and Oil*, ed. James A. Bill and W. M. Roger Louis (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1988), 23–46; Ferrier, "The Iranian Oil Industry," 657–66; Elm, *Oil, Power, and Principle*, 44–291; Sussan Siavoshi, "The Oil Nationalization Movement, 1949–1953," in *A Century of*

The final chapter of this era was the highly controversial August 19, 1953 coup against Mossadegh's government. Designed and performed by the CIA and MI6 and accompanied by internal forces and part of the military, the coup brought an end to the nationalization movement and replaced democracy with another era of autocracy. After the coup, Muhammad Reza Shah seized power, imprisoned or executed his opponents, kept Mossadegh under house arrest, and renewed oil concessions with the great powers. Once again, a short span of democracy was followed by twenty-six years of dictatorship up to the 1979 revolution.[21]

Revolution: Social Movements in Iran, ed. John Foran (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994), 106–34; Mary Ann Heiss, "The International Boycott of Iranian Oil and the Anti-Mosaddeq Coup of 1953," in *Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran*, ed. Mark J. Gasiorowski and Malcom Byrne (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2004), 178–200.

[21] The 1953 coup is still present in the collective memory of Iranians as a highly controversial event. Even at the present time, various scholars highlight the role of some groups and ignore those of others. For example, Darioush Bayandor and Fariborz Mokhtari frame the coup as an internal affair. They paint a portrait of a nation's uprising against the dictatorial character of Mossadegh. Gasiorowski strongly rejects this claim as unfounded and highlights the role of the United States and Britain. Faghfoory focuses on the role of religious forces in the country and the broken alliance between Mossadegh and Kashani as the main reasons behind the defeat of the Nationalization Movement. For the United States' CIA reports of the coup, see: Donald Wilber, *Overthrow of Premier Mossadeq of Iran, November 1952–August 1953* (CIA Clandestine Service History, March 1954). For different accounts of the coup, see: Mohammad Hassan Faghfoory, "The Role of the Ulama in Twentieth Century Iran with Particular Reference to Ayatullah Haj Sayyid Abul-Qasim Kashani" (PhD diss., University of Wisconsin Madison, 1978); Darioush Bayandor, *Iran and the CIA: The Fall of Mosaddeq Revisited* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010); Fariborz Mokhtari, "Iran's 1953 Coup Revisited: Internal Dynamics versus External Intrigue," *Middle East Journal* 62, no. 3 (2008): 457–88; Maziar Behrooz, "The 1953 Coup in Iran and the Legacy of the Tudih," in *Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran*, ed. Mark J. Gasiorowski and Malcom Byrne (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2004), 102–25; Mark J. Gasiorowski, "The 1953 Coup d'État Against Mosaddeq," in *Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran*, ed. Mark J. Gasiorowski and Malcom Byrne (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2004), 227–60; Ervand Abrahamian, "The 1953 Coup in Iran," *Science & Society* 65, no. 2 (2001): 182–215; Mark J. Gasiorowski, "The Causes of Iran's 1953 Coup: A Critique of Darioush Bayandor's *Iran and the CIA*," *Iranian Studies* 45, no. 5 (2012): 669–78; Kermit Roosevelt, *Countercoup: The Struggle for the Control of Iran* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979); Ali Rahnema, *Behind the 1953 Coup in Iran: Thugs, Turncoats, Soldiers, and Spooks* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015).

The Age of Social Movements

The popular political struggles between 1941 and 1953 were highly rooted in the two decades of Reza Shah's reign. Although Reza Shah managed to suppress his opponents and seize the power to rule the country as a dictator, during the first five years after the 1921 coup he faced multiple challenges. Up to the mid-1920s the constitutional atmosphere was still alive in Tehran and major cities. Taking *bast* in mosques, shrines, and the parliament was a well-established method of protest, and the traditional middle class, accompanied by the high-ranking clerics, were able to mobilize the masses.[22]

After the 1921 coup, a major challenge to Reza Shah's rule occurred during his campaign for republicanism. In early 1924, following his counterpart in Turkey, Reza Shah proposed a bill to transform the political system of the country from the constitutional monarchy to a republic in order to pave the way toward his own presidency. The republican campaign, supported by progressive forces and intellectuals, started from the press with the publication of various articles in favor of the Iranian republic and against the monarchy. In contrast, afraid of the fate of the religious forces after the elimination of the monarchy in Turkey, the conservative deputies of the Parliament, accompanied by the clerics and the traditional social groups, opposed the bill. Utilizing the methods of protest similar to those of the constitutional era, the traditional middle class – under the guidance of the clerics and the guild leaders – took *bast* in the parliament and the main mosques of Tehran to oppose the bill. By the occupation of the parliament, conservatives managed to fight republicanism effectively. This popular resistance resulted in the repeal of the republican movement and the transformation of the Qajar monarchy into the Pahlavi monarchy.[23]

[22] In her book, *Soldiers, Shahs and Subalterns in Iran*, Stephanie Cronin studies various episodes of contention during the Reza Shah reign: Stephanie Cronin, *Soldiers, Shahs and Subalterns in Iran: Opposition, Protest and Revolt, 1921–1941* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).

[23] For detailed accounts of the republican movement and the popular resistance, see: Cronin, *Soldiers, Shahs and Subalterns in Iran*, 135–44; Yahya Dulatabadi, *Hayat-i Yahya [Yahya's Life]*, vol 4. (Tehran: Intisharat-i ʿAtar, 1361 [1982]), 345–60; Malak al-Shuʿaraʾ Bahar, *Tarikh-i Mukhtasar-i Ahzab-i Siyasi-yi Iran: Inqiraz-i Qajariyyih [The Brief History of the Political Parties of Iran: The Demise of the Qajar Court]* (Tehran: Kitab-ha-yi Jibi, 1357[1978]), 2: 40–64.

The repertoires of contention and the spatiality of protests of the anti-republican movement were similar to those of the constitutional era. Taking *bast* in the mosques and the parliament helped the opposition to fight against republicanism. However, in the heat of the protests against the republican movement, a small group of "mostly militants from the recently formed trades unions, teachers, telegraphists, pharmacists, and workers" protested in Baharistan Square, on the side farthest from the parliament, in support of the movement. Abrahamian calls this group "the first 'modern' crowd in Persian history, for it was organized by political parties and its participants were members of the new classes."[24] Coming from a different social background in comparison to the traditional middle class and religious forces, this group designated an alternative spatiality to express its political agenda. Instead of taking *bast* in the mosques or the parliament, they transformed Baharistan Square into a political public space. Through this maneuver, a novel method of protesting with its specific spatiality burgeoned that would became a new norm for political activities in the years to come.

After his rise to power as the new king of Iran, Reza Shah managed to effectively suppress his opponents. Tehran remained calm under his rule, and no major protests occurred in the city. Through the implementation of various policies, as discussed in the previous chapter, the Pahlavi state weakened many of the traditional sources of power. Yet, other cities in Iran witnessed a few episodes of contention even after the solidification of Reza Shah's power. The oil industry workers' strike in 1929[25] and the 1935 massacre by the army of protesters in Imam Reza Shrine in Mashhad[26] were the most notable instances of uprisings after Reza Shah's rise to power. As Cronin argues, after the consolidation of the Pahlavi state, the balance of power between people and the state tilted in favor of the latter. As a result, the

[24] Ervand Abrahamian, "The Crowd in Iranian Politics 1905–1953," *Past & Present*, 41 (1968): 201.

[25] For accounts of the oil industry workers' strikes in the southern city of Abadan, see: Cronin, *Soldiers, Shahs and Subalterns in Iran*, 201–37.

[26] For accounts of the Mashhad incident, see: Cronin, *Soldiers, Shahs and Subalterns in Iran*, 32–4; Hamid Algar, "Religious Forces in Twentieth Century Iran," in *The Cambridge History of Iran: From Nadir Shah to the Islamic Republic*, ed. Peter Avery et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 7: 743; Abrahamian, *Iran between Two Revolutions*, 152.

authoritarian Pahlavi regime managed to suppress and abolish traditional repertoires of urban protest. The new state did not acknowledge the rights of *bastī*s;[27] its forceful measures in confronting instances of *bast*, particularly in the case of Mashhad, and the weakening of the traditional middle classes resulted in the eclipse of this long-lived custom.[28]

As the previous chapter discussed, this general decline of popular uprisings during the reign of Reza Shah can be interpreted as the expansion of abstract spaces over the lived reality of social spaces and people's daily lives. However, this process of abstraction was far from homogeneous and dominant. Throughout Reza Shah's reign, the seeds of differential spaces burgeoned inside this spatial abstraction and, after Reza Shah's fall, they manifested in the big cities around the country, particularly in Tehran. By examining the main political players of the twelve-year period between 1941 and 1953, I investigate episodes of political gatherings in Tehran.

The main sources for collecting different instances of political gatherings, protests, parades, demonstrations, and riots were various daily and weekly periodicals of the twelve-year era. In order to provide a more coherent picture of this colorful political tapestry, I had to scan the newspapers belonging to different political groups. Due to their rivalry, each group reported exaggerated descriptions of its gatherings and, at the same time, downplayed the political meetings of its rival groups. Except *Ittilaʿat* and *Dad* newspapers, which were in circulation for much of the twelve-year era, the rest of the periodicals had a limited period of circulation and were repeatedly closed by the ruling governments using various excuses. On occasions, these newspapers, particularly those affiliated with the Tudih Party, had alternative titles ready to be published the day after the seizure of the original one. As a result, it is not possible to follow a specific newspaper for the Tudih Party throughout this period; rather, one should find the substitute newspapers that were circulated after the closure of the original ones. For example, after the crackdown on *Shahbaz* and *Nabard* newspapers, both affiliated with the Tudih Party, *Iran-i Ma* substituted them. Similarly, in 1945 *Namih-yi Bashar* was printed after the government

[27] People who take *bast*.
[28] Cronin, *Soldiers, Shahs and Subalterns in Iran*, 35–8.

shut down *Zafar* newspaper, one of the most popular periodicals affiliated to the Tudih Party. The best example in this regard is *Bih Su-yi Ayandih*. Between May 21 and November 30, 1952, this newspaper was printed under thirty-one different names, a few of them circulated for just one day.[29]

Besides *Ittilaʿat* and *Dad* newspapers, in order to produce a comprehensive list of the political gatherings of this era, I scanned the available issues of *Zafar*, *Namih-yi Bashar*, *Iran-i Ma*, *Rahbar*, *Shahbaz*, *Namih-yi Mardum*, *Farman*, *Rastgu*, *Shivih*, *Sangar-i Solh*, *Azhir*, *Namih-yi Rahbar*, *Bidari-yi Ma*, *Bih Su-yi Ayandih*, *Niru-yi Sivvum*, *Shurish*, *Mardum-i Iran*, *Democrat-i Iran*, and *Bakhtar-i Imruz* newspapers and magazines in the National Archive of Iran, Library, Museum and Document Center of Iran Parliament, and the Old Periodicals Archive of the University of Tehran Central Library. I also consulted various history books and memoirs to complete the initial list of political gatherings, protests, and parades, and the sponsoring political groups organizing and initiating these episodes.

Based on the collected data from these sources, provided in the Appendix, in the twelve-year period between Reza Shah's forced abdication in September 1941 and the military coup of August 1953 against Muhammad Mossadegh, 190 instances of political gatherings, protests, parades, and riots occurred in the public spaces of Tehran. Moreover, it is possible to divide these twelve years into two distinct sections. Between 1941 and 1947, the Tudih and, later, the Democrat Parties held the majority of the large-scale political gatherings. Particularly in 1945 and 1946, the Tudih Party was the most active political organization of Tehran and could gather tens of thousands of people in major squares and streets of the city. After its initial suppression in 1946 and further clampdown in early 1949, there is a period of stagnation in regard to political activities in Tehran. However, after the formation of the National Front Party, Tehran experienced an

[29] These alternative titles were *Akharin Nabard*, *ʿAsr-i Nuw*, *Navid-i Ayandih*, *Dizh*, *Mustahkam*, *Zid-i Istiʿmar*, *Rahnama-yi Millat*, *Rahbar-i Mardum*, *Akharin ʿAlaj*, *Razm Avaran*, *Saranjam*, *Piyvand-i Ma*, *Ravish-i Khalq*, *Farda-yi Ma*, *Vahdat-i Asia*, *Raha*, *Sharq-i Piruz*, *Dimukrasi Nuvin*, *Subh-i Zindigi*, *Urdu-yi Sulh*, *Naghmih-yi Nuw*, *Salabat-i Sharq*, *Jahanbin*, *Dar Rah-i Zindigi*, *Qarn-i Jadid*, *Jahan-i Ma*, *Surud-i Farda*, *Jang-i Qalam*, *Shahrah-i Piruzi*, *Arzish*, and *bih Su-yi Ayandih* once again.

unprecedented political atmosphere. As a result, after a short period of decline, from 1950, the National Front and the Oil Industry Nationalization Movement rejuvenated the political scene and the political public spaces of the city. In this period, even the majority of the gatherings of other groups, such as the Tudih Party, were in direct association with this national movement.

From the 190 episodes of political gatherings in this era, 127 occurred after the formation of the National Front Party in October 1949 and, particularly, after Muhammad Mossadegh's rise to power as the prime minister in April 1951. There were sixteen political gathering in 1950, fifty-six in 1951, and twenty-eight in 1952. In the first eight months of 1953, twenty-six episodes of contention and political gatherings occurred in Tehran.

1941–1947: The Tudih and Democrat Parties

Due to Iran's proximity to Russia and later to the Soviet Union, the background of the leftist movement in Iran, particularly in the northwest of the country, goes back to the 1906 Constitutional Revolution.[30] Fred Halliday argues that the first Iranian Communist Party goes back to "June 1920 before any other in Asia, months earlier than China, India, Vietnam or Japan."[31] However, the core of the

[30] For the history of the leftist movement in Iran, see: Janet Afary, "Armenian Social Democrats, the Democrat Party of Iran, and *Iran-i Naw*: A Secret Camaraderie," in *Reformers and Revolutionaries in Modern Iran: New Perspectives on the Iranian Left*, ed. Stephanie Cronin (London: Routledge Curzon, 2004), 67–84; Pezhmann Dailami, "The First Congress of Peoples of the East and the Iranian Soviet Republic of Gilan, 1920–21," in *Reformers and Revolutionaries in Modern Iran: New Perspectives on the Iranian Left*, ed. Stephanie Cronin (London: Routledge Curzon, 2004), 85–117; Stephanie Cronin, "Iran's Forgotten Revolutionary: Abulqasim Lahuti and the Tabriz Insurrection of 1922," in *Reformers and Revolutionaries in Modern Iran: New Perspectives on the Iranian Left*, ed. Stephanie Cronin (London: Routledge Curzon, 2004), 118–46; Touraj Atabaki, "Incommodious Hosts, Invidious Guests: The Life and Times of Iranian Revolutionaries in the Soviet Union, 1921–39," in *Reformers and Revolutionaries in Modern Iran: New Perspectives on the Iranian Left*, ed. Stephanie Cronin (London: Routledge Curzon, 2004), 147–64.

[31] Fred Halliday, "The Iranian Left in International Perspective," in *Reformers and Revolutionaries in Modern Iran: New Perspectives on the Iranian Left*, ed. Stephanie Cronin (London: Routledge Curzon, 2004), 20.

Tudih Party formed during Reza Shah's rule among a group of educated Persian-speaking young men in Tehran. In 1937, a group of fifty-three was arrested in connection with the establishment of a communist organization. Becoming famous as *Panjāh va Sih Nafar*, or the Fifty-Three People, they formed the core of the Tudih Party after Reza Shah's abdication in 1941.[32]

For five consecutive years the Tudih Party had incredible growth. By 1946, the party had 50,000 core members and 100,000 active members.[33] Matin-asgari argues that the Tudih owed its success to the fact that "it offered the most coherent vision of social reform to Iran's urban middle and lower classes."[34] In addition, the physical presence of the Red Army was effective in the initial success and growth of the party.[35] In the election of the fourteenth Parliament, the party succeeded in winning eight seats and, at its high point in the mid-1940s, the party received three cabinet ministries in Qavam al-Saltanih's government.

After the 1946 evacuation of the Red Army from Iran, Qavam broke his ties with the Tudih, suppressed the party, arrested its high-ranking members, and banned its public meetings. The unsuccessful plot to assassinate Muhammad Reza Shah on February 4, 1949 provided the excuse for further clampdown on the party by the court and military forces. After the 1946 suppression, it took the party four years to rearrange and gain strength once again. The Oil Industry Nationalization Movement and the resulting political openness in Iran provided the Tudih Party with the opportunity to enter the political scene as a decisive force. This revival did not last long and, after the 1953 coup, the Tudih received the most severe attacks from the court and the military. Many of its high-ranking members were

32 For the story of the fifty-three, see: Abrahamian, *Iran between Two Revolutions*, 155–62; Buzurg ʿAlavi, *Panjah va Sih Nafar [The Fifty-three]* (Tehran: Intisharat-i Javidan, 1357 [1978]).

33 Abrahamian, *Iran between Two Revolutions*, 303.

34 Afshin Matin-asgari, "From Social Democracy to Social Democracy: The Twentieth-Century Odyssey of the Iranian Left," in *Reformers and Revolutionaries in Modern Iran: New Perspectives on the Iranian Left*, ed. Stephanie Cronin (London: Routledge Curzon, 2004), 20.

35 Stephanie Cronin, "Introduction," in *Reformers and Revolutionaries in Modern Iran: New Perspectives on the Iranian Left*, ed. Stephanie Cronin (London: Routledge Curzon, 2004), 3.

executed or sentenced to long-term confinement; many of them had to flee the country.[36]

Ervand Abrahamian provides a comprehensive analysis of the Tudih Party's social composition. He divides the party into three levels. The modern middle class dominated the "top echelons" of the party; 97 percent of the Central Committee appointed after the party's First Congress belonged to the modern middle class. This was 88 percent after the Second Congress. In the "middle echelons" of the party there were 72 percent middle class and 27 percent working class after the First Congress, and almost half and half after the Second Congress. In the "lower echelons" of the party, however, the working class was dominant.[37] As Abrahamian describes, the party "was like an iceberg, with the party organization corresponding to the visible tip, and the much larger labor movement to the hidden mass below."[38]

Moreover, the Tudih Party even appealed to the wage earners of the bazaar. After the destruction of the complex guild system in the Reza Shah era, the long-established master–apprentice relationship had vanished and provided an opportunity for the Tudih Party to recruit from this traditional section of society.[39] Finally, the party had a considerable presence among students, professors, and academic staff.[40]

Between 1941 and 1946, the Tudih was the most successful organization in using urban spaces as political platforms. The broad social basis of the party gave it the ability to mobilize tens of thousands of people for its public gatherings, parades, and protests. Moreover, the party held many of its gatherings, particularly May Day parades, with its main ally, the Central Council of Federated Trade Unions

[36] In his great novel of *Dastan-i Yik* Shahr [*The Story of a City*], Ahmad Mahmud provides a valuable and detailed description of the fate of the members of the Tudih Party after the 1953 coup based on his personal experience: Ahmad Mahmud, *Dastan-i Yik Shahr* [*The Story of a City*] (Tehran: Intisharat-i Muʿin, 1394 [2015]). Also see: Abrahamian, *Iran between Two Revolutions*, 281–325; Jami, *Guzashtih Chiragh-i Rah-i Ayandih Ast*, 148–717.

[37] Abrahamian, *Iran between Two Revolutions*, 327.

[38] Abrahamian, *Iran between Two Revolutions*, 347.

[39] Abrahamian, "The Crowd in Iranian Politics 1905–1953," 202–3.

[40] Abrahamian, *Iran between Two Revolutions*, 331–3.

(CCFTU).[41] The party was extremely creative in its political meetings. From long parades throughout the main streets of Tehran to large gatherings in the most spacious squares of the city, and from public meetings in front of the party's club to sports festivals in Amjadiyyih Stadium, the Tudih Party demonstrated a great capacity for turning Tehran's streets and squares into political platforms.

To study these episodes, examining a diversity of resources is essential. The popular periodicals of the era, such as *Ittilaʿat* newspaper, did not cover the party's gatherings in detail. Sometimes they were silent and did not provide news of the party's gatherings. On other occasions they covered the meetings very briefly, without mentioning the actual name of the party. In contrast, the newspapers affiliated to the party greatly exaggerated the numbers of the people and the sizes of protesting crowds.

The two years of 1945 and 1946 were the Tudih Party's most active period of this era. The party held at least fourteen independent, large-scale political gatherings in Tehran. Before these two years and particularly in 1944, the party was under pressure from the state. In 1944, Saʿid's government attempted to ban or restrict the party's gatherings on several occasions.[42] However, after the fall of Saʿid's government and before Qavam's rise to power, the country went through a highly turbulent political atmosphere and witnessed four premierships with average rules of 100 days. This period provided the Tudih Party with the opportunity to consolidate its presence in the public realm by holding large-scale meetings and parades.

After the fall of Saʿid's government, the party's first gathering was on February 2, 1945, the anniversary of Taqi Arani's death. He was one of the founding members of the party who was tortured and killed in Reza Shah's jail. After Reza Shah's abdication, the Tudih Party called the anniversary of Arani's death the Day of the Martyrs of Freedom[43] and, every year, attempted to commemorate this day by holding a gathering in Imamzadih Abdullah, his burial place. *Namih-yi Rahbar*

[41] For more information on CCFTU, see: Ervand Abrahamian, *Khomeinism: Essays on the Islamic Republic* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 62–8.

[42] One of these occasions occurred on November 17, 1944 when, despite the martial law, the Tudih Party held a massive gathering for the commemoration of the October Revolution: *Zafar*, Aban 29, 1323 [November 20, 1944].

[43] *Ruz-i Shuhaday-i Azadi*: *Namih-yi Rahbar*, Bahman 12, 1323 [February 1, 1945].

newspaper mentions that, in contrast to the previous two years, when the government forcefully prevented this gathering, in 1945 thousands of people responded to the party's invitation[44] and gathered in Imamzadih Abdullah.[45] This gathering was beyond the city limits in a cemetery in Rey, south of Tehran.

In 1945, the party's first public political meeting inside the city took place on March 30. This gathering was a reaction to the conservative groups' protest in Isfahan during which the Tudih Party's club in the city was looted and set on fire. Despite martial law, the party managed to gather around 20,000 people in front of its club on Firduwsi Street. After the initial speeches at the party's club, the protesting crowd commenced a long parade in the main northern streets of Tehran by forming rows of four people. From the party's club, the crowd moved north toward Istanbul Street where, by using two water cannons, the military forces tried in vain to disperse the crowd. However, the protesters managed to follow their designated trajectory and returned to the club via Saʿdi Street and Tupkhanih Square. Passing Sayyid Zia Tabatabaʾi's[46] house on Saʿdi Street, the crowd seized the opportunity to chant slogans against him and demonstrate the party's popular support. Finally, with further speeches at the party's club, the parade ended on Firduwsi Street, where it had begun earlier.[47]

This parade in the northern streets of Tehran contained the main characteristics that became the iconic features of the Tudih Party's political meetings. First, the party's favorite spot for its gatherings was in front of the party's club building on Firduwsi Street. This building became the epicenter of political activities of the party. Facing the street, the balcony of the building (Figure 6.2) provided the essential platform for the speeches of the high-ranking party members and the leaders of the groups affiliated to the party.[48] Also, it was an

[44] *Namih-yi Rahbar*, Bahman 12, 1323 [February 1, 1945].
[45] *Namih-yi Rahbar*, Bahman 15, 1323 [February 4, 1945].
[46] As one the main opponents of the Tudih Party, Sayyid Zia was a highly unpopular politician who played a crucial role in Reza Shah's rise to power.
[47] *Namih-yi Rahbar*, Farvardin 12, 1324 [April 1, 1945]; *Dad*, Farvardin 12, 1324 [April 1, 1945].
[48] To my great surprise, I found out that this building exists at the present time and has not been demolished yet. I discovered two low-quality photos of the building and the balcony amid the pictures printed in the newspapers of the era. The comparison between these photos and the existing buildings on the street, particularly the unique shape of the handrails of the balcony, helped me to pinpoint the location of the club on Firduwsi Street.

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Figure 6.2 The balcony of the Tudih Party's club on Firduwsi Street, from which many of the high-ranking members of the party addressed the protesting crowds in the 1940s and the early 1950s.

appropriate stage for playing music and anthems before the formal commencements of the meetings.[49]

Second, the Tudih Party's favorite repertoire of protest was long parades in the main streets of northern Tehran. Starting from the party's club, these marches took the protesting crowds alongside the main centers of daily life in the northern city and, after forming multikilometer loops, they usually ended up in front of the beginning point again. For example, on May Day, 1945, the parade began from the

[49] Miting va Namayish-i ʿazim-i Ma dar Avval-i May Jashn-i Kargaran-i Dunya [Our Massive Meeting on First of May, the International Worker's Day], *Zafar*, Urdibihisht 13, 1324 [May 3, 1945]; Nazm va Inzibat-i Puladin-i Kargaran va Ruwshanfikran dar Miting-i Pariruz Nimunih-yi Liyaqat va Rushd-i Siyasi-yi Tudih-yi Iran Ast [The Strict Discipline of the Workers and Intellectuals in the Meeting of Two Days Ago is a Sample of the Competence and Political Maturity of Iranian Crowds], *Namih-yi Rahbar*, Urdibihisht 13, 1324 [May 3, 1945]; Naql az Ruznamih-yi Dad: Jashn-i Mah-i May dar Tehran [From *Dad* Newspaper: May Day Festival in Tehran], *Zafar*, Urdibihisht 14, 1324 [May 4, 1945]; *Namih-yi Mardum*, Bahman 28, 1324 [February 17, 1946]; Musht-i 80 Hizar Kargar va Zahmatkish va Azadikhah-i Tehran [This Fist of 80 Thousand Workers and Toilers and Liberals of Tehran], *Zafar*, Tir 30, 1325 [July 21, 1946]; *Namih-yi Rahbar*, Farvardin 12, 1324 [April 1, 1945]; *Dad*, Farvardin 12, 1324 [April 1, 1945]; *Namih-yi Rahbar*, Murdad 17, 1324 [August 8, 1945].

club and followed Firduwsi, Nadiri, and Yusifabad (Hafiz) Streets, Hasanabad Intersection, Sipah Avenue, Tupkhanih Square, and ended on Firduwsi Street at the party's club.[50] On May 11, 1945, the party held another parade for the commemoration of the end of World War II, which took people from the club to Istanbul and Lalihzar streets, and then circulating Tupkhanih Square and concluding the march at the party's club.[51] These parades became the Tudih Party's iconic repertoire of contention. In the late 1940s and the early 1950s, following its reopening, the party revived this repertoire of contention once again.[52] In this era, besides the Tudih Party and its affiliated organizations, no other political party held similar parades in the city. As the chapter discusses later, the only exception to the Tudih Party was students' parades. University and high school students, particularly during the Oil Industry Nationalization Movement, formed long marches from the University of Tehran to Baharistan Square.[53]

[50] Miting va Namayish-i ʿazim-i Ma dar Avval-i May Jashn-i Kargaran-i Dunya [Our Massive Meeting on First of May, the International Worker's Day], *Zafar*, Urdibihisht 13, 1324 [May 3, 1945]; Nazm va Inzibat-i Puladin-i Kargaran va Ruwshanfikran dar Miting-i Pariruz Nimunih-yi Liyaqat va Rushd-i Siyasi-yi Tudih-yi Iran Ast [The Strict Discipline of the Workers and Intellectuals in the Meeting of Two Days Ago is a Sample of the Competence and Political Maturity of Iranian Crowds], *Namih-yi Rahbar*, Urdibihisht 13, 1324 [May 3, 1945].

[51] Tazahur-i Buzurg-i Millat-i Iran bih Munasibat-i Piruzi [The Massive Protest of Iranian Nation for the Commemoration of the Victory], *Iran-i Ma*, Urdibihisht 23, 1324 [May 13, 1945], *Namih-yi Rahbar*, Urdibihisht 23, 1324 [May 13, 1945].

[52] Kargaran-i Jahan Mutahid Shavid [Get United the Workers of the Universe], *Zafar*, Urdibihisht 15, 1325 [May 5, 1946]; Diruz Mardum-i Tehran Shahid-i Hadisih-yi Khunini Budand [Yesterday People of Tehran Witnessed a Bloody Incident], *Bakhtar-i Imruz*, Tir 24, 1330 [July 16, 1951]; Diruz Subh bih Daʿvat-i Firaksiyun-i Nihzat-i Milli Mitingi dar Miydan-i Baharistan Anjam Girift [Yesterday, a Meeting Was Held in Baharistan Square after the Invitation of the National Front Party], *Ittilaʿat*, Khurdad 30, 1332 [June 20, 1953]; *Bakhtar-i Imruz*, Farvardin 25, 1332 [April 14, 1953]; *Bakhtar-i Imruz*, Farvardin 9, 1331 [March 29, 1952]; Tazahurat-i Diruz Munjar bih Ightishash va Khunrizi Shud [Yesterday Protests Resulted in Riots and Bloodshed], *Ittilaʿat*, Tir 24, 1330 [July 16, 1951]; Tazahurat-i Diruz-i Jamʿiyat-i Mubarizih ba Shirkatha-yi Istiʿmari-yi Naft [Yesterday Protest of the National Population of Fight Against the Colonial Oil Companies], Khurdad 8, 1330 [May 30, 1951].

[53] Tazahurat dar Miydan-i Baharistan [Demonstration in Baharistan Square], *Ittilaʿat*, Azar 30, 1329 [December 21, 1950]; Tazahurat Danishjuyan-i Danishgah dar Miydan-i Baharistan [Demonstration of the University Students

The long parades provided the party with the opportunity to interact with ordinary people. The organizers of the meetings strongly emphasized forming well-ordered and peaceful marches to demonstrate the benign intentions of the party and to challenge their opponents, who attempted to portray the Tudih Party as an alien agent that followed the Soviet Union's policies and pursued aggressive measures to establish its hegemony in the political realm. On March 30, 1945, before the commencement of the parade, ʿAbidi, one of the leaders of the party, announced: "We began our march in order to show the [peaceful] purpose of our meeting to the residents of the capital."[54] Similarly, following the May Day parade of 1945, under the title of "The Strict Discipline of the Workers and Intellectuals," *Namih-yi Rahbar* newspaper wrote:

> Little by little, people of Tehran will understand the meanings of the parades; they will know the Tudih Party. The fake news that portrays the party as the looter of the bazaars won't be effective anymore. Not only the shops on the trajectory of our parade were open, except a few ones that were closed for the first of May, but also their owners came out to watch our parade and even joined our joyful meeting and express their happiness.[55]

After each political gathering, the newspapers close to the Tudih Party illustrated the same picture; they admired the discipline of the

in Baharistan Square], *Ittilaʿat*, Diy 4, 1329 [December 25, 1950]; Tazahurat dar Barabar-i Baharistan [Demonstration in Front of Baharistan], *Ittilaʿat*, Diy 10, 1329 [December 31, 1950]; Tazahurat Danishjuyan Danishamuzan-i Tehran [Demonstration of the Students of Tehran], *Ittilaʿat*, Urdibihisht 1, 1330 [April 22, 1951]; Imruz Hizaran Nafar Danishamuz-i Dukhtar va Pisar dar Khiyaban-ha Faryad Mizadand "Naft Bayad Milli Shavad" [Today Thousands of Girl and Boy Students Chanted in the Streets that "Oil Should be Nationalized"], *Bakhtar-i Imruz*, Diy 10, 1329 [December 31, 1950]; Danishjuyan-i Danishgah Faryad Mizadand: Ya Marg ya Mossadegh [The University Students Chanted: Whether Death or Mossadegh], *Bakhtar-i Imruz*, Isafand 11, 1331 [March 2, 1953]; *Niru-yi Sevvum*, Jaryan-i Mashruh-i va Daqiq-i Dimunstirasiyun-i Mushtarak-i Danishjuyan va Danishamuzan-i Tehran [The Detailed Coverage of the Shared Demonstration of University and High School Students], Isafand 12, 1331 [March 3, 1953].

[54] *Namih-yi Rahbar*, Farvardin 12, 1324 [April 1, 1945].

[55] Nazm va Inzibat-i Puladin-i Kargaran va Ruwshanfikran dar Miting-i Pariruz Nimunih-yi Liyaqat va Rushd-i Siyasi-yi Tudih-yi Iran Ast [The Strict Discipline of the Workers and Intellectuals in the Meeting of Two Days Ago is a Sample of the Competence and Political Maturity of Iranian Crowds], *Namih-yi Rahbar*, Urdibihisht 13, 1324 [May 3, 1945].

immense protesting crowds and described bystanders' and ordinary people's sympathetic reactions to the parades: "everyone acknowledged that such an enormous demonstration with such an order does not even take place in European countries […] Bystanders welcomed the protesting crowd with such a joy and sincerity that it was impossible to distinguish between the protesters and spectators."[56]

The third characteristic of these parades was the design of their trajectory. The party usually arranged these protests to pass by their opponents' newspapers, political clubs, and organizations. This arrangement provided the party with the perfect spectacle to demonstrate its power and, on occasions, the excuse to attack these places.[57] These newspapers, clubs, and organizations as well as the modern middle class's main centers of public life, were mostly concentrated in the northern neighborhoods of Tehran. As a result, the majority of the Tudih Party's parades and protests were restricted to these neighborhoods.

In both 1945 and 1946 the party commemorated Arani's death anniversaries,[58] held May Day parades,[59] and celebrated the anniversaries

[56] Kargaran-i Jahan Mutahid Shavid [Get United the Workers of the Universe], *Zafar*, Urdibihisht 15, 1325 [May 5, 1946].

[57] *Namih-yi Rahbar*, Farvardin 12, 1324 [April 1, 1945]; *Dad*, Farvardin 12, 1324 [April 1, 1945]; Diruz Mardum-i Tehran Shahid-i Hadisih-yi Khunini Budand [Yesterday People of Tehran Witnessed a Bloody Incident], *Bakhtar-i Imruz*, Tir 24, 1330 [July 16, 1951]; Tazahurat-i Diruz Munjar bih Ightishash va Khunrizi Shud [Yesterday Protests Resulted in Riots and Bloodshed], *Ittilaʿat*, Tir 24, 1330 [July 16, 1951]; *Bih Su-yi Ayandih*, Tir 24, 1330 [July 16, 1951]; *Shujaʿat*, Tir 26, 1330 [July 18, 1951]; *Rastakhiz-i Khalq*, Tir 28, 1330 [July 20, 1951]; *Navid-i Ayandih*, Tir 22, 1331 [July 13, 1952]; Elahi, *Duriha va Dilgiriha*, 236–7.

[58] *Namih-yi Rahbar*, Bahman 15, 1323 [February 4, 1945]; *Namih-yi Mardum*, Bahman 16–17, 1324 [February 5–6, 1946].

[59] Nazm va Inzibat-i Puladin-i Kargaran va Ruwshanfikran dar Miting-i Pariruz Nimunih-yi Liyaqat va Rushd-i Siyasi-yi Tudih-yi Iran Ast [The Strict Discipline of the Workers and Intellectuals in the Meeting of Two Days Ago is a Sample of the Competence and Political Maturity of Iranian Crowds], *Namih-yi Rahbar*, Urdibihisht 13, 1324 [May 3, 1945]; Miting va Namayish-i ʿAzim-i Ma dar Avval-i May Jashn-i Kargaran-i Dunya [Our Massive Meeting on First of May, the International Worker's Day], *Zafar*, Urdibihisht 13, 1324 [May 3, 1945]; Naql az Ruznamih-yi Dad: Jashn-i Mah-i May dar Tehran [From *Dad* Newspaper: May Day Festival in Tehran], *Zafar*, Urdibihisht 14, 1324 [May 4, 1945]; Jashn-i Mah-i May dar Tehran [May Day Festival in Tehran], *Dad*, Urdibihisht 12, 1324 [May 2, 1945]; Kargaran-i Jahan Mutahid Shavid [Get United the Workers of the Universe], *Zafar*, Urdibihisht 13, 1325 [May 3, 1946]; Kargaran-i Jahan Mutahid Shavid [Get United the Workers of the Universe], *Zafar*, Urdibihisht 15, 1325 [May 5, 1946].

of the Constitutional Revolution.[60] It also held other meetings to condemn the attack on the party's club in Isfahan,[61] to commemorate the end of World War II,[62] to honor the Soviet Union's Workers' delegation,[63] to celebrate the reopening of the party's club,[64] to support the Aqajari workers' strike,[65] to welcome Louis Sayan, the General Secretary of the Federated Workers Trade Union,[66] and to commemorate the anniversary of the establishment of the party and *Mihrigān* festival.[67]

The success of the party in portraying itself as a coherent political body with a consistent social vision and its ability to mobilize masses and utilize the spatiality of the city to represent its visions helped it to achieve incredible growth in 1945 and 1946. The examination of the accounts of newspapers suggests that the sizes of the crowds in the Tudih Party's political gatherings grew from 10,000–20,000 people in early 1945[68] to 120,000 people in October 1946.[69] However, there are inconsistencies in the accounts of the newspapers. As an example, *Iran-i Ma* newspaper estimated that 10,000 people took part in the

[60] *Namih-yi Rahbar*, Murdad 16–17, 1324 [August 7–8, 1945]; *Iran-i Ma*, Murdad 16, 1324 [August 7, 1945]; *Ittilaʿat*, Murdad 15, 1325 [August 6, 1946]; *Dad*, Murdad 16, 1325 [August 7, 1946].

[61] *Namih-yi Rahbar*, Farvardin 12, 1324 [April 1, 1945]; *Dad*, Farvardin 12, 1324 [April 1, 1945].

[62] Tazahur-i Buzurg-i Millat-i Iran bih Munasibat-i Piruzi [The Massive Protest of Iranian Nation for the Commemoration of the Victory], *Iran-i Ma*, Urdibihisht 23, 1324 [May 13, 1945]; *Namih-yi Rahbar*, Urdibihisht 23, 1324 [May 13, 1945].

[63] *Namih-yi Rahbar*, Murdad 17, 1324 [August 8, 1945].

[64] *Namih-yi Mardum*, Bahman 28, 1324 [February 17, 1946]; *Ittilaʿat*, Bahman 28, 1324 [February 17, 1946].

[65] Davazdah Hizar Musht-i Girih Kardih-yi Kargaran [Twelve Thousand Fists of Workers], *Zafar*, Khurdad 5, 1325 [May 26, 1946].

[66] Musht-i Hashtad Hizar Kargar va Zahmatkish va Azadikhah-i Tehran [The Eighty Thousand Fists of Workers, Toilers and Liberals of Tehran], *Zafar*, Tir 30, 1325 [July 21, 1946]; *Dad*, Tir 30, 1325 [July 21, 1946].

[67] Bish az Yiksad Hizar Nafar [More than One Hundred Thousand People], *Zafar*, Mihr 14, 1325 [October 6, 1946]; Rizhih-yi ʿUmumi-ye Afrad-i Hizb-i Tudih-yi Iran, *Namih-yi Rahbar*, Mihr 14, 1325 [October 6, 1946].

[68] *Namih-yi Rahbar*, Farvardin 12, 1324 [April 1, 1945]; *Dad*, Farvardin 12, 1324 [April 1, 1945].

[69] Bish az Yiksad Hizar Nafar [More than One Hundred Thousand People], *Zafar*, Mihr 14, 1325 [October 6, 1946]; Rizhih-yi ʿUmumi-ye Afrad-i Hizb-i Tudih-yi Iran, *Namih-yi Rahbar*, Mihr 14, 1325 [October 6, 1946].

1945 parade for the anniversary of the Constitutional Revolution.[70] However, *Azhir* newspaper mentioned 15,000 people and *Tufiq* newspaper claimed 30,000–40,000 people for the same gathering.[71] These numbers clearly show that the periodicals of the era tended to exaggerate the achievement of their affiliated political groups. Keeping this point in perspective, in these years there was an undeniable growth in the party's popularity and its ability to bring the masses into the public spaces of Tehran.

On Friday October 4, 1946, the Tudih Party held its last large public gathering to celebrate the fifth anniversary of the party's inauguration. Moreover, the party used the timing of this occasion and its coincidence with *Mihrigān* festival[72] to portray the meeting as a national parade based on pre-Islamic ceremonies. Just before the suppression of the party, this gathering was at the height of the party's alliance with Qavam al-Saltanih, the prime minister of the country at the time. As a result, the party used Tupkhanih Square as its rallying point and, instead of the party's club, it used the municipality building and its balcony for the high-ranking members' speeches. Based on the accounts of *Namih-yi Rahbar* and *Zafar* newspapers, around 120,000 people participated in this parade. The accounts of the day portray a militaristic image, with the high-ranking members observing the well-ordered rows of marching groups from the balcony of the municipality building.[73] This picture resembles the military parades in Tupkhanih Square, where Muhammad Reza Shah watched the armed forces from the same balcony. As an example, on October 26, less than a month after the Tudih Party's parade, the court

[70] *Iran-i Ma*, Murdad 16, 1324 [August 7, 1945].

[71] Both numbers are available in *Rahbar* newspaper from the accounts of the parade in other periodicals: *Rahbar*, Murdad 19, 1324 [August 10, 1945].

[72] *Mihrigān* is a pre-Islamic festival with Zoroastrian origins.

[73] The parade in Tupkhanih Square was just one of the five main events prepared by the party for the celebration of its establishment. On Thursday, October 3, the party held a sports festival in Amjadiyyih Stadium. On Wednesday, there was a dinner party at the club to which Qavam al-Saltanih was invited. Moreover, there were two smaller events on Tuesday night and on the day after the main parade. For the full accounts of these events and their program, see: Bish az Yiksad Hizar Nafar [More than One Hundred Thousand People], *Zafar*, Mihr 14, 1325 [October 6, 1946]; Rizhih-yi ʿUmumi-ye Afrad-i Hizb-i Tudih-yi Iran, *Namih-yi Rahbar*, Mihr 14, 1325 [October 6, 1946]; *Rastgu*, Mihr 9, 1325 [October 1, 1946].

held its annual events for the celebration of Muhammad Reza Shah's birthday in Tupkhanih Square, where the Shah was present on the municipality balcony observing the military parade.[74] However, the October 4 parade was the last occasion that the Tudih Party managed to demonstrate its power and popularity; soon, Qavam al-Saltanih's government suppressed the party. It took the party around four years to return to the political scene during the Oil Industry Nationalization Movement.

With the rise of Qavam al-Saltanih to power and his foreign and internal achievements as the new prime minister of the country, an alternative political force grew that, for a relatively short period of time, managed to hold several large rallies in Tehran. Qavam was an experienced politician who had served various governments since the reign of the last Qajar monarch, Ahmad Shah (1909–25). Between 1941 and 1953 he became premier for three terms, a short period from August 1942 to February 1943, a longer one lasting from January 1946 to December 1947, and finally one very brief term for a few days in July 1952. In his second round, Qavam negotiated the Red Army's evacuation from the country and suppressed the separatist movements in the northwest of Iran. These achievements brought him and his party, the Democrat Party, short-term popularity.[75]

Becoming the prime minister on January 27, 1946, one of Qavam's first orders was the relaxation of martial law, imposed by the previous government, which made public gatherings possible again. Later, on February 18, he left the country to travel to the Soviet Union in order to negotiate the evacuation of the Red Army from Iran.[76] After his arrival, on March 11, 1946, Qavam's supporters and the members of the Tudih Party gathered in Baharistan Square to support the prime minister on the day of his report to the Parliament about the negotiations with the Soviet Union.[77] This was Qavam's first public display

[74] *Democrat-i Iran*, Aban 6, 1325 [October 28, 1946].

[75] For Qavam's premierships during the twelve-year period and his Democrat Party, see: Azimi, *Iran*, 63–79, 147–82; Jami, *Guzashtih Chiragh-i Rah-i Ayandih Ast*, 375–511; Abrahamian, *Iran between Two Revolutions*, 225–45.

[76] ʿAqili, *Ruzshumar-i Tarikh-i Iran*, 1: 274–6.

[77] Tazahurat dar Mughabil-i Majlis [Demonstration in Front of the Parliament], *Ittilaʿat*, Isfand 20, 1324 [March 11, 1946]; Abrahamian, *Iran between Two Revolutions*, 223.

of popular support and paved the way for the establishment of the Democrat Party later in June 1946.[78]

During its short life, the Democrat Party succeeded in holding some large-scale public gatherings. Similar to the Tudih and, later, the National Front, by filling up the spacious squares of the city, the party was able to show its popular support and use it as the leverage to achieve political privilege. Besides Qavam's successful negotiations with the Soviet Union and his relative success in controlling the separatist movements around the country, the Democrat Party's short-term affiliation with the Tudih Party provided it with the social force that was essential for its political maneuvers in the public realm. Qavam managed to harvest the Tudih Party's popularity to boost his public approval. However, after achieving relative stability as the prime minister, he broke his ties and suppressed the party.

The most reliable source to study the political gatherings of the Democrat Party is its official newspaper, *Democrat-i Iran*. It began circulation from October 24, 1946, just before the Democrat Party's public meeting for the hundredth day of its inauguration. Prior to the publication of the newspaper, the party had already held its first two public gatherings, one for the anniversary of the Constitutional Revolution on August 5, 1946[79] and one in September 1946.[80] The party held these two gatherings in the largest square of the city, Tupkhanih (Sipah). This square became the Democrat Party's favorite spot for its political gatherings. Similar to the Tudih Party's use of the balcony of its club building as the stage for public speeches, the Democrat Party utilized the balcony of the municipality building in Tupkhanih Square for the same purpose.[81]

78 ʿAqili, *Ruzshumar-i Tarikh-i Iran*, 1: 279.

79 Miting-i Hizb-i Democrat-i Iran dar Miydan-i Sipah [Democrat-i Iran Party's Meeting in Sipah Square], *Ittilaʿat*, Murdad 13 and 15, 1325 [August 4 and 6, 1946]; *Dad*, Murdad 16, 1325 [August 7, 1946].

80 Afrad-i Hizb-i Democrat-i Iran dar Barabar-i Rahbar-i Kul-i Hizb Rizhih Raftand [The Members of the Democrat-i Iran Party Marched in Front of the Leader of the Party], *Ittilaʿat*, Shahrivar 16, 1325 [September 7, 1946]; ʿAqili, *Ruzshumar-i Tarikh-i Iran*, 1: 282.

81 Rizhih-yi Afrad-i Hizb-i Nirumand-i Ma [The March of the Members of our Powerful Party], *Democrat-i Iran*, Aban 6, 1325 [October 28, 1946]; Jashn-i Duvumin Sal-i Taʾsis-i Hizb-i Dimucrat-i Iran [The Second Anniversary of the Democrat Party's Establishment], *Ittilaʿat*, Tir 13, 1326 [July 5, 1947]; *Democrat-i Iran*, Tir 15–16, 1326 [July 7–8, 1947].

The rally for the hundredth day of the Democrat Party's inauguration was one of the largest gatherings of the party during its relatively short life. *Democrat-i Iran* newspaper provides complete coverage of the day. Once again in Tupkhanih Square, the balcony of the municipality building transformed into the stage for the speeches of the party's leaders and a platform for Qavam al-Saltanih to watch the party members' parade. As the newspaper claims, more than 100,000 official members of the party participated in the parade and 75,000 people gathered in Tupkhanih Square to watch the event.[82] Regarding the timing of this gathering, this emphasis on the numbers seems to be the Democrat Party's plan to flaunt its public acceptance. Less than a month after the Tudih Party's gathering for its fifth anniversary of inauguration and *Mihrigān* festival, which gathered around 120,000 people in Tupkhanih Square, the Democrat Party aimed to hold a larger parade in the same place. The war of power between various political groups was clearly manifested in their attempts to demonstrate their popularity through numbers, as if the Democrat Party was more popular than the Tudih Party because it managed to gather around 175,000 people only 100 days from establishment, while the latter party managed to gather 120,000 people after five years of working.

By taking these measures, Qavam al-Saltanih attempted to fabricate an alternative political force to the Tudih Party. The full coverage of the Democrat Party's gatherings in *Ittilaʿat* newspaper shows that the court approved this maneuver.[83] As the main periodical of the country with the highest circulation rate, *Ittilaʿat* was close to the royal family. With the exception of the most intense days of the Oil Industry Nationalization Movement, in the period between 1941 and 1953, *Ittilaʿat* newspaper usually remained silent or presented a cursory examination of the gatherings of the Tudih Party and, later, the National Front. As a result, its full coverage of the Democrat Party's

[82] Rizhih-yi Afrad-i Hizb-i Nirumand-i Ma [The March of the Members of Our Powerful Party], *Democrat-i Iran*, Aban 6, 1325 [October 28, 1946].

[83] Afrad-i Hizb-i Democrat-i Iran dar Barabar-i Rahbar-i Kul-i Hizb Rizhih Raftand [The Members of the Democrat-i Iran Party Marched in Front of the Leader of the Party], *Ittilaʿat*, Shahrivar 16, 1325 [September 7, 1946]; Jashn-i Duvumin Sal-i Taʾsis-i Hizb-i Dimucrat-i Iran [The Second Anniversary of the Democrat Party's Establishment], *Ittilaʿat*, Tir 13, 1326 [July 5, 1947].

gatherings suggests the implicit approval of the court and Muhammad Reza Shah's support of Qavam.

Moreover, Qavam's breaking of ties with the Tudih Party and the clampdown on the party in late 1946 indicate that the establishment was terrified of the increasing popularity of the Tudih Party. Even after the suppression of the party, Qavam's government took extra measures to prevent possible gatherings of the party's supporters on particular occasions. For example, on the verge of the 1947 May Day, the state imposed martial law, which prevented the possible gatherings of the leftwing groups for the day. *Iran-i Ma* newspaper mentions the heavy presence of military forces in front of the party's club on the day, while the Iranian Workers' Syndicate,[84] affiliated to the Democrat Party, was free to hold its meeting in the Railway Stadium. The newspaper disputes the official report that 20,000 people gathered in the latter meeting, arguing that only a few hundred were present.[85]

Qavam al-Saltanih maintained martial law for the greater part of 1947 and only suspended it for twenty-two days, between June 17 and July 8,[86] in order to hold the ceremonies for the first-year anniversary of the Democrat Party's inauguration. Between July 1 and 5 the party prepared multiple events, including garden parties, speeches, a sports festival in Amjadiyyih Stadium, and a huge parade in Tupkhanih Square.[87]

This was the last occasion that the Democrat Party managed to hold a public gathering in Tehran. With Qavam al-Saltanih's fall from power in December 1947, Tehran witnessed two years of stagnation of organized political rallies. In these years, the most active political forces were the traditional strata of society under the influence of religious leaders such as Sayyid Abu al-Qasim Kashani. However, in late 1949 a new political force formed, the National Front Party, which swept through the country and become the most active and powerful political organization in Iran.

[84] *Sandika-ye Kargaran-i Iran*

[85] *Iran-i Ma*, Urdibihisht 11, 1326 [May 2, 1947].

[86] *Ittilaʿat*, Khurdad 24, 1326 [June 15, 1947]; *Ittilaʿat*, Tir 17, 1326 [July 9, 1947]; *Democrat-i Iran*, Tir 17, 1326 [July 9, 1947].

[87] Barnamih-yi Jashn-i Aghaz-i Duvumin Sal-i Taʾsis-i Hizb-i Dimucrat-i Iran [The Program for the Celebration of the Second Anniversary of the Democrat Party's Inauguration], *Democrat-i Iran*, Tir 8, 1326 [June 30, 1947]; Jashn-i Duvumin Sal-i Taʾsis-i Hizb-i Dimucrat-i Iran [The Second Anniversary of the Democrat Party's Inauguration], *Ittilaʿat*, Tir 13, 1326 [July 5, 1947]; *Democrat-i Iran*, Tir 15–16, 1326 [July 7–8, 1947].

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1949–1953: The National Front Party and the Oil Industry Nationalization Movement

During the 1949 election for the sixteenth Parliament, the National Front Party formed through the alliance of various socio-political forces. This coalition developed as a reaction to the court's interference in the process of the election. Enraged by this meddling, a group of popular politicians, backed by their followers, protested against the court and entered the royal gardens to negotiate the cancelation of the election and holding of an honest one.[88] This incident galvanized the core of the National Front Party, which was soon joined by four influential political organizations.

On November 4, 1949, the assassination of the court minister by a member of a radical Islamic group intimidated the Shah and persuaded him to step back from his solid position and agree to nullify the previous election in Tehran and hold a new parliamentary election in the city. In the new election, the National Front succeeded in electing eight highly popular delegates into the Parliament.[89] In the words of Abrahamian, "as the forthcoming months proved, the eight, supported by the middle classes, could shake not only Parliament but also the shah and the whole country."[90]

The National Front was the main political force behind the Oil Industry Nationalization Movement. Similar to the Constitutional Revolution in which a temporary coalition of incompatible social forces resulted in great political achievements, the National Front was a volatile mixture of social groups ready to disintegrate after its initial victories. However, the main difference between the current movement and the earlier ones was the substitution of the modern middle class for the small group of the intelligentsia. As Chapter 5 demonstrated, the forty-five-year span between the Constitutional Revolution and

[88] A full account of this protest and sit-in in the royal garden appears in Chigunih Tehran Diruz bih Nida-yi Tahasun Pasukh Dad? [How Yesterday did Tehran Respond to the Call for Sit-in?], *Bakhtar-i Imruz*, Mihr 23, 1328 [October 2, 1949].

[89] For the story of the election for the sixteenth Parliament and formation of the National Front Party, see: Jami, *Guzashtih Chiragh-i Rah-i Ayandih Ast*, 549–51; Abrahamian, *Iran between Two Revolutions*, 251–61; Bahram Afrasiyabi, *Khatirat va Mubarizat-i Duktur Hossein Fatimi [Memoirs and Struggles of Dr. Hossein Fatimi]* (Tehran: Intisharat-i Sukhan, 1366 [1987]),111–21.

[90] Abrahamian, *Iran between Two Revolutions*, 261.

the nationalization era had witnessed the formation of the modern middle class. At this time, instead of the small group of intelligentsia, the progressive component of the movement was a fully fledged class, capable of mobilizing its resources and pursuing its political goals.

The National Front is a well-studied topic in the contemporary history of Iran.[91] Based on these studies, the four major political organizations constituting its main body belonged to the modern or traditional middle classes. This coalition drew together various groups of intellectuals, university professors and students, white-collar professionals, petit shopkeepers (*bāzārī*s), traditional religious classes, and clerics. Moreover, the party had some support among the working class; the Toilers' Party,[92] one of the affiliated organizations, was an anti-Tudih Party that had won workers' support to some extent. From a broad perspective, the National Front was divided between two main poles: the modern middle class supporting Muhammad Mossadegh and the traditional middle class supporting the high-ranking cleric of Tehran, Sayyid Abu al-Qasim Kashani.[93] The unity between these two resulted in the nationalization of the oil industry and Mossadegh's premiership between 1950 and 1953, and their division resulted in the failure of the movement and the 1953 military coup.

The dichotomy of the socio-political forces forming the National Front produced dichotomous political public spaces in return. Besides the main streets and squares of northern Tehran, on several occasions the traditional components of the party revived the main mosques of the old city, particularly Shah Mosque, as political platforms for

[91] Abrahamian, *Iran between Two Revolutions*, 253–60; Abrahamian, "The Crowd in Iranian Politics 1905–1953," 204–5; Mark J. Gasiorowski, "The 1953 Coup d'Etat in Iran," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 19, no. 3 (1987): 262; Siavoshi, "The Oil Nationalization Movement," 116–17; Fakhreddin Azimi, "Unseating Mosaddeq: The Configuration and Role of Domestic Forces," in *Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran*, ed. Mark J. Gasiorowski and Malcom Byrne (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2004), 29–32; Mark J. Gasiorowski, "Conclusion: Why Did Mosaddeq Fall?" in *Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran*, ed. Mark J. Gasiorowski and Malcom Byrne (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2004), 270.

[92] *Hizb-i Zahmatkishan*.

[93] Besides Mossadegh and Kashani, Muzafar Baqaʾi and Khalil Maliki were the other two influential leaders of the party; however, Mossadegh's and Kashani's popularity overshadowed the popularity of the other two. For the leadership of the party, see: Siavoshi, "The Oil Nationalization Movement," 114–15.

their gatherings. However, the majority of the studies examining this era overlook these protests and political meetings and mostly focus on the main episodes of contention during this era, such as the protests of July 17–21, 1952 and the events of August 15–19, 1953.[94]

The spatiality of the political gatherings of this era fall into three main categories. First, the gatherings of the modern middle class, whether in support of the National Front or in opposition to it, occurred exclusively in the main streets and squares of the northern city, particularly in Baharistan Square. Second, the traditional strata utilized both the main mosques of the city and the main squares of northern Tehran for their political gatherings. Third, the modern and traditional middle classes held their shared gatherings mostly in the same spatial settings as the first category. The Appendix provides a comprehensive list of all the protest, parades, riots, and political rallies of this era.

The first major political gathering after the establishment of the National Front Party occurred on February 7, 1950, just a day before Tehran's new parliamentary election. To galvanize their popular support and encourage the masses to vote, the leaders of the party, particularly Muhammad Mossadegh, invited people to gather in Baharistan Square. The examination of this meeting suggests two significant points. First, from the beginning of their coalition the party's leaders were aware of the impact of the occupation of public spaces by the masses as an instrument to push forward their political objectives. They believed that public spaces were crucial platforms to support social movements against the establishment. Initially, they harvested this potential to push for their parliamentary election. Second, this awareness was not the continuation of the old, established methods of protests utilized during the constitutional era; rather, it was the product of the new socio-spatial discourse that had already changed people's and the state's various spatial practices prior to the 1950s.

Bakhtar-i Imruz newspaper, as the main venue reflecting the news of the National Front Party, dedicated multiple pages to the February

[94] Heiss, *Empire and Nationhood*; Ferrier, "The Anglo-Iranian Oil Dispute"; Katouzian, "Oil Boycott and the Political Economy"; Louis, "Musaddiq and the Dilemmas of British Imperialism"; Cottam, "Nationalism in Twentieth-Century Iran"; Ferrier, "The Iranian Oil Industry," 657–66; Elm, *Oil, Power, and Principle*, 44–291; Siavoshi, "The Oil Nationalization Movement, 1949–1953"; Heiss, "The International Boycott of Iranian Oil."

7 meeting.[95] Three days prior to the gathering, *Bakhtar-i Imruz* published Mossadegh's invitation:

[… Oh People!] do not prevent expressing your feelings, [which helps] dedicated people to continue their struggle and fight for your rights […] In developed countries, people are free to gather and discuss their views about candidates months and even years before the elections. In these countries, there is not a single day that people do not protest and political parties do not express their views about the election of their representatives. But in this country […] they use the smallest excuse to declare martial law and keep it to the extent that people cannot take a step forward to release themselves from these animosities […] and now if you do not protest and express your feelings […] they will pretend that people do not have the merit to elect their own representatives. As a result, I invite all of the classes, parties, and patriots to gather in Baharistan Square on Bahman 18 [February 7], at three in the afternoon.[96]

Mossadegh's invitation clearly shows how the National Front Party was aware of the role of large-scale political gatherings in public spaces of Tehran as an effective instrument for increasing the pressure on the court. Moreover, the comparison with the "developed countries" demonstrates the influence of the new spatial discourse on forming

[95] The February 7 meeting is a great example that clearly shows why the examination of the events of this era highly demands multiple sources. In contrast to *Bakhtar-i Imruz*, which days before the gathering urged people to participate and, after the rally, covered all the details of the day, *Ittilaʿat* newspaper, as the main newspaper of the country with the highest circulation rate, was mostly silent and only published a brief article about the rally: Duktur Mossadegh Mardum Tehran ra Bih Shirkat dar Miting ʿumumi Daʿvat Mikunad [Doctor Mossadegh Invites People of Tehran to Participate in a Public Meeting], *Bakhtar-i Imruz*, Bahman 15, 1328 [February 4, 1950]; Pishva-yi Millat az Kinar-i Mujassamih-yi Azadi ba Shuma Harf Mizanad [The Leader of Nation Talk with You besides the Statue of Freedom], *Bakhtar-i Imruz*, Bahman 17, 1328 [February 6, 1950]; Imruz Buzurgtarin Miting-i Tarikhi-yi Pishva-yi Millat Anjam Paziruft [Today the Biggest Historic Meeting of the Nation's Leader Took Place], *Bakhtar-i Imruz*, Bahman 18, 1328 [February 7, 1950]; Diruz Mardum-i Tehran Vafadari-yi Khod ra bih Usul-i Azadi Sabit Kardand [Yesterday People of Tehran Proved Their Loyalty to the Principles of Freedom], *Bakhtar-i Imruz*, Bahman 19, 1328 [February 8, 1950]; Miting dar Miydan-i Baharistan [Meeting in Baharistan Square], *Ittilaʿat*, Bahman 19, 1328 [February 8, 1950].

[96] Duktur Mossadegh Mardum Tehran ra Bih Shirkat dar Miting ʿumumi Daʿvat Mikunad [Doctor Mossadegh Invites People of Tehran to Participate in a Public Meeting], *Bakhtar-i Imruz*, Bahman 15, 1328 [February 4, 1950].

the spatiality of political activities in Tehran. The latter point is more obvious in the editorial piece published in *Bakhtar-i Imruz* newspaper the day after the meeting. Probably written by Hossein Fatimi, one of the most popular and influential figures of the National Front Party and the editor-in-chief of the newspaper, the article compares Baharistan Square to the Place de la Bastille (Bastille Square) in Paris:

> If the famous Bastille Square is the representation of the great soul of France and, every year on July 14, people gather there to salute the sacred martyrs of freedom and commemorate the heroes of the 1789 revolution, Baharistan Square is also the combination of the memories of the struggles between freedom and tyranny [...] From this day, Tehran has a great responsibility [...] The educated and patriotic class blew an iron fist to the mouth of the thieves of people's votes.[97]

As was demonstrated earlier in the case of the Tudih Party, the members of the "new educated and patriotic class," in the words of Fatimi, or the modern middle class, as this book calls them, were defining the terrains of popular political struggles. They distanced themselves from the old, established repertoires of contention, which were frequent during the constitutional era, and redefined the new public spaces of the city as the novel platforms of protests and political struggles. More interestingly, as the text of the article indicates, the members of this class hand-picked historical events to fabricate authentic political public spaces and compare them with their European counterparts. Without mentioning the main episodes of contention prior to the success of the Constitutional Revolution, Fatimi fast-forwarded to the 1908 military coup against the revolutionaries, stating: "For half a century, bloody struggles have occurred in this square and in the critical days of the small tyranny,[98] this square defined the future of Iran."[99] These accounts provide a tailored version of history and ignore the main spaces of protests during the Constitutional Revolution.

By holding the February 7 gathering, Baharistan Square became the main platform for the National Front Party to gather people for

[97] Diruz Mardum-i Tehran Vafadari-yi Khod ra bih Usul-i Azadi Sabit Kardand [Yesterday People of Tehran Proved Their Loyalty to the Principles of Freedom], *Bakhtar-i Imruz*, Bahman 19, 1328 [February 8, 1950].

[98] The 1908 coup.

[99] Diruz Mardum-i Tehran Vafadari-yi Khod ra bih Usul-i Azadi Sabit Kardand [Yesterday People of Tehran Proved Their Loyalty to the Principles of Freedom], *Bakhtar-i Imruz*, Bahman 19, 1328 [February 8, 1950].

its political meetings. Similar to the Tudih and Democrat Parties, the National Front began to use the balcony of a building adjacent to the square as the stage for holding speeches and to address people during the meetings. In this case, the balcony of *Kishvar* newspaper provided this stage.[100] Baharistan Square played a crucial role in the success of Mossadegh and his allies in the Oil Industry Nationalization Movement and Mossadegh's premiership. They used this platform to put pressure on the court and the Parliament representatives, to demonstrate the popular support for the nationalization of the oil industry, to oppose the British government's interference in Iran, to force the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company to leave the country, and to support Mossadegh's premiership.[101]

In this era, the National Front and Mossadegh's supporters were not the sole political forces who desired to establish their dominance over Baharistan Square. The examination of the accounts of newspapers suggests a fierce rivalry between the Tudih Party and its affiliated groups with the National Front Party. These poles of political power were in a constant struggle over the spatiality of the city, particularly Baharistan Square. On the surface, this struggle resembles the mid-1940s rivalry between the Tudih and Democrat Parties. The competing

[100] Imruz Buzurgtarin Miting-i Tarikhi-yi Pishva-yi Millat Anjam Paziruft [Today the Biggest Historic Meeting of the Nation's Leader Took Place], *Bakhtar-i Imruz*, Bahman 18, 1328 [February 7, 1950]; *Bakhtar-i Imruz*, Diy 9, 1329 [December 30, 1950]; *Bakhtar-i Imruz*, Khurdad 30, 1332 [June 20, 1953]; *Bakhtar-i Imruz*, Tir 31, 1332 [July 22, 1953]; Dar Miting-i kih Diruz ʿAsr dar Miydan-i Baharistan Bana bih Daʿvat-i Firaksiyun-i Nihzat-i Milli [In Yesterday's Afternoon Meeting in Baharistan Square upon the Invitation of the National Front Party], *Ittilaʿat*, Murdad 26, 1332 [August 17, 1953].

[101] *Bakhtar-i Imruz*, Diy 9, 1329 [December 30, 1950]; *Ittilaʿat*, Diy 9, 1329 [December 30, 1950]; *Bakhtar-i Imruz*, Bahman 28, 1329 [February 17, 1951]; *Ittilaʿat*, Bahman 28, 1329 [February 17, 1951]; *Bakhtar-i Imruz*, Isfand 19, 1329 [March 10, 1951]; *Ittilaʿat*, Isfand 19, 1329 [March 10, 1951]; *Bakhtar-i Imruz*, Khurdad 1, 1330 [May 23, 1951]; *Atash*, Khurdad 1, 1330 [May 23, 1951]; *Ittilaʿat*, Khurdad 1, 1330 [May 23, 1951]; *Ittilaʿat*, Khurdad 25, 1330 [June 16, 1951]; *Bakhtar-i Imruz*, Azar 21, 1330 [December 13, 1951]; *Ittilaʿat*, Azar 21, 1330 [December 13, 1951]; *Bakhtar-i Imruz*, Diy 29–30, 1331 [January 19–20, 1953]; *Ittilaʿat*, Diy 29–30, 1331 [January 19–20, 1953]; *Bakhtar-i Imruz*, Farvardin 27, 1332 [April 15, 1953]; *Ittilaʿat*, Farvardin 27, 1332 [April 15, 1953]; *Bakhtar-i Imruz*, Khurdad 30, 1332 [June 20, 1953]; *Ittilaʿat*, Khurdad 30, 1332 [June 20, 1953]; *Bakhtar-i Imruz*, Tir 31, 1332 [July 22, 1953]; *Ittilaʿat*, Tir 31, 1332 [July 22, 1953].

political forces attempted to demonstrate their popular support by dragging out big crowds into the main squares and streets of Tehran. In their periodicals, they boasted about their gatherings and, at the same time, discredited the rival groups' meetings by downsizing the crowds or remaining absolutely silent about these rallies.

One of the best examples in this regard was the May Day gathering of 1951. Initially, Tehran's Chief of Police had banned the event due to the imposed restrictions of martial law. However, Mossadegh, who was appointed as the new prime minister on April 28,[102] eased the martial law and allowed political parties to hold the May Day ceremonies. This was a great opportunity for the Tudih Party to once again hold its most iconic annual event after its 1946 suppression. Based on the accounts of *Bih Su-yi Ayandih* newspaper, this meeting was highly successful, and the party and its affiliated groups managed to gather around 80,000 people in Baharistan Square.[103] At the same time, the Workers' Syndicate, a governmental organization, held a smaller gathering in Shah Intersection (Sih Rah-i Shah). The May 2 issue of *Bakhtar-i Imruz* newspaper, as the most vocal supporter of Mossadegh and the National Front Party, mentioned both gatherings and used the same phrase "a few thousand people" to describe the sizes of the crowds in both cases.[104] Two days later, *Bih Su-yi Ayandih* reacted to *Bakhtar-i Imruz*'s coverage, stating that:

> The author of this newspaper should be aware that, in the real world, facts and realities prevail rather than malignant imaginations and illusions. On paper, it is possible to use the same expression for eighty thousand people and three hundred people, but in the real world, they are not the same. The difference between eighty thousand and two or three hundred is the same as the difference between the Iranian Nation's Movement and the so-called National Front. If someone thinks otherwise, it is the sign of his stupidity and ignorance.[105]

The rivalry between political groups and their attempts to use public spaces as a medium to represent their popular support were clearly

[102] Diruz va Imruz Vaqayiʿ-yi Muhhimi Ruy Dadih Ast [Yesterday and Today, Important Events Have Occurred], *Ittilaʿat*, Urdibihisht 7, 1330 [April 28, 1951].
[103] *Bih Su-yi Ayandih*, Urdibihisht 12, 1330 [May 3, 1951].
[104] *Bakhtar-i Imruz*, Urdibihisht 11, 1330 [May 2, 1951].
[105] *Bih Su-yi Ayandih*, Urdibihisht 13, 1330 [May 4, 1951].

reflected in the textual world. Both textual and physical spaces were arenas for confrontations between various socio-political forces

Besides deflecting the events of the physical world, sometimes rival political groups chose to remain absolutely silent about the meetings and protests of their opponents. There are many cases where the newspapers close to the National Front Party, such as *Bakhtar-i Imruz*, *Mardum-i Iran*, and *Niru-yi Sivvum*, remained silent about the gatherings of the Tudih Party and the leftwing groups close to the party. Similarly, *Bih Su-yi Ayandih* and *Shahbaz*, as the main newspapers affiliated to the Tudih Party, had the same attitude toward the National Front and the Islamic groups close to Kashani, such as the Population of the Devotees of Islam[106] and the Assembly of the Militant Muslims.[107] The third center of power, the court, had the same attitude toward the former two. Although *Ittilaʿat* was nominally an independent newspaper, it closely followed the policies of the court. In these years, *Ittilaʿat* provided extensive coverage of the news of the royal family, particularly Muhammad Reza Shah; however, it briefly covered the gatherings of the National Front Party and the Tudih Party, particularly the latter.

A great example in this regard occurred on May 22, 1951. On this particular day, both the National Front Party and the railway workers had separately organized gatherings in Baharistan Square. In the period between 1951 and 1953, the Tudih Party was largely successful in challenging Mossadegh's government by organizing numerous workers' strikes and protests. On May 22, at 8:30 a.m., the railway workers held a large meeting in Baharistan Square to protest against the new election bill proposed by the government. While *Bih Su-yi Ayandih* newspaper provided complete coverage of this meeting and claimed that tens of thousands of workers gathered in the square,[108] *Bakhar-i Imruz* and *Ittilaʿat* newspapers remained absolutely silent and did not provide news of the meeting. Later in the afternoon of the same day, upon the invitation of Kashani, a huge gathering of

[106] *Jamʿiyyat-i Fadaʾiyan-i Islām*.
[107] *Majmaʿ-i Musalmanan-i Mujahid*.
[108] Pariruz Zahmatkishan-i Tehran, dar Miting-i ʿAzim-i Dah-ha Hizar Nafari-yi Khud bih Layihih-yi Khaʾinanih-yi Intikhabat Iʿtiraz Kardand [Two Days Ago in a Huge Meeting of Tens of Thousands, the Workers of Tehran Protested against the Treacherous Election Bill], *Bih Su-yi Ayandih*, Khurdad 2, 1330 [May 24, 1951].

around 120,000 people took place in Baharistan Square, to support Mossadegh's government and protest against the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. For this gathering, *Bakhar-i Imruz* provided extensive coverage of the events.[109] In contrast, *Bih Su-yi Ayandih* and *Ittilaʿat* mentioned it briefly, with the former referring to the protesting crowd as "various groups of Tehran's residents"[110] and the latter solely printing Kashani's speech.[111]

Beyond this peaceful rivalry in the textual world, the struggle between competing political forces had a more fierce side. These groups used their power to restrict their rivals' presence in both textual and physical worlds, sometimes even violently. From July 15, 1951, the rivalry between the National Front Party and the Tudih Party entered a new phase. Mossadegh's government attempted to restrict the access of the Tudih Party and some radical Islamic groups to Baharistan Square; instead, the National Front Party took over the right to hold rallies in the square. One major event played a great role in establishing this monopoly. On July 15, 1951, almost two months after Mossadegh's rise to power, the Tudih Party arranged a massive parade to challenge the government and reintroduce itself as a decisive force in the politics of the country. This march coincided with the visit of William Averell Harriman, the US mediator between Iran and the United Kingdom in the case of the nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. The Tudih Party was highly skeptical of the negotiations and, in the weeks prior to the talks, the newspapers close to the party attacked Mossadegh, accusing him of possible collusion with the Americans. As a result, the party's parade on July 15 was planned in a highly contentious atmosphere.

On July 15, the Tudih Party's parade ended up in violent clashes with rightwing groups, resulting in several casualties and serious damage to public and private property. Even after seventy years, it is hard to identify and accuse a single responsible group for the events of the day. On one hand, *Bih Su-yi Ayandih*'s issue of July 15, distributed on the morning of the parade, predicted possible attacks on the protesters and accused Baqaʾi and ʿArab, two of the conservative political figures

[109] *Bakhtar-i Imruz*, Khurdad 1, 1330 [May 23, 1951].
[110] *Bih Su-yi Ayandih*, Khurdad 2, 1330 [May 24, 1951].
[111] Miting-i Diruz Baʿd az Zuhr [Yesterday's Afternoon Meeting], *Ittilaʿat*, Khurdad 1, 1330 [May 23, 1951].

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close to the National Front.[112] On the other hand, the Tudih Party had designed the trajectory of the parade to pass by the Iran Party and Toilers' Party offices, two smaller parties affiliated with the National Front. Moreover, in his book of memoirs, Sadred-din Elahi, one of the members of the party who participated in the parade, mentions that the organizers of the rally distributed club-like sticks among the crowd during the parade.[113] Beginning from their conventional gathering point on Firduwsi Street, the crowd marched toward the Iran Party and Toilers' Party on their way to Baharistan Square. The protesters used this opportunity to assault and destroy the parties' offices. Afterwards, in Baharistan Square, a group of protesters attempted to enter the parliament building, resulting in severe clashes with the parliament guards. From this moment, the parade transformed into a widespread riot in the northern section of the city, which was contained after the intervention of military forces by bringing tanks into Baharistan Square and other main public spaces of Tehran. As *Bakhtar-i Imruz* reported, the incidents of the day left sixteen deaths and 281 injuries.[114]

After the incidents of July 15, Mossadegh's government did not give permission for leftwing groups or even radical Muslim organizations to hold their gatherings in Baharistan Square and Shah Mosque of the Bazaar. In early August, the Tehran police department put "a total ban" on all political gatherings in Baharistan Square[115] and, instead,

[112] Tahrikat-i Dastih-yi (ʿArab-Baqaʾi) [The Provocations of (ʿArab-Baqaʾi) group], *Bih Su-yi Ayandih*, Tir 23, 1330 [July 15, 1951].

[113] Sadred-din Elahi, *Duriha va Dilgiriha* [*Remoteness and Heartbrokenness*] (Los Angeles: Ketab Corp. USA, 2008), 237.

[114] The newspapers close to the Tudih Party accused the rightwing political groups for the events of the day, while the newspapers close to the National Front Party held the former group accountable. For close examination of the events of the day, see: Diruz Mardum-i Tehran Shahid-i Hadisih-yi Khunini Budand [Yesterday People of Tehran Witnessed a Bloody Incident], *Bakhtar-i Imruz*, Tir 24, 1330 [July 16, 1951]; Tazahurat-i Diruz Munjar bih Ightishash va Khunrizi Shud [Yesterday Protests Resulted in Riots and Bloodshed], *Ittilaʿat*, Tir 24, 1330 [July 16, 1951]; *Bih Su-yi Ayandih*, Tir 24, 1330 [July 16, 1951]; *Shujaʿat*, Tir 26, 1330 [July 18, 1951]; *Rastakhiz-i Khalq*, Tir 28, 1330 [July 20, 1951]; *Navid-i Ayandih*, Tir 22, 1331 [July 13, 1952]; Elahi, *Duriha va Dilgiriha*, 236–7.

[115] Chira Mikhahand bih Har Qiymat Bishavad az Tazahurat-i Mardum Julugiri Kard? [Why Do They Want to Prevent People's Protest with Any Possible Measure?], *Bih Su-yi Ayandih*, Murdad 11, 1330 [August 3, 1951].

appointed Fuwziyyih Square, in the northeastern corner of Tehran, as the new ground for holding political rallies.[116] In an article on August 11, *Bih Su-yi Ayandih* attacked the ban, arguing that "the government is reaching a compromise with Britain and the United States and tries to hide people's power from Mr. Harriman. In this final stage, it is pretending to have the legibility to govern and has the support of the public."[117] Mossadegh's opponents saw this ban as a sign of his tyranny and regarded it as a plot to marginalize the oppositional forces.

After the ban, the National Association of Democratic Journalists of Iran,[118] close to the Tudih Party, was the first group that, in a futile attempt, decided to hold its meeting in Baharistan Square. For the anniversary of the Constitutional Revolution, this association submitted a request to have a meeting in the square – this was rejected and the police department appointed Firduwsi Square as the gathering site. However, a few hours before the meeting the police and military forces blocked access to the square and redirected people to Fuwziyyih Square. From the speeches of the day, it is possible to grasp the symbolic role of Baharistan Square as the most prominent rallying point in Tehran. Jaʿfari, the first speaker of the day, denounced the ban and claimed that the meeting was supposed to be held in Baharistan Square, but "the government, which is afraid of the remembrance of the history of the Constitutional Revolution," prevented access to the square.[119] Similarly, on August 13, *Bih Su-yi Ayandih* newspaper published the announcement of the National Association of Democratic Journalists of Iran, explaining the changes in the place of the gathering. This announcement describes Fuwziyyih Square as "the remote, ruined, and unknown square."[120] These accounts suggest the symbolic role of Baharistan Square as the Mecca of political rallies in Tehran.

116 Baray-i Sukhanraniha va Miting Miydan-i Fuwziyyih Taʿin Shud [Fuwziyyih Square is Appointed for Speeches and Meetings], *Ittilaʿat*, Murdad 11, 1330 [August 5, 1951].

117 Chira Mikhahand bih Har Qiymat Bishavad az Tazahurat-i Mardum Julugiri Kard? [Why Do They Want to Prevent People's Protest with Any Possible Measure?], *Bih Su-yi Ayandih*, Murdad 11, 1330 [August 3, 1951].

118 *Anjuman-i Milli-yi Ruznamihnigaran-i Democrat-i Iran.*

119 Mardum-i Tehran Pariruz … [Two Days Ago People of Tehran …], *Bih Su-yi Ayandih*, Murdad 16, 1330 [August 8, 1951].

120 Ittilaʿiyyih-yi Anjuman-i Milli-yi Ruznamihnigaran-i Democrat-i Iran [The Announcement of the National Association of Democratic Journalists of Iran], *Bih Su-yi Ayandih*, Murdad 21, 1330 [August 13, 1951].

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The mere act of holding their meetings was not sufficient for political groups and they demanded access to Baharistan Square as the most renowned public space of the city.

In addition to the anniversary of the Constitutional Revolution, on several occasions the Tudih Party and other leftwing groups requested to occupy Baharistan Square for their gatherings, but were rejected by the police. On August 24, the Tudih Party had to hold the fortieth day of the "martyrs" of July 15 in Fuwziyyih Square.[121] On October 19, Tehran's workers' syndicates had to hold their gathering against the government in the same place.[122] Similar cases occurred on November 2 and 9, 1951[123] and on February 22,[124] March 20, and March 28,[125] 1952. In some cases these group went as far as inviting their supporters to Baharistan Square, but had to relocate the meeting to Fuwziyyih Square after the police department did not grant them permission. On December 20, 1951, *Shahbaz* newspaper published a meeting announcement in Baharistan Square by the National Population of Fight Against the Colonial Oil Companies in Iran.[126] This group invited its supporters for a meeting against Mossadegh's policies and colonial interferences in the country.[127] *Bih Su-yi Ayandih* reiterated the same invitation on December 25;[128] however, both newspapers had to announce the change in the location of the meeting to Fuwziyyih Square after the government denied access to Baharistan Square.[129] Besides the Tudih Party, Muslim groups faced similar restrictions, particularly in regard to their access to Shah Mosque.

As mentioned earlier, the nationalization movement mainly consisted of two different sections of society, the modern and the traditional middle classes. While the former regarded the main public spaces of northern Tehran, particularly Baharistan Square, as its primary political ground, during these years the latter found the

[121] *Bih Su-yi Ayandih*, Shahrivar 3, 1330 [August 26, 1951].
[122] *Bih Su-yi Ayandih*, Mihr 22, 1330 [October 15, 1951].
[123] *Rahnama-yi Millat*, Aban 12 and 19, 1330 [November 4 and 11, 1951].
[124] *Bih Su-yi Ayandih*, Isfand 4, 1330 [February 24, 1952].
[125] *Bih Su-yi Ayandih*, Isfand 29, 1330 [March 20, 1952]; *Bih Su-yi Ayandih*, Farvardin 10, 1330 [March 30, 1952].
[126] *Jamʿiyyat-i Milli-yi Mubarizih ba Shirkatha-yi Istiʿmari-yi Naft dar Iran.*
[127] *Shahbaz*, Azar 28, 1330 [December 20, 1951].
[128] *Bih Su-yi Ayandih*, Diy 3, 1330 [December 25, 1951].
[129] *Bih Su-yi Ayandih*, Diy 5, 1330 [December 27, 1951]; *Bih Su-yi Ayandih*, Diy 8, 1330 [December 30, 1951]; *Shahbaz*, Diy 7, 1330 [December 29, 1951].

opportunity to revive the political role of the sacred spaces in the old fabric of the city, notably Shah Mosque. As early as 1946 it is possible to find some instances in which Shah Mosque played the role of a political ground in this era. On March 7, 1946, some radical religious groups began a violent protest against the Tudih Party from the entrance of the mosque. This protest resulted in clashes with the Tudih Party's supporters on Nasseriyyih Street, which left one death and several injuries.[130]

Disregarding this riot-like protest, the first gathering of the traditional middle class in Shah Mosque took place almost two years before the beginning of the Oil Industry Nationalization Movement. On January 11, 1948, in response to Kashani's invitation, thousands of people gathered in the mosque to support the Muslims in Palestine and Pakistan. The gathering provided an opportunity for the leaders and the crowd to protest against the cabinet and the inflation rate in the country.[131] Kashani invited people to a similar gathering on May 21, 1948. This gathering, once again in Shah Mosque, was followed by a march to Sipahsalar Mosque close to the parliament.[132] This was the first time after the solidification of Pahlavi's power that people transformed Sipahsalar Mosque into a stage of protest. Years after the constitutional era, the traditional strata of society revived the main mosques of the city as political public spaces.[133]

After the formation of the alliance between Mossadegh and Kashani, four major protests in support of the Oil Industry Nationalization Movement and Mossadegh's government took place in Shah Mosque. Kashani's supporters and various political Muslim groups, such as the Assembly of the Militant Muslims and the Population of the Devotees of Islam, sponsored three of these protests and invited people to participate.[134] The only exception was a protest on January 26, 1951.

[130] *Namih-yi Rahbar*, Isfand 17, 1324 [March 8, 1946]; *Iran-i Ma*, Isfand 17, 1324 [March 8, 1946].

[131] Diruz Bish az Panzdaah Hizar Nafar dar Masjid-i Shah Jamʿ Shodih Budand [Yesterday More Than Fifteen Thousand People Gathered in Shah Mosque], *Ittilaʿat*, Diy 21, 1326 [January 12, 1948].

[132] Dar Masjid-i Shah: Izhar-i Tanafur az ʿAmaliyat-i Yahud [In Shah Mosque: Declaration of Disgust against the Jews' Operations], *Ittilaʿat*, Khurdad 1, 1327 [May 22, 1948].

[133] A third gathering of Kashani's supporters in Shah Mosque occurred on June 23, 1948: *Ittilaʿat*, Tir 5, 1327 [June 26, 1948].

[134] These protests took place on December 22, 1950 and March 2 and July 30, 1951. For details of these episodes, see: Faghfoory, "The Role of the Ulama

On this day, Mossadegh and Kashani jointly asked people to gather in Shah Mosque to protest against the government and in support of the nationalization of the oil industry. The resulting crowd was huge and filled the entire space of the mosque and all the surrounding streets and bazaars.[135] This gathering was the first and the last time during the movement that the mosque supported a diverse crowd of people from different classes, particularly a shared gathering of the modern and traditional middle classes.

In 1951, the alliance between Mossadegh and Kashani did not prevent the government putting spatial restrictions on the protests of Muslim groups. After the incidents of July 15, Mossadegh's government limited the access of Muslim groups to Shah Mosque of the Bazaar for holding their political rallies. On August 17, 1951, just one month after the bloody incidents of July, the Population of the Devotees of Islam decided to hold its gathering in Shah Mosque, which was prevented by the police and rescheduled to be held in Fuwziyyih Square. Their insistence on occupying the mosque resulted in some clashes with police forces.[136] Likewise, on September 7 and November 6, 1951, the Assembly of the Militant Muslims, another political Muslim group close to Kashani, had to hold its rallies to support the Egyptian Muslims in Fuwziyyih Square.[137]

The "total ban" on the gatherings in Baharistan Square had some exceptions; during the months following the ban, the National Front Party and Mossadegh's supporters held multiple meetings in the square. They were free to occupy Baharistan Square on September 27[138] and

in Twentieth Century Iran," 222; Miting-i Diruz-i Masjid-i Shah ba Nazm va Tartib Barguzar Shod [Yesterday's Meeting in Shah Mosque was Held Orderly], *Ittilaʿat*, Diy 2, 1329 [December 23, 1950]; *Bakhtar-i Imruz*, Diy 3, 1329 [December 24, 1950]; ʿAqili, *Ruzshumar-i Tarikh-i Iran*, 1: 317; Tazahurat-i Fadaʾiyan-i Islam [The Protest of the Population of the Devotees of Islam], *Ittilaʿat*, Isfand 12, 1329 [March 3, 1951]; *Bakhtar-i Imruz*, Isfand 12, 1329 [March 3, 1951]; ʿAqili, *Ruzshumar-i Tarikh-i Iran*, 1: 319; Payam-i Ayat Allah Kashani dar Miting-i Diruz-i Masjid Shah [Kashani's Message in Yesterday's Meeting in Shah Mosque], *Ittilaʿat*, Murdad 8, 1330 [July 31, 1951].

135 Tazahurat bara-yi Milli Shudan-i Sanʿat-i Naft [Demonstration for the Oil Industry Nationalization], *Ittilaʿat*, Bahman 7, 1329 [January 27, 1951]; *Bakhtar-i Imruz*, Bahman 7, 1329 [January 27, 1951].

136 *Bakhtar-i Imruz*, Murdad 26, 1330 [August 18, 1951].

137 *Bakhtar-i Imruz*, Shahrivar 16, 1330 [September 8, 1951]; *Ittilaʿat*, Shahrivar 16, 1330 [September 8, 1951]; *Bakhtar-i Imruz*, Aban 15, 1330 [November 7, 1951]; *Ittilaʿat*, Aban 15, 1330 [November 7, 1951].

138 *Bakhtar-i Imruz*, Mihr 4, 1330 [September 27, 1951].

30[139] and on December 13, 1951.[140] Moreover, university students marched from the University of Tehran to Baharistan Square on October 30[141] and December 6, 1951.[142]

Even after the supposed removal of the ban, it is possible to find cases of rivalry between the National Front Party and Tudih Party upon accessing Baharistan Square. An interesting case occurred on June 19, 1953, when more than 100,000 Mossadegh supporters gathered in Baharistan Square. While *Bakhtar-i Imruz* provides detailed descriptions of the gathering, it fails to mention a similar meeting on Firduwsi Street in front of the Tudih Party's club.[143] *Ittilaʿat* newspaper briefly mentions the Tudih Party's gathering. Based on the latter source, the protesters marched toward Baharistan Square, where the National Front's guards and police forces blocked their trajectory, only one block away from the square.[144] *Niru-yi Sivvum* newspaper, close to Mossadegh, provides detailed coverage of the events of the day. The title on the front page states that "People Prevented Members of the Tudih Party to Enter the Square and Rejected them." The newspaper goes on, describing that, upon the invitation of *Shahbaz* newspapers, the Tudih Party intended to join the protesting crowd in Baharistan Square. The newspaper continues that the protesting crowd in Baharistan and the members of the National Front rejected their request and pushed them back to prevent the entrance of "the traitors and the agents of foreign countries" into the square.[145]

Another intriguing case occurred on the first anniversary of *Si-yi Tir*, the failed military coup against Mossadegh's government on July 21, 1952. Just one month before Mossadegh was overthrown, both the National Front Party and Tudih Party organized massive gatherings

139 *Bakhtar-i Imruz*, Mihr 7, 1330 [September 30, 1951].

140 *Bakhtar-i Imruz*, Azar 21, 1330 [December 13, 1951]; *Ittilaʿat*, Azar 21, 1330 [December 13, 1951].

141 *Bakhtar-i Imruz*, Aban 7, 1330 [October 30, 1951]; *Ittilaʿat*, Aban 7, 1330 [October 30, 1951]; *Rahnama-yi Millat*, Aban 8, 1330 [October 31, 1951].

142 *Ittilaʿat*, Azar 14, 1330 [December 6, 1951].

143 *Bakhtar-i Imruz*, Khurdad 30, 1332 [June 20, 1952].

144 *Ittilaʿat*, Khurdad 30, 1332 [June 20, 1952].

145 Faryad-i Mossadegh Piruz Ast Miydan-i Baharistan ra Milarzanid [The Cry of Mossadegh is Victorious Shook Baharistan Square], *Niru-yi Sivvum*, Khurdad 30, 1332 [June 20, 1953]. In a similar case on April 14, 1953, military forces blocked the trajectory of a leftwing group's march toward Baharistan, which resulted in severe clashes and one death: *Bakhtar-i Imruz*, Farvardin 25, 1332 [April 14, 1953].

to celebrate their so-called national revolution. To avoid the mixture of the competing groups, the organizers of the meetings added a temporal dimension to the spatial one: the National Front Party organized its meeting for the morning of July 21, 1953, and the Tudih Party for the afternoon of the same day, both in Baharistan Square. On July 20, reacting to the duality of the political meetings, *Niru-yi Sivvum* newspaper published an announcement titled as "Nationals in the Morning of *Si-yi Tir* [July 21] in Baharistan Square and Anti-Nationals in the Afternoon." The announcement states:

Compatriots! Tomorrow's morning meeting belongs to the national forces and unknown soldiers who freed the National Movement from Qavam al-Saltanih's tyranny.

Tomorrow afternoon, the thieves of *Si-yi Tir* and those who remained silent during the three days of the revolution and solely read *The State and Revolution* in their homes will gather […] Be aware and do not let the traitor Tudih Party represent itself as the inheritor of your brothers' and children's revolution […][146]

On July 22, *Niru-yi Sivvum* argued that the Tudih Party had spent large sums of money to bring people from smaller towns and villages to Tehran in order to create a larger crowd.[147] The newspaper did not stop at this claim and on July 25 and August 1 published two articles titled as "The Comparison between the Two Meetings of the Morning and Afternoon of *Si-yi Tir*." In these articles the author brings much evidence to prove that the National Front Party's gathering was larger and that the Tudih Party, despite spending a huge amount of money, failed to form a larger one.[148]

These accounts suggest the importance of Baharistan Square for the National Front Party and its role in the party's struggle against its rival groups. The proximity of the square to the parliament building, its centrality in the city, and its interconnection with the main streets

[146] Milliyun Subh-i Si-yi Tir dar Miydan-i Baharistan va Zid-i Milliha Baʿd az Zuhr [Nationals in the Morning of Si-yi Tir in Baharistan Square and Anti-Nationals in the Afternoon], *Niru-yi Sivvum*, Tir 29, 1332 [July 20, 1953].

[147] Tudihʾiha baray-i Tazahurat-i Diruz ʿIdih-ʾi ra az Shahristanha Kirayih Kardih va Avardih Budand [The Tudih Party Had Paid and Brought People from the Country for Their Yesterday's Protest], *Niru-yi Sivvum*, Tir 31, 1332 [July 22, 1953].

[148] Moqayisih-yi Do Miting-i Subh va Asr-i Si-yi Tir [The Comparison between the Two Meetings of the Morning and Afternoon of Si-yi Tir], *Niru-yi Sivvum*, Murdad 3 and 10, 1332 [July 25 and August 1, 1953].

of northern Tehran and the main centers of social life made it the ideal place for political gatherings. Mossadegh and his allies stamped their mark on this square and it became the representation of their political front. A close tie formed between the National Front Party and Baharistan; public space became the representation of a political movement. The control over this square was the sign of their control over political power. As a result, the National Front needed to preserve its hegemony over the square and prevented other political groups, particularly the Tudih Party, taking over the square and using it as a representation for their own movement. Throughout this era, Baharistan and some other major streets and squares in northern Tehran were the platforms through which Mossadegh encountered his opponents. Any threat to his government was followed by ardent protests by his supporters. The most notable instances occurred on July 17–21, 1952,[149] February 29 and 30, 1952,[150] and August 15–19, 1953.[151]

[149] In July 1952, Mossadegh requested the ability to appoint the war minister himself. It was the only ministry for which Muhammad Reza Shah retained the power to make appointments. The rejection of Mossadegh's request led to his resignation. The Shah took advantage of the moment and appointed a new prime minister. This caused a great insurgence in Tehran. For five days the streets and squares of the city were the scene of severe clashes between military forces and the people. Finally, on July 21, 1952, the Shah surrendered and gave Mossadegh the power to appoint the war minister. The events of July became famous as *Qīyām-i Sī-yi Tīr* or the July 21st uprising. For details of the event, see: Hassan Arsanjani, *Yadasht-ha-yi Siyasi dar Vaqayiʿ-yi Si-yi Tir [Political Note on the Events of July 21st]* (Tehran: Intisharat-i Hirmans, 1366 [1987]); Jami, *Guzashtih Chiragh-i Rah-i Ayandih Ast*, 635–40; Imruz Khiyaban-ha-yi Shahr Mutishanij Bud [Today, the Streets of the City were Volatile], *Ittilaʿat*, Tir 28, 1331 [July 19, 1952]; Imruz Mujadadan dar Nught-i Mukhtalif-i Shahr Zad va Khurdhaʾi bi Vuquʿ Piyvast [Once More, There Were Clashes around the City Today], *Ittilaʿat*, Tir 29, 1331 [July 20, 1952]; Havadis-i Sih Ruz-i Akhir-i Tehran [The Events of the Last Three Days in Tehran], *Ittilaʿat*, Murdad 1, 1331 [July 23, 1952].

[150] On February 28, 1953, the court staged a protest to overthrow Mossadegh. The paid thugs and retired military forces were disguised as ordinary people and attacked Mossadegh's house in an attempt to murder him. Mossadegh escaped the incident. Over the next two days, once again, the city witnessed a huge uprising in support of Mossadegh: Tazahurat-i Imruz-i Payitakht bar Mihvar-i ham Shah ham Mossadegh Dur Mizad [Today's Protests in the Capital were in Support of Both Mossadegh and the Shah], *Ittilaʿat*, Isfand 10, 1331 [February 29, 1953]; Imruz ham dar Miydan-i Baharistan va Khiyaban-ha-yi Tehran Vaqayiʿi Rukh Dad [Today There were More Incidents in Baharistan Square and Tehran's Streets], *Ittilaʿat*, Isfand 11, 1331 [February 30, 1953].

[151] Before the final coup on August 19, 1953, Mossadegh's opposition attempted an unsuccessful coup in the late hours of August 15. Mossadegh managed to prevent the coup and, in the next days, people came out into the streets in

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In the final instance of these episodes, after the unsuccessful coup of military forces and the court against Mossadegh on August 15, 1953, Baharistan became a hotbed of conflicts. People rushed to occupy the square, this symbol of the nationalization movement, and erased the signs of the royal family by pulling down Reza Shah's statue in the middle of the square.[152] However, a second military coup, on August 19, 1953, brought an end to Mossadegh's premiership. The deterioration of the relationship between Mossadegh and Kashani during the months leading to the coup and the disruption of the Tudih Party in the political process of the National Front Party left Mossadegh without sufficient support on the day that his enemies united to overthrow him. The combination of the court, military forces, American and British agents, and paid thugs of the city brought an abrupt end to his premiership and replaced these relatively democratic years with a new era of autocracy.

Students, Women, and Political Public Spaces between 1941 and 1953

Between 1941 and 1953, the University of Tehran was a significant locus for protests and parades in the city. Whether following the popular parties such as the National Front and the Tudih or forming independent student protests, the university students ignited various episodes of contention during the twelve-year period. As a matter of fact, the first large-scale protest of the era began as a student demonstration on December 9, 1942. On the morning of this day, a big group of students gathered in Baharistan Square to protest against the deterioration of the living conditions after the invasion of the Allies. Soon, the gathering transformed into a riot in which protesters looted the parliament building and the prime minister's house. The clashes between the military forces and protesters resulted in several casualties and, only after the intervention of British forces did the city regain peace.[153]

support of Mossadegh. Being frightened of the rising power of the Tudih and because of the chaos all over the city, Mossadegh asked people to stay in their homes. This mistake paved the road for the final coup. For details of these coups and the intervening events, see footnote 21 of this chapter.

152 *Bakhtar-i Imruz*, Murdad 25, 1332 [August 16, 1952]; *Ittilaʿat*, Murdad 25–26, 1332 [August 16–17, 1952].

153 *Dad*, Diy 22, 1321 [January 12, 1943]; Jami, *Guzashtih Chiragh-i Rah-i Ayandih Ast*, 174. As a result of the events of the day, the government closed down the newspapers for forty-three days. After its reopening, the *Ittilaʿat* newspaper covered the whole event over several issues between January 30 and February 27, 1943.

By analyzing various periodicals of the era, I gathered nineteen episodes in which students held independent protests and parades. The seventeenth episode occurred after the formation of the National Front Party and the beginning of the Oil Industry Nationalization Movement. From these cases, students held ten political gatherings to support the movement and Mossadegh's government.[154] However, besides these independent student gatherings and protests, in most of the political meetings of the era students were an active part of the protesting crowds.

Similar to the other political groups, Baharistan Square was students' favorite location for holding their gatherings. However, in many cases, they arranged these meetings as long parades of more than four kilometers from the University of Tehran to the square. Resembling the role of the Tudih Party's club for the leftwing groups' parades, the university acted as the gathering place for the students. But unlike the Tudih Party that, in many cases, began and ended their marches at the same place, students organized their trajectory to walk through the main streets of northern Tehran and end up in Baharistan Square, in front of the parliament building. On their path toward Baharistan, they usually passed by the major high schools of the city and invited other students to join them. As a result, by the time they reached Baharistan Square the crowds were much larger than the beginning and sometimes exceeded several thousand students.[155]

[154] The full list of all the protests and political gatherings of this era is available in the Appendix.

[155] Tazahurat dar Miydan-i Baharistan [Demonstration in Baharistan Square], *Ittilaʿat*, Azar 30, 1329 [December 21, 1950]; Tazahurat Danishjuyan-i Danishgah dar Miydan-i Baharistan [Demonstration of the University Students in Baharistan Square], *Ittilaʿat*, Diy 4, 1329 [December 25, 1950]; Tazahurat dar Barabar-i Baharistan [Demonstration in Front of Baharistan], *Ittilaʿat*, Diy 10, 1329 [December 31, 1950]; Tazahurat Danishjuyan Danishamuzan-i Tehran [Demonstration of the Students of Tehran], *Ittilaʿat*, Urdibihisht 1, 1330 [April 22, 1951]; Imruz Hizaran Nafar Danishamuz-i Dukhtar va Pisar dar Khiyaban-ha Faryad Mizadand "Naft Bayad Milli Shavad" [Today Thousands of Girl and Boy Students Chanted in the Streets that "Oil Should be Nationalized"], *Bakhtar-i Imruz*, Diy 10, 1329 [December 31, 1950]; Danishjuyan-i Danishgah Faryad Mizadand: Ya Marg ya Mossadegh [The University Students Chanted: Whether Death or Mossadegh], *Bakhtar-i Imruz*, Isafand 11, 1331 [March 2, 1953]; Jaryan-i Mashruh-i va Daqiq-i Dimunstirasiyun-i Mushtarak-i Danishjuyan va Danishamuzan-i Tehran [The Detailed Coverage of the Shared Demonstration of University and High School Students], *Niru-yi Sevvum*, Isafand 12, 1331 [March 3, 1953].

The student movement in Tehran had a particular progressive component that distinguished it from other protesting crowds: their parades and protests consisted of both boys and girls.[156] Although this feature was not novel, and many protesting crowds, particularly those affiliated to the Tudih Party, included women of various walks of life, there was a significant difference between women's participation in students' gatherings and those of political parties of this era. In order to explain this difference, first I need to examine women's presence in the meetings of the latter case.

As the continuation of the process that had already begun in the constitutional era, between 1941 and 1953, the public spaces of Tehran witnessed an unprecedented women's presence in political gatherings. Women's active participation in protests and parades mostly depended on the official parties that dominated the political realm. Notably, the Tudih Party had a clear program and organization for engaging women in its public gatherings.

The Tudih Party enabled women's membership and established a women's organization, *Tashkilat-i Zanan* or the Association of Women. Parvin Paidar and Camron Michael Amin date the establishment of this organization to 1944. Paidar claims that it was named *Tashkilat-i Zanan*, which was outlawed in 1949, and the party established *Tashkilat-i Democratic-i Zanan* in 1951.[157] Hamideh Sedghi dates the party's focus on women's issues and the establishment of *Tashkilat-i Zanan* to 1943.[158] *Tashkilat-i Zanan* published an independent periodical called *Bidari-yi Ma* or *Our Awakening*, which targeted both working-class and modern-middle-class women.[159] The examination of this magazine, however, shows that the exact date of the establishment of *Tashkilat-i Zanan* was October 30, 1943

[156] ʿAsr-i Diruz Dukhtaran va Pisaran-i Danishju Hamrah-i Mardum-i Shirafatmand-i Tehran Dimunstirasiyun-i ʿAzimi Dadand [Yesterday Evening, Girls and Boys Students Held a Massive Demonstration alongside the Honorable People of Tehran], n.t., Isafand 11, 1331 [March 3, 1953].

[157] Parvin Paidar, *Women and the Political Process in Twentieth-Century Iran* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 124–5; Camron Michael Amin, *The Making of the Modern Iranian Woman: Gender, State Policy, and Popular Culture, 1865–1946* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2002), 225–6.

[158] Sedghi, *Women and Politics in Iran*, 93–4.

[159] Paidar, *Women and the Political Process*, 124; Sedghi, *Women and Politics in Iran*, 93–4.

(Aban 7, 1322).[160] Based on the available issues of this magazine in the University of Tehran library, from March 1948, the title of this association changed to *Tashkilat-i Democratic-i Zanan-i Iran*.[161]

It seems that, in contrast to the Tudih Party, *Tashkilat-i Zanan* did not attract widespread support and, after a year and a half, it had 168 members.[162] However, despite its relatively small size, it provided a venue for women's active presence in the Tudih Party's public gatherings and parades. In almost all of the party's meetings, the head or the representative of this association was one of the main speakers of the day and had the opportunity to address the crowd alongside the high-ranking male members of the party. Moreover, in the party's protests and parades, *Tashkilat-i Zanan* was present as an independent marching group amid various male groups affiliated with the Tudih Party.

The first party's gathering in which *Tashkilat-i Zanan* participated was Taqi Arani's death anniversary on February 2, 1945. After the fall of Reza Shah's regime, each year around Bahman 14 (February 4), the party held a public ceremony at Arani's grave in Imamzadih Abdullah in Rey City, south of Tehran. In the 1945 ceremony, three members of *Tashklilat-i Zanan*, Ibrahimzadih, Malihih Sabiri, and Maryam Firuz, had the opportunity to address the crowd.[163] However, the first large-scale political meeting of the Tudih Party inside the city in which *Tashkilat-i Zanan* participated was the 1945 May Day parade. *Bidari-yi Ma* mentions that "this was the first time that the women of our country participated in a public gathering. As a result, the massive meeting of this day creates a milestone in the history of women's movement in Iran."[164] In this gathering,[165] Ibrahimzadih was the association's representative who addressed the crowd, and

[160] Badr Munir ʿalavi, "Guzarish-i Hifdah Mahih-yi Tashkilat-i Zanan [The Seventeenth-Month Report of Tashkilat-i Zanan]," *Bidari-yi Ma* 1, no. 10 (Farvardin, 1324 [March and April, 1945]): 24.

[161] *Bidari-yi Ma* 4, no. 1 (Farvardin, 1327 [March and April, 1948]).

[162] ʿalavi, "Guzarish-i Hifdah Mahih," 24.

[163] *Bidari-yi Ma* 1, no. 9 (Isfand, 1323 [February and March 1945]).

[164] *Bidari-yi Ma* 1, no. 12 (Urdibihisht, 1324 [April and May 1945]).

[165] *Zafar* newspaper claims that this gathering was the first ever Labor Day march in the history of Iran: Miting va Namayish-i ʿAzim-i Ma dar Avval-i May Jashn-i Kargaran-i Dunya [Our Massive Meeting on First of May, the International Worker's Day], *Zafar*, Urdibihisht 13, 1324 [May 3, 1945].

in the parade *Tashkilat-i Zanan* was the third marching group after the Board of Directors and the Youth Organization (*Sazman-i Javanan*).[166] Similarly, *Tashkilat-i Zanan* participated in other gatherings of the party, such as the fortieth anniversary of the Constitutional Revolution, when Vaziri and Ibrahimzadih talked to people from the balcony of the club on Firduwsi Street,[167] the Labor Day of 1946 when Ruzbih and Farjami made their speeches from the same stage,[168] and the massive parade of October 4, 1946, when Jamilih addressed a crowd of more than 120,000 people from the balcony of the municipality building in Tupkhanih Square.[169]

The periodicals close to the Tudih Party publicized women's participation in political gatherings as the progressive component of the party and regarded it as the promise of a free and democratic future for Iran. After each protest and parade, the newspapers provided comprehensive coverage of the events of the day. These articles usually had a separate subsection titled "Women's Participation"[170] or "Women Participated Too."[171] As an example, after the 1945 anniversary of Taqi Arani's death in which *Tashklilat-i Zanan* officially took part as

[166] Naql az Ruznamih-yi Dad: Jashn-i Mah-i May dar Tehran [From *Dad* Newspaper: May Day Festival in Tehran], *Zafar*, Urdibihisht 14, 1324 [May 4, 1945]. A day before this meeting, *Tashkilat-i Zanan* held a conference at the Tudih Party Club, in which around 1,000 people participated and different members of the association made speeches. The text of these speeches is available in: *Bidari-yi Ma* 1, no. 12 (Urdibihisht, 1324 [April and May 1945]). Similarly, every year, *Tashkilat-i Zanan* held ceremonies for International Women's Day on March 8. The accounts of three of these ceremonies from 1945, 1946, and 1948, which were held in Nadiri Cinema, Dar al-Funun School, and Giti Theater, respectively, are available in *Bidari-ye Ma* magazine: *Bidari-yi Ma* 1, no. 10 (Farvardin, 1324 [March and April 1945]); *Bidari-yi Ma* 2, no. 7 (Farvardin, 1325 [March and April 1946]); *Bidari-yi Ma* 4, no. 1 (Farvardin, 1327 [March and April 1948]).

[167] *Rahbar*, Murdad 16, 1324 [August 7, 1945].

[168] Kargaran-i Jahan Mutahid Shavid [Get United the Workers of the Universe], *Zafar*, Urdibihisht 15, 1325 [May 5, 1946].

[169] Bish az Yiksad Hizar Nafar [More than One Hundred Thousand People], *Zafar*, Mihr 14, 1325 [October 6, 1946].

[170] *Namih-yi Rahbar*, Urdibihisht 23, 1324 [May 13, 1945].

[171] Nazm va Inzibat-i Puladin-i Kargaran va Ruwshanfikran dar Miting-i Pariruz Nimunih-yi Liyaqat va Rushd-i Siyasi-yi Tudih-yi Iran Ast [The Strict Discipline of the Workers and Intellectuals in the Meeting of Two Days Ago is a Sample of the Competence and Political Maturity of Iranian Crowds], *Namih-yi Rahbar*, Urdibihisht 13, 1324 [May 3, 1945].

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an independent association and three of its members had the opportunity to address the crowd, *Namih-yi Rahbar* wrote:

The most interesting of all was women's speeches. This was the first time that Iranian women talked about freedom in such a big crowd and showed that they can competently fulfill their social duties. Who could believe that in Iran, the country that had changed into a graveyard where every progressive idea was doomed to be rejected, in just three years of partial freedom, there would be women who could bravely fight alongside men? Is there a person who sees these bright signs of progress and does not become delighted and salute those who are struggling in this process?[172]

For the Tudih Party and its affiliated groups, the presence of women in the parades was an instrument to portray them as the sole group that had a legitimate program for the future of all social groups and the country: "The presence of intellectual and worker women in this protest promised hopes for a prosperous future for a free nation and an ancient land."[173] As a result, after each gathering, their periodicals did not miss the chance to remind their readers of this unique characteristic of the party. They covered the details of the day, described the reactions of ordinary people and bystander women to the protesting ones, and published the pictures of protesting women on their front pages.[174]

Despite women's public presence on the political scene, the patriarchal discourse carved an isolated enclave for them, detached from the

172 *Namih-yi Rahbar*, Bahman 15, 1323 [February 4, 1945].

173 Nazm va Inzibat-i Puladin-i Kargaran va Ruwshanfikran dar Miting-i Pariruz Nimunih-yi Liyaqat va Rushd-i Siyasi-yi Tudih-yi Iran Ast [The Strict Discipline of the Workers and Intellectuals in the Meeting of Two Days Ago is a Sample of the Competence and Political Maturity of Iranian Crowds], *Namih-yi Rahbar*, Urdibihisht 13, 1324 [May 3, 1945].

174 Mushti Muhkam bar Dahan-i Kumpani-yi Naft-i Junub va ʿUmmal-i An [A Firm Fist Blown to the Mouth of the South Oil Company and Its Agant], *Bih Su-yi Ayandih*, Bahman 29, 1329 [February 18, 1951]; *Bih Su-yi Ayandih*, Shahrivar 3, 1330 [August 26, 1951]; *Namih-yi Rahbar*, Urdibihisht 23, 1324 [May 13, 1945]; Miting va Namayish-i ʿazim-i Ma dar Avval-i May Jashn-i Kargaran-i Dunya [Our Massive Meeting on First of May, the International Worker's Day], *Zafar*, Urdibihisht 13, 1324 [May 3, 1945]; Naql az Ruznamih-yi Dad: Jashn-i Mah-i May dar Tehran [From *Dad* Newspaper: May Day Festival in Tehran], *Zafar*, Urdibihisht 14, 1324 [May 4, 1945]; Kargaran-i Jahan Mutahid Shavid [Get United the Workers of the Universe], *Zafar*, Urdibihisht 15, 1325 [May 5, 1946]; Bish az Yiksad Hizar Nafar [More than One Hundred Thousand People], *Zafar*, Mihr 14, 1325 [October 6, 1946].

larger male crowds. The examination of the party's periodicals during this era shows that the use of terms such as workers, intelligentsias, teachers, university professors, and the like was aimed to identify the protesting male members of the party, and not the women. The presence of men in public space was not contingent on their gender identity; rather, their professional, social, and political stance justified their participation. In contrast, this discourse did not consider women to be part of the larger protesting crowd based on their social, political, and professional positions; rather, their gender identity was the reason for their inclusion in the political realm; being female was the reason for their top-down inclusion. Although women could be workers, students, teachers, and the like, they participated in political meetings under the title of *Tashkilat-i Zanan* and largely based on their womanhood. As an example, describing the massive parade of the party on May Day 1945, *Zafar* newspaper wrote: "yesterday in Tehran, the biggest and the most majestic collective display consisting of thousands of workers, intellectuals, and women took place."[175] Elsewhere, the same newspaper mentions: "Yesterday, thousands and thousands of Tehran's workers gathered for holding the International Labor Day and, besides them, there were brave and liberal women, youth, intellectuals, and liberals."[176] In these accounts, while men can be workers, intellectuals, liberals, and the like, women are separated from the rest of the crowd based on their gender identity.

The physical translation of this separation is clearly recognizable in public space during the political gatherings of the party, as can be seen in Figure 6.3. Although women's presence in the Tudih Party's protests became common in this era and they were active participants in the party's mass demonstrations and workers' strikes around the country,[177] in these gatherings, women, or better to say *Tashkilat-i Zanan*, usually had a separate group, detached from the larger protesting crowds of male workers, students, and intellectuals. More interestingly, despite the complete separation from the male crowd, there were

175 Miting va Namayish-i ʿazim-i Ma dar Avval-i May Jashn-i Kargaran-i Dunya [Our Massive Meeting on First of May, the International Worker's Day], *Zafar*, Urdibihisht 13, 1324 [May 3, 1945].

176 Naql az Ruznamih-yi Dad: Jashn-i Mah-i May dar Tehran [From *Dad* Newspaper: May Day Festival in Tehran], *Zafar*, Urdibihisht 14, 1324 [May 4, 1945].

177 Paidar, *Women and the Political Process*, 134.

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Figure 6.3 A group of protesting women during the Oil Industry Nationalization Movement, separated from the rest of the crowd by a human chain of men.[178]

groups of men forming a human chain by holding each other's hands, encircling the women and making a buffer zone between them and the rest of the protesting crowd. As an example, on the first anniversary of *Si-yi Tir*, the unsuccessful coup against Mossadegh, the Tudih Party held a massive parade. Describing this march, *Ittilaʿat* newspaper wrote: "There were many women in this meeting, who remained in the first section of the square and whom were protected by a chain of people."[179] Similarly, in his book of memoirs, Sadred-din Elahi describes women's presence in the Tudih Party's march of July 15, 1951: "women and girls accompanied the crowd while a human chain from the hands of our worker comrades in textile and cement factories circled them."[180] Through this act, the male guardianship reproduced

[178] Nihzat-i Milli Shudan-i Sanʿat-i Naft-i Iran [The Oil Industry Nationalization Movement of Iran], *Ittilaʿat Historical Photo Archive*, photo source: 5651002D 21-1-2004H 9-4-28, photo number: 5651002.

[179] *Ittilaʿat*, Tir 31, 1332 [July 22, 1953].

[180] Elahi, *Duriha va Dilgiriha*, 236.

itself in public space; men had to protect women against the possible attacks of conservative groups. Similar to the constitutional era, by sidelining women's political role, the patriarchal discourse redefined men as the center of the public realm. Although women's participation in the protests was a relatively progressive activity, they had to observe the social norms and accept a buffer between their group and protesting men.

The Tudih Party was not the sole group that provided an opportunity for women's presence in the political scene. As Amin claims, women's political participation in the Tudih Party was part of the bigger political landscape after Reza Shah's fall from power: "The politics of the women's movement in the 1940s mirrored the larger political scene in Iran—partisan and a tad chaotic."[181] Various women's political organizations and periodicals formed in big cities, which enabled women to fight for gender equality and suffrage. These organizations confronted the threats of religious forces who attempted to bring back women's obligatory veiling.[182]

In addition to the Tudih Party, Qavam's Democrat Party had a women's organization,[183] called *Sazman-i Zanan-i Hizb-i Democrat-i Iran* (The Women Organization of the Democrat Party of Iran). The first issue of *Democrat-i Iran* newspaper dedicated a separate section to this organization, publishing an article from Mihrangiz Duwlatshahi Ansari, one of its founding members. In this article, Ansari argued that the Democrat Party was the first party that had included the equality between women's and men's rights in its statute and fought for women's suffrage in Iran.[184]

Despite this argument and the party's attempts to portray itself as an alternative force to the Tudih Party, in practice women did not

[181] Amin, *The Making of the Modern Iranian Woman*, 239.

[182] For the male backlash to the religious forces against women's rights in the 1940s, see: Amin, *The Making of the Modern Iranian Woman*, 217–39; Paidar, *Women and the Political Process*, 121–3. For various women's organizations, women's political struggles, periodicals, and the like during the twelve-year period, see: Badr ol-Moluk Bamdad, *From Darkness into Light: Women's Emancipation in Iran*, trans. F. R. C. Bagley (Hicksville: Exposition Press, 1977), 105–13; Paidar, *Women and the Political Process*, 118–34; Amin, *The Making of the Modern Iranian Woman*, 215–45; Hamideh Sedghi, *Women and Politics in Iran: Veiling, Unveiling, and Reveiling* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 90–8.

[183] Amin, *The Making of the Modern Iranian Woman*, 226.

[184] *Democrat-i Iran*, Aban 2, 1325 [October 24, 1946].

have much presence in public meetings of the Democrat Party. They were restricted to all-women political meetings at the party's club. Even in the largest parade of the party in Tupkhanih Square for the anniversary of its establishment, *Sazman-i Zanan-i Hizb-i Democrat-i Iran* was completely absent. The program of the party's parade consisted of twenty-three groups and organizations for the public meeting in the square; however, there was no sign of the women's organization. Instead, this organization had its separate all-women gathering inside the party's club on the day after the parade.[185]

Besides those in the Tudih Party and Democrat Party, many different women's organizations became active in this era.[186] Moreover, accounts of the Oil Industry Nationalization Movement imply women's involvement in the movement. Parvin Paidar suggests that "[t]he struggle for nationalisation of oil brought thousands of banner-carrying women into the streets of Tehran and other major cities." However, in the National Front Party, women did not experience the political freedom that they obtained through the Tudih Party.[187] Because of its inherent dichotomy of progressive and conservative forces, the National Front had difficulty incorporating women into its political organization. Unlike the Tudih Party and Democrat Party, there is no sign of an independent women's organization affiliated with the National Front in the periodicals close to the party. The presence of religious forces was a great obstacle in this regard. Kashani and his religious allies blocked every effort that could provide women with more social freedom. They went as far as organizing demonstrations against women's struggles to obtain the right to vote.[188]

The examination of the accounts of the National Front Party's political gatherings in the newspapers of the era, particularly *Bakhtar-i Imruz* and *Ittilaʿat*, does not reveal any sign of organized women's

[185] Barnamih-yi Jashn-i Aghaz-i Duvumin Sal-i Taʾsis-i Hizb-i Dimucrat-i Iran [The Program for the Celebration of the Second Anniversary of the Democrat Party's Inauguration], *Democrat-i Iran*, Tir 8, 1326 [June 30, 1947]. For a similar case, see: Rizhih-yi Afrad-i Hizb-i Nirumand-i Ma [The March of the Members of Our Powerful Party], *Democrat-i Iran*, Aban 6, 1325 [October 28, 1946].

[186] For detailed accounts of women's political activities in this era, see: Amin, *The Making of the Modern Iranian Woman*, 215–45.

[187] Paidar, *Women and the Political Process*, 134.

[188] Paidar, *Women and the Political Process*, 133–4.

presence; there were no independent women's groups protesting for the party amid the larger male crowds; there were no female speakers in the gatherings of the party in Baharistan Square; all the pictures of the gatherings in these periodicals show mostly male protesters. The same lack of diversity is recognizable in the text of *Bakhtar-i Imruz* newspaper. Describing the National Front Party's meeting in Baharistan Square on February 7, 1950, the newspaper wrote: "Yesterday, people of Tehran, those who had the will to move and protest, meaning lively youth, meaning men, fighter and nationalist men from different walks of life, gathered in that vast space to hear their leader's words."[189] The text of the newspaper equated people of Tehran with the male protesting crowd. Women were absent in the official discourse of the National Front; the party's organized political activities seem to be exclusively masculine.

During the nationalization movement, in contrast to women's absence in the National Front Party's official discourse and to the Tudih Party's and Democrat Party's top-down involvement of women in the political realm, the university and high school students of Tehran formed a bottom-up progressive movement in which girls and boys participated in parades and protests alongside each other. The younger generation was at the forefront of the process of gender diversification of the political realm and public spaces. They did not need official top-down support to provide the basic requirements for women's political activities in public spaces and they did not observe the politics of the conservative forces.

Because of its unorganized and ad hoc nature, one of the most reliable sources to follow women's presence in students' political gatherings is the sporadic news of these events in the popular periodicals of the era. A great example in this regard took place on December 31, 1950, when thousands of students marched in the city and gathered in Baharistan Square. The students had planned this protest two days after a massive meeting of the National Front Party in Baharistan, where 60,000 people gathered and supported the nationalization of the oil industry. The pictures of the latter gathering in *Bakhtar-i Imruz* newspaper show a completely male crowd gathered to listen to all-male

[189] Diruz Mardum-i Tehran Vafadari-yi Khod ra bih Usul-i Azadi Sabit Kardand [Yesterday People of Tehran Proved Their Loyalty to the Principles of Freedom], *Bakhtar-i Imruz*, Bahman 19, 1328 [February 8, 1950].

speakers of the day, addressing them from the balcony of the building of *Kishvar* newspaper.[190] However, on December 31, the students had designed their route to pass by the major girls' and boys' high schools of the city. Reaching each high school, they chanted until its students left their classrooms and joined the protesting crowd. *Bakhtar-i Imruz* describes the scene in front of Nurbakhsh high school:

> When the crowd reached in front of Nurbakhsh girls' high school, the students were busy attending their classes. Through megaphones, they were encouraged to leave and join the crowd. But the principal ordered to close the iron gate of the school. Through the megaphone, the students' representative clearly announced that "in the struggle to obtain our rights, boys and girls have a shared responsibility and, to break up the colonial chains, they should cooperate brotherly." Encouraged by the cries, soon all the students left their classes and broke the lock and joined the crowd. The girls in Shahdukht high school near Baharistan joined the crowd as well and they collectively chanted and protested in Baharistan Square.[191]

Despite being very brief, *Ittilaʿat* covers the same event and, to describe the protesting crowd, it mentions "girls and boys" twice.[192] There are several similar cases throughout the Oil Industry Nationalization Movement in which students of the city formed much more inclusive crowds by combining boys and girls, while their adult counterparts based their movement mostly on men's political participation. In these gatherings, although the protesting boys and girls had their separate groups, the few available photos of the students' protests in *Ittilaʿat* and *Bakhtar-i Imruz* newspapers do not show the male human chain around the girls' groups.[193]

190 Miting-i ba ʿazimat-i Diruz ra Tehran Hargiz bih Khatir Nadarad [Tehran Never Witnessed a Great Meeting Similar to Yesterday's], *Bakhtar-i Imruz*, Diy 9, 1329 [December 30, 1950].

191 Imruz Hizaran Nafar Danishamuz-i Dukhtar va Pisar dar Khiyaban-ha Faryad Mizadand "Naft Bayad Milli Shavad [Today Thousands of Girl and Boy Students Chanted in the Streets that "Oil Should be Nationalized"], *Bakhtar-i Imruz*, Diy 10, 1329 [December 31, 1950].

192 Tazahurat dar Baharistan [Protest in Baharistan], *Ittilaʿat*, Diy 10, 1329 [December 31, 1950].

193 Tazahurat-i Danishjuyan va Danishamuzan Tehran [Tehran's Students Protest], *Ittilaʿat*, Urdibihisht 1, 1330 [April 22, 1951]; Danishamuzan va Danishjuyan Bara-yi Pushtibani az Mubarizih-yi Millat Misr Bamdad-i Imruz az Danishgah Harikat Nimudih va dar Miydan-i Baharistan Miting Dadand [In Order to Support the Egyptian Nation's Fight, This Morning

Although these cases were limited and, in comparison to the male population, women's presence was much smaller, in retrospect these years should be regarded as a milestone in the diversification of the political public spaces of Tehran. These episodes demonstrate how boys and girls of the younger generation had a clear understanding that their fate and their country's future depended on their collective political actions; they did not consider men as the sole political agents and, as the students' representative clearly announced, in their struggles to obtain their rights "boys and girls have a shared responsibility and, to break up the colonial chains they should cooperate brotherly."[194]

The younger generation and their children grew up to form the crowds who, in the late 1970s, came to the streets of Tehran to protest against the Shah and pushed for the 1979 Revolution. Their children and grandchildren are the men and women who, in the twenty-first century, occupy the streets and squares of Tehran to protest against the current regime. Without these early steps and even without those of the Constitutional Revolution, it is not possible to imagine the large-scale women's presence in the political upheavals of the late twentieth and the early twenty-first centuries.

The Transformation of Political Public Spaces of Tehran

The twelve-year period between the 1941 occupation of Iran by the Allies and the 1953 military coup was an opportunity for the revival of the democratic movements in the country after nearly two decades of silence. The rivalry between several centers of power and various political parties and organizations resulted in a vibrant socio-political

the Students Marched from the University and Gathered in Baharistan Square], *Ittilaʿat*, Aban 7, 1330 [October 30, 1951]; Imruz Hizaran Nafar Danishamuz-i Dukhtar va Pisar dar Khiyaban-ha Faryad Mizadand "Naft Bayad Milli Shavad [Today Thousands of Girl and Boy Students Chanted in the Streets that "Oil Should be Nationalized"], *Bakhtar-i Imruz*, Diy 10, 1329 [December 31, 1950]; Danishjuyan-i Danishgah Faryad Mizadand: Ya Marg ya Mossadegh [The University Students Chanted: Whether Death or Mossadegh], *Bakhtar-i Imruz*, Isafand 11, 1331 [March 2, 1953].

[194] Imruz Hizaran Nafar Danishamuz-i Dukhtar va Pisar dar Khiyaban-ha Faryad Mizadand "Naft Bayad Milli Shavad [Today Thousands of Girl and Boy Students Chanted in the Streets that "Oil Should be Nationalized"], *Bakhtar-i Imruz*, Diy 10, 1329 [December 31, 1950].

atmosphere. The multiplicity and diversity of newspapers, political parties, and the Parliament deputies – in contrast to the hand-picked deputies of the Reza Shah era – were the main manifestations of this semi-democratic period.

During these twelve years, more than any other occasion in the country's modern history, Iranian cities witnessed episodes of protests, political meetings, and parades. In Tehran alone, at least 190 episodes occurred during this period. Major political parties, such as the Tudih Party, the National Front, and to some extent the Democrat Party, as well as smaller political organizations, Islamic groups, workers' and students' unions, and bazaar guilds were highly successful in mobilizing ordinary people and utilizing public spaces for their political objectives.

The examination of these episodes of contention clearly demonstrates that, compared to the constitutional era, the production of political public spaces in Tehran went through a fundamental transformation. Only 12 out of 190 episodes of political gatherings and protests took place in the sacred spaces of the city. While during the constitutional era up to the early 1920s people exclusively used the three major mosques of Tehran, the holy shrine outside the city, and the parliament building and garden for their protests, in this twelve-year period the major squares and streets of the city replaced these spaces as the main political public spaces of the city. In other words, the occupation of streets and squares of northern Tehran, rather than taking prolonged *bast*s in sacred spaces, was the main factor for the identification of the main players on the political scene.

The presence of the Parliament and different political organizations, such as parties' clubs and newspaper offices, had a great impact on the formation of political gatherings in the streets and squares of northern Tehran; the Tudih Party used its club on Firduwsi Street as a rallying point; the National Front Party utilized *Kishvar* newspaper's building as the stage for holding speeches in Baharistan Square; the close proximity of the parliament to Baharistan Square acted as a magnet that drew thousands of people to the square; the municipality building in Tupkhanih Square provided high-ranking political figures with the perfect stage to watch their supporters' parades inside the square; the presence of Tehran University and major high schools of the city in northern Tehran had a great impact on the formation of students'

Figure 6.4 A map of Tehran showing all the locations of protests and the trajectories of marches, 1941–53.

parades. Figure 6.4 maps the spaces of protests and political gatherings, as well as the trajectories of parades during these years.

As this map clearly illustrates, between 1941 and 1953 the spatiality of political gatherings was largely beyond the limits of the historic core of Tehran; the northern city hosted the majority of protests, parades, and meetings. Iranian society experienced the complete transformation of political public spaces; the old spaces of protest lost their unrivaled role of representing people in their political struggles. This transformation became the new norm for future unrest in Tehran and Iranian cities, and was an ever-present aspects of democratic movements in the years to come.

In comparison to the Constitutional Revolution, this fundamental transformation of political public spaces can be scrutinized through three different perspectives. First, public space went through a process of secularization. The sacred spaces of the city lost their role as the

primary congregators of a segmented urban society. People became independent of spatial religiosity in seeking a common ground for their protests. With this shift, the streets and squares of northern Tehran replaced sacred spaces and represented people's political identities during the episodes of contention.

Second, political public spaces witnessed a process of gender diversification. Initiated after the Constitutional Revolution, women's presence in political rallies, more than ever, became prevalent and accepted by society. This process occurred on two levels. First, the major political parties of the era, particularly the Tudih Party, provided formal venues for the inclusion of women in the political scene and supported their public activities. Second, and more important, the university and high school students proved themselves to be at the forefront of this process. In contrast to women's top-down inclusion by political parties, students showed that the younger generation demanded the bottom-up participation of women in political public spaces.

Third, the segmented and communal identity of political public spaces transformed into a class-based identity. Between 1941 and 1953, the mobilization of the urban classes, particularly the modern middle class and urban working class, was the most significant factor for the production of political public spaces. These relatively new urban classes, particularly the modern middle class, transformed their landscapes of daily life into political platforms. As I demonstrated in Chapter 5, the modern middle class had spent around two decades developing new forms of social life and spaces in the northern neighborhoods of Tehran. Moreover, it portrayed the old city as filthy, obsolete, unhealthy, religious, ignorant, and unhappy, and the new city as progressive, modern, clean, and happy. Such spatial polarizations reproduced political spaces during the 1941–53 period. At this time, the modern middle class transformed its familiar landscape of daily life into political public spaces rather than depending on traditional sites of protest.

Alongside the transformation of political public spaces of Tehran, people's repertoires of contention and the timing of protests transformed as well. During the constitutional era, taking *bast* was the main method of protest. As Chapter 2 discussed, by prolonged occupation of mosques and shrines, sometimes for close to a month, the protesters forced the state to surrender to their requests or evacuate them forcefully, which could result in the state's disgrace. By choosing

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the main sacred spaces of the city, as people's major destinations of pilgrimage and daily prayers, and turning them into venues of political dissent, the protesters guaranteed themselves a permanent number of audiences. For example, the *bast* in Shah ʿAbd al-ʿAzim Shrine during the Constitutional Revolution lasted for one month and the news of their *bast* spread throughout the country.

In contrast, in the 1940s and the early 1950s, the occupations of the streets and squares and the protests were daytime activities. All the episodes of contention during this era, even those that continued for days, occurred in broad daylight and ended before or a few hours after sunset. People would leave the streets and squares for the night and, sometimes, would return the next morning to continue their protest. The occupation of public spaces was not meant to last more than a few hours. Moreover, the repertoires of contention became more diverse. Sometimes people targeted a single square, such as Baharistan or Tupkhanih, for a huge gathering. By filling up the squares, they could demonstrate their numbers and collective power. Moreover, the squares were great platforms for other activities, such as speeches, parades, and various ceremonies. On other occasions, the protesters or political organizations held long parades in the main streets of the city. By marching throughout the city, they were able to attract bystanders into their crowds and disrupt the daily flow of life.

Although this chapter does not investigate the transformation of the public sphere and such an investigation demands a separate examination, a comparison of the twelve-year period with the constitutional era highlights some initial points. As Chapter 2 discussed, during the Constitutional Revolution the public sphere formed through the coming together of various social segments. The political activities of the propertied middle class (the traditional middle class in this chapter), the binding force of religious authorities, and the latter group's role in the formation of public opinion were decisive factors for this coming together. However, this model does not match the dynamics of the public sphere in the twelve-year period.

First, in the latter era, the religious authorities played a minor role in the formation of public opinion. At this time their impact was more or less limited to the traditional section of society. Political parties, with their newspapers, organizations, and meetings in public spaces, were decisive factors in the formation of the public sphere and public

opinion. Second, similar to political public spaces, the segmented nature of the public sphere transformed into a class-based model and the political parties and organizations mobilized the urban classes for their objectives. The shared identity of workers as the urban working class and the shared identity of intellectuals as the modern middle class were highly influential in creating united political fronts during people's struggles to obtain their rights. Third, the modern middle class was the key social force in the formation of the public sphere in this era. Unlike the traditional middle class, the modern middle class did not have strong communal affiliations. This relatively new class was the core group in the majority of the political parties of this era. The Tudih Party, the National Front Party, and the Democrat Party depended heavily on the participation of the members of this class. Through their political activities, the modern middle class was able to mobilize the working class and, to some extent, the traditional section of society. Fourth, Iranian women became an inseparable segment of the public sphere. While in the constitutional era they had to fight independently to open up and diversify the public sphere, at this time the parties regarded women as an essential part of the political process. They received membership in some parties, such as the Tudih Party, and participated in demonstrations, even if in limited numbers.

Conclusion

The transformation of the political public spaces of Tehran was the ultimate manifestation of the transformation of the sociality and spatiality of the city. Although from the mid-nineteenth century the state had already commenced the piecemeal transformation of Tehran, I believe that the real changes occurred after the Constitutional Revolution and through the spatial practices of ordinary people. In other words, the production of novel political public spaces in the northern neighborhoods of Tehran demonstrates that the state's long process of spatial abstraction through commodification, bureaucratization, and spatial control had been well balanced by a more significant social process: the social production of social and counter-spaces.

Despite the attempts of the Qajar state at the production of a certain spatial image and the strict spatial policies of the Pahlavi state for socio-spatial control and change, urban society gradually and constantly appropriated and reproduced the abstract spatiality of the

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city as a lived reality. People's social interactions and spatial practices constantly transformed abstract spaces as differential spaces. People planted the seeds of otherness and alternative forms of being amid the ostensible homogeneity of state spaces. These seeds burgeoned, grew, and altered state spaces as spaces of representation.

In this long-term process of change, three main poles were deeply entangled: the city, urban society, and the state. The examination of the mutual relationships between these three elements provides the analytical framework for the interpretation of the sociality and spatiality of the city. In the 1940s and the early 1950s, in comparison to the constitutional era, Tehran's political landscape went through fundamental shifts because the state, society, and the city had transformed and contributed to each other's transformations. People, the state, and the city were entangled in a dance wherein every move of each required the reaction of the others.

People's gatherings in Baharistan Square and the streets and squares of northern Tehran were closely related to various social and spatial processes that were active since the mid-nineteenth century, such as: the formation of new spatial knowledge in the nineteenth century; the role of this knowledge in the production of the city as an abstract entity; the development of new forms of social life and spaces through the spatial practices of people; and the transformation of abstract spatiality into counter-spaces. In other words, the transformation of political public spaces of Tehran was the last manifestation of the massive ontological shift that had transformed Iranians' various socio-spatial relations since the mid-nineteenth century. Prior to this final political manifestation, people had adopted new forms of social life and social spaces and the state had developed a novel understanding about its relationship to the city and the utilization of urban spaces as a vehicle for capital accumulation and social control. In this era, the fourth and the last spatial relationship, the spatiality of political activities, manifested its fundamental change.

As I demonstrated in the previous chapters, this quadruple spatial transformation occurred alongside the production of a novel form of spatial discourse as the result of the increasing contacts with Western European countries and the United States. Similar to the novel forms of social life followed by ordinary people and novel methods of legitimation adopted by the state, this discourse reproduced the spatiality of political movements. *Bakhtar-i Imruz*'s comparison of Baharistan

Square to Bastille Square in Paris[195] clearly shows how the modern middle class was aware of possible alternative forms of political actions in public spaces. This awareness was the vehicle for the transformation of the political public spaces of Tehran and abandoning the traditional repertoires of contention and their associated spaces. By the early 1950s the new discourse had already been established as the main venue for forming the spatial contours of social, political, and economic processes. It succeeded in sidelining the indigenous spatial knowledge and became the new norm for urban society and the state. It succeeded in (re)producing Iranian society and the state through defining the spatiality of Iranian cities.

[195] Diruz Mardum-i Tehran Vafadari-yi Khod ra bih Usul-i Azadi Sabit Kardand [Yesterday People of Tehran Proved Their Loyalty to the Principles of Freedom], *Bakhtar-i Imruz*, Bahman 19, 1328 [February 8, 1950].

Conclusion

I begin the concluding chapter by bringing different threads of this study together and I will continue by discussing my overarching arguments and brief final theoretical and methodological remarks for possible future investigations.

Aiming to highlight the agency of ordinary people in Tehran's transformation, I mostly scrutinized the shifts in two seemingly independent but inherently interconnected socio-spatial relationships: the spatiality of social life and social movements. Throughout the main storyline of this book, I illustrated that the transformations of these two relationships shared four common characteristics. First, there is an apparent departure from communal to class-based identities. As I discussed in Chapter 1, the social spaces of nineteenth-century Tehran were the outcome of the shared communal identity of their users; people's communal ties colored coffeehouses, bathhouses, *takīyyih*s, and *zūrkhānih*s. In the same vein, communal ties played the main role in the formation of political public spaces and the public sphere during the Constitutional Revolution. However, the structural transformation of Iranian urban society resulted in the demise of the communal sphere and the rise of class consciousness based on shared economic and political interests. As Chapter 5 demonstrated, the modern middle class produced the main social spaces of mid-twentieth-century northern Tehran. Chapter 6 illustrated the role of this class alongside the urban working class in the production of political public spaces of the city in the 1940s and the early 1950s.

Second, as I will discuss further in my overarching arguments, this structural transformation accompanied people's abandonment of the traditional instances of social life and spaces, repertoires of contention, and political public spaces to produce novel forms based on the socio-spatial knowledge that had no historical precedence in Iran. Instead of nineteenth-century coffeehouses, bathhouses, *takīyyih*s, and *zūrkhānih*s, people produced cafés, restaurants, cinemas, theaters,

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and sport clubs as their primary venues of social life, mostly in the northern neighborhoods of Tehran. Similarly, the long-lived tradition of taking *bast* in mosques and sacred places transformed into political meetings and parades in the squares and streets of the northern city.

Third, a process of spatial secularization occurred with the first two shifts. As the first chapter discussed, religiosity was the main incentive behind the majority of social activities in nineteenth-century Tehran. Various religious rituals in neighborhood mosques, Muharram and Safar mourning ceremonies, and the social life around Ramadan fasting month were based on people's religious fervor. Moreover, the Shiʿi doctrine and religious leaders were the main social forces that enabled the collaboration of various communal segments during the Constitutional Revolution; they formed the public opinion on political matters and helped to produce the public sphere. In addition, during the 1906 revolution, sacred spaces of Tehran transformed into the platforms of political activities and supported the main episodes of contention. In contrast, by the mid-twentieth century, the religious discourse lost its unrivaled role as the main producer of social life, particularly among the modern middle class. Furthermore, the religious leaders and sacred spaces were not at the forefront of the political movements of the 1940s and the early 1950s. Only a fraction of political gatherings of this era occurred in the sacred spaces of the city.

Fourth, both social and political spaces of Tehran witnessed the process of gender diversification. While the majority of traditional social spaces of nineteenth-century Tehran were dominantly masculine, women's presence in cafés, restaurants, cinemas, and theaters of the mid-twentieth-century city gradually became an accepted norm. By then, Iranian women were not obliged to socialize solely within the confines of the private realm, as their grandparents did. In the same vein, while women were absent during the main episodes of the Constitutional Revolution, by the mid-twentieth century they were an active part of the public sphere and political public spaces who founded all-women political organizations and participated in political gatherings and parades of the era.

The four characteristics mentioned above demonstrate the interconnectedness of Tehran's sociality and spatiality. The production and transformation of spaces of daily life and political public spaces closely followed social processes. Tehran as a social product formed and transformed alongside people's active production of social and

political spaces and, in return, it reproduced, enhanced, and sometimes deflected these social changes; the city and its spaces actively played a significant role in the (re)production of social processes and relations. This deep reciprocity between the city and society provided the necessary framework for studying urban change in Tehran between the mid-nineteenth and the mid-twentieth centuries.

Overarching Arguments

Four main overarching arguments help to tie the six chapters of this book together. For the first central argument, I highlight the agency of ordinary people, Tehran's inhabitants, in the production and transformation of the city. Most scholars examining the process of urban change and development in Iran and the Middle East emphasize the role of the state and consider cities as the material products that can be formed and transformed through large-scale urban projects and top-down policies. Hidden in this line of reasoning is the assumption that urban society follows the changes in the material world; it establishes a cause-and-effect relationship. Through the transformation of the physicality of cities, states are able to (re)shape societies based on their desired policies. This view considers Reza Shah's modernization of Tehran as a vehicle for the modernization of society.

State-sponsored projects and policies are loud and flamboyant; it is hard to miss them and history plays a better role in recording them; newspapers announce these projects and history books discuss them. It is easy to find numerous documents about Nasser al-Din Shah's decrees on various urban affairs and his large-scale projects, such as the 1870s expansion of Tehran. It is easy to follow Reza Shah's socio-spatial interventions and recognize the impacts of his policies. The streets and squares constructed during his reign still form a large section of the central city. His appointed mayor went as far as publishing an independent magazine, *Baladiyyih*, to publicize the municipality's projects and policies. Even Tehran's maps were the state's products; the state decided what to show on the maps and what to omit; these maps record representations of space rather than spaces representation.

In contrast, throughout this book, I aimed to give priority to the role of ordinary people in the production of Tehran. I argue that the real city is hidden in the ebbs and flows of daily life, in numerous social interactions, and in common people's fears, hopes, and desires.

The routine daily life, rather than the state's urban policies and projects, (re)produces and gives meaning to Tehran and its spaces. People's daily lives bring about continuous and incremental changes, which constantly transform the city. Unlike the vociferous state which publicizes its urban interventions, social life is silent and easy to neglect. It is always present in the background; without capturing much attention, it never stops forming and transforming the spatiality of the city. To borrow from Asef Bayat, the production of cities through people's daily lives can be best described as the "quiet encroachment of the ordinary."[1] However, this quiet and clandestine nature has a bold and dynamic face, too. As I demonstrated in the case of the 1906 Constitutional Revolution, sometimes social forces generate a massive tidal wave that sweeps through cities and nations and brings about broad changes in a matter of a short period of time. Social movements and revolutions leave long-lasting traces on cities. Although they might have been incubated for a long time, they can abruptly yield large-scale shifts.

The examples are abundant in this book. Although in the 1870s Nasser al-Din Shah initiated a massive urban project to expand the city based on a new vocabulary of urban design, it was mostly after the 1920s that the streets and squares of northern Tehran were assimilated into daily life and began to produce social meanings. The café-restaurant, museum, gallery, theater, and parks opened during the Nasseri era and under the direct supervision of the royal family resembled rudimentary caricatures of their authentic European counterparts. It took fifty years for urban society to produce these spaces and form a genuine social life in the novel spatiality of northern Tehran. Similarly, it was the northern parts of the city that transformed into lively stages of social movements and political meetings in the 1940s and the early 1950s. Despite all the efforts of the Pahlavi state to annihilate traditional repertoires of contention in the sacred spaces of the city, right after Reza Shah's abdication from power, urban society redefined the spatial meanings of streets and squares as the spaces of representation and as the platforms of protest to undermine the state's hegemony.

The emphasis on the impact of common people does not mean that I ignore the role of the state; I mainly point to the silent side of this narrative. The state is an essential character of this analysis that cannot be omitted.

[1] Asef Bayat, *Street Politics: Poor People's Movements in Iran* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997).

As a result, in Chapters 4 and 5 I examined the spatial strategies of the state to demonstrate its impact on the transformation of the city and its reciprocal relationship with urban society, which takes me to my second overarching argument. In a broad perspective, the spatiality of cities can be read as the product of a continuous struggle between top-down and bottom-up forces. To use a Lefebvrian terminology, in the labyrinthine network of streets and squares, an ongoing battle exists between spaces of representation and representations of space; between the clandestine and silent practices of ordinary people and the loud and bold strategies of the states; and between the diversity and meaningfulness of lived spaces and the abstract transparency and homogeneity of conceived spaces.

Although sometimes it is manifested in revolutions and large-scale protests, this struggle is mostly quiet and latent. As Michel de Certeau[2] suggests, it is hidden in people's day-to-day life routines and manifested in their walking, shopping, and their most mundane practices. People gradually but constantly push back the borders that seek to produce a fabricated homogeneity and transparency for their daily lives. Similarly, the state has its own covert strategies to impose its desired conformity over social life. As Chapter 5 discussed in detail, these are manifested in the seemingly innocent laws and regulations that, despite their ostensible purposes, invade and disturb the dynamics of social life and set rigid restrictions to delimit the lived reality.

By depicting this binary view, I do not intend to simplify the politics of urban change into a mere opposition, rather, as I suggested in Chapters 5 and 6, both notions of the state and society as well as their relationship are highly multifaceted. It is not possible to provide simple and unchanging definitions of the state and society. Similarly, their relationship fluctuates and changes from time to time. This constantly transforming ground of social and political forces plays a significant role in spatial production. In fact, throughout the book I aimed to demonstrate the reciprocity between three main elements: society, the state, and the city. These three are mutually interconnected; their relationships enhance and accelerate each other's transformations. Without doubt, Tehran was the product of people's and the state's spatial undertakings. However, at the same time, it was the (re)producer of the state's spatial strategies and people's social practices.

[2] Michel de Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life*, trans. Steven Rendall (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984).

As my third overarching argument, I suggest that beyond these reciprocal relationships between society, the city, and the state, which tend to highlight the role of one factor as the agent and the other as the outcome, there exists a socio-spatial discourse that dissolves all the causal relationships. From the late eighteenth century, the expansion of the intercontinental relationships between Iran and Western European countries as well as Russia led to the formation and development of a spatial discourse. Novel socio-spatial knowledge based on the particularities of European cities entered Iran via various means of knowledge production, such as Iranians' travelogues to Europe. As a new form of spatial and social understanding, it took decades before the wonderment-filled descriptions of Iranian travelers manifested as new forms of sociality and spatiality in Iranian cities. This knowledge transformed into a fully fledged discourse, developed throughout the country, and left its mark on various aspects of social practices and the state's strategies.

This process was an ontological shift. Little by little, both ordinary people and the state adopted the new spatial knowledge as the unquestionable and taken-for-granted producer of urban spatiality. This shift transformed the ways of understanding, conceptualizing, and representing socio-spatial relationships and processes. From this point of view, society, the state, and the city were the products of this shift. There is no disparity between the wonders of Nasser al-Din Shah and the dervish Haj Sayyah, as they observed European cities. There is no difference between the attempts of the modern middle class to produce theaters, cafés, and restaurants to serve as their upscale social spaces and the 1870s state-sponsored expansion of Tehran based on European schemes of urban design.

Similar to other discourses, the one mentioned above has developed its own particular power relations. On a larger scale, it has a colonial aspect that defines Western sociality and spatiality as the dominant form of being and as the authentic ones to be emulated. It reduces other socio-spatial contexts to temporal realities and presents them as undeveloped matters that merely preceded the former one. In other words, it situates other socio-spatial contexts in a line behind the desired, authentic, and Western image. It creates a single possible way of being and that is the Western European or North American way.[3]

[3] For more theoretical discussion on this matter see: Doreen Massey, *For Space* (Los Angeles: Sage, 2005).

At the urban level and by returning to contemporary Tehran, the impact of this power relationship is omnipresent and fairly easy to observe. Despite forty years of the state's rhetoric against the West and Western lifestyle and its attempts to establish a discourse based on "Iranian-Islamic" values, more than the past, the sociality and spatiality of the city resemble its European and North American counterparts. Modern and classic architectural styles have left their marks on every single building of the city; glass and steel skyscrapers dominate the business districts of Tehran; European classic architecture with stone columns and heavy cornices is the sign of wealth and prosperity for the upper classes, whose mansions in the northern city provide new architectural models for the middle and lower classes in the central and southern city. The city's restaurants and cafés compete with each other in designing menus and spaces that emanate an aura of the Western taste. Businesses are expected to adopt European titles to present their identity, products, and services – otherwise there would be a chance of failure. Even the formal and governmental planning and design agencies compete with each other to reproduce the desired Western spatiality by proposing large-scale urban projects. The municipality of Tehran has spent millions of dollars to create a large artificial lake and a waterfront urban landscape just a few miles away from the desert. For many Iranians and, ironically, for the state, the West is the new Mecca.

Once again, northern Tehran is the dominant model producing the new taste of spatiality and sociality for the rest of the country. The European- and American-style shopping malls, skyscrapers, apartment buildings, cafés, and restaurants in this part of the city set the new social and spatial standards. The lower and middle classes and people in the other cities of the country follow the desired image of wealth, beauty, power, and otherness in northern Tehran to reconstruct their lifestyles and, consequently, reproduce their personal and collective spatiality.

Finally, for my last overarching argument, I suggest that these power relationships have reproduced the social and geographical contours of Tehran and transformed it into a bipolar city. The transformation of Tehran occurred alongside the shift of power and wealth to the northern city. As early as the mid-nineteenth century, it is possible to recognize two northward and southward movements. Upper classes

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and wealthy people have constantly moved north, toward the mountains. By reaching the northern limits of Tehran and leaving no more open lands to develop, this class is pushing further north by building mansions and resorts in the mountainous villages away from the city. In contrast, the southward movement is pushing lower classes and impoverished people to the periphery. It has even exiled them beyond the city limits to the slums of southern Tehran. Impoverished people cannot afford to live in the official districts of the city and have to build their so-called informal settlements beyond the southern boundaries of the city.

Over time, the gap between the north and south has gradually grown deeper and larger. Tehran transformed from a city without meaningful geographical manifestations of wealth into a city with two contrasting poles in the north and the south. The distinction between these geographical poles matches the distinction between the wealthy vanguards of Westernization and the lower classes that continuously strive to push their lives northward. The huge mansions of the north stand in contrast to the slums of the south. The luxurious and upscale shopping malls of the north are in dire contrast to people's poverty in the south. For more than 150 years this bipolar city and its inhabitants have been in the constant process of becoming.

Final Remarks

Although the works of mostly European urban theorists such as Henri Lefebvre, David Harvey, Jürgen Habermas, Pierre Bourdieu, and so forth provided the theoretical framework of this book, a significant disparity is discernible between the context of these studies and nineteenth-century Tehran. In the eighteenth, nineteenth, and early twentieth centuries, class relations were the dominant social force in the production of the spatiality and sociality of European cities. European societies of the time had a distinct class structure consisting of the working classes, middle classes, bourgeois groups, and the like. This particular social configuration had a great role in the production of social spaces and the formation of the cultural and geographical contours of European cities. Moreover, the European social movements of this era are deeply entangled in the class identity of these societies.

It is not possible to detach the European revolutions from the dynamics and politics of class relations.

Accepting the existing theoretical frameworks at face value can result in misleading interpretations in a different geographical context. In the case of this book, it is not possible to adopt the theoretical frameworks that examine Paris and French urban society in the eighteenth, nineteenth, and early twentieth centuries and incorporate them into the context of Tehran or any other Iranian cities of the same period. It would be inaccurate to search for meaningful class relationships in nineteenth-century Tehran and examine social spaces based on theoretical frameworks similar to those of Western Europe.

In contrast, the examination of nineteenth-century Tehran, particularly prior to its 1870s expansion, illustrates a city without meaningful spatial demarcations based on people's economic conditions. Communal ties largely had priority over people's economic status. Common religion, ethnicity, profession, city of origin, and various combinations of these factors formed the primary ties between people and reproduced the city as a segmented geography consisting of numerous smaller patches. As a result, the first chapter developed the concept of the communal sphere for the examination of the spatiality and sociality of Tehran in this period.

The same incompatibility between available theoretical frameworks and the specific context of nineteenth-century Tehran is discernible in defining the public sphere and political public spaces. My examination of the Constitutional Revolution in Chapter 2 suggests that there is no universal model of the public sphere and public space. I questioned the validity of certain dominant models for Iranian socio-historical contexts. As I suggested in Chapter 2, the concept of the communal sphere can provide the necessary framework for the analysis of the public sphere and political public spaces in early twentieth-century Tehran. Segmented urban society had its particular mechanism in structuring political undertakings. This mechanism was in dire contrast to the models of political activities in European societies of the time. As a result, instead of beginning with the established models of the public sphere and political public space, in this book I reassessed these models based on the particularities of Iranian society and reformulated my theoretical frameworks. This approach can result in the empirical diversification of studies of the public sphere and public space.

Although I deliberately tied my historical investigations to theoretical deliberations, this book falls short of generating an independent theoretical framework for the examination of urban change for Iranian and Middle Eastern cities. Such a task demands a more comparative analysis between the transformations of the cities of the region and other case studies in Europe, North America, and the rest of the world. I consider this book as an opening for future similar analyses and as a way to initiate further investigations into the spatiality of Iranian and Middle Eastern cities. The accumulation of these types of studies will provide the fertile ground to generate novel urban theories.

In order to reach this goal there are certain unventured terrains of which further examination will help to provide a more holistic image of Iranian urban society and, hopefully, will help to generate independent urban theories. First, through the investigation of social and spatial dualities in the 1920s and 1930s, I illustrated Tehran's transformation during the Reza Shah era. However, my analysis did not include the possible hybrid forms of social life and spaces that could have formed in the tension between the traditional and European types of social spaces. The possible social and spatial hybridity of this era was neither completely based on European models nor followed their traditional Iranian counterparts; they were somewhere in between. Moreover, the study of this hybridity should include the possible interactions between various social groups. Did the traditional strata of society take an active part in the social life of northern Tehran? Or did they limit their social life to the traditional social spaces of southern Tehran? The same question can be asked about the modern middle class and its interactions with the traditional social groups. What were the dynamics and politics of these interactions?

Similarly, this book did not examine the social life and spaces of the urban working class. This is a relatively arduous journey; unlike the modern middle class whose traces of social life and spaces are easily recognizable in periodicals, photos, and memoirs, there is scant evidence of the urban working class's social life and spaces. Where did they live and socialize? Did they have deep social ties with the traditional strata of society or did they form their separate social enclaves? What were the dynamics of their interactions with the modern middle class? Such an examination demands a different framework and alternative sources of data and methods; it can be conducted through oral history, particularly for the 1940s and the 1950s.

Finally, in this book I covered the transformation of Tehran and the rise and demise of its social spaces, social lives, and political terrain. Although the narrative of Tehran helps to reconstruct the same image for major urban areas of the country, each city has its own particularities and demands an independent urban analysis. The massive legacy of the Safavid Empire in Isfahan and the Zand dynasty in Shiraz, the role of Imam Reza Shrine in Mashhad, and the dynamics of the international ties with the Ottoman Empire and Russia in Tabriz are just a few of these particularities. Iranian cities are highly understudied in regard to the reciprocal relationship between their sociality and spatiality.

I believe that the current book can provide a methodological framework for the same types of studies in Iran and, possibly, other Middle Eastern countries. The lack of quantitative data and the need for excessive dependence on qualitative sources can be expected in the studies of the other cities of the region. The traces of ordinary people's social lives and spaces need to be extracted from memoirs, travelogues, newspapers, magazines, maps, photos, paintings, and administrative files. This process produces a massive amount of data and demands rigorous organization with an eye on a well-defined theoretical framework.

The field of urban studies as an interdisciplinary terrain that can connect various realms of history, geography, sociology, urban planning, and the like has not been excavated much in Iranian studies. To create such an interdisciplinary dialog in this book, I incorporated a wide range of primary and secondary sources and situated my work in the tension between historical investigations and theoretical deliberations. This book hopefully joins its few predecessors and helps future studies on Iranian and Middle Eastern cities.

Appendix
Protest, Political Gatherings, and Parades between 1941 and 1953

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When	Who	Where	Why	Source
December 8, 1942	University students and various social groups	Baharistan Square	Protesting against living conditions	Various issues of *Ittilaʿat* between Diy 30, 1321 [January 20, 1943] and Isfand 8, 1321 [February 27, 1943]; *Dad*, Diy 22, 1321 [January 12, 1943]
February 3, 1943	The Tudih Party	Imamzadih Abdullah	Taqi Arani's death anniversary	ʿAqili, *Ruzshumar-i Tarikh-i Iran*, 1: 257; *Namih-yi Rahbar*, Bahman 15, 1323 [February 4, 1945]
October 22, 1943	The Tudih Party	Sangilaj Ruins	The first public meeting of the party	*Azhir*, Aban 1, 1322 [October 24, 1943]; Abrahamian, "The Crowd in Iranian Politics 1905–1953," 189[1]
January 9, 1944	The Tudih Party	From Majd Mosque to Sarchishmih and Imamzadih Abdullah	Suliyman Muhsin Iskandari's funeral	*Azhir*, Diy 20, 1322 [January 11, 1944]
February 4, 1944	The Tudih Party	Imamzadih Abdullah	Taqi Arani's death anniversary (small ceremony)	*Namih-yi Rahbar*, Bahman 15, 1323 [February 4, 1945]

[1] Abrahamian dates the meeting on October 21.

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When	Who	Where	Why	Source
March 8, 1944	Supporters and opponents of Sayyid Zia Tabatabaʾi	Baharistan Square	In support and against Tabatabaʾi and Mossadegh	*Ittilaʿat*, Isfand 18, 1322 [March 9, 1944]
October 27, 1944	The Tudih Party	Tudih club to Baharistan Square	Against Saʿid's government	*Zafar*, Aban 8, 1323 [October 30, 1944]; *Namih-yi Bashar*, Aban 17, 1323 [November 8, 1944]
November 17, 1944	The Tudih Party	Tudih club to Baharistan Square	The anniversary of the October Revolution	*Zafar*, Aban 29, 1323 [November 20, 1944]; *Dad*, Aban 28, 1323 [November 19, 1944]
February 2, 1945	The Tudih Party	Arani grave (Imamzadih Abdullah)	Arani's anniversary	*Namih-yi Rahbar*, Bahman 15, 1323 [February 4, 1945]; *Bidari-yi Ma* 1, no. 9 (Isfand, 1323 [February and March, 1945])
March 1, 1945	Haj pilgrims	Baharistan Square	Requesting visas for their pilgrimage	*Dad*, Isfand 11, 1323 [March 2, 1945]
March 6, 1945	University students and *bazārīs*	Baharistan Square	Supporting Mossadegh	*Ittilaʿat*, Isfand 15–17, 1323 [March 6–8, 1945]

March 30, 1945	The Tudih Party	Tudih club to Istanbul and Saʿdi Streets, Tupkhanih Square, and the club again	Denouncing the attack on the party's club in Isfahan	*Namih-yi Rahbar*, Farvardin 12, 1324 [April 1, 1945]; *Dad*, Farvardin 12, 1324 [April 1, 1945]
May 1, 1945	The Tudih Party and workers' unions	Tudih club to Nadiri, Yusifabad, Sipah Streets, Tupkhanih Square, and the club again	May Day parade	*Ittilaʿat*, Urdibihisht 11, 1324 [May 1, 1945]; *Zafar*, Urdibihisht 13 and 14, 1324 [May 3 and 4, 1945]; *Namih-yi Rahbar*, Urdibihisht 13, 1324 [May 3, 1945]; *Dad*, Urdibihisht 12, 1324 [May 2, 1945]
May 11, 1945	The Tudih Party	Tudih club to Istanbul, Lalihzar, Tupkhanih Square, and the club again	End of World War II	*Iran-i Ma*, Urdibihisht 23, 1324 [May 13, 1945]; *Namih-yi Rahbar*, Urdibihisht 23, 1324 [May 13, 1945]; *Dad*, Urdibihisht 23, 1324 [May 13, 1945]

When	Who	Where	Why	Source
May 18, 1945	The Justice Party	Sipahsalar Avenue	Political meeting	*Ittilaʿat*, Urdibihisht 30, 1324 [May 20, 1945]; *Namih-yi Rahbar*, Urdibihisht 30 and 31, 1324 [May 20 and 21, 1945]; *Dad*, Urdibihisht 30, 1324 [May 20, 1945]
May 19–21, 1945	Sayyid Zia Tabatabaʾi's supporters	Baharistan Square	Staged gathering to support Sayyid Zia Tabatabaʾi	*Dad*, Khurdad 1, 1324 [May 22, 1945]
June 1, 1945	Sayyid Zia Tabatabaʾi's supporters	Gumruk Square	Political meeting	*Zafar*, Khurdad 14, 1324 [June 4, 1945]
June 8, 1945	Spontaneous gathering	Tajrish	Against Sadr's cabinet	*Dad*, Khurdad 20, 1324 [June 10, 1945]
August 5, 1945	The Tudih Party	Tudih club to Istanbul, Lalihzar, Tupkhanih Square, and the club again	The anniversary of the Constitutional Revolution	*Namih-yi Rahbar*, Murdad 16, 1324 [August 7, 1945]; *Iran-i Ma*, Murdad 16, 1324 [August 7, 1945]; *Rahbar*, Murdad 19, 1324 [August 10, 1945]

August 7, 1945	The Tudih Party and workers	On Firduwsi Street in front of the party's club	Departure of the Representative Council of the Union of Soviet Workers	*Namih-yi Rahbar*, Murdad 17, 1324 [August 8, 1945]
August 24, 1945	The Tudih Party	On Firduwsi Street at the party's club	Political meeting	*Razm*, Shahrivar 3, 1324 [August 25, 1945]; *Shahbaz*, Shahrivar 4, 1324 [August 26, 1945]; *Parvarish*, Shahrivar 4, 1324 [August 26, 1945]
February 3, 1946	The Tudih Party	Arani grave (Imamzadih Abdullah)	Arani's anniversary	*Namih-yi Mardum*, Bahman 16 and 17, 1324 [February 5 and 6, 1946]
February 15, 1946	The Tudih Party	Firduwsi Street at the party's club	Reopening of the party	*Namih-yi Mardum*, Bahman 28, 1324 [February 17, 1946]; *Ittilaʿat*, Bahman 28, 1324 [February 17, 1946]
February 17, 1946	Qavam's supporters	Baharistan Square	Welcoming Qavam and supporting his cabinet	*Namih-yi Mardum*, Bahman 29, 1324 [February 18, 1946]; *Iran-i Ma*, Bahman 29, 1324 [February 18, 1946]

When	Who	Where	Why	Source
February 24, 1946	Contractual employees of Railway and Ministry of Finance	Baharistan Square	Requesting the passage of the law to change contractual employees to permanent employees	*Namih-yi Mardum*, Isfand 6, 1324 [February 25, 1946]
March 4, 1946	Various groups, such as Qavam's supporters, students, and Tudih Party	Baharistan Square	Against the prolongation of the fourteenth Parliament	*Ittilaʿat*, Isfand 13, 1324 [March 4, 1946]; *Namih-yi Rahbar*, Isfand 14, 1324 [March 5, 1946]
March 5, 1946	Various groups, such as Qavam's supporters, students, and Tudih Party	Baharistan Square	Against the prolongation of the fourteenth Parliament	*Ittilaʿat*, Isfand 14, 1324 [March 5, 1946]; *Namih-yi Rahbar*, Isfand 15, 1324 [March 6, 1946]

March 6, 1946	Various groups, such as Qavam's supporters, students, and Tudih Party	Baharistan Square	Against the prolongation of the fourteenth Parliament	*Ittilaʿat*, Isfand 15, 1324 [March 6, 1946]; *Iran-i Ma*, Isfand 15, 1324 [March 6, 1946]
March 7, 1946	Khalili's supporters and Tudih Party's members	Sabzih Miydān, entrance of Shah Mosque, Nasser Khusruw Street	Fight between Khalili's supporters and Tudih Party's members	*Iran-i Ma*, Isfand 17, 1324 [March 8, 1946]; *Namih-yi Rahbar*, Isfand 17, 1324 [March 8, 1946]
March 11, 1946	Qavam's Supporters and the Tudih Party	Baharistan Square and Firduwsi Street	Against the prolongation of the fourteenth Parliament, supporting Qavam, and the funeral of a worker	*Namih-yi Rahbar*, Isfand 21, 1324 [March 11, 1946]; *Ittilaʿat*, Isfand 20, 1324 [March 11, 1946]

When	Who	Where	Why	Source
May 1, 1946	The Tudih Party and workers' unions	Tudih club to Nadiri, Yusifabad, Sipah Streets, and ending in Tupkhanih Square	May Day parade	*Farman*, Urdibihisht 12, 1325 [May 2, 1946]; *Zafar*, Urdibihisht 13, 15, and 16, 1325 [May 3, 5, and 6, 1946]; *Zafar*, Tir 27, 1325 [July 18, 1946]
May 26, 1946	The Tudih Party	Firduwsi Street at the party's club	Supporting Aqajari workers	*Zafar*, Khurdad 5, 1325 [May 26, 1946]
June 24, 1946	Impoverished people	Tupkhanih Square in front of the municipality building	Looking for food and work	*Dad*, Tir 4, 1325 [June 25, 1946]
July 19, 1946	Central Council of Federated Trade Unions and the Tudih Party	From the party's club to Tupkhanih Square and gathering in the square	Welcoming Louis Sayan, the General Secretary of Federated Workers Trade Union	*Ittilaʿat*, Tir 29, 1325 [July 20, 1946]; *Zafar*, Tir 30, 1325 [July 21, 1946]; *Dad*, Tir 28 and 30, 1325 [July 19 and 21, 1946]

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August 5, 1946	Democrat Party	Tupkhanih Square	The 41st anniversary of the Constitutional Revolution	*Ittilaʿat*, Murdad 15, 1325 [August 6, 1946]; *Dad*, Murdad 16, 1325 [August 7, 1946]
August 5, 1946	The Tudih Party	On Firduwsi Street in front of the party's club	The 41st anniversary of the Constitutional Revolution	*Zafar*, Murdad 15, 1325 [August 6, 1946]; *Ittilaʿat*, Murdad 15, 1325 [August 6, 1946]
September 6, 1946	Democrat Party	Tupkhanih Square	Public meeting and motorized parade of the party	*Ittilaʿat*, Shahrivar 16, 1325 [September 5, 1946]; *Dad*, Shahrivar 17, 1325 [September 6, 1946]; ʿAqili, *Ruzshumar-i Tarikh-i Iran*, 1: 282
September 15, 1946	The United Council of Workers	Sivum-i Isfand Street	A gathering in honor of the representatives of Azerbaijan	*Dad*, Shahrivar 26, 1946 [September 17, 1946]

When	Who	Where	Why	Source
October 3, 1946	The Tudih Party	Amhadiyyih Stadium	The fifth anniversary of the establishment of the party/sport festival	*Namih-yi Rahbar*, Mihr 14, 1325 [October 6, 1946]
October 4, 1946	The Tudih Party	Tupkhanih Square	The fifth anniversary of the establishment of the party	*Rastgu*, Mihr 9, 1325 [October 1, 1946]; *Zafar*, Mihr 14, 1325 [October 6, 1946]; *Namih-yi Rahbar*, Mihr 14, 1325 [October 6, 1946]
October 25, 1946	Democrat Party	Tupkhanih Square	The 100th day of the establishment of the party	*Democrat-i Iran*, Aban 6, 1325 [October 28, 1946]
November 19, 1946	Qavam's supporters	Shah Reza Street	Welcoming Qavam	*Democrat-i Iran*, Aban 29, 1325 [November 20, 1946]
January 5, 1947	Mossadegh's supporters	Shah Mosque	Mossadegh's speech against Qavam and meddling in the election	ʿAqili, *Ruzshumar-i Tarikh-i Iran*, 1: 285
February 3, 1947	The Tudih Party	Arani grave (Imamzadih Abdullah)	Arani's anniversary	*Namih-yi Mardum*, Bahman 15, 1325 [February 3, 1947]

January 10, 1947	University students	From the Tehran University to the court	Protesting against the election committee	ʿAqili, *Ruzshumar-i Tarikh-i Iran*, 1: 285
April 12, 1947	The Armenians Organization of the Democrat Party	From the party's club to Shah Reza, Pahlavi, Sipah, Barq, and Shah Streets back to the club	Armenians' parade	*Democrat-i Iran*, Farvardin 23, 1326 [April 13, 1947]
May 1, 1947	Iranian Workers' Syndicate/ Democrat Party	Railway Stadium	May Day gathering	*Iran-i Ma*, Urdibihisht 11, 1326 [May 2, 1947]
May 2, 1947	Court-sponsored gathering	Tupkhanih Square to Sipah Street, Hasanabad, Pahlavi Intersection, and the court	Requesting the official burial of Reza Shah in Tehran	*Ittilaʿat*, Urdibihisht 12, 1326 [May 3, 1947]

When	Who	Where	Why	Source
July 3, 1947	The Democrat Party	Amjadiyyih Stadium	The anniversary of the establishment of the party/sport festival	*Democrat-i Iran*, Tir 8 and 15, 1326 [June 30 and July 7, 1947]
July 4, 1947	The Democrat Party	Tupkhanih Square	The anniversary of the establishment of the party	*Ittilaʿat*, Tir 13, 1326 [July 5, 1947]; *Democrat-i Iran*, Tir 8 and 15, 1326 [June 30 and July 7, 1947]
November 30, 1947	Qavam's supporters	Baharistan Square	Supporting the government	*Democrat-i Iran*, Azar 9, 1326 [December 1, 1947]
January 11, 1948	Kashani's supporters	Shah Mosque	Solidarity with the Muslims in Pakistan and Palestine	*Ittilaʿat*, Diy 19 and 21, 1326 [January 10 and 12, 1948]
February 4, 1948	The Tudih Party	Arani grave (Imamzadih Abdullah)	Arani's anniversary	*Namih-yi Mardum*, Bahman 14, 1326 [February 4, 1948]
May 1, 1948	Workers' unions	Saʿdi Street to Tupkhanih Square	May Day parade	*Ittilaʿat*, Urdibihisht 11, 1327 [May 1, 1948]

May 6, 1948	The Aria Party	Baharistan Square	Protesting against Qavam	*Ittilaʿat*, Urdibihisht 16, 1327 [May 6, 1948]
May 9, 1948	The Intiqam Party	Baharistan Square	Protesting against Qavam	*Ittilaʿat*, Urdibihisht 19, 1327 [May 9, 1948]
May 21, 1948	The Assembly of the Promoters of Jaʿfari Faith	Shah to Sipahsalar Mosques	Solidarity with the Muslims in Palestine	*Ittilaʿat*, Urdibihisht 27, 1327 [May 17, 1948] and Khurdad 1, 1327 [May 22, 1948]
June 13, 1948	Various social groups upon Kashani's invitation	Baharistan Square	Against the Parliament's vote to Hazhir	*Ittilaʿat*, Khurdad 23, 1327 [June 13, 1948]; *Atash*, Khurdad 24, 1327 [June 14, 1948]
June 15, 1948	Various social groups	Baharistan Square and later Bazaar	Against Hazhir's premiership	*Ittilaʿat*, Khurdad 25, 1327 [June 15, 1948]
June 17, 1948	Various social groups particularly traditional strata	From Sirus intersection to Sepahsalar and Baharistan Square	Against Hazhir's government	*Ittilaʿat*, Khurdad 27 and 30, 1327 [June 17 and 20, 1948]
June 23, 1948	Kashani's followers	Shah Mosque	Against Hazhir's government	*Ittilaʿat*, Tir 5, 1327 [June 26, 1948]

When	Who	Where	Why	Source
February 3, 1949	Mostly Students	University to Baharistan	Against the South Oil Concession and the Shahi Bank	*Ittilaʿat*, Bahman 14, 1327 [February 3, 1949]
May 1, 1949	Workers' unions	Railway Square, Amiriyyih, Pahlavi, Nadiri, Istanbul, Saʿdi to Tupkhanih Square	May Day parade	*Ittilaʿat*, Urdibihisht 11, 1328 [May 1, 1949]
October 14, 1949	Mossadegh and his allies	Sit-in in the court	Protesting against the electoral violations	*Bakhtar-i Imruz*, Mihr 23, 1328 [October 15, 1949]
February 7, 1950	The National Front	Baharistan Square	Encouraging people to participate in the election	*Bakhtar-i Imruz*, Bahman 15, 17, 18, and 19, 1328 [February 4, 6, 7, and 8, 1950]; *Ittilaʿat*, Bahman 19, 1328 [February 8, 1950]

May 2, 1950	University students	From the University to the Baharistan Square	Protesting against the university's conditions and medical students' requests	*Ittilaʿat*, Urdibihisht 12, 1329 [May 2, 1950]; *Bih Su-yi Ayandih*, Urdibihisht 13, 1329 [May 3, 1950]
June 8, 1950	Medical students	Baharistan Square	Protesting for educational requests	*Bih Su-yi Ayandih*, Khurdad 19, 1329 [June 9, 1950]
June 10, 1950	Traditional strata and Kashani's followers	Mihrabad Airport, Sarchishmih, and Paminar	Welcoming Kashani after returning from exile	*Bakhtar-i Imruz*, Khurdad 15 and 21, 1329 [June 5 and 11, 1950]; *Bih Su-yi Ayandih*, Khurdad 21, 1329 [June 11, 1950]
June 11, 1950	The government's employees	Baharistan Square	Requesting their promotions and overtime payments	*Bih Su-yi Ayandih*, Khurdad 22, 1329 [June 12, 1950]
June 29, 1950	Supporters and opponents of Razmara	Baharistan Square	Fight over Razmara's premiership	*Ittilaʿat*, Tir 8, 1329 [June 29, 1950]

When	Who	Where	Why	Source
July 3, 1950	Supporters and opponents of Razmara	Baharistan Square	Fight over Razmara's premiership	*Bakhtar-i Imruz*, Tir 12, 1329 [July 3, 1950]
July 4, 1950	Supporters and opponents of Razmara	Baharistan Square	Fight over Razmara's premiership	*Ittilaʿat*, Tir 13, 1329 [July 4, 1950]
September 23, 1950	The Istighlal Party	Baharistan Square	Political meeting	*Bakhtar-i Imruz*, Mihr 2, 1329 [September 24, 1950]
December 4, 1950	The National Front deputies and supporters	Nasser Khusruw Street at the office of *Shahid* newspaper	Supporting the publication of *Shahid* newspaper	*Bakhtar-i Imruz*, Azar 13, 1329 [December 4, 1950]
December 13, 1950	University students	University of Tehran	Supporting the Oil Industry Nationalization Movement	*Bakhtar-i Imruz*, Azar 23, 1329 [December 14, 1950]; *ʿAlaj*, Azar 24, 1329 [December 15, 1950]
December 21, 1950	University students	Baharistan Square	Supporting the Oil Industry Nationalization Movement	*Bakhtar-i Imruz*, Azar 28, 1329 [December 19, 1950]; *Ittilaʿat*, Azar 30, 1329 [December 21, 1950]

December 22, 1950	The Assembly of the Militant Muslims and Kashani followers	Shah Mosque	Supporting the Oil Industry Nationalization Movement	*Ittilaʿat*, Diy 2, 1329 [December 23, 1950]; *Bakhtar-i Imruz*, Diy 3, 1329 [December 24, 1950]
December 24, 1950	University students	From the University of Tehran to Baharistan Square via Shah Reza, Pahlavi, and Shah Streets	Supporting the Oil Industry Nationalization Movement	*Ittilaʿat*, Diy 4, 1329 [December 25, 1950]
December 29, 1950	The National Front Party, The Assembly of the Militant Muslims, the Istighlal and Iran Parties, and their supporters	Baharistan Square	Supporting the Oil Industry Nationalization Movement	*Bakhtar-i Imruz*, Diy 7 and 9, 1329 [December 28 and 30, 1950]; *Ittilaʿat*, Diy 9, 1329 [December 30, 1950]

When	Who	Where	Why	Source
December 31, 1950	High school students	Marching in northern streets of the city and gathering in Baharistan Square	Supporting the Oil Industry Nationalization Movement	*Bakhtar-i Imruz*, Diy 10, 1329 [December 28 and 31, 1950]; *Ittilaʿat*, Diy 10, 1329 [December 31, 1950]
January 5, 1951	Istighlal Party	Baharistan Square	Supporting the Oil Industry Nationalization Movement	*Bakhtar-i Imruz*, Diy 16, 1329 [January 6, 1951]; *Ittilaʿat*, Diy 16, 1329 [January 6, 1951]
January 5, 1951	Assembly of Freedom of Iran	Hassanabad Intersection	Supporting the Oil Industry Nationalization Movement	*Bakhtar-i Imruz*, Diy 16, 1329 [January 6, 1951]; *Ittilaʿat*, Diy 16, 1329 [January 6, 1951]
January 5, 1951	People of Shimiranat	Tajrish	Supporting the Oil Industry Nationalization Movement	*Bakhtar-i Imruz*, Diy 16, 1329 [January 6, 1951]; *Ittilaʿat*, Diy 16, 1329 [January 6, 1951]
January 25, 1951	Various groups	Baharistan Square	Against the government and the majority MPs	*Ittilaʿat*, Bahman 5, 1329 [January 25, 1951]

January 26, 1951	The National Front Party/ Kashani's and Mossadegh's mutual invitation	Shah Mosque	Supporting the Oil Industry Nationalization Movement	*Bakhtar-i Imruz*, Bahman 7, 1329 [January 27, 1951]; *Ittilaʿat*, Bahman 7, 1329 [January 27, 1951]
February 3, 1951	The members of various guilds	Baharistan Square	Protesting against the pressures of the municipality	*Bakhtar-i Imruz*, Bahman 14, 1329 [February 3, 1951]
February 7, 1951	Teachers	In front of the Ministry of Culture	Against Zanganih as the new minister of education	*Bakhtar-i Imruz*, Bahman 19, 1329 [February 8, 1951]; Navid-i Ayandih, Bahman 22, 1329 [February 11, 1951]
February 16, 1951	The National Population of Fight Against the Colonial Oil Companies	Baharistan Square	Supporting the Oil Industry Nationalization	*Bakhtar-i Imruz*, Bahman 28, 1329 [February 17, 1951]; *Ittilaʿat*, Bahman 28, 1329 [February 17, 1951]; *Navid-i Ayandih*, Bahman 29, 1329 [February 18, 1951]
February 21, 1951	University students	In front of the University of Tehran	?	*Bakhtar-i Imruz*, Isfand 3, 1329 [February 22, 1951]

When	Who	Where	Why	Source
March 2, 1951	The Population of the Devotees of Islam and Kashani's followers	Shah Mosque	Supporting the Oil Industry Nationalization Movement	*Bakhtar-i Imruz*, Isfand 10 and 12, 1329 [March 1 and 3, 1951]; *Ittilaʿat*, Isfand 10, 1329 [March 1, 1951]
March 9, 1951	The National Front Party, Kashani's supporters, the Assembly of the Militant Muslims, the Istighlal and Iran Parties, and some other groups	Baharistan Square	Supporting the Oil Industry Nationalization Movement	*Bakhtar-i Imruz*, Isfand 17 and 19, 1329 [March 8 and 10, 1951]; *Ittilaʿat*, Isfand 19, 1329 [March 10, 1951]
April 12, 1951	University students	University of Tehran	Solidarity with oil industry workers in the south	*Ittilaʿat*, Farvardin 22, 1330 [April 12, 1951]

April 13, 1951	The National Population for Fight Against the Colonial Oil Companies	Baharistan Square	Supporting the Oil Industry Nationalization Movement	*Ittilaʿat*, Farvardin 24, 1330 [April 14, 1951]
April 22, 1951	University and high school students	From the University and Alburz College to Baharistan Square via Shahpur, Nadiri, Istanbul, and Shahabad Streets	Supporting oil industry workers' strike	*Ittilaʿat*, Urdibihisht 1, 1330 [April 22, 1951]
May 1, 1951	The Tudih Party and the Workers' Unions	Baharistan Square and Nadiri Street	May Day parade	*Bih Su-yi Ayandih*, Urdibihisht 12, 1330 [May 3, 1951]; *Bakhtar-i Imruz*, Urdibihisht 11, 1330 [May 2, 1951]; *Ittilaʿat*, Urdibihisht 10 and 11, 1330 [May 1 and 2, 1951]
May 3, 1951	Mossadegh's supporters	Baharistan Square	To support Mossadegh's cabinet	*Bakhtar-i Imruz*, Urdibihisht 12, 1330 [May 3, 1951]

When	Who	Where	Why	Source
May 12, 1951	The Organization of Peace-Loving Youth	Baharistan Square	Protesting against the French government	*Bih Su-yi Ayandih*, Urdibihisht 22, 1330 [May 13, 1951]
May 13, 1951	Textile workers	Baharistan Square	Requesting the freedom of their coworkers	*Bih Su-yi Ayandih*, Urdibihisht 23, 1330 [May 14, 1951]
May 22, 1951	Railway workers and syndicates	Baharistan Square	Protesting against the new election bill	*Bih Su-yi Ayandih*, Khurdad 2, 1330 [May 23, 1951]
May 22, 1951	The National Front Party and Kashani's supporters	Baharistan Square	Against the US and Britain's interference in Iran and supporting Mossadegh	*Bakhtar-i Imruz*, Khurdad 1, 1330 [May 23, 1951]; *Ittilaʿat*, Urdibihisht 30 and Khurdad 1, 1330 [May 21 and 23, 1951]; *Atash*, Khurdad 1, 1330 [May 23, 1951]
May 28, 1951	The Population of Iranian Patriots	Istanbul Street	The anniversary of the 1933 oil concession	*Ittilaʿat*, Khurdad 7, 1330 [May 29, 1951]

May 29, 1951	The Tudih Party and the National Population for Fight Against the Colonial Oil Companies	Tudih club to Tupkhanih Square, Saʿdi, Shahabad Streets, and Baharistan Square	Against the 1933 oil concession	*Bih Su-yi Ayandih*, Khurdad 8 and 9, 1330 [May 30 and 31]; *Shurish*, Khurdad 13, 1330 [June 4, 1951]; *Ittilaʿat*, Khurdad 8, 1330 [May 30, 1951]
June 1, 1951	The Population for Child Support	Bahar Street, Darvazih Duwlat, Mukhbir al-Duwlih Intersection, Shah Abad Street, Baharistan Square, Sarchishmih, Barq Street, Tupkhanih Square, Firduwsi Square, and Darvazih Duwlat	Motorized parade for International Children's Day	*Bih Su-yi Ayandih*, Khurdad 12, 1330 [June 3]

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When	Who	Where	Why	Source
June 8, 1951	The Population of Iranian Patriots	Tajrish	Supporting the Oil Industry Nationalization Movement	*Bakhtar-i Imruz*, Khurdad 18, 1330 [June 9, 1951]
June 15, 1951	The Assembly of the Militant Muslims and Kashani's supporters	Baharistan Square	Supporting the Oil Industry Nationalization Movement	*Bakhtar-i Imruz*, Khurdad 21 and 22, 1330 [June 12 and 13, 1951]; *Ittilaʿat*, Khurdad 25, 1330 [June 16, 1951]
June 19, 1951	Glass factory workers	Starting from Hasanabad Intersection, Yusefabad and Shah Street, and gathering in Baharistan Square	Requesting a ban on foreign products	*Bih Su-yi Ayandih*, Khurdad 29, 1330 [June 20, 1951]; *Bakhtar-i Imruz*, Khurdad 28, 1330 [June 19, 1951]
June 21, 1951	The Toilers' Party	Baharistan Square	Supporting Mossadegh and the Oil Industry Nationalization Movement	*Bakhtar-i Imruz*, Tir 1, 1330 [June 23, 1951]

June 29, 1951	The National Population for Fight Against the Colonial Oil Companies	Baharistan Square	Political meeting for oil industry nationalization	*Bih Su-yi Ayandih*, Tir 9, 1330 [July 1, 1951]; *Ittilaʿat*, Tir 8, 1330 [June 30, 1951]
July 8, 1951	The Toilers' Party and the Assembly of the Militant Muslims	Baharistan Square	Against the decision of the International Court of Justice	*Ittilaʿat*, Tir 16, 1330 [July 8, 1951]
July 13, 1951	Residents of Shimiranat	Tajrish	Against the decision of the International Court of Justice and supporting Mossadegh's government	*Shurish*, Tir 24, 1330 [July 16, 1951]

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When	Who	Where	Why	Source
July 15, 1951	The Tudih Party and the National Population for Fight Against the Colonial Oil Companies	Firduwsi Square, to Tupkhanih Square, Saʿdi and Shahabad Streets, Baharistan Square/the main streets and squares of northern Tehran	The fifth anniversary of the strike of oil industry workers in Abadan	*Bih Su-yi Ayandih*, Tir 24, 1330 [July 16, 1951]; *Navid-i Ayandih*, July 13, 1952; *Bakhtar-i Imruz*, Tir 24, 1330 [July 16, 1951]; *Ittilaʿat*, Tir 24, 1330 [July 16, 1951]; Elahi, *Duriha va Dilgiriha*, 236–7
July 22, 1951	The families of the martyrs of July 15	Baharistan Square	Requesting justice	*Rastakhiz-i Khalq*, Tir 31, 1330 [July 23, 1951]
July 30, 1951	The Toilers' Party, the Assembly of the Militant Muslims, and bazaar guilds	Shah Mosque	Supporting Mossadegh's government	*Ittilaʿat*, Murdad 8, 1330 [July 31, 1951]

August 6, 1951	The National Association of Democratic Journalists of Iran	Fuwziyyih Square	The anniversary of the Constitutional Revolution	*Bih Su-yi Ayandih*, Murdad 16, 1330 [August 8, 1951]
August 17, 1951	The Population of the Devotees of Islam	Shah Mosque	Trying to hold a meeting in the mosque despite the ban/some clashes with police forces	*Bakhtar-i Imruz*, Murdad 26, 1330 [August 18, 1951]
August 19, 1951	Laid-off factory workers and their families	Baharistan Square	Protesting for their living conditions	*Bih Su-yi Ayandih*, Murdad 28, 1330 [August 20, 1951]
August 24, 1951	The National Population for Fight Against the Colonial Oil Companies	Fuwziyyih Square	The 4 day of the martyrs of July 15	*Bih Su-yi Ayandih*, Shahrivar 3, 1330 [August 25, 1951]

When	Who	Where	Why	Source
September 7, 1951	The Toilers' Party, the Assembly of the Militant Muslims, and bazaar guilds	Fuwziyyih Square	Supporting Mossadegh's government and the Egyptians' anticolonial movement	*Bakhtar-i Imruz*, Shahrivar 16, 1330 [September 8, 1951]; *Ittilaʿat*, Shahrivar 16, 1330 [September 8, 1951]
September 27, 1951	Mossadegh's supporters	Baharistan Square	Mossadegh's speech in the square	*Bakhtar-i Imruz*, Mihr 4, 1330 [September 27, 1951]
September 27, 1951	The National Front	Baharistan Square	Supporting Mossadegh's government	*Bakhtar-i Imruz*, Mihr 7, 1330 [September 30, 1951]
October 10, 1951	The workers of *Silu* 24	Baharistan Square		*Bakhtar-i Imruz*, Mihr 17, 1330 [October 10, 1951]
October 19, 1951	Workers	Fuwziyyih Square	Against Mossadegh's government	*Bih Su-yi Ayandih*, Mihr 22, 1330 [October 15, 1951][2]

[2] Unfortunately, prior to this gathering, the government banned *Bih Su-yi Ayandih* newspaper. I did not find a leftwing newspaper from October 20, 1951 to check whether the workers held or canceled their meeting. This entry is based on the announcement for the meeting in *Bih Su-yi Ayandih* newspaper.

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October 30, 1951	University and high school students	From the University to Baharistan Square via Shah Reza, Yusifabad, Nadiri, Istanbul, Shahabad	Supporting the Egyptians' anticolonial movement	*Bakhtar-i Imruz*, Aban 7, 1330 [October 30, 1951]; *Ittilaʿat*, Aban 7, 1330 [October 30, 1951]; *Rahnama-yi Millat*, Aban 8, 1330 [October 31, 1951]
November 2, 1951	The National Population for Fight Against the Colonial Oil Companies	Fuwziyyih Square	Protesting against the Security Council and supporting the Egyptians' anticolonial movement	*Rahnama-yi Millat*, Aban 12, 1330 [November 4, 1951]
November 6, 1951	The Assembly of the Militant Muslims	Fuwziyyih Square	Supporting Mossadegh's government and the Egyptians' anticolonial movement	*Bakhtar-i Imruz*, Aban 13 and 15, 1330 [November 5 and 7, 1951]; *Ittilaʿat*, Aban 14 and 15, 1330 [November 6 and 7, 1951]

When	Who	Where	Why	Source
November 9, 1951	The Democratic Youth Center of Iran	Fuwziyyih Square	International Youth Day	*Rahnama-yi Millat*, Aban 19, 1330 [November 11, 1951]
November 14, 1951	Shoe repair and shoemaker workers	In front of the Ministry of Labor on Firduwsi Street	Supporting their striking coworkers	*Rahnama-yi Millat*, Aban 23, 1330 [November 15, 1951]
November 16, 1951	Court-sponsored gathering	Fuwziyyih Square	Against the Tudih Party and supporting the monarchy	*Bakhtar-i Imruz*, Aban 25, 1330 [November 17, 1951]
November 17, 1951	University students	University of Tehran		*Bakhtar-i Imruz*, Aban 26, 1330 [November 18, 1951]
November 22, 1951	Ordinary people and cinema and theater lovers	Baharistan Square	Protesting against the closing of Saʿdi Theater	*Jaras*, Azar 1, 1330 [November 23, 1951]
November 23, 1951	Various social groups	Different parts of the city	Welcoming Mossadegh's arrival from his foreign trip	*Bakhtar-i Imruz*, Azar 1, 1330 [November 23, 1951]

December 6, 1951	The Student Organization of the Tudih Party and some other political groups	From the University to Baharistan Square and widespread riots in northern Tehran	Against Mossadegh's government	*Ittilaʿat*, Azar 14 and 16, 1330 [December 6 and 8, 1951]; *Akharin Nabard*, Azar 13, 1330 [December 5, 1951]
December 12, 1951	Various groups	Baharistan Square	Clashes between different political groups	*Bakhtar-i Imruz*, Azar 20, 1330 [December 12, 1951]
December 13, 1951	Mossadegh's supporters	Baharistan Square	Supporting Mossadegh's government and condemning yesterday's riots	*Bakhtar-i Imruz*, Azar 21, 1330 [December 13, 1951]; *Ittilaʿat*, Azar 21, 1330 [December 13, 1951]
December 24, 1951	Teachers	Ministry of Education	Protesting for their working conditions	*Bih Su-yi Ayandih*, Diy 3, 1330 [December 25, 1951]

When	Who	Where	Why	Source
December 28, 1951	The Tudih Party	Fuwziyyih Square	Against Mossadegh's government and the American International Bank and its role in the Iranian oil industry	*Shahbaz*, Azar 28, 1330 [December 20, 1951] and Diy 7, 1330 [December 29, 1951]; *Bih Su-yi Ayandih*, Diy 8, 1330 [December 30, 1951]
January 21, 1952	The National Front Party	Fuwziyyih Square and northern streets and squares of Tehran	Supporting Mossadegh's government	*Bakhtar-i Imruz*, Bahman 1, 1330 [January 22, 1952]; *Ittilaʿat*, Bahman 1, 1330 [January 22, 1952]
February 22, 1952	The Democratic Youth Center of Iran and the National Population for Fight Against the Colonial Oil Companies	Fuwziyyih Square	Against Mossadegh's government and the colonial powers	*Shahbaz*, Bahman 28, 1330 [February 19, 1952] and Isfand 3, 1330 [February 23, 1952]; *Bih Su-yi Ayandih*, Isfand 4, 1330 [February 24, 1952]

March 20, 1952	The National Population for Fight Against the Colonial Oil Companies	Fuwziyyih Square	The anticolonial meeting and the anniversary of the oil industry nationalization	*Shahbaz*, Isfand 27, 1330 [March 18, 1952]; *Bih Su-yi Ayandih*, Isfand 29, 1330 [March 20, 1952]
March 28, 1952	The Democratic Youth Center of Iran	Fuwziyyih Square	The conclusion of the International Youth Week	*Bih Su-yi Ayandih*, Farvadin 10 and 12, 1331 [March 30 and April 1, 1952]; *Bakhtar-i Imruz*, Farvardin 9, 1331 [March 27, 1952]; ʿAqili, *Ruzshumar-i Tarikh-i Iran*, 1: 333
June 24, 1952	Mossadegh's supporters	Mihrabad Airport and different parts of the city	Welcoming Mossadegh's arrival from his foreign trip	*Bakhtar-i Imruz*, Tir 4, 1331 [June 25, 1952]; *Shahbaz*, Tir 4, 1331 [June 25, 1952]
July 17, 1952	Various social groups supporting Mossadegh's premiership	Different parts of northern Tehran	Reacting to Mossadegh's resignation and fighting against the court's coup	*Ittilaʿat*, Tir 28, 1331 [July 19, 1951]; *Bakhtar-i Imruz*, Tir 26, 1331 [July 17, 1952]
July 18, 1952	Various social groups supporting Mossadegh's premiership	Different parts of northern Tehran	Reacting to Mossadegh's resignation and fighting against the court's coup	*Ittilaʿat*, Tir 28, 1331 [July 19, 1951]

When	Who	Where	Why	Source
July 19, 1952	Various social groups supporting Mossadegh's premiership	Different parts of northern Tehran	Reacting to Mossadegh's resignation and fighting against the court's coup	*Ittilaʿat*, Tir 28, 1331 [July 19, 1951]
July 20, 1952	Various social groups supporting Mossadegh's premiership	Different parts of northern Tehran/clashes in Istanbul and Saʿdi Streets and Baharistan Square	Reacting to Mossadegh's resignation and fighting against the court's coup	*Ittilaʿat*, Tir 29, 1331 [July 20, 1951]; *Bakhtar-i Imruz*, Tir 29, 1331 [July 20, 1952]; *Dizh*, Tir 30, 1331 [July 21, 1952]
July 21, 1952	Various social groups supporting Mossadegh's premiership	Baharistan Square as the epicenter of clashes	Reaction to Mossadegh's resignation and fighting against the court's coup	*Bakhtar-i Imruz*, Tir 31, 1331 [July 22, 1952] and Murdad 1, 1331 [July 23, 1952]; *Shahbaz*, Tir 30 and 31, 1331 [July 21 and 22, 1952] and Murdad 1, 1331 [July 23, 1952]; *Ittilaʿat*, Murdad 1, 1331 [July 23, 1952]; *Dizh*, Tir 31, 1331 [July 22, 1952]
July 22, 1952	Various social groups supporting Mossadegh's premiership	Tupkhanih Square	Gathering in support of Mossadegh	*Shahbaz*, Tir 31, 1331 [July 22, 1952] and Murdad 1, 1331 [July 23, 1952]; *Dizh*, Murdad 1, 1331 [July 23, 1952]

July 26–27, 1952	Various social groups	Shah Mosque and Ibn-i Babuyyih Cemetery	The funeral of the martyrs of *Siy-i Tir*	*Ittilaʿat*, Murdad 4 and 5, 1331 [July 26 and 27, 1952]; *Dizh*, Murdad 5, 1331 [July 27, 1952]
July 29, 1952	The National Front Party's supporters	Baharistan Square	Supporting the Parliament deputies	*Bakhtar-i Imruz*, Murdad 7, 1331 [July 29, 1952]
August 7, 1952	The National Front Party's supporters	Baharistan Square	Supporting the Parliament deputies	*Bakhtar-i Imruz*, Murdad 16, 1331 [August 7, 1952]
August 18, 1952	Supporters of Sumka and Pan-Iranist Parties	Istanbul Street and Mukhbir al-Duwlih Intersection	Attacking vendors and those who sold *Shahbaz* newspapers	*Zid-i Istiʿmar*, Murdad 29, 1331 [August 19, 1952]
August 19, 1952	Clashes between supporters of the Sumka, Pan-Iranist, and Tudih Parties	Istanbul, Lalihzar, Nadiri, and Firduwsi Streets	The Tudih Party's protest and clashes with the supporters of Sumka and Pan-Iranist Parties	*Bakhtar-i Imruz*, Murdad 29, 1331 [August 20, 1952]; *Zid-i Istiʿmar*, Murdad 29 and 30, 1331 [August 19 and 20, 1952]
August 20, 1952	The Tudih Party	Istanbul Street and other northern streets of the city	The continuation of yesterday's clashes	*Bakhtar-i Imruz*, Murdad 29, 1331 [August 20, 1952]; *Zid-i Istiʿmar*, Murdad 30, 1331 [August 20, 1952]

When	Who	Where	Why	Source
August 29, 1952	The Tudih Party	Fuwziyyih Square	Fortieth day of the martyrs of *Siy-i Tir*	*Sangar-i Sulh*, Shahrivar 8, 1331 [August 30, 1952]; *Rahbar-i Mardum*, Shahrivar 9, 1331 [August 31, 1952]; *Ittilaʿat*, Shahrivar 8, 1331 [August 30, 1952]
August 29, 1952	The National Front Party	Ibn-i Babuyyih Cemetery	Fortieth day of the martyrs of *Siy-i Tir*	*Bakhtar-i Imruz*, Shahrivar 8, 1331 [August 30, 1952]; *Ittilaʿat*, Shahrivar 8, 1331 [August 30, 1952]
September 14, 1952	Kashani's followers and the Toilers' Party	Mihrabad Airport, Isfand 24th Square, Pamenar and Barq Streets	Welcoming Kashani after his trip to Mecca	*Bakhtar-i Imruz*, Shahrivar 23 and 24, 1331 [September 14 and 15, 1952]
October 4, 1952	The National Front Party	Mihrabad Airport	Welcoming Fatemi after his foreign trip	*Bakhtar-i Imruz*, Mihr 13, 1331 [October 5, 1952]
October 17, 1952	Spontaneous gathering of ordinary people	Southern city (Javadiyyih, Sar-i Pul-i Rah Ahan, Sulhabad)	Breaking ties with Britain	*Salabat-I Sharq*, Mihr 27, 1331 [October 19, 1952]

October 26, 1952	The Tudih Party	Amjadiyyih Stadium and northern streets of Tehran	Disturbing the events for the Shah's birthday	*Bakhtar-i Imruz*, Aban 8, 1331 [October 28, 1952]; *Qarn-i Jadid*, Aban 5, 1331 [October 25, 1952]
November 29, 1952	Workers	Nassiriyyih, Barq, Riy, Sarchishmih Streets to Fuwziyyih Square	Against Britain and supporting Iraqis	*Ittilaʿat*, Azar 8, 1331 [November 29, 1952]; *Bih Su-yi Ayandih*, Azar 9 and 10, 1331 [November 30 and December 1, 1952]
November 29, 1952	University students	Shah Reza Street in front of the Tehran University to Pahlavi Intersection	Against Britain and supporting Iraqis	*Ittilaʿat*, Azar 8, 1331 [November 29, 1952]; *Bih Su-yi Ayandih*, Azar 9 and 10, 1331 [November 30 and December 1, 1952]
November 29, 1952	The Assembly of the Militant Muslims and bazaar guilds	Arg Mosque and Sabzih Miydān	Against Britain and supporting Iraqis	*Niru-yi Sivvum*, Azar 8 and 9, 1331 [November 29 and 30, 1952]; *Bih Su-yi Ayandih*, Azar 9 and 10, 1331 [November 30 and December 1, 1952]

When	Who	Where	Why	Source
December 6–7, 1952	The National Front Party	Mihrabad Airport and different streets of the northern city	Welcoming Makki after his foreign trip	*Niru-yi Sivvum*, Azar 16 and 17, 1331 [December 7 and 8, 1952]; *Bakhtar-i Imruz*, Azar 16 and 17, 1331 [December 7 and 8, 1952]
December 11–12, 1952	Leftwing groups	Amirabad close to the University of Tehran	Scattered protest for the anniversary of Azerbaijan and Kurdistan uprisings	*Bih Su-yi Ayandih*, Azar 23, 1331 [December 14, 1952]
January 1, 1953	Women	Baharistan Square	Protesting for women's suffrage	*Bih Su-yi Ayandih*, Diy 12, 1331 [January 2, 1953]
January 4, 1953	University students	University of Tehran	Protesting against the changes in regulations and supporting engineering students	*Niru-yi Sivvum*, Diy 15, 1331 [January 5, 1953]; *Bakhtar-i Imruz*, Diy 14, 1331 [January 4, 1953]; *Ittilaʿat*, Diy 14, 1331 [January 4, 1953]; *Bih Su-yi Ayandih*, Diy 16, 1331 [January 6, 1953]

January 5, 1953	Leftwing youth groups and Avarigan group	Baharistan Square, Ikbatan, Nadiri, Istanbul, Lalihzar, Nasser Khusruw Streets, and in front of the bazaar	Severe fights between opposing political groups	*Bakhtar-i Imruz*, Diy 15, 1331 [January 5, 1953]; *Bih Su-yi Ayandih*, Diy 17, 1331 [January 7, 1953]
January 19, 1953	The National Front Party and Mossadegh's supporters	Baharistan Square	Supporting Mossadegh's government and putting pressure on the Parliament for giving him emergency powers	*Niru-yi Sivvum*, Diy 30, 1331 [January 20, 1953]; *Bakhtar-i Imruz*, Diy 29 and 30, 1331 [January 19 and 20, 1953]; *Ittilaʿat*, Diy 29 and 30, 1331 [January 19 and 20, 1953]

When	Who	Where	Why	Source
February 1–2, 1953	Conservative newspapers accuse the Tudih Party and the leftwing newspapers claim this episode was staged against the Tudih Party	Hafiz Street	Against Mossadegh's government and supporting the extension of the fishing contracts with the Soviet Union	*Niru-yi Sivvum*, Bahmen 14, 1331 [February 3, 1953]; *Bih Su-yi Ayandih*, Bahman 14, 1331 [February 3, 1953]
February 9, 1953	Residents of Nizam al-Mulk Avenue	Ministry of Interior	Protesting against the municipality	*Niru-yi Sivvum*, Bahmen 21, 1331 [February 10, 1953]
February 20–21, 1953	Leftwing groups	Javadiyyih, Sar-i Pul-i Rahahan, and in front of the University of Tehran	International Youth Day	*Bih Su-yi Ayandih*, Isfand 4, 1331 [February 23, 1953]

February 28 and March 1, 1953	Anti-Mossadegh forces	Baharistan Square and many parts of the city	Staged protest and coup against Mossadegh's government and suppression of his supporters	*Niru-yi Sivvum*, Isfand 10, 1331 [March 1, 1953]; *Bakhtar-i Imruz*, Isfand 10, 1331 [March 1, 1953]; *Ittilaʿat*, Isfand 10, 1331 [March 1, 1953]; *Bih Su-yi Ayandih*, Isfand 10, 1331 [March 1, 1953]
March 1–2, 1953	Students and Mossadegh's supporters, the Pan-Iranist Party, and Toilers' Party	Students' march from the University of Tehran to Baharistan Square via Shah Reza, Shah, Nadiri, Istanbul Streets/ Baharistan Square as the epicenter of protests	Supporting Mossadegh's government against the coup	*Niru-yi Sivvum*, Isfand 11 and 12, 1331 [March 2 and 3, 1953]; *Bakhtar-i Imruz*, Isfand 11, 1331 [March 2, 1953]; *Ittilaʿat*, Isfand 11, 1331 [March 2, 1953]; *Shurish*, Isfand 16, 1331 [March 7, 1953]; *Bih Su-yi Ayandih*, Isfand 11 and 12, 1331 [March 2 and 3, 1953]
March 3, 1953	Leftwing groups	Northern city	The continuation of previous day's protests and clashes	*Bakhtar-i Imruz*, Isfand 12, 1331 [March 3, 1953]; *Bih Su-yi Ayandih*, Isfand 13, 1331 [March 4, 1953]

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When	Who	Where	Why	Source
March 4, 1953		Northern city	The continuation of previous day's protests and clashes	*Bakhtar-i Imruz*, Isfand 13, 1331 [March 4, 1953]; *Bih Su-yi Ayandih*, Isfand 14, 1331 [March 5, 1953]
April 8, 1953	University students	University of Tehran	Supporting Mossadegh's government	*Bakhtar-i Imruz*, Farvardin 19, 1332 [April 8, 1953]
April 9, 1953	Mossadegh's supporters	Baharistan Square	Supporting Mossadegh's government	*Bakhtar-i Imruz*, Farvardin 20, 1332 [April 9, 1953]
April 12, 1953	Mossadegh's supporters and opponents	Various parts of the northern city, Istanbul and Lalihzar Streets, and Firduwsi Intersection	Severe clashes between opposing political groups	*Ittilaʿat*, Farvardin 24, 1332 [April 13, 1953]
April 14, 1953	The Tudih Party	Saʿdi, Shahabad, Firduwsi, and Istanbul Streets, and Tupkhanih, Mukhbir al-Duwlih, and Firduwsi Squares	Riot-like protest with severe clashes with the military forces	*Bakhtar-i Imruz*, Farvardin 25, 1332 [April 14, 1953]

April 16, 1953	The National Front Party and Mossadegh's supporters, students, and workers	Main gathering in Baharistan Square, students' march from the University of Tehran via Yusifabad Intersection, Nadiri, Istanbul, and Shahabad Streets, workers' march from Railway Square, Qazvin Street, and other southern districts, and *bazārīs*' march from Bazaar district and Nasser Khusruw Street	Supporting Mossadegh's government and putting pressure on the Parliament to the proposed bill by the National Front	*Niru-yi Sivvum*, Farvardin 27 and 29, 1332 [April 16 and 18, 1953]; *Mardum-i Iran*, Farvardin 30, 1332 [April 19, 1953]; *Bakhtar-i Imruz*, Farvardin 26 and 27, 1332 [April 15 and 16, 1953]; *Ittilaʿat*, Farvardin 27, 1332 [April 16, 1953]

When	Who	Where	Why	Source
April 27, 1953		Sipahsalar Mosques and Baharistan Square	Afshar Tus's funeral	*Bakhtar-i Imruz*, Urdibihisht 7, 1332 [April 27, 1953]; *Niru-yi Sivvum*, Urdibihisht 7 and 8, 1332 [April 27 and 28, 1953]
May 18, 1953		Baharistan Square	Protest against the minority MPs	*Bakhtar-i Imruz*, Urdibihisht 28, 1332 [May 18, 1953]
June 13, 1953	Kashani's supporters and their clashes with Mossadegh's supporters	Shah Mosque	ʿIyd-i Fitr prayer and a gathering against Mossadegh's government, which resulted in clashes with pro-Mossadegh forces	*Niru-yi Sivvum*, Khurdad 24, 1332 [June 14, 1953]
June 19, 1953	Mossadegh's supporters/ various social groups	Baharistan Square	Supporting Mossadegh's government	*Niru-yi Sivvum*, Khurdad 28, 30, and 31, 1332 [June 18, 20, and 21, 1953]; *Mardum-i Iran*, Tir 1, 1332 [June 22, 1953]; *Bakhtar-i Imruz*, Khurdad 30, 1332 [June 20, 1953]; *Ittilaʿat*, Khurdad 30, 1332 [June 20, 1953]; *Mardum-i Iran*, Tir 1, 1332 [June 22, 1953]

June 19, 1953	The Tudih Party	Tupkhanih Square and Saʿdi and Shahabad Streets	The party attempted to join the protest in Baharistan Square, which was rejected by Mossadegh's supporters	*Niru-yi Sivvum*, Khurdad 30, 1332 [June 20, 1953]; *Ittilaʿat*, Khurdad 30, 1332 [June 20, 1953]
July 21, 1953 (morning)	Mossadegh's supporters and the National Front Party	Gathering in Baharistan Square/ marching from Shahabad and Saʿdi Streets to Tupkhanih Squares/the second gathering in Tupkhanih Square	Anniversary of *Siy-i Tir* uprising	*Niru-yi Sivvum*, Tir 31, 1332 [July 22, 1953]; *Mardum-i Iran*, Murdad 1, 1332 [July 22, 1953]; *Bakhtar-i Imruz*, Tir 31, 1332 [July 22, 1953]; *Ittilaʿat*, Tir 31, 1332 [July 22, 1953]

When	Who	Where	Why	Source
Jul 21, 1953 (afternoon)	The Tudih Party	Gathering in Baharistan Square/marching from Shahabad and Saʿdi Streets to Tupkhanih Square and concluding on Firduwsi Street	Anniversary of *Siy-i Tir* uprising	*Niru-yi Sivvum*, Tir 31, 1332 [July 22, 1953]; *Ittilaʿat*, Tir 31, 1332 [July 22, 1953]
August 3, 1953	The Toilers' Party and Mossadegh's supporters	Long march starting from Tupkhanih Square and continuing on Bab al-Humayun Street, Sabzih Miydān, Jalil Abad Street, National Garden, Firduwsi, Lalihzar, Istanbul, and Shah Reza Streets	Spontaneous gathering and march alongside the national referendum on the day	*Niru-yi Sivvum*, Murdad 13, 1332 [August 4, 1953]

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August 15–16, 1953	Various social groups and Mossadegh's supporters	Baharistan Square as the epicenter of protest/ Different parts of the northern city	Reaction to the unsuccessful military coup against Mossadegh's government	*Niru-yi Sivvum*, Murdad 25 and 26, 1332 [August 16 and 17, 1953]; *Mardum-i Iran*, Murdad 26, 1332 [August 17, 1953]; *Bakhtar-i Imruz*, Murdad 25 and 26, 1332 [August 16 and 17, 1953]; *Ittilaʿat*, Murdad 25 and 26, 1332 [August 16 and 17, 1953]
August 17–18, 1953	Various social groups, Mossadegh's supporters, and the Tudih Party	Different parts of the northern city, particularly Baharistan Square and Firduwsi, Istanbul, and Shahabad Streets	Reaction to the unsuccessful military coup against Mossadegh's government	*Niru-yi Sivvum*, Murdad 27 and 28, 1332 [August 18 and 19, 1953]; *Bakhtar-i Imruz*, Murdad 26 and 27, 1332 [August 17 and 18, 1953]; *Ittilaʿat*, Murdad 26 and 27, 1332 [August 17 and 18, 1953]

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